Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dalip Singh vs Faquir Singh And Another on 16 May, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997P&H19, AIR 1997 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 19, (1996) 3 SCT 194, 1996 REVLR 2 182, (1996) 3 RRR 493, 1996 PUNJ LJ 438, (1996) 114 PUN LR 119
ORDER G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. Petitioner-Dalip Singh who was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Attewali, Tehsil and District Fatehgarh Sahib, in the election held on January 20, 1993, has prayed for setting aside of the judgment dated 7-10-1995 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fatehgarh Sahib, whereby petitioner's election has been set aside.
2. Respondent No. 1 Faquir Singh also contested the election to the office of Sarpanch and after having lost the battle of ballot he filed a petition under Section 13 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to challenge the election of the petitioner on the ground that he was not eligible to contest the election being an employee of the Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. and also on the ground that his father had taken shamilat Land' on lease from the Gram Panchayat but had not paid the lease money. The petitioner contested the election petition. He denied the allegations made by respondent No. 1 by standing that as an employee of the Cooperative Sugar Mills, Morinda, he did' not suffer from any disqualification to contest the election to the office of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. He also pleaded that the so-called arrears outstanding against his father could not be treated as a disqualification against him.
3. The Executive Magistrate, Fatehgarh Sahib, who tried the petition recorded findings in favour of petitioner-Dalip Singh on both the issues and dismissed the election petition. However, in appeal, learned Additional District Judge, Fatehgarh Sahib, upheld the challenge to the election of the petitioner and by his impugned judgment, set aside the election and declared respondent No. 1 as elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Attewali.
4. The following two questions which arise for determination by this Court are:--
(1) Whether the petitioner could be treated as defaulter qua Gram Panchayat Attewali within the meaning of Section 6(5)(e) of the Act merely because his father had allegedly taken Shamilat land on 'chakota' from the Gram Panchayat and did not pay the amount; and (2) Whether the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the election to the office of Sarpanch being an employee of Co-operative Sugar Mill, Morinda.
5. Before proceeding further, we deem it useful to reproduce Section 6(5) of the Act as well as Article 191 of the Constitution of India, which lay down the disqualifications for a Sarpanch or Panch and for Member of Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council respectively. The, provisions are:--
"6(5). No person who
(a) is not a member of the Sabha or is not qualified to be elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly; or (aa) has after the trial of an election petition presented under Chapter IIA found guilty of any corrupt practice specified in Section 13U, unless the period of disqualification laid down or on under Section 13T has elapsed or the Government has removed the disqualification under the last aforesaid section; or
(b) has been convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude unless a period of five years has elapsed since his conviction; or
(c) has been subjected to an order by a criminal court and which order in the opinion of the Director implies a defect of character unfitting him to be a Sarpanch or Panch, unless a period of five years has elapsed since the date of order; or
(d) has been convicted of an election offence; or
(e) has been ordered to give security for good behaviour under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; or
(f) has been notified as disqualified for appointment in public service, except on medical grounds; or
(g) is a whole time salaried servant of any local authority or State or the Union of India; or
(h) is registered as a habitual offender under the Punjab Habitual Offenders (Control and Reforms) Act, 1952; or any other Act for time being in force or;
(i) is an undischarged insolvent; or
(j) has not paid the arrears of the tax imposed by the Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad; or
(k) is an employee of Sabha or Gram Panchayat; or (kk) is a member of either house of Parliament or of the Legislature of the Punjab State; or
(l) is tenant or lessee holding a tenancy of lease under the Gram Panchayat or is in arrears of rent of any lease or tenancy held under the Gram Panchayat or is a contractor of the Gram Panchayat; or
(m) is in unauthorised occupation of property belonging to any local authority; or
(n) has been convicted of an offence-under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 within a period of five years immediately preceding the last date of the filing of nomination papers; or
(o) being a Sarpanch has cash in hand in excess of that permitted under the rules and does not deposit it in pursuance to general or special order of the prescribed authority within the time specified by it; or
(p) being a Sarpanch or Panch does not attach with his nomination paper a certificate, of the Block Development and Panchayat Officer to the effect that he has handed over to the Panchayat Secretary or the officer authorised by the Block Development and Panchayat Officer in this behalf complete charge of the records of the Gram Panchayat and of the case, if any, with him;
shall be entitled to stand for election as, or continue to be a Sarpanch or Panch;
Provided that a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislature of the Punjab State may be elected as a Sarpanch or Panch if, along with his nomination paper he gives a written undertaking to the effect that he shall resign his membership of either House of Parliament or of the Legislature of the Punjab State as the case may be, and so resigns before taking the oath under sub-section (1) of Section 9.
Article 191 : Disqualifications for membership:-- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State-
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court;
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign Stale;
(e) if he so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.
Explanation:-- For the purpose of this clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule by reason only that he is Minister either for the Union or for such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualfied for being a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule:"
6. A person who holds any office of profit under the Government of India or Government of any State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India is disqualified from contesting election for a Legislative Assembly. By reading Art. 191 of the Constitution of India in Section 6(1), 5(1) of the Act, it can be said that a person who holds any office under the Government of India or the Government of State of Punjab is disqualified for being elected as Sarpanch or Panch of a Gram Panchayat. Another disqualification is enumerated in clause (g) according to which a whole time servant of any local authority or a State or Union of India is not entitled to stand for election or continue to be a Sarpanch or Panch of a Gram Panchayat. Yet another disqualification is in a case where a person is a tenant or lessee under the Gram Panchayat or is in arrears of any lease or tenancy held under the Gram Panchayat or a contractor of the Gram Panchayat.
7. Now; we shall deal with the two questions formulated above. In the election petition filed by him, respondent No. 1 pleaded that Dalip Singh is a defaulter of Gram Panchayat Attewali regarding the chakota amount. He also alleged that father of Dalip Singh had taken shamilat land on chakota from Gram Panchayat and did not pay the chakota amount to the said Panchayat. He alleged that Dalip Singh's father died and the said amount has not been paid by Dalip Singh or anybody else although he is legally bound to pay the same. In his reply, Dalip Singh stated that he is not a defaulter of the Gram Panchayat. The allegation that his father took Shamilat land on chakota from Gram Panchayat and did not pay the amount was also denied by him. Shri Jaswinder Singh, Secretary Gram Panchayat, Attewali, appeared as a witness and stated that land measuring 14 kanals 4 marlas was given on lease to Khazan Singh son of Jagat Singh for a sum of Rs. 220/- during the year 1960-70. He further stated that in the year 1973-74, Khazan Singh took on lease land measuring two acres and two kanals for a sum of Rs. 290/-. During the year 1974-75, Khazan Singh was given land measuring one acre and six kanals on lease for a sum of Rs. 180/-. Again in the year 1975-76, land measuring one acre and six kanals was given on lease to Khazan Singh for a sum of Rs. 220/-. During the year 1981-82, one acre and six Kanals was given to Khazan Singh for a sum of Rs. 300/-. He further stated the amounts of Rs. 130/-, Rs. 220,/- and Rs. 300/- had been deposited by Khazan Singh. Shri Jaswinder Singh admitted that a person who is defaulter is not entitled to give bid in future. He stated that although notices are given to the defaulters but he could not say whether any such notice was given to Khazan Singh, father of Dalip Singh. In his testimony, respondent-Faquir Singh stated that Khazan Singh was in arrears of Rs. 220/-. He stated that after the death of Khazan Singh, Dalip Singh and his brother Jagir Singh inherited the property and the property left by Khazan Singh was in possession of both of them. In his cross-examination, Faquir Singh admitted that he did raise any objection regarding the arrears when he was member of Gram Panchayat, Attewali. Another witness, namely, Sher Singh, Presiding Officer for conducting the election of the Gram Panchayat, stated that Faquir Singh did not file any objection in writing nor raised any oral objection before start of the poll that Dalip Singh was not competent to contest election. He also stated that even after the conclusion of the election, Faquir Singh did not raise any objection. He further stated that no list of defaulters was produced before him. Dalip Singh appeared in support of his case and on the basis of record he made a statement that a sum of Rs. 220/-had not been deposited in the funds of Gram Panchayat. On the basis of this evidence, the Executive Magistrate concluded that Faquir Singh had failed to establish the allegation of Dalip Singh being a defaulter because lease was given to his father Khazan , Singh. Learned Additional District Judge held that amount of Rs. 220/- was found outstanding against the father of Dalip Singh and as he had succeeded to the property of his father, the payment of dues of Gram Panchayat was a pious debt and as the same was not deposited he became a defaulter of the Gram Panchayat.
8. In our opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge to the effect that petitioner (Dalip Singh) was a defaulter of Gram Panchayat is ex facie perverse. In his election petition, Faquir Singh did not make any allegation that Dalip Singh was a tenant or a lessee of the Gram Panchayat or that he was in arrears of any lease or tenancy under the Gram Panchayat. What he pleaded was that Dalip Singh's father had taken the land on lease and a sum of Rs. 220/- was outstanding against him. The evidence was also produced only to show that Khazan Singh had taken the land from Gram Panchayat on lease and a sum of Rs. 220/- was outstanding against him. In view of these pleadings and evidence, it is impossible to record a finding that Dalip Singh was a tenant or lessee under the Gram Panchyat nor can it be held that Dalip Singh was in arrears of rent on the date of election. As Dalip Singh did not take any land on lease from Gram Panchayat and he never became a tenant of the Gram Panchayat, he cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be in arrears of rent. Due to inheritance of property of his father along with his brother Jagir Singh, Dalip Singh and Jagir Singh may be under a moral obligation to deposit the amount, but, when the law only contemplates a personal default on the part of a candidate to deposit the arrears of rent, any liability by his predecessor-in-interest or parents cannot make such candidate liable to suffer a disability to contest the election. If the Legislature intended that arrears of predecessor-in-interest should also constitute a disability for contesting election to the office of Sarpanch, the language of Section 6(5)(1) would have been altogether different. It would have been been provided that a person who is in arrears of rent or any lease held under the Gram Panchayat by himself or his predecessor-in-interest is disqualified. Absence of such language shows that the Legislature did not intend to disqualify a; person from contesting the election to the office of Sarpanch merely because his father or mother or any other predecessor-in-interest was/is in arrears of rent. We are also of opinion that the provision regarding disqualification of a person to contest the election has to be construed strictly and there is no reason for us to re-writ the provisions of the Statute so as to sustain the plea of disqualification.
9. Coming to the second question, we consider it absolutely imperative to mention that the allegation made by respondent No. 1 was that Dalip Singh is an employee of Cooperative Sugar Mills, Morinda and, therefore, his nomination paper was liable to be rejected. The statement made by Faquir Singh before the Election Tribunal was also to the effect that Dalip Singh is a permanent employee of Sugar Mill, Morinda. On his part, Dalip Singh stated that he was a seasonal pen-incharge in Co-operative Sugar Mills, Morinda. He also stated that the Sugar Mill is a private institution because it has share holders and is governed by Punjab Cooperative Societies Act and all the rules and regulations framed thereunder. This shows that before the Election Tribunal, respondent No. 1 had neither pleaded nor proved that Dalip Singh was an employee of "Sugarfed". Learned Additional District Judge relied on the judgmeat of this Court in Karnal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 Pun LJ 617 and held that although the Co-operative Sugar Mill, Morinda, cannot be regarded as a local authority, but, he was disqualified from contesting election because he was holding office of profit under the Morinda Sugar Mill which was under the control and supervision of Sugarfed, Punjab.
10. Shri Nagpal, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the petitioner is an employee of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills and not of a 'local authority' or State or Union of India and, therefore, the disqualification enumerated in clause (g) of S. 6(5) of the Act could not be invoked in his case. He further argued that the petitioner was not an employee of Sugarfed and, therefore, the decision in Karnail Singh's case (supra) has no relevance in the context of the facts of this case. On the other land, Shri H. S. Toor, Senior Advocate, appearing for respondent No. 1, vehemently aruged that being an employee of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills, the petitioner will be deemed to be an employee of Sugarfed which is an instrumentality/agency of the State and, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge regarding disqualification of the petitioner should be upheld.
11. At the cost of repetition, we would like to state that respondent No. 1 did not plead before the Election Tribunal that Dalip Singh was an employee of Sugarfed. Even in evidence, respondent No. 1 did not produce the Constitution or bye-laws/Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills and Sugarfed to establish that Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills was a part of Sugarfed or was under the direct control of Sugarfed. In the absence of a specific plea- that the petitioner was an employee of Sugarfed and total lack of evidence to prove that Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills was an agent of Sugarfed, it cannot be held that the petitioner was an employee of Sugarfed. Rather, the evidence produced by the parties clearly establishes that the petitioner was an employee of Morinda Sugar Mill. We may refer to the provisions of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. As per S. 2(c), a 'Cooperative Society' means a 'Co-operative Society' registered or deemed to be registered under the Act of 1961. Section4 Lays down that a 'society' which has an object of promoting the economic interest of its members in accordance with the co-operative principles may be registered under the Act of 1961. Section 6 contains restrictions of holding of shares. Sections 7 and 8 contain the procedure for registration of Co-operative Societies. Chapter III of the Act contains provisions regarding members of the Cooperative Societies, their rights and liabilities. Chapter IV lays down provisions for management of the Co-operative Societies. Section 23 which finds mention in Chapter IV lays down that final authority in a Cooperative Society shall vest in the general body. Sub-section (1) of S. 23 empowers the Co-operative Society to constitute a smaller general body for the purpose of management. Section 27 of the Act of 1961 empowers the Registrar to remove or substitute the Committee or a member(s) thereof. Section 30 declares that the Co-operative Society shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal and with the power to hold property, enter into contract, institute and defend suits and legal proceedings and do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted. Chapter VI contains provisions regarding properties and funds of the Co-operative Societies. From these provisions, it is clear that every Co-operative Society registered under the Act of 1961 has an independent existence. Registrar of the Co-operative Societies does have some control over the functioning of the Co-operative Societies, but there is nothing in the Act of 1961 to indicate any control of any other body except the Government by way of shareholdings. It must, therefore, be held that Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills is an independent body and being a seasonal employee working under the said society, the petitioner would be deemed to be an employee of Morinda Sugar Mill. The evidence produced by the parties before the Election Tribunal also proves that petitioner Dalip Singh was, an employee of Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills and not that of Sugar-fed which has an independent existence.
Before us, no provision of law has been cited to prove that an employee of Morinda Cooperative Sugar Mills is automatically treated as an employee of Sugarfed.
12. In the light of the above, we have to see whether the petitioner can be treated as disqualified from contesting election to the office of Sarpanch in view of S. 6(5)(g) of the Act. In the first place, we would, consider whether the petitioner can be treated as an employee of a 'local authority'. The expression 'local authority' has not been defined in the Act, but, S. 2(30) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, defines it in the following words:--
. "2(30) 'local authority' means a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund."
This definition will have to be taken into account for the purposes of S. 6(5)(g) of the Act. It is not the case of respondent No. 1 that Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills is a municipal committee or district board or a body of port commissioners. Therefore, what is left to be examined is whether it is an authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. A learned single Judge (A. D. Koshal, J., as he then was), considered this aspect in Ude Singh v. The State of Haryana, (1972) 74 Pun LR 44 and held :--
"an employee of a co-operative society registered under the Punjab Co-operative ' Societies Act cannot be regarded as a whole-time salaried servant of a local authority."
We fully concur with the view taken in Ude Singh's case regarding the interpretation of the expression 'local authority'. In addition, we may refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Housing Board of Haryana v. Housing Board Employees' Union, (1995) 8 JT (SC) 37 : (1995 AIR SCW 4291). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of the Genera! Clauses Act, 1897 along with the Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971 and the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and held (at p. 4293 of AIR, SCW) :--
"Concept of 'local authority' is ..... contained in Entry 5, which empowers the Stale Legislature to make law with respect to any subject relating to Local Government including the constitution of 'Local Authorities'. The State Legislature can also confer such powers as it itself possesses upon a 'Local Authority', including the power of taxation (within the limits of List II) for the purposes of Local Self-Government. The 'Local Authority', undoubtedly, is a representative body but notwithstanding its representative character, it remains a subordinate authority created by a statute and, therefore, it cannot claim the power of taxation which belongs to the State Legislature except to the extent it is conferred upon it by the statute which creates it.
The Municipal Committees, the District Boards, Gram Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis etc. represent the units of Local Self Government where people of a local area govern themselves through their elected representatives in respect of a large number of matters including construction of buildings, roads, parks, lighting of streets, sewerage, conservancy and water works etc. These Local Self-Governments, namely, the Municipal Boards and the District Boards etc. are constituent under statutory provisions which elaborately provide for the election, through adult franchise, of persons who, on being elected, become members of the Municipal Boards or the District Board. These Boards are basically independent bodies with very little or minimal of Government control and that too in the limited field. They formulate their own policies and implement those policies through the machinery provided under law. They have power to levy Panchayat, municipal or other local taxes and have also the power to realise those taxes through coercive processes, if they arc not paid immediately on demand. They have also the right to raise, build up and manage their 'local funds'.
Under the basic principle of statutory interpretation, the words 'Other Authority' having been placed in the company of 'Municipal Council' and 'District Boards' etc. in the definition of 'Local Authority' in the General Clauses Act can be interpreted to mean a 'Body' having and possessing, practically all the attributes of a Municipal Board or the District Board so far as their independent existence is concerned."
13. Reference also deserves to be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. R. C. Jain, (1981) 2 SCR 854 : (AIR 1981 SC 951), in which their Lordships had examined the concept of 'local authority' and held (at pp. 952 and 953 of AIR) :--
"What then are the distinctive attributes and characteristics, all or many of which a Municipal Committee, District Board or Body of Port Commissioners shares with any other local authority? First, the authorities must have separate legal existence as corporate bodies. They must not be mere governmental agencies but must be legally independent entities. Next, they must function in a defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, be elected by the inhabitants of the area. Next, they must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with freedom to decide for themselves questions of policy affecting the area administered by them. The autonomy may not be complete and the degree of the dependents may vary considerably but, an appreciable measure of autonomy there must be. Next, they must be entrusted by statute with such governmental functions and duties as are usually entrusted to municipal bodies, such as those connected with providing, entrusted with the performance of civic duties and functions which would otherwise be governmental duties and functions. Finally, they must have the power to raise funds for the furtherance of their activities and the fulfilment of their projects by levying taxes, rates, charges, or fees. This may be in addition to monies provided by government or obtained by borrowing or otherwise. What is essential is that control or management of the fund must vest in the authority."
14. In view of the judgment of this Court in Ude Singh's case, (1972 (74) Pun LR 444) (supra) and two decisions of the Supreme Court we hold that Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills cannot be treated as 'local authority' for the purpose of S. 6(5)(g) of the Act.
15. Counsel for respondent No. 1 has not argued and in our opinion rightly, that the petitioner was an employee of Union of India and, therefore, we are not required to examine and decide whether the petitioner can be treated as an employee of Union of India and is, therefore, disqualified from contesting election. The Only limited point which now remains to be considered is whether the petitioner can be treated as an employee of the State. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 laid emphasis on the decision in Karnail Singh's case (1993 Pun LJ 617) (supra) and argued that the point should be treated as concluded from that decision. We have carefully gone through that decision and. in our opinion, the same cannot be applied to the present case for holding that the petitioner was disqualified from contesting election. Petitioners in those cases were employees of Punjab Tractors Limited, Pepsu Road Transport Corporation and Punjab State Electricity Board. They had challenged the instructions issued by the Government of Punjab vide circular dated 7-12-1992 debarring them from contesting election to the Gram Panchayats. A Division Bench of this Court examined the provisions of Section 6(5)(a) and (g) of the Act and after taking note of the statement made by the Advocate General that Punjab Tractors Ltd., Punjab State Electricity Board and Pepsu Road Transport Corporation are entirely funded by the Government and the State Government exercised full control over them, the Division Bench held that the petitioners are holders of office of profit under the State of Punjab and as such, they are disqualified from contesting election in view of the provisions contained in S. 6(5)(g). For taking the aforesaid view, the Division Bench placed reliance on Article 191 of the Constitution of India and the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihari Lal Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC 385, in which the Supreme Court had dealt with an issue of disqualification of an Assistant Teacher who was employed in a Basic School run by the U.P. Board of Basic Education.
16. From the decision of the Supreme Court in Bihari Lal Dobray's case (supra), it appears that the true test to determine whether a body is a 'State' for the purposes of disqualification clause depends upon the degree of control the Government exercises over such bodies or committees, their composition, degree of its dependency on the Government for its financial needs and the functional aspects. Another factor which is required to be considered is whether such body discharge any Governmental function. In our opinion, none of these elements is present in the case of Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills. There is nothing on the record to show that the said Mill discharges any important Governmental function or that it is wholly or substantially financed by the Government or that the Government exercises deep and pervasive control over its functioning. It cannot, therefore, be said that Merinda Sugar Mill is an agency or instrumentality of the State.
17. In Karnail Singh's case (1993 Pun LJ 617) (supra), this Court had decided the issue involving employees of the instrumentally and agency of the Slate and not a Cooperative Society registered under the Act of 1961. Therefore, that decision has no bearing on the issue raised in this case. We may add that although Sugarfed finds reference at Item No. 57 in the List appended to the notification dated 27-12-1992 which was under challenge in Karnail Singh's case, but, in view of our finding that the petitioner cannot be treated as an employee of Sugarfed, it is not possible to accept the submission of Shri Toor that in view of the judgment in Karnail Singh's case, the petitioner should be treated as disqualified.
18. We may also refer to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Pritam Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 Punj & Har 228 in which this Court was directly called upon to decide the question whether a Co-operative Society registered under the Act of 1961 can be treated as State for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench referred to various provisions of the Co-operative Act and held:--
"A Society registered under the Act of 1861 does not fall within the expression 'other authorities' within the meaning of Article 12 and, therefore, the same is not amenable to writ jurisdiction."
The view of the Full Bench about the non-maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 against a society may be to debate, but, there is no reason not to accept its conclusion that a Co-operative Society registered under the Act of 1961 is not a State for the purposes of Article 12.
19. Reference also deserves to be made to the decision of the Full Benches of Gauhati and Madhya Pradesh High Courts and some other decisions.
20. In Sahabuddin Choudhury v. State of Assam, (1994) 2 Serv LR 265 : (1994 Lab IC 108) a Full Bench of Gauhati High Court considered the status of State Assam Cadre Management Co-operative Society Limited and held that the society cannot be treated as an agency of the State Government because of lack of pervasive control of the Government over the functioning of the society.
21. In Dinesh Kumar Sharma v. M. P. Dugdha Mahasangh Sahkari Maryadit, (1994) 2 Serv LR 113, a Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the society registered under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 is not an instrumentality of the State for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
22. The same view has been expressed by a learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Pawan Kumar Pareek v. Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh, (1994) 2 Serv LR 798.
23. Two other learned single Judges of Rajasthan High Court have held in K. M. Mohnot v. The Chairman, Bank of Rajsthan, (1994) 3 Serv. LR 442 and in WAPCOS Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India, (1994) 3 Serv LR 495 that the Bank of Rajasthan and Water and Power Consultancy Services (India) Ltd. do not fall within the definition of 'State', as contained in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
24. In view of the above legal position, we hold that the Morinda Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. cannot be treated as a State for the purpose's of Section 6(5)(g) of the Act. As a logical corollary, it must be held that the petitioner did not suffer from disqualification, enumerated in that section and the impugned judgment suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it.
25. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. The judgment Annexure P4 is set aside. As a logical consequence, the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. The petitioner shall get costs from respondent No. 1, which we assess as Rs. 5000/-.
26. Petition allowed.