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11. Under Section 4 it is provided that on acquisition of private forests the State Government shall take steps for afforestation of forest lands on scientific basis for developing the lands and utilising them according to their capability including pastures, for regulating the felling of trees on scientific lines, for promoting soil and water conservation as would best subserve agriculture, for distribution of the mature exploitable forest produce as to best subserve the common good and for securing those purposes undertake schemes, particularly in the best interest of the agriculture and agricultural population of the State; the said section then goes on to indicate what several other matters may be provided for by such schemes. Original Section 5 created an obligation upon a person in possession of private forest to surrender and hand over the same to the Collector forthwith, but under the amended Section 5 it has been provided that no sooner any private forest would stand acquired and vested in the State Government the person authorised by the State Government or Collector in that behalf shall enter into and take over possession thereof and any person resisting taking over of such possession will be liable to be removed by use of such force as may be necessary. Section 6 provides machinery for determining whether a particular piece of property is private forest or not and whether the same has vested in the State Government or not and the Collector's decision oft the point, subject to an appeal to the Tribunal or revision to the State, has been made final. Sections 7 to 11 provide for a scheme and procedure for determination by the Collector of the amount payable to the owner of private forest and the manner of making payment to him and deductions of amounts of encumbrances to be made therefrom. Section 12 provides for payment of amount to a person other than the owner of the private forest for extinguishment of his right, if any, qua private forest enjoyed by him otherwise than as a member of the public and it further provides that if any amount is awarded to such a person, the same will be liable to be deducted from the amount determined as payble to the owner of such private forest. Section 13 provides for an appeal against an order of the Collector under Sections 9, 11 and 12 while Section 14 lays down the procedure for hearing of such appeal by the Tribunal and Section 15 deals with limitation for preferring such an appeal. Sections 17 and 18 provide for finality of the Collector's award subject to appeal to the Tribunal and revision to the State Government under certain circumstances. The provisions of Section 21 enable the State Government to make declaration of certain lands as private forest and the effect that would follow after such a declaration is made. Section 22 casts an obligation on the owners of private forests to deliver records relating to such private forests which have vested in the State Government under the provisions of the Act to an officer authorised by the State Government. Section 23 confers rule making power upon the State Government for carrying out the purposes of the Act while Section 24 repeals some of the sections including Sections 34A and 35 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as it is made applicable to the State of Maharashtra with effect from the appointed day viz. 30-8-1975.

Belying upon this factual position which indisputably arises on record, Mr, Singhvi ior the petitioners has raised the question about legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 3 of the Acquisition Act to the extent to which it purports to vest the aforesaid 'forest produce' in the form of timber cut and fashioned into logs in the State Government. Mr. Singhvi's argument challenging the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 3 of the Acquisition Act runs thus: According to him, the pith and substance of the Acquisition Act is acquisition of private forests; the topic 'forests' falls under Entry 19 in List II while the topic 'acquisition and requisitioning of property' falls under Entry 42 in List III of the 7th .Schedule to the Constitution and as such under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III it would be perfectly competent to the State Legislature to legislate upon the subject of acquisition of private forests which it has done under Section 3 of the Act. However, neither in Article 366 of the Constitution nor in the General Clauses Act, 1897 (which has been made applicable for interpretation of the Constitution under Art, 367) has the expression 'forest' been denned nor was there any legislative practice prior to enactment of the Constitution throwing any light on the precise meaning of the expression 'forest' inasmuch as neither the Government of India Act, 1935 (legislative practice prior to the introduction of federal structure accompanied by distribution of legislative powers being irrelevant) nor any other Indian enactment had defined 'forest' and therefore the topic 'forests' appearing under Entry 19 in List II must be given its plain dictionary meaning. He pointed out that out of the three meanings given in Oxford English Dictionary the applicable meaning of the expression 'forest' is 'an extensive tract of land covered with trees end undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture; also the trees collectively a forest' which shows that forest is essentially or 'basically land of certain description, namely land covered with trees etc. and that forest produce in the form of cut and fashioned logs of wood or cut timber would not come within that concept as it is a separate and distinct species of property end therefore the State Legislature exercising its legislative powers under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III lacks competence to legislate on acquisition of such forest produce. No doubt it is true, he has argued, that while legislating on forests the State Legislature can legislate on matters necessarily incidental to effectuate legislation on forests but according to him acquisition of forest produce would not be incidental to the main purpose of the Act, namely acquisition of private forests themselves. He has further contended that the State Legislature cannot obtain legislative competence under Entry 19 in List II to legislate for acquisition of forest produce by giving to the expression 'forest' an artificial meaning which it does not bear as a matter of plain language, even taking the widest meaning which is given to that expression in standard dictionaries. He has pointed out that the expression 'forest' has been artificially denned in Section 2(c-1) of the Act by including within its compass 'all forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise' and further since the said definition includes certain lands which are 'deemed forests', even the forest produce of such deemed forest would also be included in the definition of 'forest', which would be beyond the competence of the State Legislature, inasmuch as, under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III the Stat Legislature is entitled to legislate only upon the topic of acquisition of private forest, the expression 'forest' receiving its ordinary dictionary meaning. Mr. Paranjpe appearing for some of the interveners has contended that both the definitions of 'forest' and 'private forest' have been artificially extended by including in them lands as well as forest produce, which by no stretch of imagination can be included therein accordr ing to the normal connotation of forest o* private forest; for instance, according to him, by artificially extending the meaning of the 'forest' the State Legislature has brought within its fold lands where quarrying of stones would be in operation and that. the definition of private forest in Section 2 (f) is made so large and extensive that it would include quarries and mines and other lands, which may not be described as forests by the device of (a) issuing a notification under Section 34A of the Forest Act, 1927 or (b) by issuing a notification under Section 35(1) of the said Act or (c) by giving a notice under Section 35(3) of the said Act or (d) by issuing a notification under Section 38 of the said Act and as such these definitions would be beyond the legislative compe-tence of the State Legislature. Looking at the question from another angle counsel for the petitioners have contended that by the device of enacting artificial definitions of the expressions 'forest' and 'private forest' the State Legislature has enacted this measure for the purpose of acquiring forest produce under the guise of legislating on acquisition of private forest under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III, but since the legislature can be said to have transgressed its limits, the enactment to the extent to which it purports to vest forest produce in the State is a piece of colourable legislation and as such the same is, to that extent, liable to be struck down as being beyond its competence. (Vide K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, ). Counsel for the , petitioners have also urged that since the topic of 'forest produce' is a distinct and independent species of property, and the same is not covered by any other specific entry in any of the three Lists in the 7th Schedule it will fall hi the residuary Entry 97 in List I and as such Section 3 of the Act will be trenching upon that Union entry and therefore to the extent that it purports to vest forest produce in the State Government will have to be struck down. Lastly, counsel have contended that in any event on its proper construction Section 3 of the Act vests in the State Government all 'private forests' and the expression 'private forest' occurring in the operative part of Section 3 must mean private forest as defined in Section 2 (f), in which definition 'forest produce' is not included and as such on a strict construction of Section 3 read with Section 2 (f) forest produce of the private forests would not vest in the State; the contention is that by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 Clause (vii) which spoke of 'all forest produce there-in, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise' which had been initially added to the definition of 'private forest' was deleted therefrom and the same has-been inserted as Clause (v) in the definition of the expression 'forest' in Section 2(c-1) and as such the amending measure has misfired.

30. Turning to the definition of 'private forest' given in Section 2 (f), it will appear clear that even this definition consists of two parts; the first part indicating what the expression 'means' according to the Legislature and the second part indicating what the expression 'includes' according to the Legislature. In the first part 'private forest' has been defined to mean 'any forest which is not the property of the Government' while under the inclusive part six items or heads mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) to (vi) have been included in the definition. The 'meaning' part presents no difficulty and the question is about the inclusive part of the definition. The true impact of this inclusive part of the definition cannot be realised without bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter V of the Forest Act, 1927. It may be stated that the Indian Forest Act, 1927 deals with different types of forest, such as, (i) Reserved forests, (ii) Village forests, (iii) Protected forests and (iv) Forests which are not the property of Government; Chapter V deals with the fourth category of forest and contains Sections 34-A, 35 and 38. Under Section 34A it has been provided that for the purposes of that Chapter 'forest' includes any land containing trees and shrubs, pasture lands and any other land whatsoever which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be a forest. Section 35(1) enables the State Government to issue a notification regulating or prohibiting certain acts, such as, breaking up or clearing of the land for cultivation, pasturing of cattle, firing or clearing of the vegetation, girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees, cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber; or quarrying of stone or the burning of lime or charcoal, etc., when such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any forest not belonging to Government, for the purpose of conservation of trees and forests, preservation and improvement of soil, improvement of grazing, maintenance of a water supply In springs, rivers and tanks, maintenance, increase and distribution of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel, maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works, protection of roads, bridges, railways and other lines of communication and preservation of the public health, etc. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 it is provided that no notification under Sub-clause (1) shall be issued until after a show cause notice to the owner of such forest has been issued and until his objections, if any are heard and considered by Government. Section 38 provides for protection of private forest at the request of the owners and states that upon a request in that behalf being made by the owners the State Government can apply the provisions of the Forest Act to such private forest by means of a notification. If Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 2(f) are read in the light of the aforesaid provisions of Sections 34A, 35 and 38 of the Forest Act, 1927, it will appear clear that these Sub-clauses bring within the definition of private forest four types of land in respect of which action has been taken by the State Government under Sections 34A, 35(1), 35(3) and 38 of the Forest Act. Sub-clause (i) brings within the definition of 'private forest' any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under Section 34A of the Forest Act and Sub-clause (ii) brings any forest in respect of which a notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act has been issued immediately before the appointed day within the category of 'private forest'. Both the sections viz. 34A and 35 of the Forest Act have been repealed with effect from 30th Aug. 1975 after the coming into force of the Acquisition Act and in view of such repeal no fresh declaration by issuing a notification under Section 34A or fresh issuance of a notification under Section 35(1) is now possible. As regards action taken either under Section 34A or under Section 35(1) prior to 30-8-1975 our attention was not drawn to any defective declaration or defective notification issued under either of these provisions. Moreover, it would be reasonable to assume that such prior declaration under Section 34A was in respect of such land as possessed the essential attributes of a forest. Prior action under Section 35(1) must have been merely regulatory or prohibitory of certain acts specified in the section and that too in respect of 'forest' inasmuch as the power to issue such regulations or prohibitions is confined to forests. No grievance can be made with regard to action taken by means of a notification under Section 38 of the Forest Act in respect of land mentioned in Sub-clause (iv), inasmuch as, such action is taken with a view to formation or conservation of forest over such land at the request of the owners of land. It is thus clear that Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Section 2(f) deal with declared, adjudicated or admitted instances of forests. Sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(f) no doubt seeks to cover land in respect of which merely a notice has been issued to the owner of a private forest under Section 35(3) and his objections may have remained unheard till 30-8-1975 as Section 35 has stood repealed on the coming into force of the Acquisition Act. Here also, as in the case of owners of land falling under Sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(c-1), his objections, if any, including his objection that his land cannot be styled as forest at all can be heard and disposed of under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, and this position was conceded by Counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra. Sub-clause (v) includes within the definition of private forest the interest of another person who along with Government is jointly interested in a forest, while Sub-clause (vi) includes sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of forest and lands appurtenant thereto. In our view, the artificiality involved, if any, in the definition of 'private forest' in Section 2(f) is indeed of a very minor nature and does not introduce anything over which the State Legislature has no competence. The contention of Mr. Singhvi and Mr. Paranjpe that under the artificial definitions even lands which cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as forest in its normal or natural connotation have been brought within that concept as well as their apprehension that lands which may be barren tracts where quarrying operations may be carried on may be included in the artificial definitions under the power of declaration conferred on the State without any hearing are misconceived. In the first place, the artificial parts of the two definitions of 'forest' and 'private forest' do not do anything of the kind as suggested and secondly under Section 6 of the Act owners of such land which is sought to be declared as forest would have an opportunity of raising objections to the proposed declarations and of satisfying the Government that their lands are not and cannot be treated or declared as forests.

31. We may now deal with two more submissions that have been urged by Counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention that the forest produce, of the private forests which vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act, was not intended to pass to the State Government, one based on the construction of Section 3 read with the two definitions of 'forest' and 'private forest' given in Sections 2(c-1) and 2(f) respectively and the other based on the absence of any provision for payment of compensation or amount for acquisition of forest produce in the Act. Dealing with the first aspect Mr. Seervai has contended that on its proper construction Section 3 of the impugned Act vests in the State Government all private forests and the expression 'private forest' occurring in the operative part of that section must mean 'private forests' as defined in Section 2 (f) in which definition 'forest produce' is not included and therefore on a strict construction of Section 3 read with Section 2 (f) no forest produce of the private forests which have vested in under Section 3 would vest in the State. He has urged a two-fold argument in support of this construction. In the first place the word 'forest' in the composite expression 'private forest' must mean natural forest according to the dictionary meaning and that word cannot be given the artificial meaning which has been assigned to it in Section 2(c-1), for, according to him, one definition cannot be read into another definition and as such though the definition of 'forest' in Section 2(c-1) includes 'forest produce' under Sub-clause (v) of that definition, the same cannot he read into or form part of 'private forest under Section 2 (f). Secondly, when Act 29/75 was initially amended by Ordinance 13 of 1975 Sub-clause (vii) which spoke of 'all the forest produce therein' was added in the definition of 'private forest' in Section 2 (f) but when the Act was further amended by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 (which replaced the Ordinance) that Sub-clause (vii) was deleted from Section 2 (f) and was added as a new Sub- Clause (v) to the definition of 'forest' under Section 2 (c-1) and as such the amending measure (Act 72 of 1975) must be held to have misfired. The net result, according to Mr. Seervai, is that the forest produce would not vest in the State Government along with private forests on a proper construction of Section 3 of the Act. It is not possible to accept this contention for the reasons which we shall presently indicate.