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Showing contexts for: working trustee in State Of Rajasthan And Ors vs Sajjanlal Panjawat & Ors on 14 December, 1973Matching Fragments
In a similar case of the Jains, this Court had in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi's case (supra) upheld the validity of the provisions of 'the Bombay Act analogous to those contained in Chapters V, VI, and vII of the Act. The analogous provisions of s. 17(3) of the Act were somewhat different in the Bombay Act and consequently the High Court on a consideration of s. 17(3) held it to be invalid. We shall deal with this aspect later. It was, however, observed in Ratilal panach and Gandhi's case (supra) that the provisions relating to registration undoubtedly have been made with a view to ensure due supervision, of the trust properties and the exercise of proper control over them, and that these are matters relating to administration of trust property as contemplated by Art. 26(d) of the Constitution and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be an attempt at interference with the rights of religious institutions to manage their own affairs it was further pointed out that the provisions of the Bombay Act also cast a duty on a public trust to keep accounts and to get them audited and to prepare balance-sheet and to report irregularities, if any which certainly were not matters of religion and the objections raised with regard to the validity of those provisions seem to be a`together baseless. Section 35 of the Bombay Act which is similar to s. 30 of the Act was upheld on the ground that "It is a well-established principle of law that trustees in charge of trust properties should not keep cash money in their hands which are not necessary for immediate expenses; and a list of approved securities upon which trust money could be invested is invariably laid down in every legislation on the subject of trust." Section 36 of the Bombay Act which is analogous to s. 31 of the Act was also considered to be salutary. aimed it protecting the property of the trust. Section 38 in Chapter VIll requires that the Assistant Commissioner when be is satisfied that (a) the original object of the public trust has failed, (b) the trust property is not being properly managed or administered; or (c) the direction of the court is necessary for the administration of the public trust; may direct the working trustee or any other trustees or person having interest in the trust to apply to the court for direction. In case these persons fail to do so. he may himself make an application to the court. When there is a refusal by the Assistant Commissioner to apply, an application can be made under s. 39 to the Commissioner. Section 40 empowers the Court on an application made either under s. 39 or s. 39 to pass such order thereon as it may consider proper. Sections 41 to 43 also make similar provisions which are applicable when the working trustee disclaims or dies, is absent for six months, is declared insolvent, desires to be discharged from the trust, or refuses to act as a trustee or is not available to administer the trust. under s. 43 it is the Court which after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, appoints a new working trustee having regard to the facts enumerated therein. These provisions appear unexceptionable and do not in any way conflict with any of the tenets of the Jain religion. The Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner has not been given any power to pass orders by themselves, except in the matter of presentation of an application to the Court, so as to invite a charge of arbitrariness or capriciousness. It is the Court which has been empowered to pass such orders as it considers fit according to the circumstances of the case, which it can only do after hearing the parties and their objections, if any, urged before it. The Court should be expected to have regard for the rights of the parties and if any of their fundamental rights is infringed, they have remedies both under the law by an appeal or under the Constitution. The High Court, as we have already noticed, struck down S. 52, (1) (d) & (e) as the provisions of s. 53 did not lay down proper safeguards for leaving the administration of the properties in the hands of a denomination. What we have now to consider is whether this decision is justified. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the relevant provisions of ss. 52 and 53 of Chapter X of the Act which are as under :