Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Jaladeb Gunchait @ Jaladev Guchait vs Sankar Kumar Das on 15 December, 2016
Author: Ashis Kumar Chakraborty
Bench: Ashis Kumar Chakraborty
1
In The High Court At Calcutta
15-12-2016 Civil Revisional Jurisdiction
sh-7
.
CO 3971 of 2016 Jaladeb Gunchait @ Jaladev Guchait v.
Sankar Kumar Das Mr. Jahar Chakraborty Mr. Ashok Kumar Mondal ... for the petitioner.
Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharyya Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee ... for the opposite party.
This revisional application, at the instance of the defendant in the ejectment suit is directed against the order dated August 9, 2016 passed by the learned 3rd Judge, Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 160 of 2005. By the impugned order, the learned Court below has rejected the application filed by the defendant- petitioner praying for, acceptance of the delayed deposit of rent for the month of February 2016.
The facts giving rise to the present revisional application are that the plaintiff-opposite party filed the ejectment suit, before the learned Court below claiming a decree for eviction and recovery of possession of the suit property from the defendant-petitioner. The eviction suit is filed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 2 1997 ( in short " the Act of 1997"). In the said suit the defendant- petitioner filed an application under Section 7(1) of the Act of 1997 praying for, leave to deposit the monthly rent of Rs.192/-, per month with the learned Court below from the month of April 2004, without prejudice to his rights and contentions. The defendant-petitioner also filed an application under Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997 and the same was also disposed of by the learned Court below on December 21, 2010. Undisputedly, the defendant-petitioner complied with the direction passed by the learned Court below by the said order dated December 21, 2010 and he also continued to deposit the current monthly rent with the learned Court below as directed by the order passed in the application under Section 7(1) of the Act of 1997. However, after the parties had adduced their evidence and oral argument on behalf of the parties commenced before the learned trial Judge it transpired that the defendant-petitioner did not deposit the monthly rent for the month of February 2016 within March 15, 2016 as stipulated under Section 7(1)(c) of the Act of 1997. It is the case of the defendant-petitioner that he had made over the rent amount for the month of February 2016, to his advocate for deposit with the learned Court below, but the clerk of the advocate by mistake deposited the said rent only on March 30, 2016. Thus, the defendant-petitioner filed an application before the learned Court below praying for, an order for acceptance of the delayed deposit of monthly rent for the month of 3 February 2016 which was rejected by the learned Court below by the impugned order. While rejecting the said application filed by the defendant-petitioner, relying on the decision of a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Lokenath v. Sita Rani Roy reported in 2016(2) ICC 533 (Cal) the learned Court below held that in view of the clear provisions contained in Section 7 of the Act of 1997 there no discretion is conferred on the Court to extend the time for deposit of the current monthly rent by the defendant-tenant in an ejectment suit, beyond the period of the 15th day of each succeeding month stipulated in Section 7(1)(c) of the Act of 1997. It is the said decision of the learned Court below which is the subject matter of challenge in this revisional application.
Mr. Jahar Chakraborty, learned advocate appearing in support of the revisional application contended that although, it is only the proviso to Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997 which confers jurisdiction on the Court to extend the time for deposit of arrear rent ascertained and directed to be paid under Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997, but the provisions of Section 7(3) of the Act makes abundantly clear that a Court has jurisdiction to extend the time even for payment of admitted amount of rent directed to be paid under Section 7(1) of the Act of 1997. On this ground he urged that in the facts of the present case, the defendant-petitioner had done everything for deposit of the current rent for the month of February 2016 within March 15, 2016, the learned 4 Court below failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it to accept the delayed deposit of rent by the defendant-petitioner for the month of February 2016, resulting in gross injustice to the petitioner.
However, Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharyya, learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party and opposing the revisional application strenuously contended that it is well settled law that the provisions of the rent Act is a welfare legislation not entirely beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord. He also urged in a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the Court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom. In this regard, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, from a reading of the entire Section 7 of the Act of 1997 it is clear that there is no scope for the Court to extend the time for payment of the admitted current monthly rent beyond the period of the 15th day of the next succeeding month as stipulated in Section 7(1)(c) of the Act under Section 7(1) of the Act of 1997 and it is only the provision to Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997 confers power on the Court to extend the time for deposit of rent as directed under Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997 that too, for a period of not exceeding two months. He strongly contended in view the of the clear and unambiguous language of the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) 5 and (2) of Section of the Act of 1997 the impugned order passed by the learned Court below suffers from no infirmity and the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the contents and purport of of Section 7(3) of the Act is devoid of any merit.
Since the question that falls for consideration in this application relates to the contents and purport of Section 7 of the Act of 1997 and sub-Section (1) to (4) thereunder, I find it appropriate to extract the said provisions as below:
"7. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction- (1)(a) On a suit being instituted by the landlord for eviction on any of the grounds referred to in section 6, the tenant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and upto the end of the month previous to that in which the payment is made together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum.
(b) Such payment or deposit shall be made within one month of the service of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the suit without the summons being served upon him, within one month of his appearance.
(b) The tenant shall thereafter continue to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil Judge month my month by the 15th of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.
(2) If in any suit referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as to the amount of the rent payable by the tenant, the tenant shall, within 6 the time specified in that sub-section, deposit with the Civil Judge the amount admitted by him to be due from him together with an application for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of the application, the Civil Judge shall, having regard to the rate at which rent was last paid and the period for which default may have been made by the tenant, make, as soon as possible within a period not exceeding one year, an order specifying the amount, if any, due from the tenant and, thereupon, the tenant shall, within one month of the date of such order, pay to the landlord the amount so specified in the order:
Provided that having regard to the circumstances of the case an extension of time may be granted by the Civil Judge only once and the period of such extension shall not exceed two months. (3) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be granted, the Civil Judge shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit.
(4) If the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), no order for delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant, shall be made by the Civil Judge, but he may allow such cost as he may deem fit to the landlord:7
Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if, having obtained such relief once in respect of the premises, he again makes default in payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months or for three successive rental periods where rent is not payable monthly."
From a reading of the above provisions of Section 7 and sub-Sections thereunder, it is clear that it is only as per the proviso to Section 7(2) of the Act, the Court has the power to extend the time for payment of the arrear rent, adjudicated by it, once and the Court has no power to extend the time for deposit of the current rent month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month under Section 7(1)(c) of the Act. From a plain reading of the above provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1997 it is clear that the words " or within such extended time as may be granted" appearing in Section 7(3) relate to Section 7(2) and the proviso thereto. Thus, I find substance in the contentions of the plaintiff opposite party.
For the reasons as aforesaid, I find that the impugned order passed by the learned Court below suffers from no infirmity. Accordingly, the revisional application, being CO 3971 of 2016 stands rejected. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Certified website copies of the order, if applied for, be urgently made available to the petitioner, subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J) 8