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7. It may be mentioned that at the conclusion of lengthy hearing of the petitions, the learned Counsels for the petitioners and the respondents have placed before the Court detailed written submissions for consideration. This Court has, therefore, condensed the lengthy written submissions as precisely as possible to see that the judgment is not unnecessarily burdened. They are as under:

8. Mr. Mihir J. Thakore, learned Senior Advocate, with Messrs Bijal Chhatrapati, Gaurav Mathur, A.M. Hava, learned advocates for Singhi & Co. for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 11809 of 2006 and other petitions, Mr. S.N. Soparkar, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Tanvish U. Bhatt, learned advocate for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 12103 of 2006 and cognate matters, and Mr. K.S. Nanavati, learned Senior Advocate for Nanavati Associates for the petitioners in Special Civil Application Nos. 12033 and 12034 of 2006, contended that the entries granting exemption have been interpreted since 1987 to include fuel used as raw material and, therefore, the circular of 2005 is liable to be set aside. According to the learned Counsels for the petitioners, the fuel used by the petitioner is either raw material or processing material or consumable store and, therefore, the petitioners would be entitled to the Page 0932 benefit of Entry 175 of the Notification issued under Section 49(2) of the Act. It was asserted that the manufacturing process undertaken by the petitioners consists of receiving raw materials in bulk quantities, which are conveyed to the furnace where the same are heated with natural gas so as to manufacture the final products, and as the natural gas purchased by the petitioners from GAIL against the relevant form at concessional rate of Sales Tax is used directly in the manufacturing process, the same would fall squarely within the four corners of Entry No. 175. According to the learned Counsels for the petitioners for interpreting the expression 'goods required by him as raw or processing material or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods', the doctrine of noscitur a sociis will have no application because meaning of raw material, processing material and consumable stores is clear and unambiguous. It was emphasised by the learned Counsels for the petitioners that the words 'raw material', 'processing material' and 'consumable stores' are not used in the same sense but are distinct categories of goods and, therefore, the principle of noscitur a sociis would not be applicable while interpreting the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Explaining that the word 'consumable stores' is a composite word, it was pleaded that it must be construed as such and not as two individual words nor the word 'consumable stores' be equated with the word 'consumables' which is generic in nature. Referring to common parlance meaning of the word 'consumable stores', it was argued that the consumable stores are synonymous with indirect material required to be used in the manufacturing process, e.g. fuel, lubricating oils, greases, etc. and, therefore, the said word should not be interpreted to mean as analogous to the word raw material. It was pointed out that the application of doctrine of noscitur a sociis while interpreting Section 15B of the Act or Entry 175(2) would render the words 'processing material' and 'consumable stores' redundant which should be avoided and the word 'consumable stores' should not be interpreted to mean that it is that material which gets used up or consumed or wasted in the final product. It was argued that by circular dated February 19, 2001, it was rightly clarified by the respondents that the exemption of sales tax on purchase of fuel under the Act would continue to be available to the petitioner and similarly situated industries even after the judgment in the matter of Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra) because the provisions of the Act were materially different from those of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which were subject matter of consideration in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and, therefore, the circular dated September 2, 2005 challenged in the petitions is liable to be set aside. What was asserted on behalf of the petitioners was that a bare perusal of Section 5-B(1) of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957, which was subject matter of consideration in Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), and Section 15B of the Act read with Entry 175(2) made under Section 49(2) of the Act makes it apparent that the concession and incentive provided under Section 15B as well as Entry 175(2) are materially different from the provisions of the A.P. Act and, therefore, on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), circular Page 0933 dated September 2, 2005 cancelling the benefits granted by circular dated February 19, 2001 could not have been issued. It was maintained that the words: "raw materials", "processing materials" or "consumable stores" used in Section 15B of the Act and Entry 175(2) are the words of wide import to convey every form of inputs including the Natural Gas used in the processing of manufactured goods and as the circular dated September 2, 2005 is contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court in J.K.Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) as well as by the Division Benches of this Court in (1) Vasuki Carborandum Works v. State of Gujarat 1979 (43) STC 294(2) K.Rasiklal & Co. v. State of Gujarat 1992 (86) STC 238 and (3) Saurashtra Cacline Bauxite & Allied Industries (supra), the circular dated September 2, 2005 should be set aside. The learned Counsel for the petitioners asserted that as the natural gas purchased by the petitioners is inextricably linked and used in the overall manufacturing process undertaken by the petitioners, e.g. the natural gas is used by the petitioners by directly feeding the same into the glass melting furnace for converting raw materials into molten glass in the process of manufacturing glass, the natural gas used should be treated as processing material, which would qualify for the benefits as provided under Entry 175 of the Act and, therefore, circular dated February 19, 2001 should be upheld by the Court whereas circular dated September 2, 2005 should be set aside. It was emphasized by the learned Counsels for the petitioners that in the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and the Rules, the term "consumable" is not used along with the terms like 'components parts" "sub-assembly parts" and "intermediate parts" as is the case in Section 5-B(1) of the A.P. General Sales Act, which was considered by the Supreme Court in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra), and, therefore, on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), circular dated September 2, 2005 could not have been issued. What was highlighted on behalf of the petitioners was that the natural gas purchased by the petitioners at the concessional rates is part and parcel of the composite process of manufacturing the goods and is clearly a processing material and/or consumable stores as envisaged by the exemption notification and, therefore, the circular dated September 2, 2005 should be quashed. According to the learned Counsels for the petitioners, to deny the petitioners the exemption of sales tax on natural gas as they were availing for the last almost 12 years would tantamount to rewriting the terms and conditions of the scheme introduced by the respondents for granting higher benefits under the Incentive Policy for new industrial units without the consent of the petitioners and, therefore, also circular dated September 2, 2005 should be set aside. It was contended that Section 27 of the Act deals with the powers of the Commissioner of Sales Tax whereas Section 49(2) of the Page 0934 Act empowers the State Government to grant exemption by notification and as the exemption is granted to the petitioners pursuant to the policy of the State Government, which was declared in the year 1986, as well as subsequently, the circular issued in the year 2005 should be set aside. It was argued that Entry 175(2) made under Section 49(2) of the Act is neither withdrawn nor annulled nor modified nor rescinded by the State Legislature and, therefore, circular issued in the year 2005 is liable to be set aside. The learned Counsels for the petitioners referred to the provisions of Section 62 of the Act and contended that it was determined by the Commissioner of Sales Tax under Section 62 of the Act that the fuel is either raw-material or processing material or consumable store and, therefore, purchase tax was not payable and as the declaration made under Section 62 of the Act is binding on the respondents, the circular dated September 2, 2005 should be set aside. The learned Counsel emphasized that the word 'consumed' is not used as verb, but is used as a noun and, therefore, the fuel used by the petitioners for processing raw-material used in the manufacture of final products would qualify for exemption as provided in the relevant entry. The learned Counsel emphasized that in the cases of Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Limited (supra) and Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), the Supreme Court did not deal with the processing material at all, but interpreted the word "consumables" after considering the words that were neighbours to the said words and, therefore, the decision rendered in Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra) cannot be interpreted to mean that the fuel used by the petitioners is neither raw material nor processing material nor consumable store and would not earn benefit under the Exemption Entry. The learned Counsels referred to the definition of the word 'raw-material' as appearing in Section 2(19) of the VAT Act and contended that the fuel used by the petitioners should be treated as "raw-material" used for the purpose of manufacturing final product. In the alternative, it was argued that the respondent No. 2, i.e. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Vechanvera Bhavan, Ashram Road, Ahmedabad, who was the author of the circular dated February 19, 2001, could not have issued circular dated September 2, 2005 in complete volte face cancelling the circular dated February 19, 2001 from its original date, i.e. February 19, 2001, and holding that the judgment in the matter of Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), would be applicable to the provisions of the Gujarat Act inasmuch as it is not open to the respondents to seek to recover sales tax liability retrospectively more particularly when such liability was imposed/ enhanced due to change in interpretation of law and the petitioners could not collect tax from their customers. It was contended by the learned Counsels for the petitioners that on the basis of solemn representation made by the respondents by Page 0935 way of notification dated June 25, 1987, the petitioners had invested huge sums of money and not recovered the tax from their customers and, therefore, in view of the principles of promissory estoppel, the respondents are precluded from recovering the tax retrospectively. What was asserted was that the scheme introduced by the Government as well as Entry 175(2) held out a promise and assurance of levy of the taxes at the concessional rate of 0.25% on all inputs including fuel, which was reaffirmed in the context of fuel by circular dated February 19, 2001 and, therefore, the respondent No. 2 is estopped from taking up a position to the contrary by issuing circular dated September 2, 2005 and recovering the tax retrospectively. According to the learned Counsels for the petitioners, it is not open to the respondents to apply the decision in the matter of Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra) to interpret the provisions of the Incentive Scheme by way of which sales tax incentives have been granted to the petitioners since the said scheme was a specially designed package, distinct from the provisions of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act in order to invite investment in the State of Gujarat and in view of the clear representation made by the State that all inputs including fuel would enjoy the benefit of concessional rate of sales tax, the respondents are estopped from contending that the fuel purchased by the petitioners would be liable to sales tax at the full rate as prescribed by the provisions of the Act. It was argued that the issuance of circular dated September 2, 2005 is totally illegal and, therefore, the reliefs claimed in the petitions should be granted. In support of these contentions, the learned Counsels relied upon the decisions in (1) Vasuki Carborundum Works v. The State of Gujarat 43 STC 294; (2) Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Thomas Stephen & Co. Ltd. Quilon ; (3) K.Rasiklal & Co. v. State of Gujarat STR 3 of 1984, 1992 (86) STC 238; (4) J.K.Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur and Anr. 1965(16) STC 563; (5) Pournami Oil Mills and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. 1986 (Supp) SCC 728; (6) Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 77 STC 282; (7) Filterco and Anr. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh and Anr. ; (8) Vishwanath Jhunjhunwala v. State of U.P. and Anr. ; Page 0936 (9) Ghowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. ; (10) Standard Fireworks Industries, Sivakasi and Anr. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madurai ; (11) Judgment rendered by the Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal at Ahmedabad on September 28, 2004 in Second Appeal No. 682 of 2003 which was filed by Pandesara Industries Ltd. against State of Gujarat; (12) Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Ltd. Cuttack v. Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneshwar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 125; (13) State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders and Ors. ; (14) Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Andhra Sugar Ltd. Venkata-Raypurama 1989 Supp (1) SCC 144; (15) Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I and Anr. v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. ; (16) Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Industrial Coal Enterprises ; (17) Government of India and Ors. v. Indian Tobacco Association ; (18) Mercury Pharmaceuticals Industries v. The State of Gujarat 43 STC 301; (19) Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Vadilal Dairy Frozen Food Industries (2006) 146 STC 9 (Guj); (20) Saurashtra Calcine Bauxite and Allied Industries v. State of Gujarat 1993 (91) STC 435; (21) Pine Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. Assessing Authority and Ors. ; (22) State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mangalam Timber Products Ltd. ; (23) State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. and Anr. ; (24) West Bengal Page 0937 Hosiery Association and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 134; (25) British Physical Lab India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. ; (26) Shree Cement Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Rajashtan and Ors. ; (27) Indian Aluminum Co.Ltd. and Anr. v. Karnataka Electricity Board and Ors. ; (28) Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works, Deedwana, Rajasthan ; (29) Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad ; (30) Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle D, Jaipur, v. Rajasthan Electricity Board (1997) 104 STC 89; (31) Commercial Taxation Officer, Udaipur v. Rajasthan Taxchem Ltd. (2007) 5 VST 529 (SC); (32) State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. ; (33) Sonebhadra Fuel v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow ; (34) Lokmat Newpapers Pvt.Ltd. v. Shankarprasad ; (35) Rainbow Steels Ltd. Muzaffarnagar & Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Delhi v. C.S.T., U.P. & State of U.P. ; (36) Shriram Vinyl & Chemical Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai ; (37) Union of India v. Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. and Ors. ; (38) State of A.P. v. V.C.Subbarayudu and Ors. ; (39) Sales Tax Page 0938 Reference No. 2 of 2003 decided on October 13, 2006 rendered by the Division Bench comprising R.S.Garg & D.H.Waghela, JJ.; (40) Ardeec Engineering (Saurashtra) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat 117 STC 178; as well as on (a) Interpretation of Statutes & Written Instruments; (b) Statutory Interpretation A Code, 3rd Edition, F A R Bennion MA (Oxon), Barrister, Butterworths; (c) Accounting Standard & Corporate Accounting Practice.

9. Mr. S. Ganesh, learned Senior Advocate, with Ms. Amrita Thakore and Mr.Navin Kumar, learned advocates for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 12106 of 2006, argued that the circular dated February 19, 2001 drawing the conclusion that the decision in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the term "processing materials" was missing in the A.P. Act whereas in the Gujarat Act, the term "consumable stores" occurred in the immediate conjunction with the terms "raw or processing materials" was just and is binding on the tax authorities as a result of which, the circular issued in the year 2005 should be set aside. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel relied upon decisions in (1) Collector of Central Excise, Patna v. Usha Martin ; (2) CCE v. Dhiren Chemicals Industries ; (3) CCE v. Dhiren Chemicals Industries ; (4) Fenner India Ltd. v. CCE ; (5) Kalyani Packaging Industry v. Union of India and Anr. ; and, (6) SACI Allied Products Ltd. v. CCE . It was argued by the learned Senior Advocate that on issuance of circular in the year 2001, certain rights came into existence in favour of the assessees to whom the said circular applied and acting on the basis of the circular of 2001 during the period from February 2001 up to September 2005, the petitioner like all other assessees in the State of Gujarat had arranged its affairs on the basis of the said circular of 2001 whereas the sellers of fuel had also charged sales tax at the rate of 0.25% and, therefore, the Tax Authorities should not be permitted to deviate or depart in any significant manner from the terms of the assurance given or representation made by the State in the circular of the year 2001. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on (1) Mahabir Vegetable Page 0939 Oils (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. ; and, (2) MRF Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and Ors. . According to the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, the rights which came into existence in favour of the assessees, who had acted on the basis of the said circular, could not have been taken away by the State Government by executive order or even by subordinate legislation passed with retrospective effect and, therefore, the circular of 2005 should be regarded as illegal. In support of this submission, the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decisions in (1) ITO v. M.C. Ponnoose ; (2) Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs & Central Excise Cochin and Ors. ; (3) Hukum Chand, Etc. v. Union of India ; and (4) MRF Ltd. v. Asst. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and Ors. (supra). It was argued that Section 86 of the Act which confers power on the State Government to make Rules does not authorize to make rules with retrospective effect, i.e. which has the effect of taking away or nullifying the existing rights and that Section 49(2) of the Act confers powers on the State Government to issue exemption notification prospectively as a result of which, the rights accrued in favour of the assessees pursuant to circular of the year 2001 could not have been nullified retrospectively by circular dated September 2, 2005. It was contended that when an assessee is prohibited or prevented from recovering tax from its customers by reason of an exemption notification, no demand for sales tax can be raised on the assessee in respect of the past period during which he was prohibited or inhibited from recovering the amount of tax and, therefore, circular dated September 2, 2005 should be regarded as illegal. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions in (1) West Bengal Hosiery Association and Ors. v. State of Bihar (1988) 4 SCC 134; (2) British Physical Laboratory (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. JT 1998 (9) 4 SC 313; (3) Shree Cement Limited v. State of Rajasthan ; and, (4) Texmaco Limited v. The State of Ahndra Pradesh and Anr. . It was pointed out that all sellers had recovered Page 0940 only 0.25% sales tax on the sales of petroleum fuels like furnace oil, diesel oil, etc. made to their customers whereas purchasing customers had also determined their costs and prices of their manufactured products on the basis and footing that they were required to pay sales tax only at the rate of 0.25% during the period 2001 to 2005 and, therefore, no demand for sales tax could have been raised on the sales of furnace oil, which took place in the past between the period from February 19, 2001 to September 2, 2005. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, circular dated September 2, 2005 does not correctly hold that furnace oil sold to industrial units like that of the petitioner is not eligible for the benefits of tax of 0.25% and, therefore, the same should be set aside. It was pointed out that the circular of the year 2005, in sharp contrast to the provisions of the circular of 2001, does not contain any independent reasonings whatsoever, but refers to and blindly follows the judgment of the Gujarat Sales Tax Tribunal in Pandesara's case nor does it anywhere point out any error contained in the circular of 2001 or refer to the comparative analysis of the provisions of the A.P. Act and the Gujarat Act, which are set out in the circular of 2001 and, therefore, the circular of the year 2005 should be regarded as bad in law. It was pleaded that the circular issued in the year 2005 does not make any reference whatsoever to the earlier judgments of the Gujarat High Court rendered either in the case of Saurashtra Calcine Bauxite & Allied Industries (supra) or in the case of Vasuki Carborundum Works (supra), even though the legal position laid down by these judgments was expressly stated in the circular issued in the year 2001 and as the circular issued in the year 2005 is based entirely on the judgment of the Sales Tax Tribunal in Pandesara Case, it must necessarily follow that if that judgment is found to be incorrect or contrary to law, the circular issued in the year 2005 would be liable to be set aside. It was asserted that the judgment of the Sales Tax Tribunal in Pandesara Case is erroneous and, therefore, it could not have been stipulated by circular dated September 2, 2005 that furnace oil, which is purchased and utilized in an industrial process to manufacture goods is not a "processing material" or "consumable store" within the meaning of para 255(2) of the Exemption Notification. According to the learned Senior Advocate, in Pandesara Case, the Tribunal had blindly followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra) without considering the significant and material differences between the scheme of the A.P. Act and the Gujarat Act and, therefore, the judgment of the Tribunal in Pandesara's Case should be set aside. According to the learned Senior Advocate, in Pandesara's Case, the assessee had, in fact, succeeded because the Revenue had failed to discharge the burden cast on it of showing that natural gas purchased by Pandesara was used as "raw-material", "processing material" or "consumable store" so as to attract the charge of purchase tax under Section 15B of the Gujarat Statute and, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal in Pandesara's Page 0941 Case cannot be considered as laying down any general principle of law, which would be applicable to other cases where no issue of discharge of burden arises nor could have been made the basis for the purpose of issuing circular dated September 2, 2005. The learned Counsel for the petitioner explained that the Tribunal in Pandesara case did not consider the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Saurashtra Calcine Bauxite & Allied Industries (supra), which expressly lays down that the fuel consumed by an industrial unit is a processing material and as the Tribunal had failed to consider the binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court, the judgment in Pandesara"s case should be set aside.

Page 0943

11. As against this, Mr.Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General, assisted by Ms.Sangeeta Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents, contended that while ascertaining the meaning of the words 'raw- material', 'processing material' and 'consumable store', the principle of noscitur a sociis should be applied to find out the real meaning of those words as those words are not defined under the Act nor meaning of the words 'processing material' and 'consumable store' are available in the dictionary. After emphasizing that ordinary meaning of the word 'raw material' is that material which gets transformed into the end product, it was argued that the words 'processing material' and 'consumable store' should also be given the same meaning as they are in the company of the word raw-material. According to the learned Advocate General, the fuel i.e. gas, which is used by the petitioners, is not used or consumed or vested in the final product and, therefore, it cannot be regarded either as raw material or as processing material or as consumable store so as to earn benefit of Entry No. 175(2) made under Section 49(2) of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondents emphasised that the principle laid down in decisions rendered in CST v. Rewa Coal Fields Limited (1999) 5 SCC and Vishwanath Jhunjhunwala v. State of U.P. as well as Commercial Taxation Officer v. Rajasthan Texchem Limited rendered in Civil Appeal No. 117 of 2007 on January 12, 2007 relied upon by the learned Counsels for the petitioners, which deal with specific legislation laying down the specific definition of the term 'raw material', would not apply to the facts of the present case, but the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue v. Pio Food Packers 46 STC 63 would apply to the facts of the instant case wherein the distinction between the words 'manufacture' and 'processing' is drawn and it is held that with each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change, but it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognized as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to have taken place. According to the learned Advocate General, as the use of fuel by the petitioners does not result into a new and distinct article, it cannot be said that it is used in the manufacturing process. The learned Advocate General referred to the definition of the term "manufacture" as defined in Section 2(16) of the Act and pointed out that the word 'processing' is used with reference to the raw material meaning thereby when any process is carried out with reference to the raw-material for getting altogether a new commodity with distinctive name, character and use, then in that case the Page 0944 same would amount to 'manufacture' and as the said expression cannot be equated with the words 'in the manufacture or processing of goods' as used in Section 8(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act read with Rule 13 wherein the goods referred to are final taxable goods, the principle laid down in J.K. Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) would not apply to the facts of the instant case. It was pleaded that the words, i.e. "in the manufacture and processing of goods", used in the Central Law have wider meaning in comparison to the words 'in the manufacture of goods' as used in the Act and, therefore, the fuel used by the petitioners would not qualify for earning exemption under the Act. According to the learned Counsel, the facts and circumstances in case of J.K. Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (supra), were different from those obtaining in the present case and, therefore, the same cannot be pressed into service by the learned Counsels for the petitioners more particularly after later pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra). It was argued that in J.K. Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with Section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read with Rule 13 of the Central Sales Tax (Regulation & Turnover) Rules, 1957, which are quite different from the provisions of Section 15B and the language employed in Entry 175(2) made under Section 49(2) of the Act and, therefore, the same should not be treated as good guide while interpreting the provisions of the Act. It was argued that Section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act authorizes the Sales Tax Officer to specify in the certificate, subject to any Rules made by the Central Government, goods intended for use by a dealer 'in the manufacture or processing' of goods for sale or in mining or in the generation or distributions of electricity or any other form of power for the purpose of attracting concessional rate of tax as prescribed under Section 8(1) of the Act whereas Rule 13 of the said Rules deals with various goods like raw-materials, processing materials, machinery, plant, equipment, tool stores, spare parts, accessories, fuel or lubricants to be used in the 'manufacture or processing' of goods, i.e. final taxable goods, and, therefore, it was on the basis of the aforesaid provisions that the appellant in that case had desired the Sales Tax Officer to include into the certificate, various goods including 'drawing materials, photographic materials and electricals' which it was intending to use in the 'manufacture or processing' of its finished products like cloth, yarn, tiles, paints, etc. as a result of which, the Supreme Court interpreted the aforesaid provisions in a wider fashion and observed to the effect that 'if the process of designing is so intimately connected with the manufacture of cloth, there is no reason to regard the said process of designing as not being a part of the process of manufacture within the meaning of Rule 13 read with Section 8(3)(b) of the aforesaid Act, but such is not the position obtaining from the provisions of the Act under consideration and, therefore, Page 0945 the decision in J.K. Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Milss Ltd. (supra) cannot be made basis to interpret the provisions of the Act. The learned Advocate General contended that in the case of Vasuki Carborandum Works (supra), the assessee was engaged in the manufacturing of crockery, which was being packed by kathi (twine) and while dealing with the facts of the said case, the Division Bench of this Court held kathi as a part of the consumable stores being used for the purpose of marketting the goods in question whereas in the case of K.Rasiklal & Co. (supra), the Division Bench of this Court was concerned with articles Ghan and hammers used for giving shape to certain articles being used in the manufacture of oil engines as a result of which, the contention of the assessee that ghan and hammers are tools and, therefore, they should be treated as consumable tools, was negatived by holding that neither 'ghan' nor 'hammer' is being used in the process of manufacture of oil engine as a result of which, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that ghan and hammer are at any stage becoming integral part of the taxable goods so as to make taxable goods marketable and in case Saurashtra Calcine Bauxite (supra), the Division Bench was dealing with 'furnace oil' used to produce heat required in the processing of Calcine Bauxite wherein Sulphur and Carbon of the furnace oil were admittedly found in the final product Calcine Bauxite and, therefore, these judgments relied upon would not be applicable to the facts of the instant case while considering the question, whether the fuel used by the petitioners is 'raw-material' or 'processing material' or 'consumable store'. The learned Counsel asserted that unless the material becomes an integral part of the final taxable goods by getting the same used up, burnt up, vested or remain in an identifiable or unidentifiable form in the final manufactured product, the same cannot be considered to be 'raw material' or 'processing material' or 'consumable store' in the manufacture of final taxable goods. The learned Counsel argued that the fuel used by the petitioners does not get used up or burnt up or vested or remain in an identifiable or unidentifiable form in the final manufactured product and, therefore, the same can neither be considered raw material or processing material or consumable store in the manufacture of final taxable goods and, therefore, circular dated September 2, 2005 is not liable to be set aside. While dealing with the arguments based on the principle of promissory estoppel, it was contended by the learned Advocate General that any action of the Government in violation of law cannot be treated as a representation to found a plea of promissory estoppel and as what was stated in the circular dated February 19, 2001 was against the law, the same cannot bind the State Government. It was contended that the circulars issued by the department are binding on the a uthorities on the administrative side, but the same cannot fetter the exercise of the quasi judicial power and the statutory authority invested with such powers has to act independently in Page 0946 arriving at a decision under the Act as a result of which, circular dated February 19, 2001 cannot be treated as binding on the respondents. After pointing out to the Court that issue relating to binding effect of the circular has been referred to the larger Bench of the Supreme Court vide judgment in the case of CCE Bolpur v. Ratan Melting and Wire Industries , it was pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that the law declared by the Supreme Court is made binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities and, therefore, the circular of the year 2005 based on the decision of Coastal Chemicals Limited, cannot be regarded as illegal. It was contended that determination order passed under Section 62 of the Act is not binding on the respondents in view of the decisions in (1) J.G. Bavishi & Sons v. State of Gujarat 84 STC 161; and (2) Quality Chemicals v. State of Gujarat rendered by the Division Bench on January 19, 1993 in Sales Tax Reference No. 4 of 1998, as well as the decision of the Tribunal in Pandesara Industries Private Ltd. (supra). The learned Counsel contended that the ratio laid down in the decisions in (1) West Bengal Hosiery Association v. State of Bihar (1988) 4 SCC 134; (2) British Physical Lab. India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka ; and (3) Shree Cement Limited v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 675 would not apply to the facts of the captioned proceedings inasmuch as they deal with the statutory notifications issued by the State Government under various tax legislations, which came to be quashed and set aside by the Court and question arose as to whether the State Authorities should be permitted to recover the amount of tax, which would have been paid, but for the said notifications whereas in the instant case, the provision of law has remained the same, but the understanding thereof on the part of the State Government was against the law, which came to be clarified and corrected pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Coastal Chemicals Limited (supra), read with the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Pandesara Industries Private Limited and, therefore, the past recovery of dues cannot be regarded as illegal. It was pleaded that the decisions in (1) Mahabir Vegetable Oil (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana ; (2) Govind Prasad v. R.G. Prasad and (3) MRF Limited v. Page 0947 Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax , deal with altogether different situations while holding that the subordinate legislations cannot be given retrospective effect if such a power in that behalf is not contained in the main legislation whereas in the instant case, on true interpretation of law, as propounded by the Supreme Court, the past recovery is sought to be made, which cannot be regarded as illegal. While meeting with the arguments based on promissory estoppel, it was contended that the decision in the case of India Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 125 and other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsels for the petitioners, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the instant case because the interpretation is clearly wrong and against the provisions of the law and it was so realised in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Coastal Chemicals Ltd. (supra), more particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in IT Commissioner v. Firm Maur and other decisions. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the learned Counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the various judgments delivered under the different provisions to contend that the fuel used by them is either raw material or processing material or consumable goods, but those judgments could not have been relied upon because a situation contemplated under one statute cannot, in the absence of any express or clear intentment, be given effect to while interpreting the provisions of another statute. The learned Counsel contended that neither the circular dated September 2, 2005 nor the decision rendered in Pandesara Industries Private Limited, which is based on sound principles, is demonstrated to be wrong and, therefore, the petitions, which lack merits, should be dismissed.

16. On hearing the rival pleas urged before this Court, this Court is of the view that the question whether fuels used by the petitioners can be regarded as raw materials or processing materials or consumable stores is essentially a question of fact depending upon the process of manufacture employed in different industries. The question whether the fuels used by the petitioners should be regarded as raw materials or processing materials or consumable stores, requires a close look. This and others contentions require appropriate evaluation as well as an indepth analysis. The assistance from the technical persons to ascertain whether the fuels used by the petitioners should be regarded as raw materials or processing materials or consumable stores may also be required. As the entire matter requires a second look and Page 0949 better investigation, the learned Counsels for the petitioners, on instructions of the petitioners, who are present in the Court, have agreed that the matters be remitted to the Assessing Authority/Appellate Authority, as the case may be, with appropriate directions, in respect of period post September 2, 2005. In view of the stand taken by the respondents in their affidavit-in-reply and willingness shown by the petitioners through their learned Counsels to go before the Assessing Authority / Appellate Authority, as the case may be, the question whether the fuels used by the petitioners should be regarded either as raw materials or as processing materials or as consumable stores, need not be examined by the Court on merits and this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the matters are remitted to the Assessing Authority/Appellate Authority for deciding the said issue with certain directions.