Delhi District Court
Earth Hermitage City Pvt Ltd vs State (Delhi Administration) on 24 March, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-002883-2022
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 88/2022
M/s. EARTH HERMITAGE CITY PVT. LTD.,
Through Shri. Atul Gupta,
S/o. of Sh. J.B. Gupta,
R/o. A-1/294, Janakpuri,
New Delhi ... REVISIONIST
PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)
2. TRILOK CHAND CHOUDHARY,
S/o. Late Sh. Daya Ram,
39, Gadaipur,
Mehrauli, New Delhi-110030.
3. M/s. PLUMY ESTATE PVT. LTD.,
Through its Authorized Representative;
39, Gadaipur,
Mehrauli, New Delhi-110030. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of Institution : 15.02.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 12.03.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 24.03.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under Sections 379/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') against the order dated 11.01.2022 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Ld. CMM, Central, Tis Hazari Court (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. CMM/Ld. Trial Court'), in case titled as; 'State v. Plumy Estate Pvt. Ltd., New Case No. 15398/2018', arising out of FIR No. 155/2015, PS EOW, under Sections 406/420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 1 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:34:50 +0530 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). Pertinently, by virtue of the said order, Ld. Trial Court dismissed the application, moved by the revisionist under Section 437(5) Cr.P.C. for/seeking cancellation of bail granted to respondent no. 2; directions for arrest of respondent no. 2 as well as to commit him/respondent no. 2 to custody.
2. Tersely put, the genesis of the present proceedings is the FIR no. 155, registered at PS EOW, on 18.11.2015 under Section 406/420/34/120B of IPC, wherein it was inter alia asserted that respondent no. 2 was the director of respondent no. 3 and signatory of a memorandum of understanding dated 18.03.2013, executed between the complainant/revisionist and respondent no. 3. It was further asserted by the revisionist that respondent no. 2 along with one Brijbhan Bhandana Dunger Singh, on behalf of respondent no. 3, approached the revisionist through, Jugal Arora and Vipin Gaur of M/s. Maa Kalka land Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'broker'). The complainant has further averred that the revisionist was lured by the said persons, respondent nos. 2-3 and other accused persons (as specified under the complaint/FIR) to invest in their Township Project at Village Anandpur, Faridabad. As per the instant FIR/complainant, the accused persons, including respondent no. 2, while acting in concert and collusion with each other are avowed to have made various representations, allurements, promises and assurances in respect of the said township project, whereby, inducing the complainant/revisionist to make payments of Rs. 11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs only) on 01.06.2012; Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore only) on 05.06.2012; and Rs. 5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores only) CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 2 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:34:57 +0530 on 18.03.2013. Subsequently, the revisionist is asserted to have been induced/pressurised by the accused persons, including accused no. 2 to make additional payments of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores only) on 22.04.2013; and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore only) on 23.04.2013. Correspondingly, it is alleged that consequent to such allurements, the revisionist was wrongly induced to part Rs. 9,11,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crore Eleven Lakhs only), which was wrongfully gained by the accused persons. It was further declared that even after the receipt of the said payment, accused persons did not do anything in compliance of the terms and conditions of the aforenoted memorandum of understanding dated 18.03.2013 and in furtherance of development of the proposed Township Project, despite the revisionist being induced to part with huge amount. Consequently, the revisionist issued a legal notice dated 09.05.2014 to the accused persons, seeking return of the amount paid. However, it is asserted under the complaint/FIR that even after receipt of the legal notice, several meetings/correspondences and emails dated 24.11.2014, 22.11.2014, 01.11.2014, 27.10.2014, 18.10.2014, 29.09.2014, 22.09.2014, 08.09.2014, 20.08.2014 and 09.08.2014, no respondent is proclaimed to be forthcoming from the accused persons' end. Consequently, the revisionist is avowed to have carried out scrutiny of the proposed project/land, whereupon it was determined that the proposed project land was under
chakbandi and that several litigations were pending in respect of the said land. The complainant/revisionist further asserted that when the complainant/revisionist sought for refund of the amount, the accused persons threatened the revisionist and its CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 3 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:02 +0530 officials of dire consequences, leading to the filing of the instant complaint and registration of FIR on the basis of the complaint filed.
2.1. Notably, during the course of proceedings, respondent no. 2 is avowed to have been arrested on 23.08.2016, followed by the accused/respondent no. 2 moving an application for bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. before the Ld. Trial Court.
Remarkably, the Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 26.08.2016 was pleased to grant interim bail to the said respondent/respondent no. 2, inter alia under the following observations;
"...It is stated that the matter has been settled between the accused and the complainant. It is further stated that accused has transferred an amount of Rs 50 Lacs into the bank account of the complainant. Three cheques of Rs. 2 crores each have also been received by the complainant. It is further stated that the MOU dated 26.08.2016 has been executed between the parties. MOU has been placed on record. Statements of the parties have been recorded in this regard. The parties shall remain bound by their statements.
Counsel for the complainant has stated that the complainant has no objection in case interim bail is granted to accused so as to enable him to comply with the terms of the settlement.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the settlement, accused Trilok Chand Chaudhary is ordered to be admitted to interim bail till 30.09.2016 on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. One Lac with two sureties each in the like amount failing which he be remanded to JC till 09.09.2016.
Bail bonds furnished and the same are accepted till 27.08.2016. SHO concerned is directed to verify the bail bond and file report..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Strikingly, as per the revisionist, pursuant to Memorandum of Understanding dated 26.08.2016 (hereinafter CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 4 of 26 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.03.24 14:35:06 +0530 referred to as the 'MOU'), executed between the revisionist and respondent no. 3, the said parties had entered into a settlement in respect of the disputed claims for a sum of Rs. 9,61,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crores Sixty One Lakhs only) to be disbursed in the manner, as specified under the said MOU. However, as per the revisionist, the accused persons, including respondent no. 2 failed to abide by the terms of said settlement, rather, the accused persons/respondent no. 2 persevered to seek indulgence from the Ld. Trial Court. Correspondingly, though, the accused persons are proclaimed to have party cleared the amount, specified under the MOU, however, failed to comply with the terms, thereof in its entirety. In the meanwhile, the Ld. Trial Court, is asserted to have confirmed the order of bail, granted to accused/respondent no. 2 vide order dated 18.01.2018 inter alia under the following observations;
"...I have perused the previous record.
Interim bail of the accused was granted on 26.08.2016 in pursuance of settlement between the parties. Part amount has been paid by the accused and the balance is to be paid at the time of quashing of FIR.
Though Ld. Counsel for the accused submits that the property has also been transferred in the name of sister concern of the complainant, yet this fact has been denied by the Ld. Counsel for the complainant. Ld. Counsel for the accused has assured that property has been transferred but this fact has not been verified as the Directors of the complainant company are behind the bars in some other cases.
Be that as it may, accused is on interim bail for the last two years, which was being extended from time to time. Matter is still under investigation and no purpose would be served by keeping the matter pending on the board of the Court, particularly when part payment has already been made and the settlement acted upon by the parties.
As custodial interrogation of the accused is no more required and nothing further is to be recovered CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 5 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.03.24 14:35:10 +0530 at his instance, bail of the accused therefore confirmed.
In case the complainant still feels that the terms and conditions of MOU are not being complied with by the accused deliberately or that he is not participating in Investigation, the complainant or the IO shall be liberty to move application seeking cancellation of bail.
Accordingly, application stands disposed off..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Relevantly, it is the case of the revisionist that accused/respondent no. 2 obtained the bail by misrepresenting the facts and flouted the conditions of MOU, whereupon, an application under Section 437(5) Cr.P.C. was moved by/on behalf of the revisionist before the Ld. Trial Court, seeking cancellation of bail. However, as aforenoted, the said application was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 11.01.2022/impugned order, inter alia under the following observations;
"...7. Heard Record perused.
8. The landmark judgment of three judges bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case titled as X vs. State of Telengana & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 511 made it absolutely clear that rejection of a bail in a non-bailable case is distinguished from cancellation of bail, once granted. It is further held that bail once granted should not be cancelled unless a cogent case, based on supervening events has been made out. It is further held by the Court that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing cancellation of bail, already granted. Generally speaking, grounds for cancellation of bail broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are:
interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of concession granted to accused in any manner. Satisfaction of Court, on basis of material placed on record of possibility of accused absconding is yet CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 6 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:35:14 +0530 another reason justifying cancellation of bail However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow accused to retain his freedom by enjoying concession of bail during trial.
9. It is also a settled proposition of law that if accused falls to comply with the conditions of settlement as per which the bail has been granted to the accused, application for cancellation of ball can be filed
10. In the present matter accused was arrested on 23.08.2016, however on the basis of settlement, he was admitted to interim bail on 26.08.2016 This interim bail was extended from time to time and finally on 18.01.2018, he was admitted to regular bail. This order dated 18.01.2018 of admitting the accused to regular bail is the genesis of the present application. From perusal of the order dated 18.01.2018, it is apparent that even on that day, Ld. counsel for the accused was submitting before the Court that a property has been transferred in the name of sister concern of the complainant. Though, that fact was denied by the Ld. Counsels Sh. Aman Gaur and Sh. Aviral Mittal, present for the complainant. Despite, this denial of the Ld. counsel for the complainant, the Court observed, "Be that as it may, accused is on interim bail for the last two years, which was being extended from time to time.
Matter is still under investigation and no purpose would be served by keeping the matter pending on the board of the Court, particularly when part payment has already been made and the settlement acted upon by the parties. As custodial interrogation of the accused is no more required, and nothing further is to be recovered at his instance, bail of accused, therefore confirmed".
11. From reasoning of the Court at the time of granting regular bail to the accused, it is apparent that the Court had not taken into consideration the dispute between the accused and the complainant ie whether a property has been transferred in the name of the complainant or not by the accused. The Court has granted bail to the accused mainly due to the reason that for the last two years, he was on interim bail, investigation was still pending. Apparently, the basis of granting regular bail to the accused was not the settlement between the parties simplicitor, rather it was due to the reason that investigation was still CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 7 of 26 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.03.24 14:35:17 +0530 going on while the accused was running on interim bail for two year, he had partially acted on the agreement, his custodial interrogation was no more required. However, in the end, Ld Predecessor of this Court, gave an option to the complainant that if complainant still feels that terms and conditions of the MOU are not complied with, he can move an application for cancellation of bail. Due to this liberty, given by the Ld. Predecessor of this Court, the present application has been moved after lapse of 3 years and 9 months from the said orders. Though it is claimed that one of the Director of the complainant company in the present case namely Mr. Atul Gupta was running in JC from 02.08.2017 till 10.06.2021. Thus, it is submitted that the application could not be moved earlier. However, this ground is not tenable as though Mr. Atul Gupta was in JC. However, every person in JC has right to meet his Counsel or his family members, if a person is in prison, it does not mean he cannot communicate with anyone.
12. In these circumstances, considering the fact that accused Trilok Chaudhary is on bail in the present case since 26.08.2016. Initially, on interim bail till 18.01.2018 and on regular bail since 18.01.2018 till date. The undersigned does not deem it appropriate to cancel his bail at this stage i.e., after almost five years, after being admitted to bail in the matter. It is to be noted that in the present case trial is yet to start and the same will take time. Even charges are yet to framed in the matter. A criminal Court, exercising jurisdiction to grant/ cancel bail is not expected to act as a recovery agent and a person cannot be kept in JC during trial as a punitive measure. In these circumstances, considering the fact that no purpose would be served by again arresting the accused and sending him in JC, the application for cancellation of bail is heresy dismissed in the larger interest of justice.
Copy of this order be given dasti to the Ld. counsel for accused as well as Ld. Counsel for the complainant by way of email/WhatsApp..."
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist outrightly contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court without properly appreciating the facts of the present case as well as wrongly applying the law. Further, as per the Ld. CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 8 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:21 +0530 Counsel, the impugned order is wrong and contrary to settled law and has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, mechanically, without due application of mind to the factual and legal position. As per the Ld. Legal Aid Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not apply its mind while dismissing the application of the revisionist seeking cancellation of bail of respondent no. 2. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the impugned order is perverse and bad in law, as passed in haste, without application of law as well as oblivious of the facts and circumstances brought forth to the attention of the Ld. Trial Court. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order, failed to consider that there were serious allegations/accusations against respondent no. 2, pertaining to economic offence/scam, where public at large has been affected. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the MOU was sufficient enough a reason to direct arrest of respondent no. 2. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court was oblivious to the fact that under Clause 2 of the MOU, respondent no. 2 agreed to pay certain amount to the revisionist, despite which such agreed amount was not paid/handed over to the revisionist by respondent no. 2. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court further did not consider that while granting bail, Ld. Trial Court duly noted that the settlement had been reached between the revisionist and accused persons, including respondent no. 2. Ergo, under such circumstances, it was asserted that the violation of said terms of settlement/MOU, itself makes the accused/respondent no. 2 liable to be taken in custody, by cancellation of the liberty/bail granted in his/respondent no. 2's favour. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 9 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:35:25 +0530 Counsel, the accused/respondent no. 2 misused and has been persistently misusing the liberty granted to him by the Ld. Trial Court, disentitling him to any indulgence/relaxation. 3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the accused/respondent no. 2 violated and abused the concession as well as terms and conditions of bail, besides intentionally, deliberately and wilfully failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Settlement/MOU. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that respondent no. 2 as well as other officials of respondent no. 3 threatened the officials of the revisionist numerous times, when they approached the accused persons for compliance of the terms of order dated 26.08.2016 as well as the MOU. It was further vehemently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly placed reliance on the decision in X v. State of Telengana & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 511, despite the fact that the ratio and facts/circumstances of the said case were not applicable in the present case. It was further strenuously reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court did not appreciate that the Ld. Trial Court, while granting bail/interim bail to respondent no. 2 duly noted that the parties shall remain bound by the terms of settlement/MOU, despite which, the Ld. Trial Court did not reject the bail granted to the accused/respondent no. 2, oblivious to the earlier orders of the court. In so far as the maintainability of the present petition is concerned, Ld. Counsel submitted that the impugned order, grossly affects the rights of the revisionist and is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned order determines a valuable right of the revisionist to CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 10 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:29 +0530 seek cancellation of bail of respondent no. 2/accused on violation of the terms granting bail to the said accused, making the impugned order amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was further placed on the decisions in; Dilip Kumar v. Sunita Mittal, 2017 (239) DLT 34; Prashant Kumar v. Mancharlal Bhagatram Bhatia, 1987 Mh.LJ 1026; and M/s. AB Creations & Anr. v. M/s. Bhan Textiles Pvt. Ltd., CRP 151/2023, dated 07.10.2024 (DHC).
4. Per contra Ld. Addl. PP for the State contended that the present petition is not maintainable in view of the bar envisaged under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C./438(2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS'), the impugned order being interlocutory in nature. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that no rights or liabilities have been adjudicated by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order and merely an application seeking cancellation of bail granted to the accused/respondent no. 2 was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court. As such, it was contended that the revision against the said order would not lie/would not be maintainable, making the present petition to be dismissed at the outset. Even otherwise, Ld. Addl. PP for the State contended that there is no infirmity in the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. CMM/Ld. Trial Court after duly appreciating the facts of the present case, as well as in terms of the mandate under the provisions envisaged under law/Section 437 Cr.P.C. Consequently, Ld. Addl. PP for the State entreated that the present petition may be dismissed at the outset, as not maintainable, besides, no irregularity can be CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 11 of 26 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.03.24 14:35:32 +0530 attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court as per the provisions of law.
4.1. Learned Counsel for respondent nos. 2-3, while supplementing the arguments of Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present petition is not maintainable as the same has been filed by one Mr. Atul Gupta, without there being any authorization/resolution authorizing Mr. Gupta to initiate the present proceedings on behalf of the revisionist. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that even the affidavit filed in support of the present petition has been filed by Mr. Atul Gupta in his personal capacity and not in the capacity of having been authorized by M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. in the instant case. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, in view of the decisions in Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee & Anr., 2004 SCC (Crl.) 814 and Pritpal Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., MANU/SC/1611/2001, law is settled that mere non-compliance of the terms and conditions of settlement agreement cannot form the basis of cancellation of bail. Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-3 further submitted that the same is despite the fact that the order of grant of bail to respondent no. 2 was not premised on the ground of settlement, rather, on continued incarceration of the accused, the investigation having not been concluded in the meanwhile despite long incarceration. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel the terms of settlement/MOU was duly complied with by the accused persons/respondent no. 2 and there is no lacunae/omission on the part of the said accused. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 137; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, 1988 CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 12 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:37 +0530 CriLJ 1938; Durga Prasad Sao v. State of Orissa, Crl. Rev. 517/1982; and Janakpala Krishna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2015 (3) ALT (Crl.) 476.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/revisionist, Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 2 as well as that of Ld. Counsel for respondent nos. 2-3 have been heard as well as the record(s), including the records of Ld. Trial Court, case laws relied upon by the parties and the written submissions/note filed, thoroughly perused.
6. In light of the facts and circumstances brought before this Court, the questions that outrightly falls for consideration is qua the maintainability of the present revision petition against the order dismissing the revisionist's application seeking cancellation of bail of respondent no. 2/accused, passed by the Ld. Trial Court. Relevantly, in order to determine the said conundrum, this Court deems it apposite to outrightly refer and reproduce the provisions under law/Section 397 Cr.P.C. 1, as under;
"397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and 1 Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; "438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation-- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section
439.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding...." (Emphasis supplied).
CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 13 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.03.24 14:35:40 +0530
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub- section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked either suo motu or an application of the party(ies), solely in the cases where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon'ble Court while explicating the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. ( pari materia with Section 438 BNSS) observed as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 14 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:44 +0530 perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Clearly, it may be noted from above that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. Concomitantly, another inherent inhibition/embargo to the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of Courts is envisaged under Sub-Section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. (corresponds with Section 438(2) BNSS), which bars the maintainability of revision against 'interlocutory order', objective behind the said provision being to avoid delay in enquiry and/or trial. Pertinently, the meaning of words/expression, 'interlocutory order(s)' has been persistently asserted in various decisions of Courts, including that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this regard, reference is outrightly made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (Supra.), wherein the Hon'ble Court remarked as under:
"6. ...The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 15 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:35:48 +0530 statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revison to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 6 SCC 195, while elucidating the words 'interlocutory order', noted as under:
"11. That apart, the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code, is clearly erroneous. It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380] and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [(1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393] ). The feasible test CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 16 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:35:51 +0530 is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Appropriately, to comprehensively deal with the issue in hand it is further apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI, (2017) 14 SCC 809, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while appreciating the distinction between; final, intermediate and interlocutory order as well as elucidating the connotation of 'intermediate order(s)', inter alia, observed as under;
"16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass--final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction--that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.
*** *** ***
21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind--an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 17 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:35:56 +0530 order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Evidently, in conspectus of the above, it is observed that the orders which may be passed by a criminal court may be categorized as; final order(s), intermediate order(s) and interlocutory order(s). Quite understandably, final orders are those that finally adjudicate the rights of parties, such as orders/judgments of acquittal or conviction. In contradistinction, intermediate orders are the ones which, when reversed, have an effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in final order(s). Correspondingly, interlocutory orders, neither finally adjudicate the rights of parties nor have an effect of terminating/culminating proceedings when the objections raised by a party(ies) are upheld.
12. Apposite to further note here that the test for determination of the nature of an order cannot be to see whether the issue which it determines would come to a culmination, rather, as aforenoted final orders are ones which finally determine the dispute and intermediate orders are one, which, when reversed would terminate a proceeding. Needless to further observe that in case every order, which determines some/an issue is treated as intermediate or final order, would result in opening floodgates of litigation and protracting trial, which menace was sought to be curtailed with the insertion of sub-Section (2) under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Relevant in this regard, to further make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 18 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:36:00 +0530 Neelam Mahajan v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2281 , wherein the Hon'ble Court noted as under;
"20. After perusing the impugned order as well as the material placed before this court and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case this Court is also of the opinion that every interlocutory order merely because it disposes of an aspect, nay a vital aspect in the course of a pending proceeding even adversely affecting a party for the time being would not be something other than interlocutory."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, it is quite evident that every order, which would adjudicate on an aspect of a proceeding cannot be termed as final or intermediate order. Consequently, the Courts have to be cautious to determine whether the order sought to be impugned by means of a petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C./Section 438 BNSS is barred as against an interlocutory order or not. Consequently, in the backdrop of foregoing discussion, when the impugned order/order dated 11.01.2022, passed by the Ld. Trial Court is conscientiously evaluated, this court unambiguously reaches a conclusion that the said order/impugned order does not have an effect of terminating the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, in any manner, hence, is quite evidently not in a nature of final order. Further, in case, the arguments addressed by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist are conceded to and the objections raised by the revisionist in the instant petition are upheld, whereby the impugned order is reversed, same would not have effect of terminating the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, bringing the impugned order outside the purview of 'intermediate order'. As a corollary, the impugned order is nothing other than an interlocutory order against which, no revision would be maintainable. Pertinent to further note that this Court is conscious of the persistent avowals CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 19 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:36:04 +0530 of the superior courts affirming2 that the orders granting bail or refusing bail or cancelling bail are merely interlocutory orders and as such, they cannot be revised by the superior court in view of the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Reference 3 in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Sri. Pal Singh v. State of U.P., MANU/UP/0790/1988 , wherein the Hon'ble Court while considering earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in an akin context remarked as under;
"4. On behalf of the State it is opposed on the ground that it does not lie. It is contended that the order granting or rejecting or cancelling the bail is an interlocutory order against which no revision lies. The two leading cases in this respect are (1) Amar Nath v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0068/1977:
AIR 1977 SC 2185 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra 1978 AWC 96.
5. The Court has held that the expression interlocutory has not been so used in Section 397(2) 2 Bhanwar Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/RH/0298/1978.3
Reference is further made to the decision in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/0560/1988, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, noted; "24. At the conclusion of the hearing on the legal aspect, Shri Poti, learned counsel appearing for the State Government contended, on instructions, that an order passed by a Designated Court for grant or refusal of bail is not an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the Act and therefore an appeal lies. We have considerable doubt and difficulty about the correctness of the proposition. The expression 'interlocutory order' has been used in Section 19(1) in contradistinction to what is known as final order and denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The essential test to distinguish one from the other has been discussed and formulated in several decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Federal Court and this Court. One of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in One way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue. In V.C. Shukla vs State through C.B.I. MANU/SC/0284/1979 : 1980CriLJ690 , Fazal Ali, J. in delivering the majority judgment reviewed the entire case law on the subject and deduced therefrom the following two principles, namely, (i) that a final order has to be interpreted in contra-distinction to an interlocutory orders; and (ii) that the test for determining the finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. It was observed that these principles apply to civil as well as to criminal cases. In criminal proceedings, the word 'judgment' is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused. Applying these tests, it was held that an order framing a charge against an accused was not a final order but an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 and therefore not appealable. It cannot be doubted that the grant or refusal of a bail application is essentially an interlocutory order. There is no finality to such an order for an application for bail can always be renewed from time to time. It is however contended that the refusal of bail by a Designated Court due to the non-fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Section 20(8) cannot be treated to be a final order for it affects the life or liberty of a citizen guaranteed Under Art. 21. While it is true that a person arraigned on a charge of having committed an offence punishable Under the Act faces a prospect of prolonged incarceration in view of the provision contained in Section 20(8) which places limitations on the power of a Designated Court to grant bail, but that by itself is not decisive of the question as to whether an order of this nature is not an interlocutory order. The Court must interpret the words 'not being an interlocutory order' used in Section 19(1) in their natural sense in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act to exclude any interference with the proceedings before a Designated Court at an intermediate stage. There is no finality attached to an order of a Designated Court granting or refusing bail. Such an application for bail can always be renewed from time to time. That being so, the contention advanced on behalf of the State Government that the impugned orders passed by the Designated Courts refusing to grant bail were not interlocutory orders and therefore appealable Under Section 19(1) of the Act, cannot be accepted." (Emphasis supplied) CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 20 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:36:07 +0530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the restricted sense of an order which is converse to the term 'final order'. An order which does not decide any of the matters in dispute or which does not substantially decide any vital issue in the case against the accused, touching the merits of the case or rights of the parties, will still be an interlocutory order. Cataloguing of such orders will not be possible. In the case of 'Amar Nath', while giving examples of what is interlocutory within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code, the Supreme Court mentioned the word " passing orders for bail". This term was interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhola v. State MANU/UP/0625/1979: 1979 ACR 164 and it was held that it will include the granting, rejecting and cancelling the bail. This being the legal position, the order cancelling the bail will be an interlocutory order against which a revision shall be barred under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Clearly, in light of the aforesaid, it is quite clear that the orders granting bail or refusing bail or cancelling bail have been repeatedly held by superior courts to be interlocutory in nature. As a corollary, the order refusing to cancel bail, in the considered opinion of this Court is also interlocutory in nature against which, no revision would lie. The same is for the reason that such an order does not determine the right of an applicant in an unqualified term. Even otherwise, when the order of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order is scrupulously analysed, no infirmity, irregularity, palpable error and/or non-compliance of the provision of law, in the considered opinion of this Court, determinable therein by this Court. On the contrary, as aforenoted, the Ld. Trial Court, while dismissing the application of the revisionist seeking cancellation of bail granted to the accused/respondent no. 2 duly and correctly noted the settled law4 that bail once granted, should not be cancelled in a 4 Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 8 SCC 559.
CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 21 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:36:12 +0530 mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial. Correspondingly, this Court is also in complete concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that though, while granting bail to the accused/respondent no. 2 on 18.01.2018, Ld. Trial Court had noted the factum of settlement/execution of MOU between the revisionist and respondent no. 3, however, the basis of grant of bail to the accused/respondent no. 2 even at that stage appears to be observation of the Ld. Trial Court that the interim bail granted to the accused for around two years (then) had been extended from time to time; matter was still under investigation and that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the accused/respondent no. 2 in custody, when no apparent reason for further custodial interrogation of the said accused/respondent no. 2 was forthcoming, as per the opinion of the Ld. Trial Court. Needless to mention that this Court is further in concurrence/concert with the observation of the Ld. Trial Court, under the impugned order that criminal court, while exercising its bail jurisdiction cannot be expected to act as a recovery agent in order to solve the dues between the private party. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., MANU/SC/0089/2021, wherein the Hon'ble Court unambiguously remarked in an akin context as under;
"5. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for realization of disputed dues. It is open to a Court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 22 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.24
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consideration, while considering an application for bail are the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character behavior and standing of the accused and the circumstances which are peculiar of the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Lastly, this Court deems it apposite to observe that even otherwise, in the considered opinion of this Court, such an application seeking cancellation of bail to respondent no. 2 by the Ld. Trial Court solely on the ground of violation/non-compliance of terms of settlement/MOU was not maintainable in view of the persistent avowals of the superior courts. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Pritpal Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., (Supra.), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court resolutely remarked as under;
"5. The Magistrate cancelled the bail granted to the Appellant solely on the ground that the terms of the compromise had not been complied with. To say the least, the ground on which the petition for cancellation of bail was made and was granted is wholly untenable. It is our view that the order, if allowed to stand, will result in abuse of the process of Court. The High Court clearly erred in maintaining the order. Therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate cancelling the bail and the order of the High Court confirming the said order are set aside. The bail order is restored. The appeal is allowed..."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Correspondingly, in similar situation the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee & CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 23 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:36:21 +0530 Ors. (Supra.), reiterated the law in respect of the foregoing as under;
"7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well wishers, there is no submission made to the court that there will be a compromise or that the appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the court. Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart non-fulfilment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Consequently, in light of the foregoing discussion, facts and circumstances of the present case as well as judicial dictates, the only conclusion which this Court can (and has) unequivocally arrived in the instant case is that impugned order/order dated 11.01.2022, passed by the Ld. Trial Court is nothing order than an interlocutory order, not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It is reiterated that under the CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 24 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24 14:36:25 +0530 impugned order, Ld. Trial Court did not adjudicated any right(s) of the party(ies)/revisionist, rather, merely dismissed the application of the revisionist to cancel bail granted to the accused/respondent no. 2. Even otherwise, for the reasons aforenoted, no infirmity, irregularity, palpable error and/or non- compliance of the provision of law, in the considered opinion of this Court, determinable even on merits in the order dated 11.01.2022 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order. Further, apposite to note at this stage that, though, this Court holds highest regard for the decision(s) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, however, the same would not be of any assistance to the revisionist, in the manner as sought to be relied upon by the Ld. Counsel, as the facts and circumstances of the present case are clearly distinguishable. Ergo, for the reasons hereinunder noted, the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed as not maintainable both on merits as well as law.
18. Conclusively, it is reiterated that the impugned order, i.e., 11.01.2022, passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Ld. CMM, Central, Tis Hazari Court , in case titled as; 'State v. Plumy Estate Pvt. Ltd., New Case No. 15398/2018', arising out of FIR No. 155/2015, PS EOW, under Sections 406/420/34 IPC, dismissing the revisionist's application under Section 437(5) Cr.P.C. is interlocutory in nature and not amenable to the scrutiny of this Court under its revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed in view of bar envisioned under the provisions under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C./Section 438(2) BNSS, as not maintainable. Needless to reiterate no infirmity, irregularity, CR. No. 88/2022 M/s. Earth Hermitage City Pvt. Ltd. v. State & Ors. Page No. 25 of 26 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.03.24 14:36:29 +0530 palpable error and/or non-compliance of the provision of law, in the considered opinion of this Court, determinable even on merits in the order dated 11.01.2022 of the Ld. Trial Court/impugned order.
19. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order.
20. Revision file be consigned to record room after due Digitally compliance. signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.03.24
14:36:35
+0530
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 24.03.2025 ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
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