Punjab-Haryana High Court
Date Of Decision:10.02.2014 vs Gajraj Singh on 10 February, 2014
Author: Rakesh Kumar Jain
Bench: Rakesh Kumar Jain
vinod kumar
2014.02.13 10:29
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [1]
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M)
Date of decision:10.02.2014
M/s Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Gajraj Singh ...Respondent
CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain
Present: Mr. V.K.Jain, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. J.L.Malhotra, Advocate, for the appellant.
Mr. Sudhir Aggarwal, Advocate,
for the respondent.
*****
RAKESH KUMAR JAIN, J.
The defendant is in appeal against the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court by which suit filed by the plaintiff has been decreed.
In short, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for possession of a built up property situated in village Mulahera, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, comprising of a basement, ground floor and first floor, total measuring 22,000 square feet (covered area) alleging that it was leased out to the defendant on 01.01.2003 for a period of 5 years. The rent was fixed @ `10/- per square foot with an agreement that it would be increased by 20% after three years. The plaintiff determined the lease after a period of 5 years when the rate of rent was @ `12/- per square foot. He vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [2] ***** determined the lease for the basement and the ground floor on 31.12.2007, for the first floor on 29.02.2008 and issued notice to the defendant on 28.03.2008 to vacate the property in dispute. Since the defendant did not vacate the demised premises, therefore, the suit was filed for possession and also for claiming the recovery of `27,72,000/- as damages and mesne profits @ `30/- per square foot w.e.f. 01.04.2008 along with the consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from parting with possession of the property or from making any structural change.
In the written statement, the defendant took some preliminary objections but on merits, it admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant and execution of the lease but the non- payment of rent was not admitted.
On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the Trial Court:-
"1. Whether the plaintiff is lawful owner of the suit property?OPP.
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit property on the grounds mentioned in the plaint.OPP.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover an amount of Rs.27,72,000/- from the defendant along with pendente-lite and future interest as prayed for?OPP.
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of injunction as prayed for?OPP.
5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own act conduct and acquiescence from filing the present suit?OPD.vinod kumar
2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [3]
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6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit?OPD.
7. Relief."
In order to prove his case, plaintiff examined himself as PW2, Parveen Kumar Raghav, J.E. as PW1, Satbir Singh, Kanungo as PW3, Vivek Singh Rao as PW4 and tendered site plan Ex.P1, lease agreement Ex.P2, notice Ex.P3, postal receipt Ex.P4, courier receipt Ex.P5, reply to notice Ex.P6, lease agreement Ex.PX, certified copy of statement of Mahender Kumar as Ex.PA, certified copy of lease agreement Ex.PB, certified copy of judgment Ex.PC and certified copy of decree sheet Ex.PD.
On the other hand, defendant examined M.K.Dhir, Director of the company as DW1 and Jagdish, Assistant Draftsman as DW2 and tendered Punjab Govt. Gaz. Notification Ex.DW1/1 and site plan Ex.DW1/2, attested copy of statement of Gajraj Ex.DA.
The Trial Court non-suited the plaintiff on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the suit because during the pendency of the suit, the area in which the property in dispute is situated came within the municipal limits to which the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (here-in-after referred to as the "Act") became applicable but the lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on the ground that even if the suit land, on which the building is in existence, was not within the municipal limits at the time of filing of the suit to which Act became applicable during the pendency of the suit as the property in dispute has come within vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [4] ***** the urban limits of Municipal Committee, Gurgaon, the rights of the parties to the suit had crystalized for the purpose of maintainability of the suit at the time of filing of the suit and the Civil Court would continue to have the jurisdiction to decide the same.
Notice in the appeal was issued on 06.09.2013 for 11.09.2013 and on that date, following order was passed by this Court:-
"This defendant's appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated July 2nd, 2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Gurgaon whereby judgment and decree of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gurgaon was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.
The plaintiff filed a suit for possession and recovery of Rs.27,72,000/-, mesne-profits and permanent injunction. At the time of institution of suit, the demised shop fell outside the limits of municipal area, therefore, the suit was filed in the Civil Court. During the pendency of suit, the demised shop was covered by the area which is notified as municipal area.
Learned counsel for the appellant-defendant has urged that since during the pendency of suit, the demised shop was covered within the municipal area so, the Civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the eviction vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [5] ***** of the appellant-defendant can only be ordered under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on (i) Sawan Ram vs. Gobind Ram and another 1980(2) RCJ 62; (ii) Jagpat Rai vs. Gurdal Singh PLR 1991(2) 23; Ram Narain and others vs. Ram Lal and others PLR 2004(1) 634; (iv) J.N. Katyal and another vs. Krishan Kapur alias Bittu and another 2005 (1) RCR (Civil) 303 and; (v) Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others vs. Niranjan Modak 1985(1) Rent Control Reporter 27.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that even if the demised shop fell within the municipal area, the Civil Court still has got the jurisdiction to decide the suit. In this regard, reliance has been placed on (i) Harjit Kaur vs. Sarabjit Kaur and another 2013(1) RCR (Rent) 74; (ii) Sarvjit Kaur and others vs. Gurcharan Singh 2010(4) PLR 154 and; (iii) Basakha Singh vs. Mani Ram Bhatia 2007(1) RCR 384.
List for hearing on 10.01.2014.
Meanwhile, execution of judgment and decree dated July 2nd, 2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Gurgaon qua eviction of the vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [6] ***** appellant-defendant, is stayed.
Learned counsel for the appellant has undertaken that the entire amount of arrears shall be deposited by the appellant within three weeks before the Executing Court and he shall continue paying future rent as well.
Executing Court shall disburse the amount of arrears of rent to the defendant-respondent." I have heard counsel for the parties and examined the record.
Before I proceed further to decide the lis between the parties, I would like to record that there is lot of confusion about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if a suit is filed by the landlord for seeking possession in the Civil Court during the exemption period, as provided under Section 1(3) of the Act, and where the suit is filed by the landlord for seeking possession under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 when the Act is not applicable but during the pendency of the suit the property in dispute comes within the municipal limits when it is so extended under Section 4 of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (here-in-after referred to as the "Municipal Act").
Thus, it would be relevant to refer to certain provisions of the Act, which read as under:-
"1. Short title and extent.-- (1) This Act may be called the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.
(2) It shall extend to all urban areas in Haryana vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [7] ***** but nothing herein contained shall apply to any cantonment area.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its completion."
"2. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.--
(a) to (h) xxx xxx xxx
(i) "urban area" means any area administered by a municipal committee, notified area committee, Faridabad Complex Administration or any area declared by the State Government by notification to be urban area for the purpose of this Act."
"13. Eviction of tenants.-- (1) A tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
xxx xxx xxx"
Certain provisions of the Municipal Act also requires to be noticed, which read as under:-
"2. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.--
(1) to (24) xxx xxx xxx (24A) "urban area" means an area within the vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [8] ***** municipal limits of municipality;
xxx xxx xxx"
"4. Notification of intention to alter limits of municipality.-- (1) The State Government may, by notification, and in such other manner as it may determine, declare its intention to include within a municipality any local area in the vicinity of the same and defined in the notification. (2) Any inhabitant of a municipality or local area in respect of which a notification has been published under sub-section (1), may, should he object to the alteration proposed, submit his objection in writing through the Deputy Commissioner to the State Government within six weeks from the publication of the notification; and the State Government shall take such objection into consideration.
(3) When six weeks from the publication of the notification have expired, and the State Government has considered the objections, if any, which have been submitted under sub-section (2), the State Government may, by notification, include the local area in the municipality. (4) When any local area has been included in a municipality under sub-section (3), this Act, and, except as the State Government may, by vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [9] ***** notification, direct otherwise, all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers issued, made, or conferred under this Act and in force throughout whole of the municipality at the time, shall apply to such area."
From the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that though the Act is applicable to the urban area where the property in dispute is situated, but would not apply to such building, construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of the Act, for a period of ten years from the date of its completion but insofar as the Municipal Act is concerned, it would bring the area with in the definition of an "urban area" by virtue of Section 4, to which provisions of the Act would apply, meaning thereby any property which comes within the definition of "building", as provided under the Act, even if constructed long ago would not be governed by the provisions of the Act if it does not fall within the urban area and as a natural corollary, the provisions of the Act much-less Section 13(1) would not be applicable but as soon as that area, in which the building is constructed, comes within the definition of "urban area" in view of Section 4 of the Municipal Act, the provisions of the Act much-less Section 13(1) would be applicable and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred.
Learned counsel for the parties have relied upon number of judgments in support of their case dealing with both the aforesaid situations, namely, in case where the building is constructed on or after the commencement of the Act and are exempted for 10 years from the date of its completion and where vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 10 ] ***** the Act has become applicable because of the extension of the municipal area converting rural area into the urban area.
The present case is pertaining to the second situation because admittedly, when the suit was filed, the demised premises was not within the municipal limits of Gurgaon and was not covered by the provisions of the act but during the pendency of the suit, it came within the municipal limits of Gurgaon. The lower Appellate Court, after relying upon certain judgments of this Court, has concluded that the rights of the parties are to be seen on the date when the suit is filed and inclusion of the demised premises within the municipal limits during the pendency of the suit would not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following judgments in support of his case:-
(i) Sawan Ram v. Gobind Ram and another,
1980(2) Rent Control Journal 62;
(ii) Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra, AIR 1980
Supreme Court 299;
(iii) Jagpat Rai v. Gurdial Singh, 1991(2) PLR 23;
(iv) Krishan Lal and another v. Krishan, 2010(2) Rent Control Reporter 87;
(v) Ram Narain and others v. Ram Lal and others, 2004(1) PLR 634;
(vi) J.N.Katyal and another v. Krishan Kapur alias Bittu and another, 2005(1) RCR (Civil) 303; and
(vii) Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak, 1985(1) Rent Control Reporter 27 (SC). On the other hand, counsel for the respondent has relied upon the following judgments:-
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(i) Shri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar v. Manoj Kumar,
1998(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 283;
(ii) Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Panja, 1988(2)
R.C.R. (Rent) 423 (SC);
(iii) Basakha Singh v. Mani Ram Bhatia, 2007(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 384;
(iv) Harjit Kaur v. Sarabjit Kaur and another, 2013 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 74; and
(v) Smt. Sarvjit Kaur and others v. Gurcharan Singh, 2010(4) PLR 154.
In Sawan Ram's case (supra), Gobind Ram filed a suit against his tenant, namely, Sawan Ram for seeking his ejectment and realization of arrears of rent. During the pendency of the suit, the Act was amended with the result that the grounds on which the ejectment of the tenant was sought from the shop in dispute was no more available. The tenant filed application that the suit may be dismissed. The Sub Judge rejected the application as a result of which the revision was filed by the tenant before this Court. The matter was ultimately placed before the Full Bench of this Court to answer the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred from the fields covered by the provisions of the Act. The answer of the Full Bench was in affirmative.
In Mani Subrat Jain's case (supra), the tenant, an advocate, entered into a compromise with the landlord agreeing to vacate the premises by a certain date on certain terms. A decree in terms of the compromise was passed before the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was made applicable to the area in question on 04.11.1972. The landlord sought execution of the decree after the said Act was extended to the area but it was held vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 12 ] ***** that the tenant still remained a tenant in possession and Section 13 of the said Act interdicted the execution of the decree, meaning thereby he had the protection of the Act.
In Jagpat Rai's case (supra), Gurdial Singh filed a suit for possession of his shop situated in village Assandh, Tehsil and District Karnal, by way of ejectment. The Trial Court decreed the suit. Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of the Trial Court. During the pendency of the second appeal, an application was filed by the defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for producing a notification of the State of Haryana by way of additional evidence showing that village Assandh has been declared to be a Notified Area Committee in exercise of the powers under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973. It was argued by the landlord that when the suit was filed, the shop was not within the Notified Area Committee and, therefore, any decree passed could be executed irrespective of the fact that the area of the shop has been included in the Notified Area Committee and the provisions of the Rent Act have become applicable. He sought the support of the judgment reported as Nand Kishore Marwah v. Smt. Samundri Devi, 1987 H.R.R. 627, Atma Ram Mittal's case (supra) and M/s Kesho Ram & Co. and others v. Uniion of India, 1989 H.R.R. 322 but these judgments were not found applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on the ground that the suit was filed during the period of exemption and it was held that the rights of the parties had crystallized on the date of institution of the suit and the ultimate decree passed can be executed irrespective of the fact vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 13 ] ***** that the period of exemption has already expired either during the pendency of the suit or appeal but where the property in dispute is included in the municipal limits of the Notified Area Committee during the pendency of the suit, it comes within the the definition of local area under the Act and the provisions of the Rent Act would apply and consequently the tenant could be ordered to be ejected only on any of the grounds available under the Rent Act and not otherwise as in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others' case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that once the area has been included in the Notified Area Committee, the provisions of the Rent Act would apply and the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below was reversed.
In Krishan Lal and another's case (supra), the suit was filed by the landlord terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The suit was filed on 06.07.2001 but during the pendency of the suit, a notification was issued on 01.08.2001 extending the area of municipal limits of Uchana, District Jind and the provisions of the Act were made applicable to the property in dispute. The Trial Court dismissed the suit in view of the fact that the Act has been made applicable and the appeal filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed. This Court also dismissed the second appeal while relying upon the aforesaid judgment in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others' case (supra).
In Ram Narain and others' case (supra), the suit was filed terminating the tenancy in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Trial Court decreed the suit vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 14 ] ***** but in appeal it was reversed on the ground that the shop in dispute is situated within the municipal limits of Kharkhoda to which the provisions of the Act have been made applicable and the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction to try the suit. The second appeal at the instance of the landlord was dismissed by this Court opining that the lower Appellate Court has not committed any error to take into consideration the subsequent event of constitution of Notified Area Committee in respect of Kharkhoda i.e., the area where the shop in dispute is situated.
In J.N.Katyal and another's case (supra), the plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of ejectment from the house in dispute. The suit was filed on 11.10.1999. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the suit is not maintainable because during the pendency of the suit, the Act became applicable to Panchkula town in view of the notification dated 25.01.2001. The appeal was also dismissed and the second appeal before this Court preferred by the landlord was also dismissed clarifying the difference between the two situations where the suit is filed during the period of exemption when the Act by itself was applicable and which was ordered to be continued despite the fact that the exemption period was over during the pendency of the suit and where the suit was filed when the provisions of the Act became applicable during the pendency of the suit due to inclusion of the area in the municipal limits.
In Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others' case (supra) also, the Supreme Court has observed that if the Rent Act comes into force during pendency of the appeal, the tenant is entitled to vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 15 ] ***** protection of Rent Act as the appeal is continuation of the suit and the change in law during the pendency of appeal has to be taken into consideration Insofar as the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the respondent are concerned, in Shri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar's case (supra), the tenant was inducted in the shop on 01.11.1977. The building was constructed a few months before the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy was terminated by notice issued on 10.08.1983 and the suit for possession was filed on 26.09.1983. In the said case, it was made explicitly clear in para 8 and 20 of the judgment that where the suit is filed during the period of exemption provided under the Act and the exemption period comes to an end during the pendency of the suit, the rights of the parties had to be crystallized from the date when the suit was filed and not subsequent thereto as there is no change in law but change in the circumstances. Para 8 of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"8. There is no provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of a civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted. There is also no provision preventing the execution of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13 (1) does not expressly refer to execution of a decree for possession. On a reading of all the provisions of the Act, it is evident that it has not prevented a civil court from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 16 ] ***** incurred prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the building in question. If the Legislature had intended to take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide a suit which had been validly instituted, it would have been worded differently. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under Section 1 (3) is to encourage construction of new buildings.
That purpose would be defeated if the owner of the building is deprived of his right to get possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten years from the date of its completion. In fact the logical consequence of the argument of the appellants if accepted would be that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord within ten years from its completion it cannot be executed after the expiry of the said period of ten years as such execution would not be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is common knowledge that a proceeding in a civil court for recovery of immovable property could be dragged on by the defendant easily for a period of ten years or more and thereby the tenant whose tenancy had been terminated validly before the suit would successfully make the proceeding infructuous by prolonging the litigation. The argument of the appellants cannot be accepted as otherwise the vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 17 ] ***** purpose of exemption would get defeated."
In Atma Ram Mittal's case (supra), the landlord filed a suit for possession in the Civil Court of Hisar in respect of a shop rented out to the tenant in 1978. The suit was filed after terminating the tenancy in terms of Section 1(3) of the Act. On 15.02.1983, the tenant filed written statement and in November, 1984, the tenant filed an application for dismissal of the suit as the shop in question was constructed in June, 1974 and the period of ten years had elapsed by June, 1984 in terms of Section 1(3) of the Act and as such, the immunity from application of the Act had expired and the suit under the Act was not maintainable and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred. The said application was dismissed by the Trial Court. However, in revision, this Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the suit pending before the Civil Court was dismissed which led to the filing of the appeal before the Supreme Court. In these set of facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the rights of the parties have to be seen on the date of the institution of the suit and the building would remain exempted till suit is disposed of or adjudicated.
In Basakha Singh's case (supra), similar situation was there where building was exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act for 10 years. Civil Suit for eviction was filed and decreed but Rent Act became applicable as the exemption period was over during pendency of the appeal. It was held that the Civil Court is not prevented from adjudicating the rights accrued and liability incurred prior to the date on which the Rent Act become applicable. vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh
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In Harjit Kaur's case (supra), the suit was filed for ejectment of the tenant and recovery of arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.01.2004 till 30.09.2004. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and the appeal was dismissed. It was not disputed that when the suit was instituted on 01.11.2004, the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, were not applicable which became applicable during the pendency of the suit w.e.f. 01.04.2005. This Court, while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar's case (supra), held that the rights of the parties are to be seen at the time of filing of the suit though in Shri Kishan @ Krishan Kumar's case (supra), the exemption period was continuing when the suit was filed which came to an end during the pendency of the suit and in that background it was held that the rights have to be crystallized at the time of filing of the suit.
Lastly, in Smt. Sarvjit Kaur and others' case (supra), the suit was filed for seeking ejectment of the tenant but at that time, it was notified as municipal committee on 28.03.2006 but vide notification dated 21.09.2006, it was again notified as a Gram Panchayat. This Court has held that "the suit was instituted on 15.09.2003. On that date, Radaur was admittedly Gram Panchayat and therefore, provisions of the Haryana Rent Act were not applicable to the demised property. Consequently, civil court had jurisdiction to try the ejectment suit. Rights of the parties had to be determined at the time of the institution of the suit. In this context, it may be noticed that even in urban areas, provisions of the Haryana Rent Act are not vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 19 ] ***** applicable to a building for ten years after its completion. If ejectment suit is filed during the said period of ten years, civil court continues to have jurisdiction to pass ejectment decree in such a suit, even if provisions of the Haryana Rent Act become applicable to the demised property during the pendency of the suit, on expiry of the initial period of ten years from the date of completion of the building. On the same analogy, in the instant case, provisions of the Haryana Rent Act were not applicable when the suit was instituted and therefore, applicability of provisions of the Haryana Rent Act during the pendency of the suit on declaration of Radaur as municipal town would not divest the civil court of its jurisdiction to try the suit".
I have discussed all the judgments referred by both the parties in their favour and have come to a definite conclusion that if a suit is filed, for seeking eviction of the tenant and recovery of rent, before the Civil Court during the period of exemption in terms of Section 1(3) of the Act and during the pendency of the suit exemption period expires, the rights of the parties to the suit would be seen on the date on which the suit was filed, for the purpose of decreeing the suit, meaning thereby the Civil Court would continue to have the jurisdiction to try the suit to its logical end.
In case the suit is filed when the property in dispute is not an urban property to which provisions of the Act are inapplicable but during the pendency of the suit, limits of the municipal area are extended, taking in its fold the area in which the demised premises is situated, it becomes an urban area and, therefore, the Civil Court would not have the jurisdiction to decide vinod kumar 2014.02.13 10:29 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.3486 of 2013 (O&M) [ 20 ] ***** the lis between the parties even at the stage of execution as the tenant would have protection of the provisions of the Act in which specific grounds are provided for seeking eviction and the tenancy cannot be terminated merely by serving a notice upon the tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
In the present appeal, when the suit was filed, the demised premises was in the rural area and was included subsequently in the urban area to which the Act is applicable, therefore, the Civil Court would cease to have jurisdiction to try and decide the suit and the proper forum for the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant is of the Rent Controller where he could file appropriate application for seeking ejectment in terms of the provisions of the Act.
Consequently, the present appeal is hereby allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored with costs throughout.
February 10, 2014 (RAKESH KUMAR JAIN) vinod* JUDGE