Himachal Pradesh High Court
Himachal Road Transport Corporation ... vs Presiding Officer And Anr. on 20 May, 1999
Equivalent citations: (2000)ILLJ1151HP
Author: D. Raju
Bench: D. Raju, M.R. Verma
JUDGMENT
D. Raju, C. J.
1. The above writ petition has been filed seeking for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent- Labour Court dated September 10, 1992 in case-App-17/89, whereunder the first respondent-Labour Court held the second respondent to be entitled to two hours' over time wages per day for the relevant period, as claimed by the second respondent, besides 11 months' pay in lieu of 171 Sundays on which he was said to have performed the duties but was not granted the compensatory leave in lieu of Sundays, by the respondents with a further direction to pay the amount within a stipulated time imposing a default clause for payment of interest also, if not paid within the time stipulated.
2. The second respondent, who was working as a Conductor in the petitioner-Corporation, was posted as Booking Clerk at Haridwar where he used to do the work of Booking tickets for the buses of the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation"). He filed an application invoking the powers of the first respondent-Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for computation and for a direction to pay Rs. 91,980/- by the petitioner on the basis of facts that the second respondent had been doing 7 hours' overtime duty daily with effect from February 1984 to September 1987. He also claimed wages with reference to 171 Sundays during which he was said to have worked in addition to other claims and thus made the total claim of Rs. 150, 180/-, with interest thereon. The petitioner-Corporation contested the claim of the second respondent in all respects. After trial and enquiry, the first respondent came to pass an award on the terms, noticed earlier, and aggrieved against the same, the petitioners have filed the writ petition.
3. Mr. Deepak Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended and submitted in the first instance itself that the relief of the nature claimed by the second respondent could not be legitimately made the subject matter of the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and that, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction, power and authority to entertain and adjudicate on such claims and grant any relief to a claimant. The learned Counsel also contended that factually there was no basis for claiming that the second respondent worked for more than 8 hours' a day, that there were no orders specifically granting overtime wages to the second respondent and in the absence of any such specific orders, the second respondent will not be entitled to any such over-time wages. As for the claim made for compensatory wages for having said to have worked for 171 Sundays, the learned Counsel for the petitioners pointed out that there is no scope for paying the second respondent 11 months pay and consequently the impugned award is liable to be set aside.
4. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent-worker, while adopting the reasoning of the learned Judge in the Labour Court, with equal force and vehemence contended that the findings recorded by the Court below and the relief granted on the basis of those findings cannot be said to be vitiated for any illegality or any infirmity, whatsoever, to warrant the interference of this Court in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While contending that the claim of the nature, which is based on a right secured under the statute itself could be the subject matter of the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, inasmuch as in the teeth of indisputable right secured to the worker in this regard, what remains to be done was merely quantification of the amount and verification of the claim for the period for which it was actually claimed by the second respondent. As for the other contentions made against the award, the learned Counsel for the second respondent also stated that sufficient, cogent and convincing reasons for countenancing the claim on merits have been given by the Labour Court and no exception could be taken to the same and there is no warrant to interfere with those findings and the relief ultimately granted, on merits,
5. Learned Counsel appearing on either side, in support of their respective stand, invited our attention to the various and relevant provisions of law as also the contents of the award, which is under challenge, and the relevant materials placed by either of the parties before the Court below, in this regard.
6. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the above materials to which our attention has been drawn. The first question that requires to be dealt with and decided is as to the jurisdiction, competence and the authority of the Labour Court to countenance the claim of the nature for consideration and adjudication within the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Section 33-C enables a workman, where any money is due to him from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or Chapter V-B, he himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and on a certificate being issued to the Collector, the same can be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C also enables any workman, who is entitled to receive from the employer any money or benefit, which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, such question may be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. The question as to the scope and extent of power of the Labour Court in dealing with an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act came to be considered by this Court, to which one of us (D. RAJU, C. J.) was a party, in a batch of writ petitions, C.W.P. 4 of 1992 etc. in a judgment rendered on December 30, 1998. That was a case wherein a question was raised, in the context of a claim by the workers of the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and Himachal Pradesh Housing Board, vis-a-vis, the payment of bonus. After a review of the relevant case law on the subject, it was held that the proceedings contemplated under Section 33-C(2) of the Act are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court, like the execution Court, as in the execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, on the interpretation of the award on which the claim is made relief may be granted by implementing the adjudication, if any already, made by a decree and not to adjudicate any dispute, the claim of which itself requires adjudication for its enforcement in the form of a decree. It was also observed therein that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) was to deal with by interpretation of award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's power for the purpose of the execution where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement and that it does not extend to determination of the dispute, as to the very entitlement or the basis of the claim, if there be no power of adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. Ultimately, with particular reference to the claim projected in those cases, namely, the payment of minimum bonus declared under the Bonus Act, it was held that the claim is not only based on a statutory right and entitlement declared by the statute itself but is to enforce a corresponding liability imposed on the employer and in such cases of indisputable and indefeasible existence of a right, as such, the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) is entitled to accord relief.
7. In P.K. Singh and Ors. v. Presiding Officer and Ors. (1998-II-LLJ-363) (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court also observed that it is only where a workman's claim under Section 33-C(2) cannot be disposed of unless his right to such claim is first adjudicated on a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act, an application under Section 33-C(2) will not be maintainable. It, therefore, requires to be seen in the light of the above principles of law laid down as to whether the claim involved in this case is of computing in terms of money any benefit arising out of any pre-existing right as such either under any agreement or award or under any of the statutory provisions of any Act or that the right claimed itself will depend upon a prior adjudication on a reference. The second respondent, would be, in our view, a motor transport worker, having regard to the definition contained in Section 2(h) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Workers Act), he being both a Conductor and a Booking Clerk by virtue of his appointment and by virtue of assignment, in which he was placed during the relevant period of time in respect of which the benefit is claimed. The Transport Workers Act has been enforced, so far as the State of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, withe effect from February 1, 1962 and the petitioners would answer the description of 'Motor Transport Undertaking' as also the 'employer' for the purpose of said Act as defined under Section 2(g) and 2(e), respectively. There is no claim projected nor there could be any, to show that the petitioner-Corporation is exempted from the provisions of the said Act. Sections 13 and 14 of the Transport Workers Act not only stipulate: the hours and limits of the employment but Section 15 provides for daily intervals for rest and Section 19 weekly rest and Section 20 compensatory day of rest. Section 26 provides for the payment of extra wages for overtime and in the teeth of such categorical provisions contained in the Transport Workers Act, there is hardly any need or necessity for the worker to have a formal adjudication of the right to receive the benefits claimed by him in his application under Section 33-C(2) and what remains for the worker was only to have such statutory benefits computed in terms of money and for which purpose alone, the application in this case appears to have been filed and in our view, rightly countenanced and computed by the first respondent-Labour Court and granted the relief to the extent it was found permissible.
Consequently, we see no merit, whatsoever, in the challenge made to the jurisdiction of the first respondent to entertain the claim within the scope of an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act and the same shall stand rejected.
8. As for the challenge made to the award on the other grounds, we are of the view that in the teeth of the specific provisions to which a reference has been made by us (supra), the relief actually granted cannot be said to be either unauthorised, baseless or unwarranted. Nothing has been stated before us that there is otherwise any infirmity in the manner of calculations or in the quantum determined to be the monetary value of the benefit. In the light of the above, we see no infirmity, whatsoever, in the ultimate award passed by the first respondent- Labour Court in favour of the second respondent-worker.
9. For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit in the writ petition and the same shall stand dismissed. No costs.
CMP No. 769/1993In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the present application is dismissed and the interim stay shall stand vacated.