Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Sh Dixshu vs Controller General Of Accounts on 17 October, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.3230 of 2024
Orders reserved on : 08.10.2025
Orders pronounced on : 17.10.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Sh. Dixshu
S/o Sh. Ashok Kumar Chhabra
DOB: 06.01.1995
R/o X/356, Street no.8, Ram Nagar,
Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri T.D. Yadav)
VERSUS
1. Comptroller and Auditor
General of India
Through Comptroller & Auditor General
9, DeenDayal Upadhyay Marg.
New Delhi- 110002.
2. Principal Accountant General
0/0 Pr. Accountant General (Audit-I)
Karnataka, 'C' Block, 2nd Floor, P.B. No. 5398,
Audit Bhavan, Bengaluru-560001.
3. Deputy Accountant General (Admin)
Indian Audit & Accounts Department
0/0 The Principal Accountant General (Audit-I)
'C' Block, Ground Floor, P.B. No. 5398,
Audit Bhavan, Bengaluru-560001.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Dr. S.S. Hooda)
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Item No.149/C-3 2 OA No.3230/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. RajinderKashyap, Member (A):
By filing the instant OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
(i) To set-aside & quash impugned chargesheet/ memorandum dated. 13.04.2023 against applicant & Inquiry report dated 18.09.2023. (Annexure A-I (Colly).
(ii) To set aside and quash impugned orders dated 27.10.2023 passed by disciplinary authority & order dated.23.01.2024 passed by appellate authority against applicant (Annexure A-I (Colly).
(iii) To direct the respondent to reinstate in service to the applicant as stenographer Grade-II Forthwith.
(iv) To direct the respondent to grant all the consequential benefits like seniority, promotion, pay and allowance and arrears after grant relief (i) & (ii) to the applicant.
(v) To pass any other order/s as deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(vi) Award Cost.
2. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder refuting the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.
FACTS IN BRIEF
3. The applicant was appointed as Stenographer Grade-II in the O/o the Principal Accountant General Karnataka, Bengaluru vide orderdated.26.10.2017 (Annexure A-2). Thereafter on 31.03.2021, the applicant made representation through proper channel for grant of deputation to C&AG Office or any IA&AD Office in Delhi due to health issues of his ailing parents (Annexure A-3) followed by subsequent representations dated 17.6.2021, 13.09.2021 , 20.12.2021, 22.02.2022 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 3 OA No.3230/2024 pursuing the said request for grant of deputation [Annexure A-4 (Colly.)]. Thereafter, Applicant again made representations through Welfare Officer on 09.06.2022 and 28.09.2022 requesting to grant of deputation to C&AG office or any IA&AD office in Delhi on the very same ground [Annexure A-5 (Colly)]. Subsequently, the applicant applied for half pay leave till 30.12.2022 through email on 14.11.2022. However, the leave was granted only for 14 days, i.e., till 02.12.2022. Thereafter, according to the applicant, due to adverse circumstances, he again applied vide email dated 28.11.2022 for extraordinary leave till 10.02.2023 but the same was granted till 18.12.2022. Thereafter, on 08.12.2022 through email, he had again requested for extraordinary leave till 10.02.2023 and also requested for grant of deputation to the said offices (Annexure A-6).
3.1 When the applicant did not report for duty on 19.12.2022, the respondents issued recall Memo dated 20.12.2022 directing the applicant to report for duty on or before 26.12.2022, failing which suitable disciplinary action will be initiated against him (Annexure A-
7). Subsequently, applicant preferred an appeal against recall memo dated 20.12.2022 through email on 22.12.2022 and request for extraordinary leave and also requested for deputation to Delhi on humanitarian ground [Annexure A-8 (Colly)]. 3.2 Thereafter, according to the applicant, without considering above detail appeal of the applicant, respondents issued final recall memo dated 11.01.2023 directing him to report for duty on or before 16.01.2023, failing which suitable action will be initiated against him 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 4 OA No.3230/2024 (Annexure A-9). Subsequently, applicant again preferred an appeal against final Recall memo dated 11.01.2023 through email on 16.01.2023 highlighting the health conditions of his ailing parents and regarding his own health conditions, who is suffering from depression and he is under treatment from IHBAS, Hospital Delhi (Annexure A-
10).
3.3 Thereafter, the applicant represented to Addl. Dy. CAG (Southern Region) on 17.01.2023 and a copy to PAG & DAG regarding request for deputation to the O/o C&AG office or any IA&AD office in Delhi on humanitarian ground (Annexure A-II). However, the respondents issued warning memo dated 14.03.2023 directing him (applicant) to desist from the practice of submitting direct representation to higher authorities on service matters in future (Annexure A-12).
3.4 Thereafter the applicant made various representations to Principal Accountant General & Deputy Accountant General on 06.02.2023, 13.04.2023, 09.06.2023, 08.08.2023, &06.10.2023 regarding request for extraordinary leave and request for deputation to Delhi and also requested to grant extraordinary leave lastly till 08.12.2023 [Annexure A-13 (Colly.)] for 56 days but in vain. 3.5 However, subsequently without considering the submission made by the applicant from time to time regarding request for extraordinary leave and request for deputation to Delhi on humanitarian grounds along with medical documents, the respondent issued show cause on 09.02.2023 (Annexure A-14) to the applicant to 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 5 OA No.3230/2024 explain as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated for violating CCS (Conduct) Rules 1965 and why the period of unauthorized absence should not be treated as 'dies non' in terms of rule 25 of CCS (Leave) Rules 1972. The applicant submitted his reply on 13.2.2023 (Annexure A-15) to the said show cause notice dated 09.02.2023 requesting for regularization of leave and deputation to Delhi on humanitarian ground. Thereafter, the respondents had issued a warning Memo dated 14.03.2023, as the applicant directly addressed his representation to the Comptroller & Auditor General of India, New Delhi for deputation in the office of IA & AD situated in Delhi, which was replied by the applicant on 27.03.2023 (Annexure A-16) and also requesting for deputation to the said offices.
3.6 Thereafter, the respondents issued memorandum dated 13.04.2023 under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 alleging that the applicant has remained an unauthorised absence from 19.12.2022 to till date in spite of having receipt 2 recall memos and thus, the applicant has violated Rule 3 (I) (ii), 3 (I) (iii), 3 (I) (xviii), 3 (I) (xix) and Government of India decision 23 (8) under Rule 3 of the Rules ibid. Alongwith the same, respondent annexed Statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the said Article of charge framed against the applicant (Annexure-II), list of documents (Annexure-III), list of witnesses (Annexure IV). 3.7 The applicant submitted his reply to the said Memorandum on 24.4.2023 denying all the allegations levelled against applicant (Annexure A-17). Thereafter respondent issued an order dated 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 6 OA No.3230/2024 12.05.2023 by which the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed to inquire into the charges framed against applicant (Annexure A-18). Subsequently, Inquiry Officer issued a letter to the applicant on 16.05.2023 (Annexure A-19) intimating him to attend the preliminary hearing charges framed against him on 26.05.2023. Thereafter, Inquiry Officer again issued a letter to the applicant on 07.07.2023 (Annexure A-20) regarding first regular hearing proceedings to be held on 17.07.2023 to which the applicant submitted his reply to PAG (Audit-l) and copy to DAG and inquiry officer via email and registered post on 23.05.2023 against preliminary hearing on 26.5.2023 and also submitted his reply to Inquiry officer on 14.07.2023 against first regular hearing to be held on 17.07.2023 requesting to kindly conduct an inquiry in any IA &AD office in Delhi due to ill health of his ailing aged parents as also of his own health, as it would not be possible for him to go to Bengaluru, which is 2500 kilometres far away from Delhi in the pitiful circumstances [Annexure A-21(Colly)]. 3.8 According to the applicant, without taking into account of applicant's reply dated 14.07.2023 (Annexure A-22), Inquiry Officer again issued notice on 18.07.2023 to the applicant regarding second regular hearing proceeding to be held on 31.07.2023. Subsequently, the applicant again submitted reply on 27.07.2023 (Annexure A-23) against second regular hearing on 31.07.2023 requesting for deputation on humanitarian ground as requested by him various representations dated 31.03.2021, 17.06.2021, 13.09.2021, 20.12.2021. 22.02.2022, 09.06.2022, 28.09.2022, 08.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 17.01.2023, 06.02.2023, 13.02.2023, 27.03.2023, 13.04.2023, 24.04.2023, 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 7 OA No.3230/2024 23.05.2023, 09.06.2023 and 14.07.2023 addressed to DAG (Admin) and PAG (Audit-I) are still pending for consideration till date. 3.9 On 01.08.2023 (Annexure A-24), Inquiry Officer again issued third and final hearing regular proceedings to be held on 18.08.2023 stating the in case applicant failed to appear on the appointed date and time proceedings will be taken ex parte. The applicant submitted detailed reply 10.08.2023 (Annexure A-25) to the said third notice for final regular hearing on 18.08.2023 requesting to conduct an inquiry in any IA &AD office in Delhi. However, according to the applicant, again without taking into account the submissions made by the applicant from time to time through above stated various representations, the Inquiry Officer submitted ex parte inquiry report on 18.09.2023 [Annexure A-1 (Colly.)] stating that charges stand proved against the applicant and the same was communicated vide endorsement dated 06.10.2023 for making representation against inquiry report within 15 days from the date of endorsement. The applicant submitted detailed parawise reply on 13.10.2023 (Annexure A-26) against the said Inquiry Report dated 18.09.2023. However, according to the applicant, without application of mind, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 27.10.2023 (Annexure A-1 Colly.) imposed the penalty of removal from service upon the applicant and the period of unauthorised absence of the applicant from 19.12.2022 to 27.10.2023 is treated as 'dies non' and the same was forwarded to the applicant vide covering letter dated 27.10.2023. Thereafter, the applicant preferred appeal to the appellate authority on 04.12.2023 (Annexure A-27).
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Item No.149/C-3 8 OA No.3230/2024
3.10 According to the applicant, without taking into account the
submissions made by the applicant through various representations as well as appeal, the appellate authority also rejected the appeal of the applicant vide order dated 23.01.2024 (Annexure A-1 Colly.). Hence, aggrieved by the said inquiry proceedings and the said impugned orders, the applicant has filed the present OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the contents of the reply raised a preliminary objection of maintainability of the present OA in view of the provisions of Section 20 (1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 20 of the Rules ibid reads as under:-
20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted -
(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances, -
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.
(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial."
(emphasis supplied) 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 9 OA No.3230/2024 4.1 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 provide a statutory remedy of revision to an employee who is aggrieved by an order passed by the appellate authority. However, the applicant has failed to avail himself of this remedy by not preferring a revision petition before the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, as contemplated under Rule 29 of the said Rules. It is further contended that the applicant, in paragraph 6 of the Original Application, has incorrectly stated that he has exhausted all remedies available under the relevant Rules, without disclosing the availability of the remedy of revision or assigning any reason for not availing the same. Hence, the present Original Application is premature and not maintainable, being filed without exhausting the statutory remedy provided under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
4.2 In support of above contention learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of coordinate Bench of this Tribunal at Patna in OA No.410/2010, titled Kameshwar Singh vs. Union of India and others, decided on 05.11.2020 in which also the applicant had approached the Patna Bench of this Tribunal without exhausting the remedy of revision as provided under Rule 29 of the Rules ibid and this Tribunal and had also not in para 6 of the said OA stated that "he has availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules.." and this Tribunal dismissed the same OA on the sole ground that applicant therein had remedy of revision under Rule 29 of the Rules ibid read with Section 20(i) of the AT Act, 1985. Learned counsel also submitted that the said decision of this Tribunal was challenged by the said Kameshwar Singh (supra) by way of writ 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 10 OA No.3230/2024 petition, being Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.9619 of 2022, titled Kameshwar Singh vs. Union of India and others, before the Hon'ble High Court of judicature at Patna and the Hon'ble High Court vide order/judgment dated 11.07.2022 dismissed the said writ petition with the following observations:-
"7. Crux of the matter in the present petition is whether petitioner need not invoke Rule-29 of CCA Rules, 1965 in filing Revision before the Revisional Authority or not? In order to overcome Section 20(2)(a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 or not?. Rule-29 of CCA Rules, 1965 reads as under:
"29. [Revision] (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules-
(I) the President; or
(ii) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a Government servant serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department; or
(iii) the Member (Personnel) Postal Services Board in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Postal Services Board and Adviser (Human Resources Development), Department of Telecommunications in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Telecommunications Board; or
(iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central Government, in the case of a Government servant serving in a department or office (not being the Secretariat or the Posts and Telegraphs Board), under the control of such Head of a Department; or
(v) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised or
(vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the President by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order;
may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and may-
(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or
(b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or
(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order to or any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or
(d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit:
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 11 OA No.3230/2024 Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any revising authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, and if an inquiry under rule 14 has not already been held in the case no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in rule 14 subject to the provisions of rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary :
Provided further that no power of revision shall be exercised by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, Member (Personnel), Postal Services Board, Adviser (Human Resources Department), Department of Telecommunications or the Head of Department, as the case may be, unless-
(i) the authority which made the order in appeal, or
(ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie, where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him.
(2) No proceeding for revision shall be commenced until after-
(i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or
(ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred.
(3) An application for revision shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under these rules.
8. Further Section 20(2)(a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 reads as under:
Section 20(2)(a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that filing of revision under Rule-29 of 1965 is not an efficacious remedy. In terms of Section 20(2)(a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, if it is to be invoked in that event the petitioner need not exhaust a remedy of Rule-29 of CCA Rules, 1965. Section 20(2) (a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is required to be read with Section 20(3). The petitioner need not prefer any memorial before the President or the respective Governor. He is required to exhaust remedy under Rule-29 of CCA Rules, 1965. Rule-29 specifically provide for revision and the Revisional Authority is required to decide the revision in the form of deciding appeal. Therefore, revision under Rule- 29 is nothing but another appeal vide Rule29(3) of Rules 1965. Section 20(2)(a) of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 could not assist the petitioner in the light of Rule-29(3) of Rules, 1965 and language employed therein.
10. In light of these facts and circumstances, the petitioner has not made a case. In fact petitioner has mislead the Tribunal while stating in para-6 of the original application that he has availed all other remedies. In other words the petitioner should have apprised the Tribunal stating 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 12 OA No.3230/2024 that he had a revision remedy under Rule-29 of CCA Rules, 1965, still it is not an efficacious remedy. On the other hand, he has not highlighted in his original application that he had a remedy of revision in para-6 of the original application.
11. Having regard to the conduct of the petitioner also the original application filed before the Tribunal was not maintainable. Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chand Sharma Vs. Udham Singh Kamal &Ors. reported in (1999) 8 SCC 304 at para-4 held as under:
"4. The respondent No. 1 Udham Singh Kamal on 2nd June, 1994 filed Original Application (O.A.) before the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. This O.A. was admittedly beyond the prescribed period of limitation of three years as provided under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. As regards the limitation in paragraph 5, the first respondent has stated as under
:
"The applicant further declares that the application is within the limitation prescribed in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985."
This averment clearly indicates that the first respondent was all along asserting that he had filed O.A. within limitation but it was not so. The appellants in both these appeals have raised a contention that the O.A. was beyond three years and, therefore, the same was barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Despite this objection raised by the appellants, the first respondent did not file any application for condonation of delay. Section 21 (3) of the Act gives power to the Tribunal to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown."
12. If the aforesaid principle is applied the petitioner's averment at para-6 of the original application which is cited supra the original application before CAT is not maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed while affirming the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 05.11.2020 passed in OA/050/00410/2020. The petitioner is at liberty to invoke remedy of revision within a period of eight weeks from today. If such revision is filed before the Revisional Authority, he/she is hereby directed to decide the petitioner's revision petition on merits within a reasonable period of six months from the date of receipt of revision petition." 4.3 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, in view of the aforesaid submissions and the judgments of the Patna Bench of this Tribunal as well as the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna (supra), the instant OA deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. Without prejudice, learned counsel also made submissions on merits.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant has been dismissed from service, and the disciplinary 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 13 OA No.3230/2024 proceedings leading to his dismissal were vitiated due to non-adherence to the procedure prescribed under the relevant rules. Learned counsel also submitted that, as the impugned action is contrary to law and principles of natural justice, the applicant has rightly invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal for redressal of his grievances. FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF MAINTAINABILITY OF THIS OA
6. The respondents have raised an objection that the applicant has not exhausted all the available remedies and did not prefer any Revision Petition against the Order of Appellate Authority as envisaged under Rule 29 of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 and as such OA is not maintainable in view of bar provided in Section 20 of AT Act, 1985. 6.1 While hearing this matter, a pointed query was also posed to the learned counsel for the respondents on this point. The contention of the applicant is that the applicant is very much within his rights to approach this Hon'ble Tribunal under Section 19 of CAT Act 1985 for redressal of his service-related grievance. Therefore, the respondents have raised a misleading objection / contention to deflect the attention of this Tribunal that the applicant has not preferred any Revision Petition against the Order of Appellate Authority and thus not availed all the remedies available to him regarding redressal of grievance as required under Section 20 of AT Act, 1985. As regards requirement of Section 20 of the AT Act the same reads as below:
"20. Application not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted-
(1). A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 14 OA No.3230/2024 (2). For the purpose of sub section (1) a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules to redressal of grievances-
(a). if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules rejecting any Appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance ...".
6.2 The above stipulation of the legislated provision of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, it makes very clear that a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him, if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules rejecting any Appeal preferred or representation made by such person. The applicant has submitted an Appeal and the same have been duly decided by order dated 04.12.2023.
6.3 In view of this position, the contention of the respondents about not preferring a Revision Petition is not only misconceived but also unfounded and baseless. Reliance is placed on the judgement of Principal Bench of this Tribunal in Rajiv Tandon v GoI and judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore v State of M.P. [1990 (1) SLJ 98: AIR 1990 SC 10], wherein it has been unequivocally held that 'for the purpose of Section 20 of Administrative Tribunal Act, disposal of statutory Appeal under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is sufficient for approaching the CAT. It is also relevantly submitted that Revision Petition is only an alternate remedy but not an efficacious remedy". For facility of reference, relevant paragraphs of the judgement 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 15 OA No.3230/2024 of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of S.S. Rathore v State of M.P in Civil Appeal No. 207 of 1984 is as follows: -
17. ......... Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authorities take an unduly long time. That is so on account of the fact that no attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and they are not considered to be governmental business of substance. This approach has to be deprecated and authorities on whom power is vested to dispose of appeals and revisions under the Service Rules must dispose of such matters as expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, a period of three to six months should be the outer limit. That would discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of litigation.
18. We are satisfied that to meet the situation as has arisen here, it would be appropriate to hold that the cause of action first arises when the remedies available to the public servant under the relevant service Rules as to redressal are disposed of.
19. The question for consideration is whether it should be disposal of one appeal or the entire hierarchy of reliefs as may have been provided.
Statutory guidance is available from the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been laid down :
"20(2). For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievances;
or
(b) where no final order has been made by tee Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial."
20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle."
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6.4 As per Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the Law laid by the
Hon'ble Apex Court is binding on all Courts/Tribunals. LITERAL RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 6.5 The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal [C.A. No. 2684 of 2007 dated 16.3.2011 below: -
"15 In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034, this Court observed:
"In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear."
6.6 As the language of clause (a) sub-Section (2) of Section 20 of Administrative Tribunal Act is very clear and unambiguous, it has to be interpreted by applying Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation i.e. to read and apply the Law as clearly laid in the statute. 6.7 It would be profitable to see Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 which provides for Revision Petition. The Rule supra reads as follows:-
"29. Revision (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules-
(i) the President; or
(ii) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in the case of a
Government servant serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department; or
(iii) the Member (Personnel) Postal Services Board in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Postal Services Board and Adviser (Human Resources Development), Department of Telecommunications in the case of a Government servant serving in or under the Telecommunications Board; or
(iv) the Head of a Department directly under the Central Government, in the case of a government servant serving in a 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 17 OA No.3230/2024 department or office (not being the Secretariat or the Posts and Telegraphs Board), under the control of such Head of a Department; or
(v) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised or
(vi) any other authority specified in this behalf by the President by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order;
(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34,from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and
(b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed;
or
(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order to or any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or
(d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit."
6.8 In the instant case, Appeal was allowed as per section 23(ii) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 & the same has been preferred [Annx. A-6] & hence no Revision Petition could have been made. 6.9 Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in its decision dated 01.07.2015 in the matter of K.A. USHA v CHIEF COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE in OP (CAT) No. 108/2015 held the following: -
"1. Whether a revision petition by way of memorial to be preferred before the President of India as envisaged under Rule 29 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (for brevity, the CCS(CCA) Rules) is mandatory so as to enable the aggrieved person/employee to move the Central Administrative Tribunal by virtue of the hurdles stated as placed as per Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunal's Act (for brevity 'the Act') is the moot point involved.
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"9.To understand the scope of the contention, it will be worthwhile to have a look at the relevant provisions, particularly Section 20 of the Act, which is extracted below:
20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted -(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of subs-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial.
10. The terminology used under Section 20(1) of the Act stipulates that the Tribunal shall not 'ordinarily' admit an application, unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. This by itself means that exemption could be drawn under particular circumstances, if the Tribunal is satisfied as to the necessity in this regard, so as to entertain the matter. Even otherwise, the Scheme of the Statute is discernible from Sub-section (2) of Section 20; wherein it has been clearly provided under Sub-clause (a), that if a final order has been passed by the Government/Competent Authority rejecting any appeal or representation preferred by the aggrieved party, it shall be deemed for the purpose of Sub-section (1) that the parties have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service Rules for redressal of the grievance. The position becomes more clear from sub Section (3) of Section 20 of the Act, which says with reference to Sub-Sections (1) & (2) that any remedy available to an employee by way of submission of a Memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available, unless the applicant had elected to submit such a memorial. In view of the undisputed fact that the petitioner herein had not elected to prefer any memorial, the existence of any such course/remedy as envisaged under Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules cannot bar the way of the petitioner in pursuing the remedy before the Tribunal. She having already exhausted the remedy by way of appeal, by virtue of mandate under Sub-section 2(a) of Section 20 of the Act, the verdict passed by the Tribunal by way of Exts.P5 and P7 are liable to be interdicted.
11. As mentioned herein before, the petitioner has also a contention that the Tribunal had exercised the discretion as to 'satisfaction' with reference to Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act and the O.A. was ordered to be admitted way back in the year 2012. The respondents have 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 19 OA No.3230/2024 entered appearance and the pleadings are completed. The matter was listed for hearing. It was thereafter, that the petitioner was relegated to move the concerned authority with reference to Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. In Smt. Kanak and another v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and others (AIR 2003 SC 3894), with reference to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and considering the sequence of events, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 29, that it would not be proper to relegate the parties to avail the statutory remedy so as to have redressal of the grievance after pendency of the matter for quite long.
12. In view of the subsequent verdict passed by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in U.P. State Spinning Co .Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [(2005) 8 SCC 264], there is no absolute bar in passing a verdict declining to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegating the matter to pursue the statutory remedy first even after admitting the matter. This Court finds that the petitioner may not be justified in saying that once the O.A. is admitted, it is always obligatory for the Tribunal to have the matter decided on merits. Each case has to be considered and decided depending upon the facts and circumstances involved in the case. But, the question involved in this case is something different, which is more with reference to the prescription of law by virtue of Section 20(2) and (3) of the Act and see whether the petitioner has discharged the burden cast there under, so as to have the right to move the Tribunal by filing the O.A.
13. There is no dispute to the fact that the original order was passed by the disciplinary authority which was subjected to challenge by the petitioner, by filing an appeal, leading to Annexure A-1 order. Having satisfied the said requirement by virtue of the mandate under Section 20(2) (a) of the Act, it has to be deemed that the petitioner has exhausted all the statutory remedies in so far as the prescription under Sub-section (i) of Section 20 of the Act is concerned. This being so, the existence of a further chance or remedy with reference to Rule29 of the CCS(CCA) Rules by way of revision or memorial to be presented by the petitioner could not have been cited as an instance to have non-suited the petitioner. This is more so, in view of the version of the petitioner that no such remedy even otherwise do sexist and that the petitioner has not elected to have the said course. The position stands answered by the statute itself, in favour of the petitioner, by virtue of sub-Section (3) of Section 20 of the Act, that it shall not be a bar.
This Court finds that the petitioner is justified in challenging Annexures A-9 and A-11 Orders passed by the Disciplinary authority and the Appellate authority respectively before the Tribunal. In the said circumstances, Exts. P5 and P7 orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench are set aside. The case is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration on merit. The proceedings are required to be finalised in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
The Original Petition stands allowed. No cost". 6.10 This Tribunal in OA 3010/2015 in the matter of Kumar Rajeev v ECI of India dated 27.9.2018 held: -
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 20 OA No.3230/2024 "13. It is fairly well settled that Revision is not as a matter of right, and unless it is conferred by specific provision of law, it cannot be either availed or entertained..................Confronted with a specific question as to under which provision, the Revision was filed, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that it is referable to Rule 29 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. A perusal of this Rule discloses that the remedy of revision is available only against an order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, or from which no appeal is allowed.
14. In the instant case, the remedy of appeal is allowed, and it was availed by the applicant. Therefore, the question of availing the remedy of Revision does not arise. The mandate under sub rule (3) of Rule 29 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 that an Application for Revision shall be dealt with in the same manner as if it was an appeal under the rules, would become relevant, only when the revision as such is permissible."
6.11 The above decision of this Tribunal was challenged by the said Shri Kumar Rajeev before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court by way of Writ Petition (C) No.3032/2019, titled Kumar Rajeev vs. Election Commissioner of India and the Hon'ble High Court vide Order/Judgment dated 22.03.2024 upheld the said Order/Judgment of this Tribunal by observing that "the Tribunal being justified in rejecting the OA and upholding the penalty imposed on the petitioner, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed."
6.12 In view of this position, the contention of the respondents about not preferring a Revision Petition is not only misconceived but also unfounded and baseless. Therefore, the said objection raised by the respondents is rejected.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT ON MERITS
7. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the action of the respondents is illegal, arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory, being in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as the impugned orders have been passed without application of mind and in contravention of the settled principles of law.
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 21 OA No.3230/2024 7.1 Learned counsel also contended that the penalty imposed upon the applicant is grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. The applicant was never unauthorisedly absent from duty during the period 19.12.2022 till the date of charge-sheet/memo dated 13.04.2023, as alleged by the respondents.
7.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's father is a senior citizen suffering from mental illness, under treatment at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi. Due to this ailment, he faces severe memory loss, speech difficulty, and requires constant care. In addition, he has been suffering from heart disease since 2002, having suffered two fatal heart attacks in the past, along with asthma and varicose veins, for which surgery has been advised. The applicant's mother is also suffering from fibroids, requiring surgical intervention. Due to the multiple ailments of both parents and their old age, they are unable to take care of themselves independently. 7.3 The applicant initially brought his parents to Bengaluru to stay with him, but owing to the climatic difference and their fragile health, their condition worsened, compelling him to take them back to Delhi. Being the only son, it became his moral and social responsibility to take care of his ailing parents. Consequently, the applicant suffered from depression due to his family's medical condition, for which he has been undergoing treatment at IHBAS, Delhi.
7.4 Learned counsel also argued that the applicant had regularly informed the competent authority regarding the health conditions of his 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 22 OA No.3230/2024 parents and his own illness. Hence, the question of unauthorized absence does not arise.
7.5 Learned counsel also contended that the impugned charge memo dated 13.04.2023, subsequent inquiry proceedings, and penalty orders are vitiated being in violation of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, as the respondents failed to supply a list of documents and witnesses proposed to prove the allegations. In Annexure-IV to the charge memo, where the list of witnesses should have been furnished, the respondents have recorded "nil", rendering the inquiry defective and unsustainable in law. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein it was held that in departmental proceedings, documents relied upon must be duly proved by examining witnesses and not by mere production. It was further emphasized that an inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, and any finding of guilt must be based on legally admissible evidence duly proved before him. 7.6 In support of the claim of the applicant, reliance has also been made to the following decisions:-
(i) Ram and Shyam Company vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in 1985 SCC (3) 267;
(ii) Dwarika Prasad (D) Thr. LRs vs. Prithvi Raj Singh in SLP (C) No.11259/2022, decided on 20.12.2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court;
(iii) Joginder Singh (Dead) Thr. LRs vs. Dr. Virinderjit Singh Gill (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. in SLP (C) No.9202-
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 23 OA No.3230/2024 9204/2016, decided on 17.10.2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court;
(iv) Vashist Narayan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and others in Civil Appeal No.1 of 2024, decided on 02.01.2024 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court;
(v) Rajendra Prasad Gupta vs. Prakash Chandra Mishra & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.984 of 2006, decided on 12.01.2011 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court;
(vi) State of Punjab and others vs. Shamlal Murari & Anr. Reported in 1976 SCC (1) 719;
(vii) The judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Union of India v. Shameen Akhtar, W.P.(C) No. 8726/2015, decided on 11.09.2015;
(viii) This Tribunal's order/judgment dated 15.02.2024 in O.A. No. 2540/2023, titled Jai Kumar Meena v. UOI & Ors.;
(ix) This Tribunal's order/judgment dated 29.04.2024 in O.A. No. 2165/2018, titled Kuldeep Kumar vs. Union of India;
(x) This Tribunal's order/judgment dated 20.01.2025 in O.A. No. 438/2023, titled Kuldeep Kumar vs. Union of India; &
(xi) This Tribunal's order/judgment dated 29/11/2023 in O.A. No. 785/2017, titled Pankaj Kumar vs. Union of India;
7.7 Learned counsel also submitted that that the applicant had made several representations seeking extraordinary leave and deputation to Delhi on humanitarian grounds along with supporting medical documents, but the same were not considered on merits before imposition of the major penalty. Despite repeated requests to conduct 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 24 OA No.3230/2024 the inquiry at the IA & AD Office, Delhi due to his own ill health and that of his parents, the respondents insisted on holding the inquiry at Bengaluru, around 2500 kilo meters away, making it impossible for the applicant to participate effectively.
7.8 Learned counsel further argued that the respondents, without issuing any show cause notice, have treated the period from 19.12.2022 to 27.10.2023 as 'dies non', which is against the principles of natural justice. The action also amounts to double jeopardy, as the applicant has been subjected to two penalties for the same alleged misconduct. 7.9 Learned counsel also urged that the applicant's replies to the charge memo and show cause notices, as well as his numerous representations dated 31.03.2021, 17.06.2021, 13.09.2021, 20.12.2021, 22.02.2022, 09.06.2022, 28.09.2022, 08.12.2022, 22.12.2022, 17.01.2023, 06.02.2023, 13.02.2023, 27.03.2023, 13.04.2023, 24.04.2023, 23.05.2023, 09.06.2023, 14.07.2023, 27.07.2023, 08.08.2023, 10.08.2023, 15.09.2023, 06.10.2023 and 13.10.2023, were not considered by the respondents prior to passing the impugned orders.
7.10 Learned counsel also contended that the inquiry officer's finding that the applicant failed to submit replies to the recall memos and show cause notices is factually incorrect, as the applicant had duly submitted his replies and documentary evidence, which were ignored by the disciplinary authority.
7.11 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the impugned charge memo, inquiry report, and penalty orders are liable to be quashed, being 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 25 OA No.3230/2024 violative of statutory rules, principles of natural justice, and settled judicial precedents.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
8. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the applicant and submitted that the applicant has nowhere denied the fact of his unauthorized absence, either in his written statement of defence or in the present Original Application. Instead, he has merely sought a sympathetic view, citing "pitiful circumstances" and "miserable and pathetic situations." It is well settled that once the charge is admitted, there is no necessity to conduct a detailed inquiry. In this case, the applicant has admitted to the charge and only sought leniency on compassionate grounds. 8.1 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant's leave was sanctioned from 07.11.2022 to 18.12.2022, with a clear warning that failure to report thereafter would attract disciplinary proceedings. Despite this, the applicant did not report for duty on 19.12.2022, leading to issuance of a Recall Memo. As he neither responded nor resumed duty, disciplinary proceedings were rightly initiated. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 469, wherein it was held that unauthorized absence or overstaying leave amounts to indiscipline, and the employer may either condone the same by sanctioning leave or treat it as misconduct. In the present case, the respondents rightly chose to proceed departmentally.
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8.2 Learned counsel vehemently argued that the applicant remained
absent from 19.12.2022 onwards despite repeated communications and failed to participate in the inquiry, compelling ex parte proceedings. These unrebutted facts clearly demonstrate lack of devotion to duty and gross indifference towards official responsibilities, amounting to serious misconduct. The administration cannot function at the mercy of delinquent employees who remain absent without authorization. It is also submitted that the plea of illness of the applicant and his parents is unsupported by credible medical evidence. The documents produced show only outpatient treatment without any certificate of incapacity or prescribed bed rest. Moreover, such ailments could have been treated at Bengaluru itself, which has adequate medical facilities. Hence, the explanation is untenable. It is also contended that seeking leave or deputation does not absolve an employee from unauthorized absence, as leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right as provided under Rule 7(1) of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972. The competent authority has full discretion to sanction or refuse leave and, therefore, no fault lies with the respondents. He further stated that the applicant habitually bypassed proper channels and attempted to exert political influence, as evidenced by a letter from the Office of the Mayor, North Delhi, requesting his deputation, an act wholly inappropriate. He was cautioned against such conduct through letters dated 09.02.2022 and 14.03.2023 (Annexures R-4 and R-5). It has been submitted by the respondents that adequate opportunities were afforded to the applicant during the inquiry. Despite three notices from the Inquiry Officer, he failed to appear, resulting in ex parte proceedings. All procedural 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 27 OA No.3230/2024 requirements under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were duly observed, and the Disciplinary Authority passed the order after considering the inquiry report and available material.
8.3 Distinguishing the applicant's reliance on Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, learned counsel argued that the facts of that case differ materially. There, the finding rested solely on an unproved confession, whereas here, the evidence comprises the applicant's own correspondence and official records, which remained undisputed. Hence, no witness examination was necessary as the charges stood proved through documentary evidence. Though the strict provisions of the Evidence Act and CPC do not apply to departmental inquiries, their principles permit drawing presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act from admitted and unrebutted records. Accordingly, the authorities rightly concluded that the applicant's continued unauthorized absence amounted to misconduct.
8.4 Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the disciplinary and appellate authorities have passed detailed, reasoned, and speaking orders after due consideration of all relevant facts. There being no procedural infirmity or violation of rules, the applicant is not entitled to any relief by this Tribunal.
ANALYSIS
9. We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for both parties, perused the pleadings, and examined the material placed on record.
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10. Since this matter pertains to departmental proceedings, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities.
10.1 In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under:
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 29 OA No.3230/2024 proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
(emphasis supplied) 10.2 In another case in the matter of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings as under:-
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
10.3 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 30 OA No.3230/2024 "22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority............"
23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
(emphasis supplied)
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 31 OA No.3230/2024 with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
(emphasis supplied) 10.4 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and
(vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 32 OA No.3230/2024 misconduct."
11. Having regard to the aforesaid dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and upon careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case, as delineated hereinabove, the principal contention advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Charge Memorandum dated 13.04.2023 and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, including the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities, stand vitiated and are unsustainable in law. It is contended that the impugned Charge Memorandum has been issued in gross violation of the mandatory provisions contained under Rule 14(3)(ii)(b) and Rule 14(4)(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The said provisions unequivocally require the Disciplinary Authority to append and furnish the list of witnesses proposed to be examined in support of the charges levelled against the delinquent official. However, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the said list, i.e., Annexure (iv) to the impugned Charge Memorandum, contains the entry "Nil", thereby demonstrating non-compliance with the statutory mandate.
12. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon several authoritative pronouncements, the most recent being O.A. No. 438/2023 - Smt. Sushmita Saha v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Others, decided on 20.01.2025 by a Coordinate Bench 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 33 OA No.3230/2024 of this Tribunal, wherein an identical issue was examined and adjudicated. The relevant observations of this Tribunal in the said decision are extracted herein below for ready reference:
"7. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. The relevant provisions of the Rule 14 have been considered by the Hon'ble High Court in the case of Shameem Akhtar (Supra) and in identical facts and circumstances in the case of Jai Kumar Meena (Supra) this Tribunal has considered and followed the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Shameem Akhtar (Supra).
8. In paras 12 to 14 in the case of Jai Kumar Meena (Supra), the Tribunal has held as under:-
"12. The relevant provisions of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 have expressly been considered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Shameem Akhtar (supra) and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has also considered various judgments in the said case. For precision, we do not reproduce the Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, rather we reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the judgement of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Shameem Akhtar (supra). Paras 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16 reads as under:
"12. Another ground which was raised by the respondent before the Tribunal for quashing of the charge sheet was that the same was in violation of Rule 14 of sub-Rule (3) of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. The said Rule reads as under:
"(3) where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule and Rule 15, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up
-
(i) the substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant;
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained."
13. A reading of the aforesaid Rule would show that the substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehavior in support of Articles of Charge shall contain the list of documents and list of witnesses by whom the Articles of Charge are proposed to be sustained. In the present case, no list of witnesses was provided to prove the charges leveled against the respondent herein. In the case of Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police and Others, reported at JT 1998(8) SC 603, it was held as under:
2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 34 OA No.3230/2024 "....there was absolutely no evidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant and the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated by reasons of the fact that they are not supported by any evidence on record and are wholly perverse. Again, in its judgment in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others 2009(2) SCC 570 the Apex Court held that mere production of documents is not enough but their contents have to be proved by examining the witnesses. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:-
14. Indisputably, a departmental proceedings is a quasi judicial proceedings. The Enquiry Officer must be performs a quasi judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a find upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof.
Again the Apex Court in Modula India Vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo (1988) 4 SCC 619 held that in a disciplinary proceedings documents are the tools for the delinquent employee for cross examining the witnesses who deposed against him. Further, the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Hardwari Lal Vs. State of U.P.& Others 1999 (8) SCC 582 held that in a departmental enquiry proceedings examination of the material witnesses is a must. We are, therefore of the considered view that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Applicant vide the impugned Memorandum dated 22.02.2011 is an exercise in futility.
8. In view of above position, we allow this OA and quash and set aside the impugned Memorandum dated 22,12,2011 with all consequential benefits. As the Applicant has already retired from service, the Respondents shall pass appropriate orders in favour of the Applicant positively within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order."
14. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Saroi Kumar Sinha, reported at 2010 (2) SLJ 59, wherein it was observed as under:
"26... Even such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. Since the Government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the enquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. Enquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/ disciplinary authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebatted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 35 OA No.3230/2024 procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.
27. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2)of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the /employee.
28. When a department enquiry is conducted against the Government Servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate/removal from service in the case of Shaughnessy Vs. United States 345 US 206 (1953) (Jackson J), а judge of the United States Supreme Court has said procedural fairness and regularity are of the 20 indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied."
15. It is settled law that the charges leveled against a delinquent official is to be proved in the inquiry before any penalty is imposed. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 14 provides that the Articles of Charge are to be supported with documents and proved by witnesses during the hearing. In our view, this in- built safeguard has been provided to allow a delinquent employee to cross-examine the witnesses and to rebut the allegations against him. In the absence of any witness and in the absence of any opportunity to cross-examine a witness would be against the canon of natural justice and the same cannot be treated as a mere formality.
16. The writ petition, in our view, is without any merit; there is-no ground to entertain the same."
13. We fail to understand that once after the disciplinary order, the applicant has preferred not only statutory appeal but has also preferred revision petition and the same were rejected by the respondents, which alternate remained available to the applicant except to approach this Tribunal. Though the respondents have taken the objection that the applicant has not approached this Tribunal with clean hands, however, nothing has been brought to our notice in support of such vague and baseless assertions made on behalf of the respondents. Rather we find that the case of the applicant is squarely covered by the judgement of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Shameem Akhtar (supra).
14. In view of the aforesaid, we pass the following order:
(i) OA is allowed and impugned orders dated 05.11.2015 (Annexure-A-1), findings dated 13.04.2016(Annexure-A-2), order dated 15.06.2016 AnnexureA-3), appellate order dated 2025.11.07 RAVI KANOJIA17:07:35 +05'30' Item No.149/C-3 36 OA No.3230/2024 04.03.2020 (Annexure-A-4) and order dated 26.05.2023 (Annexure-A-5) are set aside.
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to the consequential benefits.
(iii) The aforesaid directions shall be complied by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 08 weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to proceed against the applicant, if they so decide, in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions."
9. Rule 14(4) (a) of the Rules reads as under:-
"(4) (a) The Disciplinary Authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained."
10. From the aforesaid judgment in the case of Jai Kumar Meena and provisions of Rule 14(3) (ii) (b) and Rule 14 (4) (a), it is apparent that the same are mandatory in nature which have been admittedly not been complied with by the respondents while proceeding against the applicant and in passing the orders impugned in the present O.A.
11. In view of the aforesaid, the present, the O.A. is allowed with the following orders:-
(i) Impugned orders dated 31.01.2022 and 21.11.2022 are set aside.
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to consequential benefits.
(iii) The respondents shall comply with the aforesaid orders, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within 6 weeks of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iv) The respondents shall be at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against the applicant, if they so decide, however, of course in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject and in such situation both the parties shall be at liberty to agitate all the grounds available to them, in accordance with the law. "
13. In view of the observations and findings recorded by the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in O.A. No. 438/2023 - Smt. Sushmita Saha v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India & Others (supra), the issue raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is no longer res integra. Following the same parity of reasoning and respectfully adopting the ratio laid down therein, the present Original Application deserves to be allowed in identical terms.
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Item No.149/C-3 37 OA No.3230/2024
Accordingly, the present O.A. is allowed in the same manner with the following directions
(i) Impugned chargesheet/Memorandum dated 13.04.2023, IO's report dated 18.09.2023 as also the order dated 27.10.2023 and 23.01.2024 passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively are set aside.
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to consequential benefits as per rules and instructions on the subject.
(iii) The respondents shall comply with the aforesaid orders, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within 6 weeks of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iv) The respondents shall be at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against the applicant, if they so decide, however, of course in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject and in such situation both the parties shall be at liberty to agitate all the grounds available to them, in accordance with the law.
14. There shall be no order as to costs.
15. Pending MA(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
(RajinderKashyap) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
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