Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Sundru Devi on 4 October, 2024
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
( 2024:HHC:9712 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,
SHIMLA
LPA No. 316 of 2024
Date of decision: 4th October, 2024
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant
Versus
Sundru Devi ...Respondent.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Appellant: Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
For the Respondent: Mr. Yudhvir Singh Thakur, Advocate.
Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge (Oral)
Parties to the list are being referred as per their status in the Writ Petition for convenience.
2 Respondent/State has preferred this appeal against the judgment dated 10th May, 2023 passed by learned Single Judge in CWPOA No. 2500 of 2020 titled as Sundru Devi vs. State of HP, whereby petitioner has been held entitled for conferment of work charge status from the date when she completed 8 years continuous service on daily wage basis with 240 days in each calendar year. 2
( 2024:HHC:9712 ) 3 The appeal has been preferred mainly on the ground that learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition on the basis of judgment passed in LPA No. 165 of 2021 titled as State of HP & others vs. Surajmani and another, whereas SLP Diary No. 21292 of 2023 titled as State of HP vs. Surajmani filed by the State against judgment in aforesaid LPA, is pending adjudication before the Supreme Court; the respondent-Department does not have work charge establishment as work charge establishment was neither created nor abolished in the Department at any point of time; further that case of petitioner for granting work charge status is not covered by judgment passed in Mool Raj Upadhayaya vs State of H.P. & Others 1994 Supp (2) SCC 316 which was further explained in Gauri Dutt and others vs. State of HP, Latest HLJ 2008(HP) 366 and therefore, petitioner has no right to claim work charge status after completion of 8 years of service; further that on account of delay in approaching the Court also, petitioner is not entitled for relief claimed in petition. 4 Learned Additional Advocate General submits that for delay and laches also, petitioner is not entitled for any relief in present petition. To substantiate this plea judgments passed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 91 of 2011 titled State of HP vs. Babu Ram decided on 17.6.2016 and CWP No. 5119 of 2024 titled Jai Ram vs. State of HP decided on 10.06.2024 have been referred by learned Additional Advocate General.
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( 2024:HHC:9712 ) 5 To rebut the plea raised on behalf of respondents- Departments regarding delay and laches, learned counsel for petitioner has referred pronouncements of this High Court in CWPOA No. 5748 of 2019, titled Man Singh vs. The State of HP and others, CWPOA No. 5554 of 2019, titled Daulat Ram vs. State of HP and others, CWPOA No. 5660 of 2019 titled Ghanshyam Thakur vs. State of HP and others and CWPOA No. 46 of 2020 titled as Yashwant Singh and others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others. In these cases, similar plea of State was not accepted by the Court.
6 In the light of above referred pronouncements, plea of respondents-Department to oust the petitioner on the ground of delay and laches, in our opinion, in present case is not sustainable. Petitioner is a daily wager and belongs to a lowest rank in her class. As per Policy, a duty was cast on the respondents to consider the cases of eligible workmen for conferment of work charge status on completion of required number of years as per Policy. Petitioner is eligible for benefits under the Policy and in consonance with pronouncements of the Courts.
7 The issue in this regard also stands settled in CWPOA No. 2735 of 2010 titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of HP, wherein it has been observed as under:-
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( 2024:HHC:9712 ) "6. The simple question is whether the delay defeats justice? In analysing the above issue, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioners are only Class-IV workers (Beldars). The Schemes announced by the Government clearly provided that the department concerned should consider the workmen concerned for bringing them on the work-charged category. So, there is an obligation cast on the department to consider the cases of the daily waged workmen for conferment of he work charged status, being on a work-charged establishment, on completion of the required number of years in terms of the policy. At the best, the petitioners can only be denied the interest on the eligible benefits and not the benefits as such, which accrued on them as per the policy and under which policy, the department was found to confer the status, subject to the workmen satisfying the required conditions.
8 It was duty of the respondents-State to confer Work Charge status upon the petitioner and for lapse on the part of respondents, petitioner, who belongs to the lowest rank of hierarchy in the service cannot be made to suffer, and in numerous similar cases it has also been held that for dereliction of duty on the part of concerned officer, petitioner cannot be made to suffer and, thus, prayer of learned Additional Advocate General is rejected.
9 For delayed extension of benefits, arising out of the Policy of the State, the petitioner cannot be deprived from consequential benefits from the due date, as implementation of Policy 5 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) is the duty of the State through its Officers, being custodian of rights of citizens.
10 In CWPOA No.5286 of 2020, titled as Mohinder Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, this High Court has observed as under:-
"2. The decision to grant benefit to individuals like the petitioner in terms of judgment passed by this Court, in CWP No. 2735 of 2010 titled Rakesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. alongwith connected matters decided on 28.07.2010, was taken vide letter dated 08.06.2015 i.e. Annexure A5. Subsequently, the respondents implemented the decision in Rakesh Kumar's case and as a consequence thereof, the date of regularization of the petitioner was changed to 01.01.2005, as is evident from Annexure R3 dated 01.08.2015.
... ... ...
7. From a perusal of records, it is clearly evident that sole ground for non grant of benefits to the petitioner is based on the reason that the petitioner had not filed a case seeking the benefits of Rakesh Kumar's case stated supra. At the outset, it is made clear that no other ground is available to the State to defend its action as it is a well settled principle of law that reasons are not like wine which mature over a period of time. As has been held in AIR 1978, Supreme Court, 851 titled Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others. Relevant extract is reproduced herein below:-6
( 2024:HHC:9712 ) "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by addition grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. In Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) ( at. p.18):
"Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority can not be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself."
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."
8. A perusal of Rakesh Kumar's case stated supra reflects that the same is a decision, which touches upon a policy matter, scheme of regularization. Rakesh Kumar's case is a judgment in rem with intention to give benefits to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. The same casts an obligation upon the authorities to themselves extend the benefits thereof to all similarly situated persons. A perusal 7 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) of Annexure A5, letter dated 08.06.2015, reflects the respondents authorities of their own had also decided to extend the benefits of Rakesh Kumar's case to all.
9. In Rakesh Kumar's case, there is no direction of the Court to restrict the consequential benefits, including monetary benefits, for three years prior to filing of the petition. It has been observed in Rakesh Kumar's case that for delay in approaching the Court, the petitioner, at the most, can be denied interest on delayed payment, but shall not be denied arrears of wages and other financial benefits for which he is entitled, like others, from the date of regularization/ conferment of Work Charge status. Therefore, restriction of payment of consequential benefits for only three years prior to filing of the Writ Petition is not sustainable.
10. Even otherwise, when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, other identical situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit, and not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
11. Plea of the respondents with respect to delay and laches is also not legally sustainable. The distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam is lucidly captured in State of UP Vs. Arvind Kumar Shrivastva 2015 (1) SCC Page 347 followed in 2021 Vol. 13 SCC Page 225. Relevant extract wherein is being reproduced hereinbelow:-
"22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly 8 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fencesitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." (Emphasis supplied)
12. Present case is covered by Paras 22.1 and 22.3 of Arvind Kumar Shrivastva's case supra and, therefore, claim of the petitioner does not suffer either from delay and laches or acquiescence."
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( 2024:HHC:9712 ) 11 Similar view has been taken by this High Court in CWPOA NO.5741 of 2020, titled as Dhanveer Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 29.08.2023.
12 In CWPOA No.2343 of 2020, titled as Vikram Singh vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, and other connected matters, decided on 09.11.2023, this High Court has observed as under:-
"23. In so far as the plea of limitation/delay and laches is concerned, the same is also liable to be rejected. As has already been stated supra, the plea of petitioners is based on discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Thimmappa and others vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and another, 2001 (2) SCC 259, wherein, it has been categorically laid down that if there is an infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India then petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. .........
25. For delayed regularization, petitioners cannot be blamed as the same was to be done by the respondent- Corporation. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No.2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of HP and others alongwith connected matters decided on 28.07.2010."
13 It is also apt to record that Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5806 of 2024, titled Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Others vs. Vikram Singh & others, laying challenge to the decision in 10 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) Vikram Singh's case (supra), was dismissed by the Supreme Court of India on 15.03.2024.
14 Affirming State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, Supreme Court of India in Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and others vs. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225, has observed as under:-
"13. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava. ... ... ..."
15 In the facts and attending circumstances of present case, in terms of judgment reported in 1996 (5) SCC 54, titled as Shangrila Food Products Limited and another vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, in order to do complete and substantial justice inter se the parties while exercising writ jurisdiction, the benefit of Rakesh Kumar's stated supra needs to be extended to the petitioner for the reasons stated herein below:-
"11. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a 11 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief....... ..."
16 Present case is squarely covered by Paras-22.1 and 22.3 of the judgment in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case, because judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons whether they approached the Court or not. In such a situation obligation is cast upon the authorities to extend the benefit to all similarly situated persons. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances, petitioner would not be treated fence-sitter and laches and delay or acquiescence would not be a valid ground to dismiss his claim.
17 The material on record reveals that the matter with respect to the conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous service stands adjudicated by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra) and further reiterated in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra). Based on these judgments, which are judgments in rem, the State Authorities have extended the benefit of judgments to many similarly placed employees in various departments, including the respondent department. Once the benefit of these judgments has been extended to similar persons then it does not behove the State Authorities to compel its employees to come to the Courts, for seeking similar benefits. Denial or defeating similar benefits by taking the plea of delay and latches certainly amounts to treating 12 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) "equal as unequal", which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in view of the mandate of law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.C.Sharma versus Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721.
18 Needless, to note, that the State Government notified Himachal Pradesh State Litigation Policy on 07.03.2011, with the object that claimants and litigants should act consistently and an endeavour should be made to avoid unnecessary litigation. Once the matter in issue with respect to the conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous daily wage service and regularization thereafter subject to availability of posts stands settled by this Court, which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then the action of the State Authorities in filing appeals so as to delay the benefits as given to others and raising objections on claims filed by claimants being dehors the Litigation Policy has been deprecated by this Court in CWP No. 1314 of 2016 titled as Nigma Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others also. Moreover, denial or delaying the benefits despite having been extended to similar incumbents, defeats the objective of a welfare State. 19 Similar benefits have been extended to similarly situated employees. Thus, petitioner cannot be discriminated on the ground of delay and laches, particularly when it was duty of respondents to extend such benefits to the petitioner. State should act as a model 13 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) employer and should extend benefits of its Policies to all eligible persons, in consonance with pronouncements of the Court(s) which have attained finality, without any discrimination particularly when identical objections have already been overruled by the Courts and such pronouncements have attained finality. Thus claim of the petitioner cannot be refuted only on the ground of delay and laches and for joining on regularization without protest. 20 Though, law of Limitation is not applicable, however principle of delay and laches is attracted for adjudication of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner may be ousted for delay and laches in appropriate case. For otherwise strong merit in the case, in order to prevent exploitation of victims for omission and commission on the part of mighty State, taking into consideration the circumstances of the petition and incapability of petitioner to approach the Court invariably, delay and laches may be ignored for adjudication of issue raised in the Writ Petition on merits. Therefore, we are of the considered view that petitioner, in present petition, is not liable to be ousted on the ground of delay and laches. 21 The Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).3398/2024, titled as State of Rajasthan and ors. V. Gopal Bijhawat, decided on 16.2.2024, had imposed costs on the State for having harassed a poor litigant for having engaged him in protracted litigation denying him fruits of his litigation. 14
( 2024:HHC:9712 ) 22 In Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).30326 of 2023, titled as The Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Vithal Rao, decided on 6.9.2023, the Supreme Court had imposed costs and had categorically observed that just because Officers of the State do not have to pay for litigation from their pocket does not mean that they can harass individuals by forcing them into uncalled for litigation. 23 In CWP No.1314 of 2016, titled as Nigma Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 30.8.2022, this High Court had directed the State to pay compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- to the petitioner therein and had ordered that the said amount shall be recovered from the erring Officers/officials on pro-rata basis. 24 Regarding regularization of the petitioner from prospective dates of passing of order after issuance of fresh Policy of the Government and withholding regularization/ grant of work-charged status to the petitioner for want of time gap between two Policies, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred pronouncement of this Court in CWP No. 2415 of 2012, titled as Mathu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation and others, decided on 31.7.2014. 25 Judgment of Single Bench passed in Mathu Ram's case has been affired by a Division Bench in LPA No. 44 f 2015 titled as Municipal Corporation, Shimla and others vs. Mathu Ram, decided on 13.10.2015.
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( 2024:HHC:9712 ) 26 Conclusion of verdict of Mathu Ram's and Rakesh Kumar's cases, with respect to gap between issuance/ formulation of two policies, is that previous policy/scheme shall remain in force till issuance/ formulation/introduction of subsequent policy/scheme, but cut off date for completion of requisite number of years shall be redundant in subsequent years and benefit of policy/scheme shall be extended to employees immediately on completion of continuous service for requisite number of years with minimum prescribed number of working days in each calendar year. In case regularization is not possible for want of availability of vacancy, the work-charge status has to be conferred upon daily wage employee on completion of requisite number of years prescribed in the Policy/Scheme. 27 With respect to ground taken by the respondents- Department that Department is not having work-charged establishment and, thus, benefit of period of service as a work-charged employee cannot be extended to the petitioner, it is apt to record that in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case an affidavit was filed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, formulating a Scheme for granting work-charged status to all daily-waged employees, serving in the State of Himachal Pradesh, in all Departments, irrespective of the fact that Department is/ was having work-charged establishment or not. 28 In Gauri Dutt's case, it has been held that the scheme formulated in Mool Raj Upadhaya's case is applicable to daily-waged 16 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) employees working in any department of the state of Himachal Pradesh and the employees, who are not governed by the directions given in Mool Raj Upadhaya's case, shall be governed by a Scheme framed by the State in this regard and it has also been observed that granting of work-charged status would mean that an employee would get regular scale of pay.
29 Upholding the order passed by the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 10.5.2018, in CWP No.3111 of 2016, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ashwani Kumar, has pronounced that work- charged establishment is not a pre-requisite for conferment of work- charged status nor conversion of work-charged employee into regular employee would make such establishment non-existent. 30 Civil Appeal No.5753 of 2019, titled as State of H.P. vs.Ashwani Kumar, preferred by the State in Ashwani Kumar's case has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 22.07.2019. Similarly, SLP (C) No. 8830-8869 of 2011 preferred by the State in Rakesh Kumar's case also stands dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15.01.2015.
31 Term "work-charge", in Himachal Pradesh, is used in different context. A person, working on daily-waged basis, before his regularization, is granted work-charged status on completion of specified number of years as daily-wager and effect thereof is that 17 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) thereafter non-completion of 240 days in a calendar year would not result into his ouster from the service or debar him from getting the benefit of length of service for that particular year. Normally, work- charged status is conferred upon a daily- wager, on accrual of his right for regularization, on completion of prescribed period of service, but for non-regularization is for want of regular vacancy in the department or for any other just and valid reason. Therefore, it is a period interregnum daily-wage service and regularization, which is altogether different form the temporary establishment of work-charge, as discussed in the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the State and, for practice in Himachal Pradesh, work-charged status is not conferred upon the person employed in a project but upon such daily- wage workers, who are to be continued after particular length of service for availability of work but without regularization for want of creation of post by Government for his regularization/regular appointment. Therefore, work is always available in such cases and the charge of a daily-wager is created thereon to avoid his disengagement for reasons upon which a daily-wager can be dispensed with from service.
32 On conferment of work-charged status, sword of disengagement, hanging on the neck of workmen, is removed on completion of specified period of daily-waged service, as thereafter instead of daily-wage, the employee would get regular pay-scale and 18 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) would be entitled to other consequential benefits for which a daily- waged employee is not entitled.
33 In response to plea that work-charged establishment does not exist in the respondent-Department, learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred pronouncements of this High Court in cases CWPOA No. 5748 of 2019, titled Man Singh Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and others; CWPOA No. 52 of 2019, titled Beli Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another; CWPOA No. 5566 of 2019, titled as Reema Devi Vs. State of H.P. and others; and CWPOA No. 5660 of 2019, titled Ghanshyam Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others; LPA No.151 of 2021, titled State of HP Vs. Beli Ram, decided on 09.08.2023; CWPOA No.5554 of 2019, titled Daulat Ram vs. State of HP and others; CWPOA No.6468 of 2020 titled Uggam Ram vs. State of HP and others decided on 09.11.2023; and CWPOA No.6151 of 2020 titled Rashid Mohammed vs. State of HP and others decided on 13.06.2024; wherein similar plea of respondent-State did not find favour of the Court. 34 According to pronouncement in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case, clarified in Gauri Dutt's case, work charge status was to be conferred irrespective of existence of work charge establishment. The said fact has not been considered in Rakesh Kumar's case. In fact, in Rakesh Kumar's case, this issue was not adjudicated but without considering Mool Raj's case and without assigning any reason, a 19 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) passing observation was made. Whereas this issue has been adjudicated and decided in subsequent judgment in Ashwani Kumar's case. Therefore, observations made on this issue in Rakesh Kumar's case are not binding especially when Civil Appeal in Ashwani Kumar's case has been dismissed by Supreme Court. Therefore, abolition or non-existence of work-charge establishment in the respondent-Department has no effect on the rights of petitioner for conferment of work-charged status after completion of 8 years in terms of Policy of the Government as well as verdict of Rakesh Kumar's case.
35 For conferment of work-charged status, work-charged establishment in the Department is not prerequisite. The same has also been affirmed by the Principal Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 9.8.2023 passed in LPA No.151 of 2021, titled State of H.P. & another Vs. Beli Ram.
36 Despite having bestowed status of custodian of rights of its citizens, State or its functionaries invariably are adopting exploitative method in the field of public employment to avoid its liabilities, depriving the persons employed from their just claims and benefits by making initial appointments on temporary basis, i.e. contract, adhoc, tenure, daily-wage etc., in order to shirk from its responsibility and delay the conferment of work-charge status or extension of benefits of regularization Policy of the State by not 20 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) notifying Policies in this regard in future. Present case is also an example of such practice.
37 So far as regularization of petitioner is concerned, that may depend upon the availability of post, but for conferring work charge status, existence of post or existence of work charge establishment is not necessary and, therefore, plea on this count to deny conferment of work charge status upon the petitioner, on completion of 8 years, is also not tenable.
38 Learned Additional Advocate General, referring Jai Dev Gupta vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 11 SCC 13, has submitted that arrears of monetary benefits be restricted to 3 years as has been restricted by learned Single Judge.
39 In view of pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case as well as this High Court in CWPOA No.7502 of 2020, titled as Nagender vs State of HP decided on 14.08.2024 we are of the considered view that in present matter, petitioner is entitled for all consequential benefits without restriction of 3 years. Accordingly, prayer for restricting the arrears is rejected.
40 It is clear from aforesaid discussion that even in absence of judgment in Surajmani's case, the issue involved in present case stands already settled upto the Apex Court and therefore there is no 21 ( 2024:HHC:9712 ) need to re-open the issue by referring the judgment passed in Surajmani's case.
41 For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge except restricting the arrears for three years has rightly held hat petitioner is entitled for the relief of conferment of work charge status after completion of 8 years service as daily wager with all consequential benefits. In view of above, arrears shall not be restricted for 3 years prior to filing of petition. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit with aforesaid modification.
All pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.
(Vivek Singh Thakur), Judge.
4th October, 2024 (Ranjan Sharma),
(ms) Judge.
Digitally signed by SUBHASH CHAND DHIMAN
SUBHASH DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, OU=
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone= 3418061207364d8c002725dfc58ff116f678c3d39289db29b99 2cce875905119, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, CHAND SERIALNUMBER= 5ce240fac0e1267843f29509683d09a9912af10edc4e6cd2ed5 d4a8c30134c1b, CN=SUBHASH CHAND DHIMAN Reason: I am the author of this document DHIMAN Location:
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