Karnataka High Court
Sri P. Nanjappa vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 January, 2020
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B. Veerappa
1 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON' BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA
WRIT PETITION No.23095/2013(KLR-RR/SUR)
BETWEEN:
SRI P. NANJAPPA
S/O LATE PILLAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
R/AT MARENAHALLI VILLGE
JALA HOBLI
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BANGALORE-560064.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI SHIVASHANKAR K, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
M S BUILDING
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BANGALORE-560002.
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT
BANGALORE -560001.
3. THE TAHSILDAR
YELAHANKA
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BANGALORE -560064.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI Y.D. HARSHA, AGA)
...
2
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
ORDER DATED 24.10.2011 PASSED BY RESPONDENT-2 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner, who is the third purchaser of the land bearing Sy.No.200/P35 measuring 2 acres situated at Marenahalli Village, Jala Hobli, Yelahanka Bangalore North Taluk under the Sale Deed dated 4.3.1993 is before this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 24.10.2011 passed by the 2nd respondent in RRT No. (2) N(A) CR.952/2009-10.
I Facts of the case
2. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the land bearing Sy.No. 200/P35 measuring 2 acres situated at Marenahalli Village, Jala Hobli, Yelahanka Bangalore North Taluk was a gomal land which was granted in favour of one Kempanna s/o Ramaiah vide 3 LND SR/1-664/61-62 and he was in possession and enjoyment of the said property. The Darkhast Demand Register Extract for the year 1964-65 as per Annexure- B which clearly depicts that at Sl.No.35 by the order bearing No.LNDSR/1-664/61-62, the land bearing Sy.No.200/P35 measuring 2 acres was granted in favour of Kempanna s/o Ramayya, Marenahalli village, Devenahalli Taluk and the said Kempanna, who was in possession and enjoyment of the property in question, sold the same under a registered Sale Deed dated 7.6.1970 in favour of one Sri S. Narasingaiah and consequently, the name of the purchaser was entered in the Khatha and other revenue records. The said Narasingaiah, who had been in possession and enjoyment of the same, sold the said land under a registered Sale Deed dated 25.4.1975 in favour of one Sri Annayappa, Son of Thimmaiah, since then the said Annayappa was in possession and enjoyment of the property in question and all the revenue records were 4 standing in his name. It is the further case of the petitioner that the said Annayappa in order to solve his financial problems and for his legal necessities, sold the same through a registered Sale Deed dated 4.3.1993 in favour of the petitioner and since then, he is in possession and enjoyment of the property in question as a lawful owner and in pursuance of the sale, the mutation extract, RTC and other revenue records were transferred in his name as per Annexures-F, G and H.
3. When the things stood thus, the 3rd respondent referred the matter to the 2nd respondent for verification of the grant records under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in the year 2008. In turn, the 2nd respondent initiated proceedings after a lapse of more than 46 years. The petitioner appeared and produced all the documents to show that the land was granted to his vendors/vendor in the year 1961-62 5 and the Darkasth Demand Register - Annexure-D along with the revenue records and the Sale Deeds of the Vendors. The 2nd respondent without considering the entire material on record proceeded to hold that the petitioner has no right in respect of the property in question and accordingly, cancelled the entries made in the revenue records and directed the Tahsildar to take appropriate action in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed.
4. Though the matter is of the year 2013, the respondents-State Government has not filed statement of objections.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis.
6
II Arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner
6. Sri K. Shivashankar, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended with vehemence that the admittedly the land in question was granted in the year 1961-62 in the name of one Sri Kempanna s/o Ramaiah. The said Kempanna sold the said land on 7.6.1970 to one Sri S. Narasingaiah, who in turn sold the same to one Sri Annayappa s/o Thimmaiah on 25.4.1975. Now the petitioner has purchased the said land from Sri Annayappa under the registered Sale Deed dated 4.3.1993. Admittedly, the earlier two Sale Deeds of the land in question was not at all questioned by the State Government or by the authorities concerned and after a lapse of more than 46 years, the Deputy Commissioner has initiated proceedings in exercise of power under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act, which is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. He would further contend that if there is any 7 violation of grant, it is the duty of the authorities concerned to initiate proceedings within a reasonable period to cancel the grant.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that, admittedly, when the grant was made on 21.8.1962 and first Sale Deed was executed on 7.6.1970, it is the duty of the competent authority to verify the records as soon as the Registered Sale Deed was executed, but the competent authority has sent the same to the concerned authority under the provisions of Section 128(4) of the Act. The revenue records all along depict that the entries in the name of the original grantee and subsequently, the 1st purchaser and 2nd purchaser. The RTC entries since 1962-63 till 2009-10, clearly depict the grant and several persons having purchased the land and ultimately, the name of the petitioner is found in the RTC and revenue records. The RTC entries in the revenue records have presumptive 8 value under the provisions of Section 133 of the Act. The said materials have not been considered by the Deputy Commissioner while proceeding in exercise of powers under Section 136(3) of the Act. Since the very proceedings initiated by the Deputy Commissioner on the basis of the report of the Tahsildar is unreasonable and even though the petitioner is in adverse possession for more than 30 years i.e., as on the date of initiation of proceedings the grantee, first purchaser and the petitioner were in possession for more than 46 years. Therefore, the proceedings initiated cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, he sought to allow the writ petition.
III Arguments advanced by the learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-Respondents
8. Per contra, Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned AGA sought to justify the impugned order and contended that the petitioner has not produced any material 9 documents either the original grant or the saguvali chit, I.L. and R.R. and the entry in the Darkhast. In the absence of any material documents produced by the petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner is justified in passing the impugned order. He would further contend that in view of the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner can initiate suo moto proceedings, where the predecessor in title himself have got a defective grant, as a result, the grant was obtained by virtue of the fraud alleged to have been committed by their predecessor in title and therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition.
IV Point for determination
9. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the parties, the only point that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is:
"Whether the Deputy Commissioner is justified in initiating proceedings under the provisions of section 136(3) of the 10 Karnataka Land Revenue Act, after lapse of more than 46 years in the facts and circumstances of the present case?
V Consideration
10. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record carefully.
11. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the land in question was granted on 12.8.1962 in favour of one Kempanna s/o Ramaiah. To prove the said fact, Annexure-B, the Darkhast Demand Register Extract for the year 1964-65 clearly depicts that at Sl.No.35, by the Order No.LNDSR/1-664/61-62, issued by the very Tahasildar, Devanahalli Taluk, that the land in question was granted to Kempanna S/o Ramaiah measuring 2 acres, Marenahalli village. It is also not in dispute that the original grantee sold the same in favour 11 of one Sri S. Narasingaiah under the registered Sale Deed dated 7.6.1970, Annexure-C produced by the petitioner wherein there is a reference in respect of the grant which reads as under::
"EzÉà eÁ® ºÉÆç½ ªÀiÁgÉãÀº½ À î UÁæªÀÄzÀ §½ £À£U À É LNSDR 1/664-61-62£Éà vÁ. 12.8.63 LR 81/21.8.62 gÀAvÉ ¸Àªð É £ÀA§gï JgÀqÀÄ £ÀÆgÀÄ (ºÉ) F JqÀUÉÊ ºÉ¨ÉânÖ£À UÀÄwð£À gÀÄdÄ ºÀ®¸À½î PÉA¥ÀAiÀÄå ºÁQzÀÝPÉÌ MPÉÌ®A §gÀºÀ II sheet of document No.748/70.71 Book I SR 10.6.70 (seal) ¨ÁèPï E¥ÀàvÉÛAlÄ 1964.65£Éà ¸Á¯ï ¯ÁUÁAiÀÄÄÛ 'A' (zÉêÀ£º À ½ À î vÁ®ÆèPï vÀº¹ À ¯ÁÝgïgÀªj À AzÀ ¸ÁUÀĪÀ½ aÃn ªÀÄAdÆgÁV vÀº° À ¤AzÀ £À£Àß ¸Áé¢Ãü £Á£ÀĨsª À z À ° À ègÀĪÀ d«ÄäUÉ ZÉPÀÄ̧A¢ ¥ÀƪÀðPÉÌ ¸ÀgÁÌj UÉÆêÀiÁ¼À, ¥À²ª Ñ ÀÄPÉÌ a£À߸Á«Ä £ÁAiÀÄÄØgª À g À À SÁvÉ d«ÄãÀÄ GvÀÛgPÀ ÉÌ ¸ÀgÁÌj UÉÆêÀiÁ¼À, zÀQëtPÉÌ C§ÄÝ¯ï ®wÃ¥sï IV ¸Á§gÀ d«ÄãÀÄ. F ªÀÄzsÉå EgÀĪÀ RÄ¶Ì «¹ÛÃtð JgÀqÀÄ JPÀgU É É D±ÁgÀ ¸É¸ÀÄì ¸ÉÃj £Á®ÄÌ gÀÆ¥Á¬Ä £À®ªÀvÉÛgq À ÀÄ ¥ÉÊ¸É G¼Àî d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß(ºÉ) F JqÀUÉÊ ºÉ¨ÉânÖ£À UÀÄwð£À gÀÄdÄ ºÀ®¸À½î PÉA¥ÀAiÀÄå ºÁQzÀÝPÉÌ 12 MPÉÌ®A §gÀºÀ III sheet of document No.748/70.71 Book II SR 10.6.70 (seal). £Á£ÀÄ F ¢£À ¤ªÀÄUÉ bÀ¯ÁªÀuÉ MAzÀÄ ¸Á«gÀzÀ gÀÆ¥Á¬ÄUÀ½UÉ ±ÀÄzÀÝ PÀAæ iÀÄPÉÌ PÉÆlÄ,Ö PÀAæ iÀÄzÀ ªÉƧ®UÀÄ F PɼU À É ºÁPÀ®àlÖ ¸ÁQëU¼ À À ªÉÆSÁÛ £ÀUÀzÁV vÉUz É ÀÄPÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. ¸ÀévÀÛ£ÀÄß F ¢£ÀªÃÉ ¤ªÀÄä ¸Áé¢Ãü £ÀPÉÌ ©nÖgÀÄvÉÛãÉ".
12. The said registered document is not at all challenged by any of the aggrieved parties including the Tahsildar. It is also not in dispute that Sri S. Narasingaiah sold the said land in favour of one Annayappa under the registered Sale Deed dated 25.4.1975 as per Annexure-D in which there is a reference of grant. Thereafter, the said Annayappa sold the said land to the petitioner under the registered Sale Deed dated 4.3.1993, Annexure-E. In the two registered Sale Deeds stated supra, there is a reference to the grant and all along, the revenue records were changed in the names of the original grantee, 1st purchaser, 2nd 13 purchaser and 3rd purchaser by the revenue authorities on the basis of the registered Sale Deeds which have presumptive value under the provisions of Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. The very revenue authorities have entered the names of the original grantee, first purchaser, second purchaser and ultimately, the name of the petitioner as the third purchaser in the revenue records in respect of the property in question. Admittedly, the assertions and documents produced by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondents.
13. A careful perusal of the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner does not indicate that the original grantee has played fraud on the Government and obtained the order of grant. It is not the case of the Deputy Commissioner that after verifying the original records, he has come to the conclusion that there was no grant at all. Except stating that the 14 petitioner has not produced any original records or saguvali chit, 2nd respondent initiated proceedings after a lapse of more than 46 years (more than 4 decades). When the rights of the parties are involved in respect of immoveable properties, the Government or its Officers should act within a reasonable period, it is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a lapse of more than 46 years stating that there was no grant, is not a ground for cancellation of entries in the revenue records, after an inordinate and unreasonable delay, ignoring the grant, registered three Sale Deeds and admittedly, the grant is not cancelled after following the due procedure in accordance with law.
VI Judgments of the Apex Court
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in an identical circumstances in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another -vs- D. Narsing Rao and 15 Others (2015)3 SCC 695 relying upon the dictum in the case of State of Gujarat -vs- Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 while considering the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 held that:-
"Though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court considering the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil -vs- Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale reported in (2009)9 SCC 352 at para-11 has held that:-
16
"It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a lapse of long time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. In the said case, the reasonable period within which the power of revision would be exercised was three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 17 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and legally not correct."
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act in the case of State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363 in page 367, at paragraph 11 has held that:
"A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable 18 period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. The revisional jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years.
17. Admittedly in the present case, after the lapse of more than 46 years, the Deputy Commissioner initiated the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act on the basis of the report of the Tahsildar is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. My view is also fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin -vs- Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71 while considering the provisions of Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 has held that though the said section does not prescribe for any time-limit for initiation of proceedings, such 19 power should be exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time and at paragraphs-1 and 2 it is held as under:
"1. The appellant by two registered sale deeds dated 11-12-1972 and 28-12- 1972 purchased from the respondent Survey Plot No. 53 measuring an area of Ac.3.06 gunts and Survey Plot No. 372/1+2 measuring an area of Ac.3.18 gunts. On the basis of aforesaid purchase the name of the appellant was mutated in the record of rights on 14-2- 1973. It appears that in September 1976 the Mamlatdar of the area concerned initiated a suo motu enquiry under Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as applicable to the State of Gujarat, (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") in respect of the validity of the aforesaid sale deeds. On 29-4-1977 the 20 Mamlatdar held that the sales in question were invalid as the appellant was not an agriculturist belonging to the State of Gujarat. The appeal, revision and the writ petition filed against the aforesaid order have been dismissed.
2. Although Mr Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power 21 should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah [ Spe. WA No. 2770 of 1979] disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha[(1969) 2 SCC 187 : (1970) 1 SCR 335] and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of 22 India[(1994) 1 SCC 44] has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be taken within reasonable time, where no period of limitation specified
- even while dealing with beneficial legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be ignored lightly where no period of limitation prescribed and actions 23 initiated after delay and at paragraphs-9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 it has been held as under:
"9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court held that in a motor accident which took place on 18-12-1989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995, after limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the claim petition could not be 24 rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time.
10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., "reasonable time" is explained as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer."25
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to
preserve rights and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses.
11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows:
"The auction-sale took place in 1942, the application for restoration of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant-writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986.
Such a long-settled position
could only be upset for some
very compelling reasons and on
26
making out an extremely strong
case for restoration of the
appeal. There is nothing on
record to suggest anything
remotely like that. Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the appeal even without any notice to the appellant-writ petitioners was clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act."
The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken.
12. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise 27 may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao[Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC OnLine AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para '17' of the judgment reads as follows:
(D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17) "17. ... that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law."
Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
28
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights.
14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand[Situ 29 Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340] .
VII Conclusion
19. It is well settled that in the absence of any period prescribed for initiation of proceedings by the competent authority, the revenue authorities have slept over the matter for a period of more than 46 years and suddenly have initiated proceedings without there being any basis. Therefore, the very initiation of proceedings by the Deputy Commissioner after a lapse of more than 46 years is beyond reasonable and cannot be sustained, since it is in utter violation of the provisions of Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done on technicality. It must be grasped that judiciary is 30 respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. For the stated supra, the point raised for consideration has to be answered in the negative holding that the Deputy Commissioner is not justified in initiating the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act after a lapse of more than 46 years ignoring the grant and three registered Sale Deeds stated supra.
20. It is not the case of the respondents-State Government that they have initiated action against the person, who was granted or against the person, who registered the Sale Deeds or against the persons, who acted upon the registered Sale Deeds entering the names of the persons in the revenue records in respect of the property in question. The State Government should first take action against the Tahsildar, Sub- 31 Registrar, person who changed the entries in the revenue records. It is high time for the State Government shall take necessary steps to set right its own house in a proper manner then only they can blame the person, who has purchased the lands under the registered Sale Deed. If there was no grant at all, it is the duty of the Sub-Registrar to verify the records and register the documents, but the same has not been done and after collecting necessary fee has registered the Sale Deeds and effected the entries in the Mutation and RTC by the revenue authorities successively from 1961-62 to 1992-93, in their respective names and now after a lapse of more than 46 years, the Deputy Commissioner cannot exercise his power under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act holding that it is a Government Land ignoring the rights accrued on the petitioner under the registered Sale Deed. Therefore, the contention of the learned Government Advocate that the Deputy 32 Commissioner has considered all the documents cannot be accepted and accordingly, it is rejected.
VIII Result/Decision
21. In view of the aforesaid reasons, writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner exercising suo motu power under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is hereby quashed.
Rule is made absolute.
Sd/-
Judge Nsu/-