Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 20.11.2025 vs Shiv Darshan on 9 December, 2025
2025:HHC:42397
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 200 of 2014
Reserved on: 20.11.2025
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Date of Decision: 09.12.2025
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Shiv Darshan ...Respondent
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Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Appellant/State : Mr Jitender Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
For the Respondent : Mr Virender Singh Rathour,
Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 06.02.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned .
Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Raj Kumari (PW1) and Rekha Devi (PW4) were walking on the roadside of Khajjian road on of 24.01.2005. A Maruti bearing registration No. HP-02D-0351 came from Dharamshala at a high speed and hit Rekha Devi rt (PW4). The incident was witnessed by Shankar (PW6) and Ashwani Kumar (PW5). The accused was driving the vehicle, and the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the vehicle. The injured person was taken in the same vehicle to the hospital. The intimation was given to the police. An entry No. 8 was recorded in the Police Station. HC Harjeet Singh (PW11) was sent for the verification of the entry.
He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW11/A) was registered. He filed an application for the medical examination of the victim. Dr Sushma Sharma (PW3) examined the victim, Rekha Devi (PW4) and found that she had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. She advised an X-
::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 32025:HHC:42397 ray, which revealed a fracture in the tibia, hence, the injury was stated to be grievous. HC Harjeet Singh (PW11) visited the spot .
and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW11/B). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-02D-0351 along with documents vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). Rajinder Soga (PW9) took the photographs (Ext.PW9/A and Ext.PW9/B) whose negatives are of Ext.PW9/C and Ext. PW9/D. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the rt investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Raj Kumari (PW1) is the informant, but she did not support the prosecution's case. Onkar Singh (PW2) and Constable Joginder Singh (PW8) witnessed the recoveries. Dr Sushma Sharma (PW3) conducted the medical examination of the victim.
::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 42025:HHC:42397 Rekha Devi (PW4) is the victim. Ashwani Kumar (PW5) and Shankar (PW6) are the eyewitnesses. Raman Sharma (PW7) went .
through X-ray and found a fracture of the Tibia. Rajinder Soga (PW9) took the photographs. Rajiv Prashar (PW10) is the owner of the vehicle who proved that he had employed the accused as a driver. HC Harjeet Singh (PW11) investigated the matter.
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5. The accused filed a written statement asserting that rt the complainant filed a false complaint against him. He was not driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP02D-0351 in a rash or negligent manner, and the vehicle had not caused any accident. Rekha Devi (PW4) ran across the road towards the school and dashed with the car. The accident occurred due to the negligence of Rekha Devi (PW4), who ran without looking for the oncoming traffic. He brought Rekha Devi (PW4) to the hospital in the vehicle being driven by him. The accused did not lead any defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that all the witnesses except Rekha Devi (PW4) turned hostile and did not support the prosecution's case. The defence version that Rekha Devi (PW4) ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:42397 ran across the road leading to the accident was highly probable.
Therefore, the accused was acquitted.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The identity of the accused was not disputed. Rekha of Devi (PW4) and Ashwani Kumar (PW5) supported the rt prosecution's case. Learned Trial Court did not assign any reason for discarding their testimonies. Shankar (PW6) specifically stated that the vehicle was at a high speed. The accused was bound to take precautions near the school, and driving the vehicle at a high speed near the school showed his negligence.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Virender Singh Rathour, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:42397 statements of the victim and Shankar (PW6) that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the car being driven by the .
accused. The accused should have taken precautions while driving the vehicle near the school. He should have slowed down the vehicle and anticipated the children's presence. The accused failed to do so. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be of allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. rt
10. Mr Virender Singh Rathour, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the driver cannot be held negligent when someone runs across the road. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the negligence of the accused was not established. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:42397 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal if the .
judgment is patently perverse or is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:
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11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of rt this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal.
It was observed thus:
"38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) '42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:42397 with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, .
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and rt sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 92025:HHC:42397 (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding .
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.'"
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) of
8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal rt against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 10
2025:HHC:42397 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and .
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a of misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is rt possible from the evidence available on record."
13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed:
"12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114."::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 11
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14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
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15. The informant, Raj Kumari (PW1), did not support the prosecution's case. She stated that a Maruti came from Dhramshala and hit Rekha Devi (PW4). She did not notice the speed of the vehicle. The accident occurred due to the negligence of of the accused and Rekha Devi (PW4). She was permitted to be rt cross-examined. She admitted that the car came at a high speed from Dharamshala and hit Rekha Devi (PW4), who was walking on the roadside. She admitted that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the car and the negligence of the accused. She admitted her previous statement recorded by the police. She stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that Rekha Devi (PW4) ran across the road, which led to the accident. She also admitted that the driver was driving the vehicle carefully at a normal speed, and he was not negligent.
16. The statement of the informant is highly contradictory. She had initially denied the negligence of the accused, but admitted that the accused was negligent after she was declared hostile. She again stated in her cross-examination ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:42397 by learned counsel for defence that there was no negligence on the part of the accused, and Rekha Devi (PW4) ran across the .
road leading to the accident. Thus, no advantage can be derived from her testimony by the prosecution.
17. Ashwani Kumar (PW5) stated that a car bearing registration No. HP-02D-0351 hit Rekha Devi (PW4), who was of walking on her side of the road. The accident occurred due to the rt high speed of the car. The injured person was taken by car to the hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that he reached the spot after the accident. Shankar (PW6), etc., had reached before his arrival. He denied that Rekha Devi (PW4) ran across the road, which led to the accident.
18. The statement of this witness in his cross-
examination that he reached the spot after the accident had occurred shows that he is not an eyewitness, and his testimony does not establish the negligence of the accused.
19. Shankar (PW6) stated that one girl had crossed the road, and the other ran across it. The accused got confused because the vehicle was being driven at a high speed. The vehicle hit the left leg of the girl. The driver stopped. The accident ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:42397 occurred because of the negligence of the victim and the driver.
He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted that the .
place of the incident had a wide road. He admitted that the accident would not have taken place but for the high speed of the vehicle. He stated in his cross-examination that the accident occurred on a national highway. The children were walking on of both sides of the road. Rekha Devi (PW4) suddenly tried to cross the road, which led to the accident. The vehicle was being driven rt toward its left side. The accident would not have occurred but for running across the road by Rekha Devi (PW4).
20. The testimony of this witness also does not establish the prosecution's case. He specifically stated that Rekha (PW4) ran across the road, which led to the accident.
21. Rekha Devi (PW4) stated that she was going to school when she met with an accident. The tyre of the vehicle crushed her left foot. Raj Kumari (PW1) was walking with her. She was taken to the hospital in the same vehicle that had hit her. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. She admitted in her cross-examination that her school was towards the left side of the road and that she was walking towards the ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:42397 other side of the road. She denied that she had run across the road, which led to the accident.
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22. The statement of the victim that she was walking on the other side of the road and her school is towards the left side of the road makes the defence version probable because the accident had occurred on the left side of the road where the of school is located. The victim's statement that she was on the rt other side of the road makes it probable that she had tried to cross the road when the accident occurred.
23. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accident occurred because Rekha Devi (PW4) suddenly crossed the road. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 758, that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident, and he cannot be held liable for negligence.
It was observed at page 759: -
"4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case, Dayanand PW 1, that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus, there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:42397 a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the .
bus driver was negligent."
24. This Court has also taken a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598: 1991 Cri LJ 771: (1990) 2 TAC 261 wherein it was observed of at page 600: -
"14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, rt but it has not been said what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving at a high speed is neither proper nor legal evidence of high speed, nor in any way indicate rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking at the two points, viz., the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near the place of the curve, which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:42397 Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather, the depositions of these witnesses indicate that .
they were coming from some village lane that joined the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca of portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why, in their deposition, they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got rt frightened by the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road, which could not be seen by him, and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident actually took place has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of driver's act. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished." (Emphasis supplied)
25. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh, Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under:
::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 172025:HHC:42397 "7...The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the .
deceased stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1), who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted that this version is that the respondent had blown the horn, and Daya Ram, on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly of crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle and its Driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased, knowing fully rt well at least the approaching vehicle stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road, but when the motorcycle reached near him, he darted before it, and the accident took place. Thus, in my opinion, the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him..." (Emphasis supplied)
26. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court that the accused was not negligent cannot be faulted.
27. It was submitted that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed, which led to the accident. This submission will not help the prosecution. The witnesses made a generalised statement that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed, and no witness has given the approximate speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:42397 of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term 'high speed' by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the .
witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed:
"Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant rt was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death."
28. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held:
"Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed".
"High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:42397 accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, .
subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur."
29. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 of Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: -
rt "It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs."
30. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -
"Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case."
31. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable merely because the witnesses have stated that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed.
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32. It was submitted that the witnesses deposed about the negligence, and this was sufficient to prove the case of the .
prosecution. This submission will not help the prosecution.
Negligence is an inference from the facts. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The of inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in rt Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed:
"It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not."
33. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), wherein it was held:
"It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court."::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS 21
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34. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the statements of the witnesses that the negligence of the accused .
led to the accident.
35. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court of even if another view is possible. Hence, the present appeal fails and is dismissed.
rt
36. Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 9th December, 2025 (Nikita) ::: Downloaded on - 09/12/2025 20:38:28 :::CIS