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30. We must now turn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India, , which is of particular relevance to the contention if regard to Article 31-B. A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, (27 of 1961) which was brought into operation on January 26, 1962. This Court had held that the provisions of this enactment and certain amendments thereto were not open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution since these enactments has been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution 17th and 40th Amendment Acts. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the main challenge was to the constitutionality of Articles 31-A, 31-B and unamended Articles 31-C. Chandrachud, J., speaking for the majority, noted the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati, , where it had been held that in exercise of the power conferred by Article 368. The Constitution could not be amended so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. He observed that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right was withdrawn, would not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure was damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of Part III was in issue and whether what was withdrawn was quintessential to the basic structure of the Constitution. The Constitution First and Fourth Amending Acts which introduced Articles 31-A and 31-B into the Constitution with retrospective effect for the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands held or let for purposes of agriculture, or for purposes ancillary thereto, strengthened rather than weakened the basic structure of the Constitution. It might happen that while existing inequalities were being removed, new inequalities might arise marginally and incidentally. Such marginal and incidental inequalities could not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution . Insofar as Article 31-B was concerned, it did not define the category of laws which were to receive its protection, and it afforded protection to the Schedule-laws against at the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. No enactment would be placed in the Ninth Schedule except by Parliament; and since it was a part of the Constitution, no additions or alterations could be made therein without complying with the restrictive provisions governing amendments to the Constitution. Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule provided a protective umbrella to all enactments included in that schedule, no matter of what character, kind or category they might be Article 31-B empowered Parliament to include in the Ninth Schedule such laws as it considered fit and proper to include therein. The 39th amendment had undertaken "an incredibly massive programme" to include Items 87 to 124 while the 40th amendment had added Items 125 to 188 to the Ninth Schedule "in one stroke". The Supreme Court drew a line, treating the decision in Kesavananda Bharati , as the landmark. Several enactments were put in the Ninth Schedule prior to that decision on the supposition that the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution was wide and untrammelled. The theory the Parliament could not exercise its amending power so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution was propounded and accepted for the first time in Kesavananda Bharti case, . This was one reason for upholding the laws incorporated in the Ninth Schedule before April 24,1973, on which date, the judgment in Kesavananda Bharti, , was rendered. These laws and regulations would not be open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any of the provision of Part III of the Constitution. Enactments and regulations which were or would be included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973 would not receive the protection of Article 31-B for the plain reason that in the face of the judgment in Kesavananda Bharti, , there was no justification for making additions to the Ninth Schedule with a view to conferring a blanket protection on the laws included therein. The various Constitutional amendments by which additions were made to the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, would be valid, only if they did not damage to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. Referring to the unamended portion of Article 31-C, it was observed that it was not "like an uncharted sea." It gave protection to a defined and limited category of laws which were passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39. These clauses of Article 39 contained Directive Principles which were vital to the well-being of the country and welfare of its people. Chandrachud, J., said, "It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose, can at all violate Article 14 or Article 19........Infact, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 will fortify that structure". Laws included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973 would not receive the protection of Article 31-B ipso facto. Those laws would have to be examined individually for determining whether the constitutional amendments by which they were put in the Ninth Schedule damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution in any manner. Such an exercise would, however, "become otiose", if they fell within the scope and purview of Article 31-A or the unamended Article 31-C. If those laws were saved by these articles, it would be unnecessary to determine whether they also received the protection of Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule. The fact that Article 31-B conferred protection on the Schedule-laws against any provisions of Part III and the other two articles conferred protection as against Articles 14 and 19 only, would make no real difference since, after the deletion of Article 31, the only provisions of Part III which would generally come into play on the question of validity of laws were Articles 14 and 19.

49. Mr. Dhanku submitted that, at worst, there was a minor abridgement of the freedom of the press and no destruction or damage to the Constitution's basic structure. There was no "shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence" of a fundamental right.

50. It is difficult to hold that the freedom of the press is merely abridged by section 22 and that there is no damage or impairment to the basic structure of the Constitution. As has been repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme Court, freedom of circulation is as much a part of the freedom of the press as the freedom to propagate news and views. Section 22 imposes a restraint on circulation. As has also been pointed out by the Supreme Court, the freedom of the press is as much the freedom of the citizen to read the journal of his choice. From the point of view, as much of the publisher as of the citizen, it is irrelevant to the concept of the freedom of the press that the publisher is a monopoly undertaking. In the wider interests of the effective functioning of our democracy, the citizen has a right to inform himself of news and views and the right cannot be denied to him on considerations extraneous thereto. The concept of the freedom of the press necessarily means that a journal's circulation should be free to grow to meet the demand for it. Interference with the circulation of the journal is, therefore, interference with the quintessence of the freedom of the press, and it damages the basic structure of the Constitution.

54. Mr. Dhanuka stresses the observation in the judgment in Waman Rao's case, , that it was impossible to conceive that any law passed for the purpose of giving effect to Clause (c) of Article 39 could violate Articles 14 or 19 and that, far from damaging the basic structure of the Constitution, laws truly and bona fide passed for giving effect to these Directive Principles would fortify that structure. The observations with respect, are not a conclusion in regard to anything upon which the Court was ruling. They are, in that sense, not obiter dicta. They really are reflections about enactments of the future. The observations are not meant to preclude the courts from holding, in an appropriate case, that a law passed to give effect to the Directive Principles in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 or any provision thereof, impairs the basic structure of the Constitution. We have no doubt that the Act truly and bona fide been enacted to achieve the objectives of Article 39(c) and that, as a whole, it fortifies the basic structure of the Constitution; but that does not mean that we must overlook the fact that section 22 therein as applicable to be a monopoly undertaking offends the freedom of the press, which is also a part of the basic structure. It is not possible on the basis of these observations to throw out the challenge to the Constitution Amendment Act that introduced the Act into the Ninth Schedule.

63. The writ petition impugned all the provisions of the Act. Before the learned Single Judge, the challenge was restricted to sections 21 and 22 thereof and he upheld that challenge. We find that it is only section 22 which is applicable to the facts of this case. Since we are considering the issue of constitutional validity, we consider it appropriate to confine the relief we give to section 22.

64. We have held that the freedom of the press is a fundamental right, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), that it is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution, that section 22 damages or impairs the basic structure of the Constitution in that it impinges on the freedom of the press, that section 22 does not, enjoy the protective umbrella of Article 31-C.