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Documents citing State Of Punjab vs Modern Cultivators, Ladwa on 8 May, 1964

Jay Laxmi Salt Words (P) Ltd vs State Of Gujarat on 4 May, 1994

He thereafter discussed the rule of strict liability as explained by the English Courts in Rylands v. Fletcher', its modification in Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd.3 the vicissitudes it suffered subsequently in Rickards v. John Inglis Lothian4 and Bartlett v. Tottenham5 both on natural and non-natural user of land and artificial collection of goods resulting in injury and various exceptions carved out of it. The learned Judge then discussed the ratio in the State of Punjab v. Modem Cultivators2 and observed that the rule of strict liability as modified by this Court entitled the appellant to successfully claim damages.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 65 - R M Sahai - Full Document

Popatlal Gokaldas Shah And Anr. vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 18 April, 2002

"The basic ingredients of torts, namely, injury and damage due to failure to observe duty has been found to have been established. In the conservative sense, it was negligence. But in modern sense and present day context it was not only negligence but mistake, defective planning, failure to discharge public duty. It was thus tort not in the narrow sense but in the broader sense to which Article 120 applied. The suit, therefore, could not be thrown out as it was filed beyond two years from the date the incident look place. The substantial question of law if Article 36 was exhaustive of all torts is thus answered in the negative. Further, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) has not been modified by our Court in Modern Cultivators (supra). And the Article of Limitation Act applicable to the facts of the case was Article 120 and not Article 36."
Gujarat High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Alkali Manufacturers Association Of ... vs Sinochem International Chemicals Co. ... on 24 April, 1998

31. Taking into consideration this instant case based upon the aforesaid decided cases, it is prima facie made out that there is different cost of production of soda ash for different manufacturers in China who are selling their product through Sinochem at a uniform price and this has raised a presumption in favour of a cartel being in operation. This is further compounded by the fact that Sinochem has not disclosed, in spite of being repeatedly asked by this Commission about the arrangement/agreement between the manufacturers of soda ash in China and Sinochem and as to how the prices are determined keeping in view the different cost of productions of these manufacturers. We hold that as laid down by this Commission in the Bengal Tools Ltd., In re [1988] 63 Comp Cas 468 (MRTPC) and Excel Industries Ltd., In re [1988] 64 Comp Cas 531 (MRTPC), the complainants had discharged their initial burden and in terms of Section 106 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act as also the cases cited by the complainant in this regard being, (1) State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, AIR 1965 SC 17 ; (2) G. K. Ketkar v. Md. Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, and (3) K. M. Patel v. Md. Hussain Rahimbaksh, AIR 1981 SC 977, para. 10 as also the circumstances herein, the onus shifts on the defendants, namely, Sinochem, to show they are not indulging in the restrictive trade practice of cartelisation on the grounds that the best evidence is available with Sinochem and it has failed to put the same on record in their defence. From the facts available before us, it is sufficient to arrive at a prima facie view as required at this stage, that Sinochem is a cartel indulging in cartelisation for the purpose of export of soda ash to India. We conclude accordingly.
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Faiyazhussain Nazirahmed Ansari vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 18 July, 2018

In State of Punjab vs. Modern Cultivators, AIR 1965 SC 17, the original action by the plaintiff was of damages on the ground of inundation of his land because of breach of canal which was under the management of the defendant. The Court held that Article 36 of Limitation Act, 1908, would apply and not Article 2 of the Limitation Act, 1908, by observing that Article 2 cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of is not alleged to be in pursuance of statutory authority. Article 2 cannot apply to omission in following the statutory duties because it cannot be suggested that they are in pursuance of any enactment. Cases of malfeasance or non-feasance may or may not have statutory protection. Act or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory command may attract Article 2 but the act of omission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment. Here the suit was for compensation for damages consequent on a break in the canal of August 15, 1947. The only act or omission could be the opening and dosing of the channel for silting operations. That way before June 1946. The third column of Article 2 provides the start of the limitation of 90 days when the act or omission takes place. The period of limitation in this case would be over even before the inquiry if that were the starting point. It was held, "Article 2 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to a case like the present where the damages sustained by the plaintiff are not the result of anything done by the state in pursuance of a statutory power exercised by it or by reason of an act which could properly be said to have been performed in the purported exercise of a statutory power."
Gujarat High Court Cites 47 - Cited by 0 - J B Pardiwala - Full Document

M. Kuppusamy vs Viswanathan And Ors. on 19 March, 1998

In State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators (1964)2 M.L.J. 185, when damages were claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant, the State of Punjab, for following of lands, as a result of breach of canal belonging to the State, by raising the plea of res ipsa loquitur, it is held that the failure of the State to produce the documents which would have shown how the breach occurred, would raise the inference that the breach was caused by reason of the negligence on the part of the State.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - M K Vinayagam - Full Document

Jai Singh vs Garhwal Motor Owners And Ors. on 21 April, 1982

The next case cited was that of the State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators (AIR 1965 SC 17). In this case the Supreme Court found that the loss was occasioned to the plaintiffs by the bursting of a canal bank. It was also found that the canal bank was regularly inspected by the State Government of Punjab. How-ever, on a consideration of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence, in the absence of reasonable explanation on the part of the State of Punjab to establish negligence and that there was inordinate delay and negligence is sealing the breach in the canal bank and the Government was rightly held responsible.
Allahabad High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

The Commissioners For The Port Of ... vs Khaitan Sons And Co. (Tea Chest) Ltd. on 14 May, 1965

* * * The respondents argued that the Indian Statute fell to be strictly construed and that, while it protects against a claim based on breach of statutory duty, it does not protect against an omission to perform a statutory duty. Their Lordships are unable to accept either argument." It has been argued that the scope of this Privy Council decision has been whittled down by the Supreme Court decision in the State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, . We are unable to accept that view. The Supreme Court in that case was concerned with the question which arose in an action for damages for inundation of plaintiffs land due to preach of a canal in the management of the defendant, under the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 and came to the finding that the break in the bank was not that kind of act or omission under the Act. The reason why we do not think that the Supreme Court decision whittles down the law laid down by the Privy Council may be stated briefly. In the first place the Supreme Court decision was concerned with a competition between Articles 2 and 86 of the Limitation Act. The language of Article 2 of the Limitation Act is very different from Section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act. Secondly, the Privy Council decision was expressly referred to by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court did not express any dissent from the Privy Council decision. Thirdly, the question here is a question of the liability of the Port Commissioners of Calcutta to deliver the goods lauded in their custody. The statute enjoins that they must receive the goods in the Port. Therefore, failure to deliver the goods which they had received is reasonably connected with performance of their duties to deliver under the Calcutta Port Act. Therefore, failure to deliver in this case is an omission which comes within the ambit and scope of Section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act. The liability of the Port Commissioners of Calcutta to deliver the goods can be seen by bare reference to such sections as Sections 112, 113, etc. of the Calcutta Port Act. Fourthly there is a special statute with special limitation here in this case which was not present in the Supreme Court decision which was, as I have said, a question of: applicability of either Article 2 or Article 36 of the Limitation Act. A special statute with special limitation is expressly provided in Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. It provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule. It also expressly provides for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit by any special or local law, The provisions con-mined in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law and the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. If there is any conflict between the Indian Limitation Act and the Calcutta Port Act on the point of limitation the Calcutta Port Act must prevail on the point of limitation against the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta.
Calcutta High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Jugal Kishore vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors. on 9 March, 1994

14. Scope of Articles 2 and 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, AIR 1965 SC 17, in which an action had been brought for damages for inundation of plaintiffs land due to breach of a canal in the management of the defendant. It was held that Article 2 cannot apply to omissions in following the statutory duties because it cannot be suggested that they are in pursuance of any enactment. Act or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory command may attract Article 2 but the act or omission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment'.
Himachal Pradesh High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 23 - Full Document
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