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11. Despite holding that the References were time-barred, the Reference Court examined the claim on merits. The Reference Court held that there is no evidence produced to show absence of sale instances in the adjoining villages. The Reference Court did not accept the judgment in Reference proceedings in respect of lands at Village Karmale in absence of any map produced to show proximity of location.

12. Mr. Ahuja, Learned Counsel for Appellants submits that there was no Written Statement filed and no issue of limitation was framed. He submits that it is undisputed that Section 12(2) notice issued on 4 th Sairaj 4 of 17 First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc October, 1988 was served on 15 th October, 1988 and second notice issued on 9th December, 1988 was served on 16th December, 1988 and the copy of the Award was not annexed to the notices. He submits that though the notices called upon the Claimants to accept compensation, the date of actual payment is admittedly on 21 st June, 1989 and reference filed within four weeks is within limitation. He relies upon the decision of Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade vs. State of Maharashtra through Collector1 to contend that certified copy of Award was essential for effective exercise of right to seek Reference under Section 18 of L.A. Act. He would further point out the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer2 and would submit that what is required is actual or constructive knowledge of passing of the Award.

14. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned AGP submits that the second part of the proviso (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the L. A. Act is applied in the present case which requires reference to be filed within a period of six months from the date of Award. He submits that stand of Claimants was that they were called upon to take the payment on 16 th December, 1988 and they were paid only on 21 st June, 1989. He submits therefore, on 16th December, 1988, the Claimants had constructive knowledge of the Award. He draws attention of this Court to the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (supra), Bhagwan Das vs. State of Uttar Pradesh3, and State of Punjab vs. Qaisar Jehan Begum 4,to contend that even constructive knowledge is sufficient to commence period of limitation.

31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so."

23. It was argued on behalf of Claimants that they had applied for Sairaj 11 of 17 First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc certified copy of the Award which was not received and the file was inspected and reference filed. The Reference Court rejected the contention by holding that no officer was examined to corroborate the said contention. The Reference Court clearly fell in error by failing to appreciate that as no specific issue of limitation was framed, there was no occasion for the Claimants to lead evidence. The case of the Claimant was that of absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the Award. The issue therefore revolved upon the date of acquisition of knowledge of the essentials elements of Award sufficient to enable the Claimants to challenge the same. The issue of limitation was thus mixed question of fact and law mandating framing of specific issue and requiring evidence to be led. It is only if the question of limitation is pure question of law that the same could have been argued, say, for example where the notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was accompanied with a copy of Award and the Reference was not filed within the period of six weeks of receipt of notice under Section 12(2). In such case, it could be argued that the limitation did not require any evidence to be led and is pure question of law, which can be raised at the time of final argument. As what is sought to be emphasized is constructive knowledge on part of the Claimants, which in turn is dependent on the issue as to whether the Claimants had attended the office for the purpose of collecting the Sairaj 12 of 17 First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc payment and could thus be said to amount to acquisition of constructive knowledge of the same, evidence was required to be led. There is specific pleading in the application that the notice under Section 12(2) did not contain particulars or essential elements of Award which could have been tested in evidence upon specific issue being framed.