N. Gopal Naidu, vs M/S. Name Estates Private Limited, on 1 October, 2021
6 The trial Court, after framing appropriate issues, held that
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction. But, in
so far as the second issue relating to the rectification of the sale
deed is concerned, the trial Court held that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the said relief since the plaintiff has not sought for the
relief of declaration of title to the suit schedule property. The trial
Court further observed that the Court fee is chargeable under
section 21 of the A.P. Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act, 1956,
however, the plaintiff filed a fixed court fee of Rs.300/- under
Section 47 of the Court fee Act and that Section 47 is not intended
for the purpose of seeking a relief in respect of immovable property
not covered by other sections and when a relief is not covered by
other sections of the Act, the fee is payable only under section 21
of the Act and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief
for rectification of name in the records of the Sub Registrar
3
concerned. By judgment and decree dated 05.01.2009, the trial
Court decreed the suit partly, grating perpetual injunction
restraining the first defendant from alienating, transferring or
creating charge or mortgage in favour of third parties in respect of
the suit schedule property and dismissed the rest of the claim.
7 Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff preferred
Cross Appeal Suit No.4 of 2012 on the file of the Court of the V
Additional District Judge, Bhongir. The lower appellate court, after
reappraising the entire material available on record, both oral and
documentary and by following the ratio laid down in Sheo Murat
Vs. Ram Muran {AIR 2004 SC 267} and State of Karnataka Vs.
K.K. Mohandas {AIR 2007 SC 2917} and also in view of Section 26
of the Specific Relief Act, allowed the appeal by judgment and
decree dated 23.12.2014. The lower appellate court observed that
the first defendant played prayed on the plaintiff since Ex.A.5
agreement would clearly show that the first defendant, being
director and authorizing the plaintiff to pursue the transactions on
behalf of the plaintiff, obtained Ex.A.8 sale deed in his favour. In
Ex.A.5 agreement it is manifestly clear that D.2 and D.3 agreed to
sell the property in favour of the plaintiff and that they also
received the sale consideration from plaintiff in respect of the suit
schedule property. The lower appellate court further held that the
findings of the trial Court is contrary to Section 26 of the Specific
Relief Act since there is nothing in Section 26 of the said Act that
relief of rectification cannot be granted unless relief of declaration
is sought.