15.It is to be noted that the Magistrate or the State Government may rescind or vary the order either Suo-motu or on the Petition of an individual who is affected. Immediately after receipt of the said Petition, an individual is entitled in Law to be heard and in fact, reasons must be ascribed in writing at the time of rejecting the Petition. The nature of an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., is required to meet an eventuality/emergency and the same is not meant to be either permanent or semi permanent in nature. No doubt, an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., is of transitory in nature. Ofcourse, it is for the District Magistrate to exercise its powers quite in tune with the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C., as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Ishtiaq Hussain Farooqui V. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1988 SC at page 93.
15.It is to be noted that the Magistrate or the State Government may rescind or vary the order either Suo-motu or on the Petition of an individual who is affected. Immediately after receipt of the said Petition, an individual is entitled in Law to be heard and in fact, reasons must be ascribed in writing at the time of rejecting the Petition. The nature of an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., is required to meet an eventuality/emergency and the same is not meant to be either permanent or semi permanent in nature. No doubt, an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., is of transitory in nature. Ofcourse, it is for the District Magistrate to exercise its powers quite in tune with the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C., as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Ishtiaq Hussain Farooqui V. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1988 SC at page 93.
In this context, reference can be had of a decision of the
Apex Court in Ishtiaq Hussain Farooqui v. State of U.P. AIR 1988
SC 93 wherein, though the context was in respect of Article 25 and
26 of the Constitution of India, it has been held therein that
exercise of fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution is not an absolute right but must yield or give way to
maintenance of public order. It was further held that the principles
are well settled and it is but for the District Magistrate to exercise
his powers in, consonance with the provisions of S. 144 of the
Code of 1973.
11. Considering the aforesaid enunciation of law, I am of the
considered opinion that the stand taken by the respondent/Department
depriving the petitioner to get the benefit of services rendered by him in
the work charged establishment for grant of second higher pay scale is
not proper. So far as the other static cadre posts are concerned, the
benefit of 'Kramonnati Vetanman' to the persons who have rendered
their services in work charged establishment is not available to them as
in absence of their promotion, they are not found entitled to get the
benefit of higher pay scale, but this benefit cannot be denied to the
Drivers who are otherwise working on identified static cadre not having
any channel of promotion because as per the legal pronouncement, even
the work charged contingency Drivers can get the benefit of upgradation
of pay due to non-availability of promotional avenues. The cases on
which petitioner has placed reliance i.e. Prem Singh (supra) and
Farooque Hussain (supra), the point as is involved in the present case
was considered by the Court and held that the services rendered by an
employee in work charged and contingency establishment shall be
counted for the purpose of upgradation of his/her pay. The stand taken
by the respondents is, therefore, unsustainable and contrary to the settled
legal position. The case on which respondents have placed reliance is
7
not applicable in the facts of the present case for the reason that in the
present case, legal position so far as Drivers working in work charged
establishment is concerned, is already settled and they have been held
entitled to get the benefit of upgradation of pay. The basic object for
granting the said benefit is nothing but to provide financial upgradation
due to non-availability of promotional avenues and as such, the present
petitioner, who is holding the post of Driver is entitled to get the said
benefit.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in the order
15.7.2022 passed by this Court in WP No.14840/2022 wherein this Court has
allowed the petition in terms of the order dated 28.9.2021 passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in WP No.24226/2019 (Ashfaq Hussain Vs.
State of MP & others) and in WP No.24247/2019 (Farooque Hussain Vs. State
of MP & others), and directed the authorities to extend the benefit of first and
second time Kramonnati to the petitioners, if there is no other legal impediment.
It is submitted that the present petitioner is also similarly situated employee in
the same department. It is prayed that this petition be also allowed in view of the
aforesaid order.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in the order
15.7.2022 passed by this Court in WP No.14840/2022 wherein this Court has
allowed the petition in terms of the order dated 28.9.2021 passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in WP No.24226/2019 (Ashfaq Hussain Vs.
State of MP & others) and in WP No.24247/2019 (Farooque Hussain Vs. State
of MP & others), and directed the authorities to extend the benefit of first and
second time Kramonnati to the petitioners, if there is no other legal impediment.
It is submitted that the present petitioner is also similarly situated employee in
the same department. It is prayed that this petition be also allowed in view of the
aforesaid order.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in the order
15.7.2022 passed by this Court in WP No.14840/2022, wherein this Court has
allowed the petition in terms of the order dated 28.9.2021 passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in WP No.24226/2019 (Ashfaq Hussain Vs.
State of MP & others) and in WP No.24247/2019 (Farooque Hussain Vs.
State of MP & others), and directed the authorities to extend the benefit of
first and second time Kramonnati to the petitioners, if there is no other legal
impediment.
The petitioners when were being disturbed by the Development Authority, they filed a writ petition being Writ-C No.2528 of 2014 (Ishtiaq Hussain & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.). This writ petition came to be dismissed on 16.11.2016 with a clear finding that the transfer effected in 1992 by Kallu and Lallu was a void transaction. Against the judgment and order of the High Court, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court by means of Special Leave Petition being SLP No.19612 of 2019. This SLP came to be dismissed on 7.9.2022.