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Gandhi Gopaldas Gordhandas vs Bai Lalitabai Marghabhai on 30 June, 1970 cites

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs Joitaram Ganesh And Anr. on 15 April, 1968

14. In support of his submissions Mr. K.C. Shah has invited our attention to a few decisions. The first one of them is in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Joitaram Ganesh reported in 10 Guj LR 43. A Division Bench of this High Court consisting of Mr. Justice J.B. Mehta and Mr. Justice B.G. Thakire (as he then was) was considering in that case the question relating to compromise decree. Mr. Shah has placed particular reliance on the observations made by the learned Judges in Paragraph 6 of the report. The Division Bench firstly considered the distinction between nullity and invalidity and recorded the finding that whereas nullity of a decree can be pleaded in execution proceedings, its invalidity cannot be pleaded. While defining the base of nullity and invalidity, after having reviewed a number of decisions on the subject, it held that whereas inherent lack of jurisdiction would give risk to nullity, irregular or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction which a Court has would give rise to invalidity. In the instant case, this question does not arise. It was then contended before the Division Bench that the question whether a decree creates a fresh lease or not cannot be agitated in execution proceedings.
Gujarat High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Sumatibai Waman Kirtikar vs Anant Balkrishna Shirgaonkar on 22 February, 1949

Besides it may be noted, when the Court applied its mind and passed a decree in terms of the compromise, it must also mean that the Court impliedly negatived the plea that is now raised in the execution proceedings, namely, that the terms of the compromise created a new lease; for, otherwise if the Court had come to the conclusion or if the defendants had raised the contention that the terms of the compromise created a new lease, it would never have proceeded to pass a decree as it did in the present case. The Court would have stated in that event that the compromise terms had given rise to a case of new lease, and as the case of a new lease was not a matter relating to the suit, no operative decree embodying such terms could be passed under the provisions of O. XXIII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. I should, therefore, think that it is not open to the judgment-debtors now to agitate the point which must be deemed to have been considered and overruled by the Court when it passed the decree in accordance with the compromise. Mr. Shah has however, relied upon the decisions reported in Sumatibai Kirtikar v. Anant Balkrishna, Gurupadappa Shivlingappa v. Akbar and Narayan Ramchandra v. Gangadhar, in which some consent decrees were construed in execution proceedings to operate as leases in favour of the judgment-debtors.
Bombay High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 5 - V Bose - Full Document
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