Himachal Pradesh High Court
Dulo (Since Deceased) Through His Lrs & ... vs Prabhu Ram on 19 June, 2024
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:3650 ) generated successfully.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA .
CMPMO No.228 of 2024 with Civil Revision No. 72 of 2023 Reserved on: 29.05.2024 Date of Decision: 19.06.2024.
1. CMPMO No. 228 of 2024 Dulo (since deceased) through his LRs & Ors ...Petitioners/JDs/Defendants Versus Prabhu Ram ......Respondent/DH/Plaintiff
2. Civil Revision No.72 of 2023 Dulo Ram (since deceased) through LRs.
........Petitioners/JDs/Defendants Versus Prabu Ram ...Respondent/DH/Plaintiff.
Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 yes For the Petitioners : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Rohit, Advocate.
1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 2Rakesh Kainthla, Judge More than a century and a half back, the Privy Council .
(speaking through the Right Hon. Sir James Colville) in The General Manager of The Raj Durbhunga, Under the Court of Wards v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Singh (1871-72) 14 Moo I A 605 (1871-72) 14 Moo IA 605 lamented that the difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they have obtained a decree. A reference to the above observation is also found in the decision of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court in Kuer Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India Ltd.
Lucknow AIR 1925 Oudh 448. It was ruled there that the Courts had to be careful to ensure that the process of the Court and the laws of procedure were not abused by judgment debtors in such a way as to make the courts of law instrumental in defrauding creditors, who had obtained decrees in accordance with their rights. Notwithstanding the enormous lapse of time, we are left awestruck at the observation of the Privy Council which seems to have proved prophetic. The observation still holds true in present times and this case is no different from cases of decree-holders' woes commencing while they are in pursuit of enforcing valid and binding decrees passed by civil courts of competent jurisdiction.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 32. Learned Senior Civil Judge Kangra, District Kangra, HP.
(learned Executing Court) passed an order rejecting the objections .
filed by the petitioners (Judgment Debtors/Objectors before the learned Executing Court) vide its order dated 20.3.2023. Undaunted the petitioners are before this court. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Executing Court for convenience).
3. It all started on 07.07.1992 when the DH/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit against Dulo predecessor-in-interest of the JDs/objectors.
Dulo died and the objectors were brought on record as his legal representatives. The suit was decreed. It was declared that a water channel exists over old khasra No. 49 (new khasra No. 462/2) and the DH has a right to irrigate his land situated in khasra No.498 through the flow of water over khasra No.462/2. The objectors were restrained by way of a permanent prohibitory injunction from restraining the D.H. from taking water. They were also directed not to obstruct the flow of water. The objectors filed an appeal, which was dismissed by learned Addl. District Judge-1 Kangra at Dharamshala on 26.7.2007.
4. The objectors filed an appeal being RSA No. 580 of 2007 before this Court. The Court dismissed the appeal on 27.8.2019.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 45. The Objectors filed a Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 26407/2019 which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on .
19.12.2019.
6. In the meantime, the DH filed a petition on 18.02.2008 for executing the judgment and the decree passed in his favour. The Objectors/JDs sprung a surprise by asserting that the judgment and decree were based on an order of correction passed by the Settlement Officer; however, this order, tatima and field book were set aside by the Financial Commissioner. Consequently, the decree had become unexecutable. They also asserted that their house is located over the part of corrected field No. 462/2 and execution of the judgment/decree would affect the entire building causing substantial loss to them. The water channel shown in the pre-settlement record does not coincide with the tatima prepared during the correction proceedings. The decree-holder has another source of irrigation. The pre-settlement musabi shows the water channel in the other field. No sketch map was annexed to the execution petition and the decree for a mandatory injunction could not be executed. Therefore, it was prayed that the execution petition be dismissed.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 57. The learned Executing Court held vide its order dated 20.03.2023 that the Revenue Authorities are bound to give effect to the .
judgment of the Civil Court and they cannot sit over the same. The objections were not covered within the purview of Section 47 of CPC, which relates to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree. The judgment passed by the Court has become final and the Executing Court is bound to execute the same. The decree-holder proved that judgment debtors/objectors have obstructed the flow of water by raising construction and they have not complied with the judgment and decree. Trilok Chand, objector/judgment debtor stated that the land of the decree-holder was never irrigated from the water channel, which shows his contemptuous behaviour. Learned Trial Court allowed the execution petition and ordered that a copy of the judgment and decree be sent to the Sub Divisional Collector concerned for giving effect to it. The Court also ordered the detention of the judgment debtors in civil imprisonment for one month and attachment of their property. The Court granted liberty to the decree-
holder to move an application under Order 21 Rule 32(3) of C.P.C for the sale of the attached property of judgment debtors for getting compensation in case the failure to comply with the decree persisted.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 68. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Executing Court, the judgment debtors/objectors filed the present .
petition, asserting that the learned Executing Court erred in dismissing the objections and allowing the Execution Petition.
Learned Financial Commissioner had set aside the correction order based on which the judgment and decree were passed. The mutation was attested on 31.1.2015, which shows that khasra No.801/462 is owned and possessed by the objectors. This entry has been incorporated in the copy of jamabandi for the year 2016-17. The decree-holder has no right to irrigate his fields in khasra No. 498 through khasra No. 801/462. The learned Executing Court failed to decide the objection that the decree had become unexecutable in view of the subsequent events and erred in allowing the application.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Executing Court be set aside.
9. The Court dismissed the revision vide order dated 04.11.2023.
10. The learned Executing Court ordered the attachment of the property vide order dated 17.11.2023.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 711. The objectors filed CMPMO no. 228 of 2024 against the order of the learned Executing Court dated 17.11.2023.
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12. The order dismissing the revision petition was recalled on 05.04.2024 in the review petition filed by the objectors.
13. I have heard Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/objectors and Mr Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Rohit, learned counsel for the respondent/D.H.
14. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the objector submitted that the learned Executing Court erred in dismissing the objections and allowing the execution petition. It was duly proved before the learned Executing Court that the order based on which the judgment and decree were passed were set aside by the learned Financial Commissioner. Thus, the very basis of the judgment and decree was knocked out. The judgment and decree had become unexecutable and the learned Executing Court erred in allowing the application. He further submitted that the objector had filed an application for the appointment of the Local Commissioner, which was not decided by the learned Executing Court. Therefore, the matter is required to be remitted to the learned Executing Court for the ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 8 decision on the application for appointment of the Local Commissioner.
.
15. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Sr. Advocate for the decree-
holder supported the order passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with the same. Learned Executing Court had rightly held that it was bound by the judgment and decree and the objections preferred by the J.D/ objector could not have been entertained. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
16. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at Bar and have gone through the records carefully.
17. The objector asserted that after the passing of the judgment and decree by the Civil Court, the learned Financial Commissioner has set aside the correction order based on which the judgment and decree were passed; hence the judgment and decree had become unexcutable. This submission proceeds on the premise that the revenue entries and the orders passed by the revenue official confer title. This premise is not correct. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, 2023 SCC ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 9 OnLine SC 1483 that the orders passed by the revenue officials and the entries made by them are no proof of title. It was observed:
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11. Mr. S.N. Bhat for the plaintiff sought to rely on Ext. P8 and the other revenue entries containing the name of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's vendor to argue that the Commissioner's order vested the plaintiff's vendor with occupancy rights, and it is only in accordance with such order did the revenue authorities enter the plaintiff's vendor's name in the records.
However, we are also unable to agree with such an argument.
12. It is a trite law that revenue records are not documents of title.
13. This Court in Sawarni v. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223 held that mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title nor does it have any presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question.
14. This was further affirmed in Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs (1997) 7 SCC 137 wherein this Court held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land.
15. In Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, this Court after considering a catena of judgments, reiterated the principle of law as follows:
"6. ***mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose."
16. We may also profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) by LRs. (1977) 2 SCC 49 wherein it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct when there exists evidence to the contrary.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 1018. Therefore, the order passed by the Financial Commissioner setting aside the correction order will not affect the execution .
proceedings.
19. The correction order, if relied upon by the Court, merged with the judgment and decree. It was not permissible for the revenue authorities to set aside the correction order and take away the effect of the judgment and decree passed by the Court. It was laid down by this Court in Goverdhan vs. Rattan Lal CMPMO No. 150 of 2008, decided on 3.6.2008 that the Revenue Authorities cannot sit over the judgment of the Civil Court and submit contradictory reports before the Civil Court.
It was observed:
This Court has noted in a number of cases that the revenue authorities give certain reports or documents during the pendency of the case but when the time comes to execute the decree passed on the basis of such reports/documents the revenue authorities take a u-turn and point out errors in the earlier reports/documents prepared by them. They cannot be permitted to do so. In the Tatima Ex.PW3/C prepared by the revenue authorities, the land was shown having 10 karams length on the northern side and now it cannot be said that on the northern side, the land is only 7 karams. Time and again this Court has held that the revenue authorities cannot sit over the judgment of the civil court. In the present case, the matter went up to the Supreme Court.
20. Similarly, it was held in Jagdish and others vs. Lajja Ram CMPMO No. 142 of 2008, decided on 3.6.2008 that in case the Revenue ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 11 Authorities are allowed to sit over the judgment of the Civil Court, it will create havoc. It was observed:
.
This Court has come across a number of cases where the revenue authorities during the pendency of the case give reports or furnish documents on the basis of which the suit is decided. When the decree passed in terms of the said report or documents have to be executed, the revenue authorities themselves turn around and deny the authenticity and correctness of the earlier report or documents. In case the revenue authorities are allowed to sit over the judgment of the Civil Courts, it will create havoc. No court not even an Executing Court can go behind a decree.
21. Thus, it was not permissible for the Revenue Authorities to pass an order nullifying the decree passed by the Civil Court.
22. Section 38 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act provides that entries in the revenue record shall not be varied in subsequent records except when they are supported by a decree or order binding on the parties. This shows that Revenue Authorities are bound to give effect to the decision of the Civil Court and they cannot nullify the same.
23. As per para 5 of the petition, the Financial Commissioner had passed an order on 7.9.2005. The first appeal was decided on 26.7.2007. Thus, it is apparent that the order was passed by the Revenue Authorities during the pendency of the appeal before the Civil Courts. The objectors did not file any application for bringing this fact to the notice of the Court.::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 12
24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh v. Kishan Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 46 that when a matter could have .
been agitated before the Civil Court before passing of the judgment and decree, the same cannot be raised during the execution petition.
It was observed as under:
"14. We have perused relevant records. We have also considered the contentions raised by learned Senior Counsel appearing for both parties. The executing court has given clear and cogent reasons for not accepting the objections taken by the appellants in the petition filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even so, we have perused the relevant documents on record to satisfy ourselves that there is no erroneous statement of fact in the order passed by the executing court. We are satisfied that the order does not suffer from any such error. We are also satisfied that the approach of the executing court in the matter is legal and proper. It is clear to us that the judgment debtors are making a last-ditch effort to prevent the decree-holders from getting the full benefit of the decree passed in their favour. As noted earlier, the plea that Karam Singh had no liability to pay any part of the mortgage debt and his property having been released from the mortgage in 1956 could not be a part of the suit property in the present case, was neither taken at trial of the suit nor before the Court in the final decree proceeding. Though in the order passed on the petition filed under Order 34 Rule 8 read with Section 151 CPC to make the decree final, the fact that Sarbans Singh was declared an insolvent person in the proceeding under the Provincial Insolvency Act was noted, no plea that the preliminary decree did not cover the land of Karam Singh or his share in the suit land appears to have been taken. In the facts and circumstances, the executing court rightly rejected the objections raised by the appellants against the execution of the decree. The High Court was, therefore, justified in declining to interfere with the order of the executing court."::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 13
25. This Court also held in State Bank of India vs. Indira Building Works & Ors., 2008 (3) Civil Court Cases 409 (HP) that pre-decretal .
arrangement cannot be gone into during the execution proceedings. It was observed as under:
"3. The Executing Court has misdirected itself on the question which was the subject matter of the objection petition. It is by now well settled that the question of fraud is to be agitated by way of a separate suit. In Adappa Papamma and Another v. Darbha Venkayya and others AIR 1935 Madras 860, the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that pre-decretal event, compromise or arrangement cannot be pleaded as a defence to the execution.
4. To similar effect is the judgment of the same High Court in K. Radhakrishna Chetty v. M/s. N.Rajagopal Pillai and Co. AIR 1972 Madras 107, in which the Hon'ble Court has held:-
"4. The only question that remains to be considered is whether this pre-decretal arrangement could be gone into execution proceedings. It is clear from page 223 of Mullah's CPC 13th. Edn. that there is a conflict of opinion among the several High Courts on this question, but so far as this High Court is concerned, it has been held that a disagreement which' related to the mode of execution or satisfaction of a decree and one which has the effect of rendering a decree nugatory and in executable in whole or in part and that while the former could be pleaded in execution, the latter could not be. This is clear from the Full Bench decision in A.Papamma v. Venkiah AIR 1935 Madras 860 (FB). The alleged arrangement put forward by the petitioner is an attack against the decree of this Court in C.R.P. 1991 of 1966 and it is not one of the characters referred to in 'Chindamharam Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiyar AIR 1918 Madras 1174 (FB),' which related only to the mode of execution. Hence, the plea raised by the ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 14 petitioner cannot be entertained by the Executing Court under section 47. Civil Procedure Code and the remedy of the petitioner, if any. is by an independent suit, I may add .
that the respondent does not admit the genuineness of the receipt relied on by the petitioner."
5. Following these judgments, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Harnam Singh and others v. Arbindu Nath and others AIR 2004 P&H 210, has held that any event occurring before the passing of the judgment is a matter of pleading in defence in a suit and cannot be raised by way of an objection of executability under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
26. Thus, it is not permissible for the objector to claim that the decree has become unexecutable due to the events which had taken place during the pendency of the proceedings before the Civil Court.
27. It was submitted that the objectors had filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 of C.P.C, which remained undecided; therefore, the matter is required to be remitted to the learned Executing Court for the decision on the application. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Mani Devi vs. Suresh Chand & Ors. (2022) (1) Civil Court Cases 737 and Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jitender Singh vs. Mehar Singh AIR 2009 Supreme Court 354, wherein the matter was remitted to the Appellate Court because the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C was not decided by the Appellate Court.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 1528. In the present case, the learned Trial Court held vide order dated 5.8.2022 that as far as change of khasra numbers are concerned, .
it can be linked at the time of giving effect to the decree of the Court.
Hence no purpose would be served by the appointment of a Local Commissioner at this stage, but still, the application for appointment of a Local Commissioner was kept pending and would be revived after the evidence was led by both parties and if the need so arose. It is apparent from the order that the learned Trial Court believed that it was not necessary to appoint a Local Commissioner but the application could be revived if there was a need. The ultimate order passed by the learned Executing Court shows that it was of the opinion that the objections raised before it could not be adjudicated by it, as it was bound by a decree. Thus, there was no need to revive the application for the appointment of the Local Commissioner and the matter cannot be remitted to the learned Executing Court merely because no formal order was passed by it. The Court has to look into the substance and not the form. It cannot remit the matter to the learned Executing Court merely on the basis of a technicality that no formal order was passed on an application under Order 26 Rule 9 of C.P.C.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 1629. Even this Court has found that the Objector/JDs do not have any right to object and the Revenue Authorities cannot sit over .
the judgment passed by the Civil Court. Therefore, the appointment of the Local Commissioner will not serve any purpose and the matter cannot be remitted to the learned Executing Court for appointment of the Local Commissioner or passing an order on the application for appointment of Local Commissioner.
30. In the cited judgments, it was held that the parties have a right to invite a decision on the application for adducing additional evidence and if the application is allowed, it may have the effect of changing the outcome of the case. In the present case, assuming that the application is allowed and the Local commissioner is appointed, the same will not change the outcome of the case because the legal position that pre-decretal arrangement cannot be raised during the execution petition, the Revenue Authorities cannot sit over the judgment of the Civil Court and the Revenue Authorities are bound by the decision of the Civil Court and not vice-a-versa, will remain the same. Therefore, the objectors cannot say that the matter is required to be remitted to the learned Executing Court and these judgments do not apply to the present case.
::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 1731. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Sr. Advocate relied upon the judgments of this Court in Liaquat Ali vs. Amir Mohammad & Ors., .
Latest HLJ 2016(2) (HP)831 to submit that the Court has the power to appoint the Local Commissioner. There is no dispute with this proposition of law, as the Court can always appoint a Local Commissioner in execution in a suitable case, as per provisions of Order 26 Rule 10-A of C.P.C. However, in the present case, there is no such necessity because the identity of the land is not in question but the question is whether the JDs are bound to obey the decree, which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and whether the Revenue Authorities can nullify such judgment and decree by passing a correction order. Therefore, the appointment of a Local Commissioner will not serve any purpose in the present case.
32. Consequently, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Executing Court and no interference is required with the same.
33. While dismissing the RSA no. 580 of 2007 the Court held in its judgment:
"27. The defendant has tried to prolong the litigation as he is in an advantageous position inasmuch as his fields are on a higher elevation, whereas, the fields of the plaintiff were on a lower elevation. The water of 'kuhal' first had to pass through the ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 18 fields of the defendant and in case the flow of the same is not stopped, the water thereafter would reach to the land of the plaintiff.
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28. Normally this would have been a fit case where heavy and exemplary costs ought to have been imposed on the defendant. But taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff and defendants are neighbours, the Court refrains from imposing such costs. However, a stern warning is issued against the defendant not to indulge in obstructing the flow of water of Kuhal in future or else the Court shall be constrained to take a very-very serious view of the matter."
34. The Court had refrained from imposing exemplary costs earlier and had issued a stern warning not to cause any obstruction but the warning went unheeded. Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249: (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 1: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 481: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 874 that 90% of the time is wasted in the Courts by unwanted litigation which is encouraged by the reluctance of the Courts to impose the realistic costs. It was observed:
"31. Dr. Arun Mohan, learned amicus curiae, has written an extremely useful, informative and unusual book Justice, Courts and Delays. This book also deals with the main causes of delay in the administration of justice. He has also suggested some effective remedial measures. We would briefly deal with the aspect of delay in the disposal of civil cases and some remedial measures and suggestions to improve the situation. According to our considered view, if these suggestions are implemented in proper perspective, then the present justice delivery system of civil litigation would certainly improve to a great extent.::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 19
32. According to the learned author, 90% of our court time and resources are consumed in attending to uncalled-for litigation, which is created only because our current procedures and .
practices hold out an incentive for the wrongdoer. Those involved receive less than full justice and there are many more in the country, in fact, a greater number than those involved who suffer injustice because they have little access to justice, in fact, lack of awareness and confidence in the justice system.
33. According to Dr. Mohan, in our legal system, uncalled-for litigation gets encouragement because our courts do not impose realistic costs. The parties raise unwarranted claims and defences and also adopt obstructionist and delaying tactics because the courts do not impose actual or realistic costs. Ordinarily, the successful party usually remains uncompensated in our courts and that operates as the main motivating factor for unscrupulous litigants. Unless the courts, by appropriate orders or directions remove the cause for motivation or the incentives, uncalled-for litigation will continue to accrue, and there will be expansion and obstruction of the litigation. Court time and resources will be consumed and justice will be both delayed and denied.
34. According to the learned author lesser the court's attention towards full restitution and realistic costs, which translates as profit for the wrongdoer, the greater would be the generation of uncalled-for litigation and exercise of skills for achieving delays by impurity in presentation and deployment of obstructive tactics. According to him the cost (risk)--benefit ratio is directly dependent on what costs and penalties will the court impose on him; and the benefit will come in as the other "succumbing" en route and or leaving a profit for him, or even if it is a fight to the end, the court still leaving a profit with him as unrestituted gains or unassessed short levied costs. Litigation perception of the probability of the other party getting tired and succumbing to the delays and settling with him and the court ultimately awarding what kind of restitution, costs and fines against him--paltry or realistic. This perception ought to be the real risk evaluation.::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS 20
35. According to the learned amicus curiae if the appellants had the apprehension of imposition of realistic costs or restitution, then this litigation perhaps would not have been filed. According to him, ideally, having lost up to the highest court (16-3-2001), .
the appellants (the defendants in the suit) ought to have vacated the premises and moved out on their own, but the appellants seem to have acted as most parties do--calculate the cost (risk)-- benefit ratio between surrendering on their own and continuing to contest before the court. Procrastinating litigation is commonplace because, in practice, the courts are reluctant to order restitution and actual cost incurred by the other side."
35. In the present case, this Court had earlier noticed the gain to the objectors by protracting the litigation and had shown its inclination to impose exemplary costs. However, it had left the matter with a pious hope that the objectors would improve their conduct. Alas! That was not to be. Hence, the time has come to walk the talk and impose the costs earlier promised by the Court. Keeping in view that the litigation has been pending for more than 30 years and is being protracted by the objectors, who are benefitting from the delay, a cost of ₹50,000/-( Fifty Thousand) is imposed upon the objectors to compensate the other side.
35. Hence the present petition fails and the same are dismissed with costs of ₹ Fifty Thousand. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19 June, 2024 (mamta/veena) ::: Downloaded on - 19/06/2024 20:33:22 :::CIS