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1 - 10 of 25 (2.03 seconds)Dish Tv India Ltd. At Essel House, B-10 vs Assistant Commissioner Of Cgst Noida ... on 22 July, 2020
Therefore, in an event where the
dumpers and tippers are treated as capital goods, the same would not be
treated as input for providing output service, but will still be covered within
the definition of capital goods. Therefore, we find that the argument taken
by the Revenue that the scope is to inprete the expression capital goods
differently for the purpose of Rule 2(a) and for the purpose of Rule 2(k) is
not in sync with the scheme of CCR, which is a special code by itself and
even if the context has to be analysed in which these definitions are to be
interpreted differently, it has to be looked beyond the CCR or for that matter
beyond the parent act i.e Central Excise Act and Finance Act 1994, under
which CCR has been formulated. Since the term capital goods has not been
defined under CEA, therefore, it has to be understood in terms of CCR itself.
We find force in the submission of the assesse and supported by the
judgments in the case of Dish TV India Ltd., supra, to hold a view that what
is not to be treated as capital good under Rule 2(a) can also not be treated
as capital good for the purpose of Rule 2(k) because if we do so, it will lead
to an absurd situation where, we are not considering dredger as capital good
for the Cenvat Credit purpose, whereas, we are treating it as a capital good
for the purpose of exclusion under Rule 2(k). A good can be a capital good
or an input on strict construction of definition used in the statute and that is
why expression such as "unless the context otherwise required" are used to
interpret the same in a manner which does not lead to an absurd situation.
In the present appeals, we find that a consistant view has to be taken and in
terms of the same, the expression capital goods used in Rule 2(k) has to be
understood in terms of definition of capital goods used under Rule 2(a). We
also find force in the submission that the definition of a particular goods
under a different statute cannot become the basis for deciding an issue
(16) Appeal No. ST/30201
& 30206/2016
under a different statute, especially when the term has been clearly defined
within the statute, under which it is being examined for the purpose of
eligibility or otherwise. Therefore, we find that even taking into the context
in which these two terms are to be examined, we do not see any reason as
to why the term capital goods used under Rule 2(k) has to be interpreted
differently than the definition of capital goods given under Rule 2(a) for the
purpose of eligibility or otherwise under CCR. In view of the same, we do not
find any merit in the impugned order passed by the Commissioner and the
same is liable to be set aside.
Section 73 in Finance Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Section 75 in Finance Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
The Customs Tariff Act, 1975
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985
Finance Act, 1999
Section 56 in Finance Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
M/S. Msco. Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors on 31 October, 1984
7. Learned Counsel for the assessee relied on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of MSCO Private Limited Vs Union of India [1985
(19) ELT 15 (S.C.)], wherein, it was held that the meaning of an expression
in one act cannot be relied upon, while construing other statutes and it must
be restricted to such statute alone.
Prestige Engineering(India) Ltd vs C.C.E on 1 September, 1994
He has also relied on Hon'ble Supreme
Court decision of Prestige Engg (India) Ltd., Vs CCE [1994 (73) ELT 497
(SC)], wherein, the term 'manufacture', the Court held that once an
expression is defined in the Act, that expression wherever it occurs in the
Act, Rules or Notifications issued thereunder, should be understood in the
same sense. As per the appellant, the term manufacture is defined in the
(5) Appeal No. ST/30201
& 30206/2016
statute, recourse cannot be made to the ordinary meaning of the term.