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Showing contexts for: constructive knowledge in Sh. Bale Ram S/O Late Sh. Bansi Ram vs Land Acquisition Collector [Along With ... on 12 May, 2005Matching Fragments
Hence the reference filed by Shri Zile Singh is hereby rejected.
(C.R. GARG) LAND ACQUISITON COLLECtor/A.D.M.(NORTH EAST)
2. The petitioners pray in these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India that the above orders be quashed and request of the petitioners for reference application submitted by them under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') be transmitted to the Court of competent jurisdiction for decision of their prayer for enhancement of the awarded compensation. According to the petitioners they had the actual and/or constructive knowledge of the award on 15th April, 2002 and they had filed the applications under Section 18 on 30th May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002 respectively within the prescribed period of limitation and as such the impugned orders are patently contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500 and State of Punjab v. Musammat Qaisar Jehan Begum and Anr. AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1604. The preposition of law stated in the above cases is no way in controversy before us. The Court is primarily concerned, in the present petition, as to the application of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases to the facts and circumstances of the cases in hand. The facts are that the appropriate government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 23rd June, 1989 acquiring large parcels of land including the land belonging to the petitioners for a public purpose, namely 'Planned Development of Delhi'. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 20th June, 1990, the land was finally acquired by the Government and award no. 13/92-93 dated 19th June, 1992 was announced by the Collector. The land thereafter vested in the government, as per the provision of the Act.
11. Earlier the view taken by some of the High Courts was that mere intimation of the award would be sufficient and the prescribed period of limitation of six months would commence from that date, when the award was announced and mere intimation was sent to the claimant. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, this view cannot be regarded as correct law. The most fair and reasonable construction of this proviso would be the date of knowledge of contents of the award which would be sufficient to enable the applicant to pursue his remedy like a common prudent man and in accordance with law. Unlike other proviso to section, sources of information or knowledge would not be a material consideration. It is the ultimate provided by the legislature for preferring an application under section 18 of the Act. In other cases, it would be within six weeks from the date of receipt of notice by the claimant under section 12(2) and in the event of the party being present at the time of announcement of the award within six weeks from the Collector's award. In no event, the Collector would have jurisdiction to entertain and make a reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction under section 18 of the Act in excess of six months from the date of Collector's award. In other words, within six months from the date, the party had constructed and/or actual knowledge or information of the award in regard to its essential features. The last part of the second proviso has not defined the word "Collector's Award" and this would have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case but in view of the principle aforestated. Once the award has been made and the party has knowledge about its ingredients, the time limit on a realistic interpretation would commence from that date and has expired on lapse of six months. Prohibition of limitation in a statute is normally to be construed strictly and the equitable or ethical consideration would not normally be with the courts in giving it totally a liberal interpretation so as to wipe out the very effect of the limitation clause.
13. This principle was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst.Quiser Jehan Begum (supra) with further expansion to the word `knowledge and/or information of the award' and clearly interpreting the expression `six months from the date of Collector's award, the Court held as under :-
(5) As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra). It was there observed that a liberal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award: occurring in the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression.... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676 :(AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S.12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award."
14. In the case of Bharat Chand Dilwali v. UOI 1988, Rajdhani Law Reporter 224 as well as a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in the case of Rsulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji v. H.P. Rathod 3rd Spl Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmd and Anr. 1975 (16) Gujrat Law Reporter 911 took the view that mere knowledge of the award or taking part in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act would not be helpful for holding that limitation had commenced from such a date. For this purpose, the date would be when either the award was communicated to the party actually or he had knowledge of essential contents of the award actually or constructively.