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[Cites 34, Cited by 0]

Gujarat High Court

Sunland Metal Recycling Industries & vs Union Of India Through Secretary & 3 on 6 February, 2014

Author: Akil Kureshi

Bench: Akil Kureshi

          C/SCA/2678/2013                                   JUDGMENT




            IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2678 of 2013



FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:



HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI


and
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI

================================================================

1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
      the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
      judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
      to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
      order made thereunder ?

5     Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?

================================================================
       SUNLAND METAL RECYCLING INDUSTRIES & 1....Petitioner(s)
                             Versus
       UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY & 3....Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR KAMAL TRIVEDI, SENIOR ADVOCATE, AND MR UDAY JOSHI FOR M/S
TRIVEDI & GUPTA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 - 2
MR GAURANG H BHATT, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1 - 4
================================================================

          CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI
                 and


                                  Page 1 of 27
      C/SCA/2678/2013                                        JUDGMENT



                  HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI

                           Date : 06/02/2014


                           ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI)

 1. In   this   writ   petition,   the   petitioners   have   challenged   the  show   cause   notice   dated   12.8.2008   calling   upon   the  petitioners   why   CENVAT   credit   amounting   to   Rs.4.82  crores (rounded off) wrongly availed by them should not be  recovered with interest and why penalty under rule 13 of  the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 and under rule 25 of the  Central   Excise   Rules,   2002   and   section   11AC   of   the  Central   Excise   Act,   1944   should   not   be   imposed.   The  petitioners have also challenged the validity of rule 13(2) of  the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 (here­in­after referred to as  "Rules   of   2002")   and   rule   15(2)   of   the   CENVAT   Credit  Rules, 2004 (here­in­after referred to as "Rules of 2004") as  ultra vires the Central Excise Act, 1944.

 2. Brief factual background is as follows :

 3. Petitioner   no.1   is   a   partnership   firm   and   was   at   the  relevant   time   engaged   in   manufacturing   of   zinc,   alloy  ingots,   copper   wire   bars,   etc.,   In   the   course   of   its  manufacturing activity, the petitioners cleared goods from  Page 2 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT time to time and also availed CENVAT credit on the inputs  used   in   such   manufacturing   activity.   The   Excise  department   however,   received   intelligence   that   the  petitioners   were   using   non   duty   paid   scrap   for  manufacturing the final product. In order to avail CENVAT  credit,   they   were   obtaining   duty   paid   invoices/bills   of  different   inputs   and   were   thus   wrongly   availing   CENVAT  credit  on  the  strength  of  such  documents   without  actual  receipt   of   the   inputs   against   such   documents.   A   search  operation   was   carried   out   at   the   premises   of   the  manufacturing   unit.   As   per   the   department   during   such  search, it was found that there was large scale infraction of  rules   and   availment   of   CENVAT   credit   by   creating   false  documents   and   entries.   We   are   not   concerned   with   the  validity   of   such   allegations.   Suffice   it   to   record,   on   the  basis   of   such   allegations   in   the   impugned   show   cause  notice,   the   petitioners   were   called   upon   to   show   cause  why :

"(i) The   CENVAT   credit   amounting   to   Rs.4,82,37,939/­ (Rupees   Four   Crores   Eighty   Two   Lakhs   Thirty   Seven  Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Nine Only) (Rs.4,76,32,463  as BET + Rs.6,05,476 as Education Cess) wrongly availed  by   them   on   re­melted   copper   ingots,   copper   wire   Bars,  Brass   ingots,   copper   profiles,   as   detailed   in   Annexure­A  attached   to   this   Show   Cause   Notice,   should   not   be  recovered from them under Rule 12 of the CENVAT Credit  Rules,  2002 or Rule 14 of the Credit Rules,  2004, as the  case may be, read with Section 11A of the Central Excise  Page 3 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT Act,   1944   by   invoking   extended   period   as   per   proviso   to  Sub­section(1) of Section 11A;
(ii) Appropriate   interest   under   Rule   12   of   the   CENVAT  Credit Rules, 2002 or Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules,  2004, as the case may be, read with Section 11AB of the  Central   Excise   Act,   1944,   should   not   be   charged   and  recovered from them;
(iii) Penalty under Rule 13 of the CENVAT Credit Rules,  2002 or Rule 15 of the  CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, as the  case may be, read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise  Act, 1944, should not be imposed upon them;
(iv) Penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002  and Section 11AC of   the Central Excise Ac, 1944 should  not be imposed upon them."

 4. While the adjudication  of the said show cause notice was  going   on,   the   petitioners   filed   the   present   petition   and  challenged   the   show   cause   notice   through   the   route   of  challenging the validity of rule 13(2) of Rules of 2002 and  rule   15(2)   of   Rules   of   2004.   Pending   the   petition,   the  adjudication   was   allowed   to   proceed.   Final   order   of  adjudication  was passed  which  was challenged  by way of  an   amendment,   We   are   however,   informed   that   the   said  order   was   also   independently   challenged   before   the  Customs,   Excise   &   Service   Tax   Appellate   Tribunal   ("the  tribunal"   for   short)   and   the   tribunal   by   its   order   dated  28.11.2013   has   remanded   the   proceedings   back   to   the  adjudicating   authority.     Learned   counsel   for   the  petitioners,   therefore,   stated   that   the   challenge   to   the  Page 4 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT order­in­original passed by the adjudicating authority does  not survive.

 5. Counsel   for   the   petitioners   confined   the   challenge   to   the  show cause notice only on the basis of validity of rule 13(2)  of   Rules   of   2002   and   rule   15(2)   of   Rules   of   2004   and  clarified that other aspects of the show cause notice  would  be raised in appropriate proceedings,  if need so arises.  In  view   of   such   facts,   we   have   confined   our   focus   to   the  validity   of   rule   13(2)   of   Rules   of   2002   and   rule   15(2)   of  Rules of 2004. 

 6. Learned     senior   counsel   Shri   Kamal   Trivedi   for   the  petitioners   drawing   our   attention   to   the   provisions  contained   in   the   Central   Excise   Act,   1944   and   in  particular,   section   37   thereof,   contended   that   the   said  rules   are   ultra   vires   the   parent   Act.   He   submitted   that  section  37 does  not authorise  the delegated  legislation  to  frame   any   rules   for   recovering   penalty.   In   absence   of  specific   powers   for   framing   rules   for   levying   penalty,   the  delegated   legislation   acceded   its   limits   of   delegation   in  framing   such   rules.   Counsel   would   contend   that   the  penalty is also in the nature of compulsory exaction of tax  of­course   of     penal   nature.   In   view   of   Article   265   of   the  Constitution,   there   could   be   no   levy   of   tax   without   the  authority of law. It was contended that with introduction of  Page 5 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT CENVAT regime whenever found necessary, the legislation  did make changes in section 37 itself.

 6.1. In support  of his contentions,  counsel  relied  on the  following decisions :

M/s. Khemka & Co.(Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of  Maharashtra  reported   in   (1975)   2   Supreme   Court  Cases 22,  in which it was held that the Central Sales  Tax Act did not contain any provision for imposition  of   penalty   for   delay   or   default   in   payment   of   tax  under  the  State    Sales  Tax  Act.  It was  further  held  that the provision for penalty for default in payment  of tax in the State Act cannot be made applicable as  incidental to and part of the process of payment and  collection   of   tax   under   the  Central   Act.  It  was  held  that under the Central Act, it is only the tax as well  as  the  penalty  payable  by  a  dealer   under   the   State  Act which can be assessed, re­assessed, collected and  enforced   in   regard   to   payment.     The   penalty   under  the   State   Act   cannot   be   assessed,   collected   and  enforced. The provisions of the State Act would apply  only for the purpose of assessment,  re­assessement,  collection   and   enforcement   of   tax.   It   was   observed  that :
Page 6 of 27
C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT "25.  Penalty is not merely sanction. It is not merely  adjunct to assessment. It is not merely consequential  to assessment. It is not merely machinery. Penalty is  in   addition   to   tax   and   is   a   liability   under   the   Act. 

Reference  may  be made  to  section  28  of  the  Indian  Income­tax   Act,   1922   where   penalty   is   provided   for  concealment of income. Penalty is in addition to the  amount of income­tax. This Court in Jain Brothers &  Ors. v. Union of India 77 I.T.R. 107 said that penalty  is not a continuation of assessment proceedings and  that   penalty   partakes   of   the   character   of   additional  tax."

Ahmedabad   Urban   Development   Authority   v.  Sharadkumar   Jayantikumar   Pasawalla   and   others  reported   in   (1992)   3   Supreme   Court   Cases   285,   in  which   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   Regulation  levying development fees was ultra vires the Gujarat  Town   Planning   and   Urban   Development   Act.   It   was  held that in absence  of any specific provision  under  the   Act,   the   delegated   authority   has   no   power   to  make such Regulations on the basis of any implied,  incidental   or   ancillary   authority   derived   from   the  words 'or otherwise'. It was emphasised that a fiscal  provision   of   levying   fees   must   be   based   on   specific  statutory   provisions   and   not   on   any   implied,  incidental or ancillary authority.

Collector   of Central  Excise,  Ahmedabad v.  Orient  Page 7 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT Fabrics (P)  Ltd. reported in (2004) 1 Supreme  Court  Cases, in which the Supreme Court observed that an  expropriatory legislation or a penal statute has to be  strictly   construed.   It   was   further   held   that   the  authority   of   law   to   levy   or   collect   tax   has   to   be  specific   and   explicit   and   should   be   expressly  provided. 

Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H.P.  and   others  reported   in     (2000)   3   Supreme   Court  Cases 40, in which the Apex Court observed that the  delegated   power   to   legislate   by   making   Rules  circumscribed   by   the   statute   as   being   "for   carrying  out the purposes of this Act" is a general delegation  without   guidelines   and   cannot   be   used   to   bring  within its net a subject excluded by the Act itself or to  bring into existence substantive rights or obligations  or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions  of  the Act. 

Union of India and others v. S.Srinivasan  reported  in   (2012)   7   Supreme   Court   Cases   683,   in   which   it  was held that the provisions of appellate tribunal for  Foreign   Exchange   (Recruitment,   Salary   and  Allowances   and   Other   Conditions   of   Service   of  Page 8 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2000 which bring  in the concept of part time member is ultra vires the  Foreign   Exchange   Management   Act,   1999,   since  existence   of   a   part   time   member   is   conceptually  absent under the said Act. It was held that if a rule  goes   beyond   rule­making   power   conferred   by   the  parent  statute  or supplants  any provision  for which  power is not conferred, it becomes ultra vires.  Heavy   reliance   was   placed   on   decision   of   Division  Bench of this Court in case of Krishna Processors v.  Union of India reported in 2012(250) ELT 186(Guj.),  in which the  Court quashed rule 96ZQ of the Central  Excise   Rules,   1944.   The   said   Rules   provided   for  procedure to be followed by an independent processor  of   textile   fabrics   and   covered   the   situation   where  excise   duty   was   being   levied   from   the   textile  processor on the basis of annual production capacity  instead   of   actual   production.   Sub­rule(5)   of   Rule  96ZQ   provided   for   penalty   equal  to   the   amount   of  duty  outstanding   from  an  independent  processor,  if  he failed to pay the duty or any part thereof  by the  date specified in sub­rule(3). This rule thus provided  for   a   penalty   equal   to   the   entire   amount   of  outstanding   duty   without   any   discretion   to   the  Page 9 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT authority and without reference to the extent of delay  in   depositing   the   duty.   The   Court   therefore,   was   of  the   opinion   that   the   penal   provision   was   extremely  harsh since in every case of delay even if it was of one  day   delay,  the  authority  was  duty  bound  to impose  penalty   equal   to   the   full   amount   of   duty   unpaid  without   any   power   of     reduction   or   waiver.   It   was  therefore,  the Court opined that such harsh penalty  was  not  envisaged  even  in the  parent  Act  and  thus  the delegated legislation travelled beyond the scope of  its   delegation,   the   rule   otherwise   also   was  unreasonable and therefore, violative of Article 14 of  the  Constitution.

Gaffar   Kassam   v   Commissioner   of   Sales   Tax,  Orissa, Cuttack and another  reported  in 1974  (33)  Sales Tax Cases 98 in which the Orissa High Court  observed   that   unless   a   statute   expressly   or   by  necessary implication authorises the Rules to create  a   penal   liability,   the   rule   making   authority   has   no  jurisdiction  to create  such  a liability.  It upheld  that  there  was no specific  provision  in the Central  Sales  Tax   Act   which   authorises   the   making   of   a   rule   for  levying of penalty for non payment of tax demand and  rule   16(2)   of   the   Central   Sales   Tax   (Orissa)   Rules,  Page 10 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT 1957 was struck down. 

Aryan Ispat and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India  reported   in   2012(281)   ELT   15   (Ori),   where   the  Division Bench of Orissa High Court struck down the  validity of rule 12AA of Rules of 2004 and rule 12CC  of   Rules   of   2002,   on   the   ground   that   the   Central  Government had no power to make such rules. 

 7. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   Shri   Bhatt   for   the  department   opposed   the   petition   and   contended   that   the  said Rules of 2002 and Rules of 2004 have been framed in  exercise  of   power  under  section   37  of   the   Central  Excise  Act and is within the scheme of the Act and the rules made  thereunder. He relied on the following decisions :

Om Prakash and others v. Union of India  reported  in   AIR   1971   Supreme   Court   771,   in   which   it   was  observed  that   it  is  a  well   established   proposition   of  law that where a specific power is conferred without  prejudice     to   the   generality   of   the   general   powers  already   specified,   the   particular   power   is   only  illustrative   and   does   not   in   any   way   restrict   the  general power.
Page 11 of 27
C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT The Assistant  Collector of Central Excise v. M/s. 
Ramakrishnan   Kulwant   Rai  reported   in   AIR   1989  Supreme   Court   1829,   in   which   the   Supreme   Court  reversed   the   decision   of   High   Court   which   had  declared rule 10A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944  as invalid. It was held that the said rule was not ultra  vires the rule making power under section 37 of the  Central Excise Act, 1944.
B.Prabhakara   Rao   v.   Desari   Panakala   Rao   and  others  reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1803, in  which   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   rule   15   of   the  A.P.   State  Transport   Appellate   Tribunal   Rules(1971)  was   not   ultra   vires   the   provisions   of   the   Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939. It was observed that the said rule  does   not   entitle   the   parties   to   the   appeal   or  application   to   produce   additional   evidence   but  clothes the tribunal with discretionary power to allow  such evidence. 
Our attention was drawn to the decision  of Division  Bench of this Court in case of  Dhariyal Chemicals v. 
Union of India reported in 2009(234) ELT 208(Guj.),  in which the  Court upheld the validity of Rule 12CC  of the  Central  Excise  Rules,  1944.  We  are  however,  Page 12 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT not concerned with the validity of the said rule in the  present petition.

 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we may  advert   to   the   provisions   contained   in   the   Central   Excise  Act, 1944 and the relevant provisions of the said  two set of  rules.

 

 9. Central   Excise   Act,   1944,   provides   for   charging   and  collection of central excise and related matters.  ➢ Chapter­II of the Central Excise Act,1944  pertains to levy  and collection of duty. Section 3 contained therein pertains  to   duties   specified   in   the   First   Schedule   and   the   Second  Schedule   of   the   Central   Excise   Tariff   Act,   1985,   to   be  levied. Sub­section(1) of section 3 provides that there shall  be levied and collected in such manner as may   prescribe  various duties specified therein. Clause(a) of sub­section(1)  pertained to a duty of excise. With the advent of the central  value added tax regime in the year 2000, the term 'a duty  of   excise'   was   substituted   by   the   expression   "a   duty   of  excise to be called  Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT)" in  the said clause. 

Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, pertains to valuation of  excisable goods for the purposes of charging excise duty.  Page 13 of 27

C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT ➢ Section 11  of the  Central Excise Act, pertains to recovery  of sums due to Government and provides for a machinery  and   the  manner   in  which  such  recovery   can   be   effected.  Section   11A   of   the   Act   provides   for   the   procedure   of  recovery of duties not levied or not paid or short­levied or  short­paid   or   erroneously   refunded.     Section   11AA   and  11AB   pertain   to   interest   on   delayed   payment   of   duty.  Section 11AC provides for penalty for short­levy or non­levy  of duty in certain cases. Sub­section(1) thereof provides for  penalty for non­levy or short­levy or non­payment or short  payment   or   erroneous   refund   of   the   duty,   particularly  where as per clause(a) the same was by reason of fraud, or  collusion   or   any   wilful   mis­statement   or   suppression   of  facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or  Rules made therein with intent to evade payment  of duty  and   provides   that   the   person   who   is   liable   to   pay   duty,  shall also be liable to pay a penalty  equal to the duty so  determined. 

Section 11B of the  Central Excise Act, governs a claim for  refund   of   duty   and   interest.   Section   11BB   pertains   to  interest on delayed refunds. 

➢ Chapter   VI   pertains   to   adjudication   of   confiscations   and  penalties. Chapter VIA of the Central Excise Act pertains to  Page 14 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT appeals and provides for a complete mechanism  for filing  appeals before the Appellate Commissioner, Tribunal, High  Court and Supreme Court.

Section  37  is contained  in Chapter  VII  which  pertains  to  supplemental provisions. It gives rule making power to the  Central Government. Sub­section(1) thereof   provides that  the   Central   Government   may   make   rules   to   carry   into  effect the purposes of the Act. Sub­section(2) provides that  in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the  foregoing   power,   such   rules   may   provide   for   variety   of  situations enlisted in clauses(i) to (xxviii) of the said Rules. Sub­section(4) of section 37 reads as under :

"(4)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­ section   (3),   and   without   prejudice   to   the  provisions of section 9, in making rules under this  section, the Central Government may provide that  if   any   manufacturer,   producer   or   licensee   of   a  warehouse --
a) removes any excisable goods in contravention of  the provisions of any such rule, or
b)   does   not   account   for   all   such   goods  manufactured, produced or stored by him, or
c)   engages   in   the   manufacture,   production   or  storage   of   such   goods   without   having   applied  for the registration required under section 6, or 
d) contravenes the provisions of any such rule  with intent to evade payment of duty, Page 15 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT then,   all   such   goods   shall   be   liable   to  confiscation and the manufacturer, producer or  licensee   shall   be   liable   to   a   penalty   not  exceeding   the   duty   leviable   on   such   goods   or  two thousand rupees, whichever is greater;"

 10. As   is   well   known,   the   Excise   was   replaced   by  CENVAT. To usher in this new regime Rules of 2002 were  framed.   These   rules   were   substituted   by   CENVAT   Credit  Rules,   2004.   Though   there   are   certain   internal   changes  between   the   two   sets   of   rules,   the   scheme   of   both   rules  being   similar,   for   the   purpose   of   our   inquiry,   we   may  advert to the Rules of 2004.

➢ Rule   3   thereof   pertains   to   CENVAT   credit.   Sub­rule(1)  provides that a manufacturer or producer of final products  or   a   provider   of   output   service   shall   be   allowed   to   take  CENVAT credit of various duties specified in clause(i) to (xi)  paid  on  any  input  or  capital  goods  or  any  input  services  received as manufacturer of final product. ➢ Rule   4     of   the   Rules   of   2004   provides   for   conditions   for  allowing   CENVAT.   Sub­rule(1)   provides   that   in   CENVAT  credit in respect of any input may be taken immediately on  receipt of the inputs in the factory of the manufacturer or  in   the   premises   of   the   provider   of   output   service.   Sub­ rule(2) pertain to Cenvat credit in respect of capital goods  Page 16 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT received in a factory or in the premises of the provider of  output   service   and   broadly   speaking   provides   for   50%   of  the   credit   to   be   taken   in   the   same   year.   The   rest   being  available the next year. 

➢ Rule  5   pertains   to   refund  of  CENVAT   credit   in  case   of   a  manufacturer who clears a final product or an intermediate  product for export. 

➢ Rule 14 pertains to recovery of CENVAT wrongly taken or  erroneously   refunded.   Rule   14   provides   that   where   the  CENVAT credit has been taken and utilised wrongly or has  been   erroneously   refunded,   the   same   along   with   interest  shall be recovered from the manufacturer or provider of the  output   service   and   the   provisions   of   sections   11A   and  11AA   of   the   Excise   Act   or   sections   73   and   75   of   the  Finance   Act,   shall   apply   mutatis   mutandis   for   effecting  such recoveries. 

➢ Rule 15  of the  Rules of 2004 pertains to confiscation and  penalty and reads as under :

"15 Confiscation and penalty :
If any person, takes or utilises  CENVAT credit in respect of  input   or   capital   goods   or   input   services,   wrongly   or   in  contravention of any of the provisions of these rules, then,  Page 17 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT all   such   goods   shall   be   liable   to   confiscation   and   such  person, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the duty  or service tax on such goods or services, as the case may  be, or two thousand rupees whichever is greater.
(2) In a case, where the CENVAT credit in respect of input  or   capital   goods   or   input   services   has   been   taken   or  utilized wrongly by reason of fraud, collusion or any willful  mis­statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of  any of the provisions of the Excise Act or the rules made  thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty, then, the  manufacturer shall also be liable to pay penalty in terms of  the   provisions   of   section   11AC   of   the   Excise   Act.
(3) In  a case, where the CENVAT credit in respect of input  or   capital   goods   or   input   services   has   been   taken   or  utilised wrongly by reason of fraud, collusion or any willful  mis­statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of  any of the provisions of these rules or of the Finance Act or  of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment  of   service   tax,   then,   the   provider   of   output   service   shall  also be liable to pay penalty in terms of the provisions of  section 78 of the Finance Act.
(4) Any order under sub­rule (1), sub­rule (2), sub­rule (3)  shall be issued by the Central Excise Officer following the  principles of natural justice."

 11. The Central question is in framing rule 13(2) of Rules  of   2002   and   rule   15(2)   of   Rules   of   2004,   rule   making  authority   acceded   its   delegation   under   section   37   of   the  Central Excise Act.

 12. There is always a presumption of constitutionality of  Page 18 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT statutory   provision.   (See  State   of  Jammu   & Kashmir   v.  Triolki   Nath   Khosa   and   others  reported   in   AIR   1974  Supreme  Court  1). Such  presumption  is available  also  in  cases   of   delegated   legislation.   (See  St.   Johns   Teachers  Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council  for Teacher Education and another  reported  in (2003) 3  Supreme Court Cases 321. We are conscious that a piece  of   delegated   legislation   does   not   enjoy   the   same   level   of  immunity   as   the   Act   of   State   or   Central   legislature.  However, there are well laid down parameters within which  a delegated legislation can be questioned.  We may in this  context refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in  case  of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and  others v. Union of India and others  reported in (1985) 1  Supreme   Court   Cases   641,   in   which   it   was   observed   as  under : 

"75.  A piece  of subordinate  legislation  does  not  carry the  same   degree   of   immunity   which   is   enjoyed   by   a   statute  passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation  may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary  legislation   is   questioned.   In   addition   it   may   also   be  questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the  statute   under   which   it   is   made.   It   may   further   be  questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other  statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield  to   plenary   legislation.   It   may   also   be   questioned   on   the  ground   that   it   is   unreasonable,   unreasonable   not   in   the  sense of not being reasonable,  but in the sense  that it is  Page 19 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT manifestly   arbitrary.   In   England,   the   Judges   would   say  "Parliament never intended authority to make such rules.  They   are   unreasonable   and   ultra   vires".   The   present  position   of   law   bearing   on   the   above   point   is   stated   by  Diplock.   L.J.   In   Mixnam's   Properties   Ltd.   v.   Chertsey  Urban District Council thus :
The   various   special   grounds   on   which   subordinate  legislation   has   sometimes   been   said   to   be   void...can,   I  think,   today   be   properly   regarded   as   being   particular  applications   of   the   general   rule   that   subordinate  legislation,   to   be   valid,   must   be   shown   to   be   within   the  powers   conferred   by   the   statute.   Thus,   the   kind   of  unreasonableness   which   invalidates   a   bye­law   is   not   the  antonym of "unreasonableness" in the sense in which that  expression is used in the common law, but such manifest  arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a court would say:  "Parliament never intended to give authority to make such  rules;   they   are   unreasonable   and   ultra   virese",   ...   if   the  courts can declare subordinate legislation to be invalid for  "uncertainty"  as distinct  from unenforceable  ... this must  be   because   Parliament   is   to   be   presumed   not   to   have  intended to authorise the subordinate legislative authority  to make changes in the existing law which are uncertain."

77. In India arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it  will   come   within   the   embargo   of   Article   14   of   the  Constitution.   In   India   any   enquiry   into   the   vires   of  delegated  legislation  must  be  confined  to  the  grounds  on  which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the ground  that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or that it is  so arbitrary  that it could not be said  to be in conformity  with   the   statute   or   that   it   offends   Article   14   of   the  constitution"

 13. In the context of framing of a rule providing penalty,  from the judgements cited before us following propositions  Page 20 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT can be noticed :
a) In   absence   of   any   specific   provision   in   the   Act,   a  delegated   authority   would   have   no   power   to   make  regulation   levying   any   fee   or   charge   on   the   basis   of   any  implied,   incidental   or   ancillary   authority.  Ahmedabad  Urban   Development   Authority   v.   Sharadkumar  Jayantikumar Pasawalla and others(supra). 
b) Expropriatory   or   penal   statute   has   to   be   strictly  construed   and   power   of   imposing   penalty   or   confiscation  has   to   be   specific,   explicit   and   expressly   provided. 

Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Orient Fabrics  (P)  Ltd.(supra). 

c) While   delegating   essential   legislative   function   of  choosing   the   legislative   policy,   only   ancillary   or  subordinate   function   may   be   delegated.  Kunj  Behari   Lal  Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others(supra)

 14. It can  be  seen  from the Central  Excise  Act and  the  Rules  of 2002 and  Rules  of 2004 that till the  year 2000,  the   central   excise   duty   was   being   charged   from   the  manufacturer as per the Central Excise Act as provided in  section   3   thereof.   Sometime   in   the   year   2000,     CENVAT  Page 21 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT regime   was   ushered   in   which   in   essence   permits   the  manufacturer   of   a  final  product  to  take   the  credit   of  the  CENVAT paid on the inputs and input services utilised for  manufacture   of   such   final   product   and   being   ultimately  saddled   only   with   the   liability   of   paying   CENVAT   on   the  value addition made by him. Rules also provide for availing  CENVAT credit on capital goods used in the manufacturing  process.  Thus  in  essence,  central  excise  was  replaced  by  the   concept   of   CENVAT.   Nevertheless,   CENVAT   was  nothing   but   a   form   of   excise   duty   charged   in   terms   of  section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Quite obviously,  because the new regime required machinery provisions for  granting   CENVAT   credit,   collection   of   duties   and   such  other   related   issues,   CENVAT   credit   rules   were   brought  into   existence.   The   initial   Rules   of   2002   were   quickly  replaced by Rules of 2004.

 15. We have noticed that these rules made provisions for  availment   of   CENVAT   credit,   its   refund   and   recovery   of  duties not paid. In particular, rule 14 pertains to recovery  of   CENVAT   credit  wrongly   taken   or   erroneously  refunded  and   rule   15   provides   for   confiscation   and   penalty.   Sub­ rule(2) of Rule 15 which is under challenge, provides that  in a case, where the CENVAT credit in respect of input or  capital goods or input services has been taken or utilized  wrongly   by   reason   of   fraud,   collusion   or   any   willful   mis­ Page 22 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any  of   the   provisions   of   the   Central   Excise   Act   or   the   rules  made thereunder, with intention to evade payment of duty,  then, the manufacturer shall also be liable to pay penalty  in terms  of the provisions  of section  11AC of the  Central  Excise Act.

 16. Section 37(1) of the Central Excise Act empowers the  rule making authority i.e. the Central Government to make  any rules to carry into effect the purpose of the Act. It  is in  exercise of these powers that the Rules of 2004 have been  framed.   Such   rules   provide   for   mechanism     for   allowing  CENVAT   credit   and   recovering   of   CENVAT   from   the  manufactures and other agencies. We may also recall that  clause(d)   of   sub­section(4)   of   section   37   provides   that  notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section(3) and  without prejudice to the provisions of section 9, in making  rules   under   this   section,   the   Central   Government   may  provide that if any manufacturer, producer or licensee of a  warehouse   contravenes   the   provisions   of   any   such   rule  with   intent   to   evade   the   payment   of   duty,   then   all   such  goods shall be liable to confiscation and the manufacturer,  producer   or   licensee   shall   be   liable   to   a   penalty   not  exceeding the duty leviable on such goods or  ten thousand  rupees (as it existed at that time now substituted  by two  thousand rupees) whichever is greater.

Page 23 of 27

C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT

 17. Thus   in   terms   of   section   37(1)   and   37(4)   of   the  Central   Excise   Act,   1944,   the   rule   making   authority   had  ample   powers     not   only   for   providing   for   mechanism   for  collection of CENVAT and matters connected therewith but  also to provide for penalties for breach of  payment of such  duty. We have already discussed that CENVAT is nothing  but a form of excise duty charged in terms of section 3 of  the Central Excise Act, 1944.  Section 37(4) of the Central  Excise   Act,   1944   permitted   the   rule   making   authority   to  provide for confiscation and penalty not exceeding the duty  liability   on   the   goods,   if   any   manufacturer,   producer   or  licensee of a warehouse contravenes the provisions of any  such rule with intent  to evade  the payment  of duty.  This  precisely   was   provided   in   sub­rule(2)   of   rule   15   i.e.   for  penalty in terms of section 11AC when CENVAT credit has  been   taken   or   utilised   wrongly   by   reason   of   fraud,  collusion,   or  any  wilful  mis­statement    or  suppression  of  facts or contravention of any of the provisions of the Excise  Act or rules made therein.  We may also recall that section  11AC itself provides for penalty from a person liable to pay  duty   if   such   duty   has   not   been   levied   or   short­levied   or  short paid or erroneously refunded, by reason of fraud or  collusion   or   any   wilful   mis­statement   or   suppression   of  facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act,  or   of   the   rules   made   thereunder   with   intent   to   evade  Page 24 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT payment of duty. In such cases the penalty would be equal  to the duty so determined.

 18. Under the circumstances, we do not find that the rule  making authority flows only from sub­section(1) of section  37   and   can   therefore,   be   stated   to   be   general   in   nature  without clothing the rule making authority with the power  to   levying   penalty.   As   noticed   section   11AC   provides   for  penalty   in   case   of   unpaid   duty   by   reason   of     fraud   or  collusion   or   any   wilful   mis­statement,   etc.,   Such   duty   in  terms of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, would be the central  value  added  tax.  Sub­section(1)  of section  37 permits  the  Central Government to make rules to  carry into effect the  purpose of the Act which would include collection of duty  and penalty when the occasion so arises.  Clause(d) of sub­ section(4) of section 37 authorises the rule making body to  frame rules for confiscation and collection of penalty when  it is found that any manufacturer, producer or licensee of  warehouse  has contravened  the provisions any provisions  of such rule with intent evade payment of such duty.

 19. In case of The Assistant Collector of Central Excise  v. M/s. Ramakrishnan Kulwant Rai (supra), the Supreme  Court   upheld   Rule   10   of   the   Central   Excise   Act,   1944,  which   provided   for   residuary   power   for   recovery   of   sums  due to the   Government. Sub­rule   was challenged on the  Page 25 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT ground   that   same   was   ultra   vires   the   rule   making  authority.   The   Supreme   Court   repelled   the   challenge  making the following observations :

"19.  We   may   now   examine   the   contention   that   at   the  relevant   time   Rule   10­A   was   not   covered   by   the   rule  making   power   conferred   on   the   Central   Government   by  Section   37.   Section   37   dealt   with   power   of   Central  Government   to   make   Rules.   Sub­section   (1)   said:   "The  Central   Government   may   make   rules   to   carry   into   effect  the purposes of this Act." Sub­section (2) enumerated the  matters   the   rules   might   provide   for   'in   particular'   and  "without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power." 

Thus,   the   section   did   not   require   that   the   enumerated  rules would be exhaustive. Any rule if it could be shown to  have  been  made  "to  carry  into  effect  the  purposes   of  the  Act" would  be within the rule making power. Chapter II of  the Act dealt with the levy and collection of duty. Section 3  as   it   stood   at   the   relevant   time   provided   that   duties  specified in the First Schedule were to be levied. We have  quoted Sub­section (1).

20.  The First Schedule contained Item Nos. description of  goods and rates of duty. Section 3 has subsequently been  amended by the Finance Acts of 1982 and 1984, and the  Central Excise Tariff Act of 1985. This section, it would be  seen, expressly empowered the levy and collection of duties  of   excise   on   all   excisable   goods   as   provided   in   the   Act  including its First Schedule. It could not, therefore, be said  that Rule 10­A was not covered by the above provision. 

21.  It   is   an   accepted   principle   that   delegated   authority  must be exercised strictly within the limits of the authority.  If rule making power is conferred and the rules made are in  excess of that power the rules would be void even if the Act  provided that they shall have effect as though  enacted  in  the   Act   as   was   ruled   in   State   of   Kerala   v.   K.M.   Charia  Page 26 of 27 C/SCA/2678/2013 JUDGMENT Abdullah & Co., [1965] 1 SCR 601. Therein the High Court  having declared rule 14­A of the Madras General Sales Tax  Rules,   1939   as   ultra   vires,   on   appeal,   this   Court   by  majority  held that the validity of the rule,  even though  it  was  directed  to  have  effect  as   if   enacted  in   the  Act,   was  always   open   to   challenge   on   the   ground   that   it   was  unauthorised.   The   validity   of   the   delegated   legislation   is  generally   a   question   of   vires,   that   is,   whether   or   not   the  enabling power has been exceeded or otherwise wrongfully  exercised.  Scrutinising  the provisions  of Rule 10­A in the  light  of  the  above  principles  and  pronouncements  of  this  Court, we have no doubt that Rule 10­A of the Rules, as it  existed at the relevant time, was valid and not ultra vires  the   rule   making   power.   Demand   notices   lawfully   issued  under   the   rule   by   the   competent   authority   could   not,  therefore,   be   challenged   on   the   ground   of   the   rule   10­A  itself being ultra vires. Whether those could be challenged  on any other ground must necessarily depend on the facts  and circumstances of the case."

 20. In   the   result,   we   do   not   find   any   substance   in   the  challenge raised by the petitioner to the   rule 13(2) of the  CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002  and rule 15(2) of the CENVAT  Credit Rules, 2004. The petition is therefore, dismissed.

(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (MS SONIA GOKANI, J.) raghu Page 27 of 27