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1 - 10 of 19 (0.22 seconds)Assam Panchayat Act, 1994
Section 16 in Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 [Entire Act]
Section 43 in Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 [Entire Act]
Molar Mal (Dead) Through L.Rs vs M/S. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd on 14 March, 2000
In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. 7 this Court
while reiterating that courts will have to follow the rule of
literal construction, which enjoins the court to take the
words as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning
which naturally implies, held that there is an exception to
that rule. This Court observed : (SCCp.295, para 12)
"12. ..... That exception comes into play when
application of literal construction of the words in the
statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is
shown that the legal context in which the words are
used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires
a different meaning."
Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By Lrs vs Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors on 8 April, 1987
The Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun
Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555, held that,
"6. The question which falls for consideration is whether the
respondents in their written statement have raised the necessary
pleading that the licence was irrevocable as contemplated by Section
60(b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on record to support
that plea. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if
any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally
settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading
and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party
in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is
to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order
to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the
essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise.
The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic
approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting
technicalities. Some times, pleadings are expressed in words which may
not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of
law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance
of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place
undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should
be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised
the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings;
instead the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew
the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found
that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and
they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that
event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of
pleadings in appeal.
Bhagwati Prasad vs Shri Chandramaul on 19 October, 1965
In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul1 a Constitution
Bench of this Court considering this question observed:
Mr. B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd vs Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors on 31 October, 2006
One may refer to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in
B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC
548,
"37. Before we embark upon the respective contentions made
before us on the said issue, we may notice that although the point
was urged during hearing before the High Court, the first
respondent in its writ application did not raise any plea in that
behalf. The High Court was not correct in allowing the first
respondent to raise the said contention.
M/S. Afcons Infra. Ltd. & Anr vs M/S Cherian Varkey Constn Co.P.Ltd.& ... on 26 July, 2010
In this regard we may refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court rendered in Afcons Infrastructure Limited v. Cherian Varkey
Construction Company Private Limited, (2010) 8 SCC 24, where it
was held,
"20. The principles of statutory interpretation are well
settled. Where the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and
normal meaning, without adding or rejecting any words.
Departure from the literal rule, by making structural changes
or substituting words in a clear statutory provision, under
the guise of interpretation will pose a great risk as the
changes may not be what the legislature intended or
desired. Legislative wisdom cannot be replaced by the
Judge's views. As observed by this Court in a somewhat
different context: