Delhi District Court
Sarla Devi & Anr vs Rajpal & Ors on 19 December, 2018
IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG:
ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL JUDGE cum COMMERCIAL
CIVIL JUDGE cum ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER:
SOUTH WEST DISTRICT : DWARKA COURTS :
NEW DELHI
C.S No: 426363/16
Sarla Devi & Anr. ... Plaintiffs
Versus
Rajpal & Ors. ... Defendants
ORDER
1. By this order, I shall dispose of the application of defendants under Order VII Rule 11 seeking rejection of the plaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants on 27.02.2013 for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction.
2. Brief case of the plaintiffs, as per plaint, is that late Sh.Sardar Singh S/o Sh.Badlu, during his lifetime, was holding ancestral joint family coparcenary property together with plaintiffs and the defendants in khata khatoni nos. 444/297 total measuring about 45 Bigha and 10 Biswas, situated in CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 1 of 45 the Revenue Estate of Village Mitraon, TehsilNajafgarh, Distt. South West, New Delhi. Plaintiff no.1 is daughterin law of late Sh. Sardar Singh, whereas, plaintiff no.2 is minor daughter of plaintiff no.1 and defendant no.1. Defendant no.1 is the husband of plaintiff no.1 and defendant no.2 and 3 are the sons of defendant no.1. Defendant no. 4 is another son of late Sh. Sardar Singh and defendant no. 5 and 6 are sons of defendant no.4.
3. According to plaintiffs, after the death of late Sh.Sardar Singh, defendants are allegedly propounding a Will dated 21.05.2009 allegedly executed by late Sh. Sardar Singh in favour of defendant no.2, 3, 5 and 6 in respect of his entire ancestral properties. On the basis of aforesaid Will, defendants no.2, 3, 5 and 6 have approached the revenue authorities for mutation of the said ancestral joint family coparcenery properties in their names. It is alleged by plaintiffs that deceased Sh. Sardar Singh had no authority to executed the said Will in respect of the entire joint family CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 2 of 45 coparcenery properties, since, plaintiff no.2, who was born on 19.03.2000, had by birth become coparcener with deceased Sh. Sardar Singh and all the parties to the present suit. It is further their case that the defendants are propounding the aforesaid Will which had been procured by them from the deceased Sh. Sardar Singh by practising fraud and deception and by way of misrepresentation and undue influence. The aforesaid Will, according to them, is also a result of coercion and forgery, considering the surrounding facts that the testator was in so feeble a state of health that he was incapable to resist the importunity and had executed the Will in his last days to buy peace while he was not capable of exercising his own judgment and volition.
4. According to plaintiffs, plaintiff no.1 had become entitled to a share in the aforesaid ancestral land in her own independent right, whereas, plaintiff no.2 has acquired the right by her birth in the family as coparcener. It is submitted by them that when late Sh.Sardar Singh had died intestate on 18.01.2013, CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 3 of 45 leaving behind his 1/3rd share in the aforesaid ancestral joint family coparcenery properties, plaintiffs became entitled to their share in that 1/3rd share of late Sh. Sardar Singh besides their own coparcenery joint shares in the suit land. Thus, the plaintiff no.1, according to them, is joint owner of the aforesaid land with the defendants to the extent of 1/16th share and plaintiff no.2 is joint owner to the extent of 1/8th share in the suit land. The plaintiffs had reasonable apprehension of dispossession by the defendants of the plaintiffs from the suit property, consequent upon the mutation in pursuance to their application and are also apprehending the sale of same by defendants depriving the plaintiffs of their right in the said properties.
5. They have prayed for a decree of declaration that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land alongwith defendants and are entitled to 3/16th share in the entire suit property. Plaintiffs have further prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the revenue authorities to CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 4 of 45 make mutation qua 3/16th shares of the suit land in favour of plaintiffs. Further, decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from sale or dealing with the suit property depriving the plaintiffs of their interest in the suit property has also been prayed for by the plaintiffs.
6. Defendants appeared in response to the summons of the suit and moved the present application u/o 7 Rule 11 CPC on 29.04.2013 seeking rejection of plaint interalia on the following grounds:
(1) That the plaintiffs have deliberately concealed the fact that late Sh. Sardar Singh was the recorded Bhumidar in cultivatory possession in respect of suit land and had died on 18.01.2013, leaving behind 3 married daughters namely Smt. Om Wati, Smt. Santosh and Smt. Parmeshwari as his Class1 legal heirs, besides, defendant no.1 and defendant no.4.
(2) Plaintiffs had totally failed to disclose the relevant provision of law under which they had allegedly inherited CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 5 of 45 and acquired the alleged rights to the extent of 3/16th shares in the suit land, plaintiff no.1 being the wife of defendant no.1 and plaintiff no.2 being the minor daughter of plaintiff no.1 and defendant no.1.
(3) That the suit has not been properly valued by plaintiffs for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fees as per the market value of the suit land.
(4) Suit of the plaintiffs is hit by Section 83 (c) of Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Rules framed thereunder, as the preparation and updation of revenue record as per the aforesaid Act and rules is exclusive jurisdiction of revenue Courts.
(5) Plaintiffs are seeking the relief of partition and possession under the garb of relief of declaration and permanent injunction and hence, the jurisdiction of this court is barred u/s 185 of DLR Act.
7. After the defendants filed the aforesaid application, plaintiffs moved an application u/o 6 Rule 17 read with order 1 Rule CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 6 of 45 10 CPC on 07.08.2013 seeking impleadment of 3 daughters of deceased Sh.Sardar Singh as defendant no.7 to 9 and consequential amendments in respective shares of the plaintiffs in the original plaint. In the amended plaint the plaintiffs have claimed themselves to be the coowners to the extent of 3/40th share each in the suit land. The aforesaid application was, subsequently, allowed by Ld. Predecessor of this court vide order dated 11.10.2017 and vide same order, another application of plaintiffs u/o 1 rule 10 and order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC filed on 13.02.2014 was dismissed. Defendants have thereafter filed the written statement to the amended suit of plaintiffs on 29.08.2018. Subsequently, replication to the written statement of defendants was filed by plaintiffs on 27.11.2018 and it was pointed out by counsel for both the parties that present application u/o 7 Rule 11 CPC filed on behalf of defendants on 29.04.2013 is pending adjudication. Arguments were accordingly heard on the aforesaid application on CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 7 of 45 27.11.2018. Besides, written submissions have also been filed on behalf of plaintiffs on 25.02.2015 and list of citations has been filed on behalf of defendants on 08.04.2015.
8. The grounds on which the defendants have sought the rejection of the present plaint of the plaintiffs have already been noted hereinabove. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also carefully perused the record. I shall be dealing with each of the grounds taken by defendants seeking rejection of plaint in their application one by one.
9. So far as the first ground seeking rejection of plaint is concerned, it is significant to note that after impleadment of defendant no. 7 to 9 in the present suit by the plaintiffs, in terms of order dated 11.02.2017 passed by Ld. Predecessor of this court, the aforesaid ground seeking rejection of the plaint on account of non impleadment of said defendants has ceased to survive.
Whether the plaint does not disclose any cause of action in CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 8 of 45 favour of plaintiffs for filing of the present suit in absence of any provision of law under which the plaintiffs are entitled to shares in the suit property?
10.It is submitted by counsel for defendants that plaintiffs have failed to disclose any provision of law which confer any right, title or interest in the suit property in favour of plaintiffs and hence, they have no right to file the present suit against the defendants. It is submitted by him that admittedly even as per the copy of khata khatoni in respect of suit land placed on record by plaintiffs alongwith their plaint, name of late Sh.Sardar Singh has been recorded as the sole bhuimdar in respect of the suit land. He submits that bhumidari rights conferred upon late Sh.Sardar Singh under the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, are specially created after abolition of ownership rights in the agricultural land and are regulated by the provisions of the Act and provisions of customary law, placing further restrictions, in addition to the restrictions placed under Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 on transfer of CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 9 of 45 bhumidari rights have been repealed by virtue of section 2 (1)
(vi) of Act.
11.Thus, according to him, late Sh.Sardar Singh was competent to execute the Will in respect of his bhumidari rights as per Section 48(1) and 48(3) of Delhi Land Reforms Act, and the aforesaid right has been duly exercised by late Sh.Sardar Singh during his lifetime. Even in the absence of aforesaid Will, according to him, after the amendment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in the year 2005, the aforesaid bhumdari rights would have devolved upon Class1 legal heirs of deceased Sh.Sardar Singh in terms of provisions of Section 8&9 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to him, plaintiffs are not even the Class1 legal heirs of late Sh.Sardar Singh as per the provisions of Hindu Succession Act and hence, cannot claim any right, title or interest in the suit land in their favour. In the absence of any such right, title or interest, according to him, plaint does not disclose any cause of action in favour of plaintiffs for filing of the present CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 10 of 45 suit. In support of his aforesaid submissions, counsel for defendants has relied upon the following judgments (1) Commission of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others Vs. Chander Sain & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1753 (2) Yudhister Vs. Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 SC 558 (3) Nathu Vs. Hukum Singh AIR 1983 Delhi 2016
12.On the other hand, it is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that since the defendants have failed to obtain any probate in respect of the alleged Will, purportedly executed by late Sh.Sardar Singh in favour of defendant no.2, 3, 5 and 6, the alleged Will cannot be acted upon nor can it be given any effect under the law. He submits that the suit property was the joint family coparcenary property of joint family of late Sh.Sardar Singh, plaintiffs and defendants and hence, plaintiff no.2 has acquired right in the aforesaid property by birth being a coparcener after the commencement of Hindu Succession(Amendment) Act, 2005. He further submits that the share received by one of the coparcener at the time of partition shall be his separate property visavis other CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 11 of 45 coparceners, however, after his marriage, if subsequently, the son or the daughter is born to him then the said property in his hand, shall be treated as coparcenery property in which son/daughter as coparcener would get his share. Even the separate property in the hand of sole survive coparcener, according to him, shall loose character of separate property, after the son is borne to him. He submits that since the plaintiff no.2 has acquired right by birth in the suit property as a coparcener, she shall be considered to be in joint possession of the suit property with defendants. According to him, after the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005, the properties which are subject matter of Will in question i.e. suit property became ancestral joint family coparcenery property w.e.f. 09.09.2005 and on the same date the right of plaintiffs accrued to them, as per Section 6 & 8 of Hindu Succession Act. He submits that provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act ceased to apply in respect of bhumidari right after the commencement of Hindu CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 12 of 45 Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 w.e.f. 09.09.2005 and all the aforesaid properties have gained the status of joint Hindu family coparcenary properties. In support of his aforesaid submission, counsel for plaintiffs has relied upon the following judgments:
(1) Pamela Manmohan Singh Vs. State & Ors. 83 (2000) DLT 469 (2) M. Yogendra & Ors. Vs. Leelamma N. & Ors. (3) Rohit Chauhan Vs. Surinder Singh & Ors. 9 Supreme Court Cases 419 (4) State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1330 (5) Ram Charan Dass Vs. Girja Nandini Devi & Ors. 1966 Supreme Court 323 (6) Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Ulhas Nagar Municipal Council & Ors. AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1021 (7) AIR Corpn. Employees' Union & Ors. Vs. G. B. Bhirade & Ors. AIR 1971 Bombay 1988 (8) Bhagwan Dass Sita Ram Vs. Albion Jute Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1957 Cal. 143 (9) Duttatra Vs. Rang Nath Gopal Rao AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2548 (10) Sher Singh & Ors. Vs. Gamdoor Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1333 (11) State of Maharashtra Vs. Narayan Rao & Ors. AIR CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 13 of 45
1985 Supreme Court 716
(12) Sathyaprema Manunatha Gowda Vs. Controller of Estate Duty, Karnataka 1997(10) Supreme Court Cases 684 (13) Dhanpat Vs. Ajit Singh, Punjab & Haryana High Court
13.I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also carefully perused the record. I have also carefully gone through the judgments relied upon by both the parties in support of their respective submissions.
14.It is significant to note that plaintiffs have made bald averments in the plaint that the suit property which is agricultural land measuring about 45 bighas 10 biswas, situated in the revenue estate of Village Mitraon, Tehsil Najafgarh, New Delhi, was an ancestral joint family coparcenery property under the Mitakshra Law in which plaintiff no.1 has a share in her own right, whereas, plaintiff no.2 had become a coparcener by birth alongwith all the parties to the present suit. Plaintiffs have failed to disclose in the entire plaint as to in what manner they are claiming the suit property to be an ancestral joint family coparcenary CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 14 of 45 property and when and how the coparcenary had come into existence and when and by whom the suit land was acquired.
15.Under the aforesaid circumstances, during the course of arguments on application u/o 7 rule 11 CPC, it was inquired from plaintiff no.1 as well as counsel for plaintiffs as to how they are claiming the suit property to be ancestral joint family coparcenary property. It was further inquired from them as to whether the same was ancestral joint family coparcenary property in the hands of late Sh.Sardar Singh or, according to them, the said property has acquired the aforesaid status after the death of late Sh.Sardar Singh. It was also inquired from them whether they are claiming the suit property to be ancestral joint family coparcenary property since prior to the date of commencement of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 or the same has acquired the aforesaid character after commencement of aforesaid Act. It was further inquired from them as to whether the suit property was acquired by late Sh.Sardar Singh himself or same had been inherited by him CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 15 of 45 from his father or the same had been received by Late Sh. Sardar Singh on partition from his Joint Hindu Family, if any. It was further inquired from them that if the said property was inherited by late Sh. Sardar Singh from his father, whether it was inherited before or after commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
16. No satisfactory answers to the aforesaid questions of the court have been given by either the plaintiff no.1 or by counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for plaintiffs has merely insisted that all the issues sought be raised by the court are matters of trial and even if plaintiffs are not able to answer the said queries of the Court at this stage, the plaint cannot be rejected, in as much as, it has been specifically alleged by them that the suit land is ancestral joint family coparcenary property of the plaintiffs and defendants. He further submits that plaintiffs are not aware of any of the aforesaid facts since the aforesaid property had already been with late Sh.Sardar Singh when plaintiff no. 1 had come to the family of late Sh. CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 16 of 45 Sardar Singh after her marriage with defendant no.1 on 30.05.1998 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. I have further inquired from the counsel for plaintiffs as to how plaintiffs will be able to lead evidence on the aforesaid issues raised by court as well as by defendants in their application u/o 7 Rule 11 as to the manner in which the plaintiffs have acquired interest in the suit property in the absence of specific pleadings in this regard in their plaint. However, counsel for plaintiffs merely kept on insisting that the aforesaid issues are matter of trial and he will prove the aforesaid facts by leading evidence in the matter.
17.I am afraid, such a course of action cannot be permitted by the court. A bare perusal of the file shows that the present suit had been filed by plaintiffs in the year 2013 and plaintiffs have been able to drag the same for a considerable period of almost 5 years on the basis of such facts and pleadings which do not disclose any cause of action in favour of plaintiffs for filing of the present suit.
CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 17 of 45
18.This court is not oblivious of the legal position that while adjudicating an application u/o 7 Rule 11 CPC, court will have to only look into the averments made in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith and defence taken by defendants in their written statement cannot be taken into consideration by this court, at the time of adjudication of an application u/o 7 Rule 11 CPC. However, it does not mean that the Court is not empowered to searchingly examine the plaintiffs to ascertain whether a clear right to sue exists in favour of plaintiffs or merely an illusion as to existence of cause of action in their favour has been created by the plaintiffs by way of clever drafting/vague pleadings just to get out of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. If upon such examination the court finds that the plaint does not disclose the clear right to sue in favour of plaintiffs, the Court is not only empowered but duty bound to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. While taking the aforesaid view, I draw support from the following observations of Hon'ble CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 18 of 45 Supreme Court in Sopan Sukhdev Sable Vs. Charity Commissioner 2004(3) SCC 137 at Page no. 146:
"9.Before dealing with the factual scenario, the spectrum of Order 7 Rule 11 in the legal ambit needs to be noted.
10. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit -- before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are germane: the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.
11. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
12. The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 19 of 45 party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467].)
13.It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487] only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.
14. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 was applicable.
15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hairsplitting technicalities."(emphasis mine)
19. It was further observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court at page nos. 147148:
CS No. 426363/16
Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 20 of 45 "17. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, the reliefs sought for in the suit as quoted supra have to be considered. The real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits.
Therefore, Order 10 of the Code is a tool in the hands of the courts by resorting to which and by a searching examination of the party, in case the court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court, in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised.
18. As noted supra, Order 7 Rule 11 does not justify rejection of any particular portion of the plaint. Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is relevant in this regard. It deals with "striking out pleadings". It has three clauses permitting the court at any stage of the proceeding to strike out or amend any matter in any pleading i.e. (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or, (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or, (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
19. Order 6 Rule 2(1) of the Code states the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the pleading has to state material facts and not the evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.
20. There is distinction between "material facts" and "particulars". The words "material facts" show that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 21 of 45 an incomplete cause of action and the statement or plaint becomes bad. The distinction which has been made between "material facts" and "particulars" was brought by Scott, L.J. in Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. [(1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA)] in the following passage:
(All ER p. 294) "The cardinal provision in Rule 4 is that the statement of claim must state the material facts. The word 'material' means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if any one 'material' statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad; it is 'demurrable' in the old phraseology, and in the new is liable to be 'struck out' under R.S.C. Order 25 Rule 4 (see Philipps v. Philipps [(1878) 4 QBD 127] ); or 'a further and better statement of claim' may be ordered under Rule 7.
The function of 'particulars' under Rule 6 is quite different. They are not to be used in order to fill material gaps in a demurrable statement of claim
-- gaps which ought to have been filled by appropriate statements of the various material facts which together constitute the plaintiff's cause of action. The use of particulars is intended to meet a further and quite separate requirement of pleading, imposed in fairness and justice to the defendant. Their function is to fill in the picture of the plaintiff's cause of action with information sufficiently detailed to put the defendant on his guard as to the case he had to meet and to enable him to prepare for trial."
The dictum of Scott, L.J. in Bruce case [(1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA)] has been quoted with approval by this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [(1969) 3 SCC 238] and the distinction CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 22 of 45 between "material facts" and "particulars" was brought out in the following terms: (SCC p. 250, para 29) "The word 'material' shows that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet."
Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word "shall" is used, clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13."(emphasis mine)
20. Moreover, in another judgment reported as Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"53. Pleadings are the foundation of litigation. In pleadings, only the necessary and relevant material must be included and unnecessary and irrelevant material must CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 23 of 45 be excluded. Pleadings are given utmost importance in similar systems of adjudication, such as, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
61. In civil cases, pleadings are extremely important for ascertaining the title and possession of the property in question.
68. In order to do justice, it is necessary to direct the parties to give all details of pleadings with particulars. Once the title is prima facie established, it is for the person who is resisting the titleholder's claim to possession to plead with sufficient particularity on the basis of his claim to remain in possession and place before the court all such documents as in the ordinary course of human affairs are expected to be there. Only if the pleadings are sufficient, would an issue be struck and the matter sent to trial, where the onus will be on him to prove the averred facts and documents.
69. The person averring a right to continue in possession shall, as far as possible, give a detailed particularised specific pleading along with documents to support his claim and details of subsequent conduct which establish his possession.
71. Apart from these pleadings, the court must insist on documentary proof in support of the pleadings. All those documents would be relevant which come into existence after the transfer of title or possession or the encumbrance as is claimed. While dealing with the civil suits, at the threshold, the court must carefully and critically examine the pleadings and documents.
72. The court will examine the pleadings for specificity as also the supporting material for sufficiency and then pass appropriate orders.
73. Discovery and production of documents and answers CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 24 of 45 to interrogatories, together with an approach of considering what in the ordinary course of human affairs is more likely to have been the probability, will prevent many a false claims or defences from sailing beyond the stage for issues.
74. If the pleadings do not give sufficient details, they will not raise an issue, and the court can reject the claim or pass a decree on admission. On vague pleadings, no issue arises. Only when he so establishes, does the question of framing an issue arise. Framing of issues is an extremely important stage in a civil trial. Judges are expected to carefully examine the pleadings and documents before framing of issues in a given case.
75. In pleadings, whenever a person claims right to continue in possession of another property, it becomes necessary for him to plead with specificity about who was the owner, on what date did he enter into possession, in what capacity and in what manner did he conduct his relationship with the owner over the years till the date of suit. He must also give details on what basis he is claiming a right to continue in possession. Until the pleadings raise a sufficient case, they will not constitute sufficient claim of defence.
77. The court must ensure that pleadings of a case must contain sufficient particulars. Insistence on details reduces the ability to put forward a nonexistent or false claim or defence. In dealing with a civil case, pleadings, title documents and relevant records play a vital role and that would ordinarily decide the fate of the case."(emphasis mine)
21. Keeping in mind the aforesaid guidelines and the fact that the Counsel for plaintiffs has failed to satisfactorily respond CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 25 of 45 to the queries of the Court as noted hereinabove and has even failed to come up with a plea to amend the pleadings so as to incorporate material facts in the plaint which forms the basis for claim of the plaintiffs in the present suit, I will examine the existing pleadings of the plaintiffs to ascertain whether the same disclose a clear right to sue in favour of plaintiffs.
22.As per the averments made in the plaint, the suit property is admittedly an agricultural land situated in the revenue estate of village Mitraon, TehsilNajafgarh, New Delhi and as per the kahtoni, copy of which has been annexed by plaintiffs at page no.33 of their plaint, the name of late Sh. Sardar Singh S/o Sh.Budlu Ram has been recorded as sole Bhumidar in respect of the aforesaid land. It is apparent, on a bare perusal of the aforesaid document that the suit property is governed by the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
23. In my considered opinion, the law regarding the applicability of the customary Hindu law to bhumidari rights under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, is no longer resintegra in view of CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 26 of 45 the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Nathu Vs. Hukam Singh and Others AIR 1983 Delhi 216 wherein after referring to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hatti Vs. Sunder Singh (1970) 2 SCC 841, judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in "Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan", I.L.R. (1972) II Delhi 922, and judgment of Full Bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Ram Awalamb Vs. Jata Shankar AIR 1969 Allahabad 526(Full Bench). It was observed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court as follows:
"11.These provisions and various other provisions of the Act show that a Bhumidar does not have an unrestricted interest in the agricultural land which was held by him before the commencement of the Act as an owner or proprietor. After the commencement of the Act and the declaration of the Bhumidari rights, he is only given the right to use the agricultural land in a particular manner as specified in the statutory provisions. There are restrictions laid down on the rights of a Bhumidar to create leases. A Bhumidar cannot transfer possession of the land. A Bhumidar is obliged to use the land for agricultural purposes. A Bhumidar is only a tenure holder having lost the right of ownership on agricultural land after the commencement of the Act. There is, however, a great security of CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 27 of 45 the tenure under the Act. Bhumidari rights are, therefore, special rights created on the abolition of the ownership of the agricultural land and are controlled and regulated by the provisions of the Act. The language of Section 5 of the Act shows that a Bhumidar has all the rights and is subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon a Bhumidar by or under the Act. The rights to the tenure holder are granted under the provisions of the Act. The restrictions imposed on the rights of a Bhumidar are also by or under the Act. There is no warrant to travel outside the Act and the Rules for further restrictions in the right or manner of transfer of the Bhumidari rights. Section 34 of the Act, permits simple mortgage of land by a Bhumidar. This right is granted to tenure holder under the Act. Reading any further restriction by involving the customary law would come in conflict with the right granted under the Act. Any such impediment would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The rule of custom pleaded and upheld by the Courts below in this case is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The inconsistent rule having the force of law stands repealed by Section 2(1)(vi) of the Act.
12 & 13. XXXX 14 - The result of above discussion is that the right of transfer of interest by a Bhumidhar of its bhumidhari rights in the agricultural land is controlled only by the provisions of the Act. The provisions of the customary law relating to restrictions on transfer do not apply to the transfer of bhumidhari rights"(emphasis CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 28 of 45
mine)
24.The aforesaid observation was made by Hon'ble Delhi High Court while dealing with the question as to the right of male lineal descendants to impugn alienation of bhumidhari rights granted under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 based on the customary law applicable to the proprietors of agricultural land before the enforcement of the said Act. The said customary law was the Hindu law of Mitakshara coparcenary placing restriction on the right of Karta to alienate joint family property except for legal necessity etc. In the aforesaid case, the suit was filed by two of the members of the Joint Hindu Family on the ground that since land in the suit was ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendant no. 2, defendant no. 2 could not have executed the mortgage deed without possession in favour of defendant no. 1 without any legal necessity. The court under the aforesaid facts and circumstances had made the aforesaid observations which have been quoted hereinabove, holding that the provisions of CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 29 of 45 customary Hindu law placing restrictions on the right of a Karta or coparcener to alienate the joint family property otherwise than for certain specified purposes are not applicable to the bhumidari rights which are special rights created under the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act.
The similar view has been taken by Full Bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Ram Awalamb and Ors. Vs. Jata Shankar and Ors AIR 1969 Allahabad 526 (Full Bench) wherein the court was interpreting the provisions of UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 which are in parimateria with the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. Following observations of Full Bench of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court are worth quoting:
"44. Our conclusion can, therefore, be briefly summarised as follows:
(1) Where members of a joint Hindu family hold bhumidhari rights in any holding, they hold the same as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. The notion of Hindu law cannot be invoked to determine that status.
(2) Where in certain class of tenancies CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 30 of 45 such as permanent tenure holder, the interest of a tenant was both heritable and transferable in a limited senses and such a tenancy could, prior to the enforcement of the Act, be described as joint family property or coparcenary property, the position changed after Act I of 1952 came into force.
Thereafter the interest of each bhumidhar, being heritable only according to the order of succession provided in the Act and transferable without any restriction other than mentioned in the Act itself, must be deemed to be a separate unit.
(3) Each member of a joint Hindu family must be considered to be a separate unit for the exercise of the right of transfer and also for the purposes of devolution of bhumidhari interest of the deceased member."(emphasis mine)
25. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, in my considered opinion, it is a well settled legal position that in cases where before the commencement of the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 there was Mitakshara coparcenary in existence consisting of several members which was holding an agricultural land, the names of all of them should have been recorded as Cobhumidars in respect of the said holding and from the date of commencement of CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 31 of 45 the Act, they will hold the said land as tenants in common and not as joint tenants and hence on death of any one of them, his share would devolve as if it was his separate property. There is no concept of coparcenery in respect of bhumidari rights.
26. It is also well settled legal position that where a joint Hindu family had a proprietary interest, the property being Sir or Khudkhast, then prior to the date of vesting, it would be governed by the provisions of Hindu Law. If member of the joint Hindu Family got any share in it from his father it would be ancestral property in his hand qua his son and lineal descendents. His sons and grand sons who were in existence as on the date of coming into force of the land reforms legislation would become cobhumidhars with respect to their respective shares even if their names have not been recorded in the Khatoni after the year 1954.
27. To illustrate, in case, prior to coming into force of the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, there was CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 32 of 45 Mitakshara coparcenary in existence consisting of A,B,C and D, which was holding an agricultural land A being the father, B and C being the sons and D being the son of predeceased son of A. Immediately upon coming into force of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, all of them being proprietaries of the agricultural land would have been entitled to get their names recorded as Bhumidhar, however, in view of summary nature of proceedings for declaration of the proprietors as bhumidhars the name of only A was recorded as bhumidhar in the revenue record. Under the aforesaid circumstances, even if the name of B, C and D was not recorded as cobhumidhars in the revenue records, they shall be considered to be cobhumidhar in respect of the said agricultural land. However, it is settled legal position that they would not hold the aforesaid property as joint tenants but as tenants in common and upon their death, the said property would not go as per rules of survivorship as is the case with coparcernary property but the same shall CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 33 of 45 devolve upon the legal heirs of each deceased cosharer as per the provisions of Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, if the succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005 and as per the provisions of Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in case of a male Hindu dying intestate and as per Sections 15 & 16 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 in case of female Hindu dying intestate, if succession has opened after 09.09.2005 i.e. after coming into force of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
28.In the case in hand as has already been observed that plaintiffs have failed to specifically allege as to whether the suit property was the coparcenary property as on the date of commencement of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and if so who all were the coparceners in the said joint hindu family. It is not even the case of plaintiffs that the name of late Sh.Sardar Singh was wrongly recorded as the sole bhumidar at the time of commencement of Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 and the names of other coparceners had been left out CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 34 of 45 from the revenue record due to summary nature of proceedings of declaration of bhumidari right under Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
29.Under the aforesaid circumstances, in the absence of any such plea on the part of plaintiffs, the only inference which can be drawn is that late Sh.Sardar Singh was the sole bhumidar in respect of suit land at the time of his death. Thus, even if the averments made in para no.8 of the plaint regarding late Sh. Sardar Singh having died intestate on 18.01.2013, are believed to be correct, the suit property would have devolved upon Class1 legal heirs of deceased Sh. Sardar Singh as per the provisions of Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as Amended upto date).
30.By no stretch of imagination, any of the plaintiffs in the present suit can be considered to be Class1 legal heirs of late Sh. Sardar Singh as per the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as Amended upto date). It is significant to note in this regard that as per ScheduleI appended to Hindu CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 35 of 45 Succession Act, 1956, neither the son nor the daughter or for that matter, wife of living son of deceased male Hindu dying intestate shall acquire any right, title or interest in the properties left behind by the deceased male Hindu. In the case in hand, defendant no.1 and 4 admittedly are the sons of late Sh. Sardar Singh, whereas, defendant no.7 to 9 are his daughters. Plaintiff no.1, even as per her own averments, is the wife of defendant no.1 i.e. living son of late Sh.Sardar Singh. Plaintiff no.2 is minor daughter of plaintiff no.1 and hence, even in case of intestate death of late Sh.Sardar Singh in the year 2013, none of the plaintiffs would have acquired any right, title or interest in the suit property.
31.This is besides the fact that even as per the averments made in the plaint, the defendant no.2, 3, 5 and 6 are propounding a Will purportedly executed by late Sh.Sardar Singh in respect of suit land in their favour. This court is not required to adjudicate the validity of the said Will at this stage. It is sufficient for this Court to note that under any circumstances, CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 36 of 45 plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the suit property, i.e. even if late Sh.Sardar Singh had died intestate or had died leaving behind the Will sought to be propounded by defendant no.2, 3, 5 and 6.
32.As has already been observed hereinabove, the concept of coparcenary property in respect of bhumidari right has ceased to be applicable after commencement of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and it is applicable only to a limited extent so as to make all the coparceners existing as on the date of commencement of the Act cobhumidars in respect of such agricultural land only in case where a coparcenery had been existing in respect of agricultural land prior to commencement of the aforesaid Act, however, name of all the coparceners could not be recorded as Bhumidar due to summary nature of proceedings in the revenue records. As has already been observed hereinabove, no such averments are found in the plaint of plaintiffs.
33.I do not find any force in the submissions of counsel for CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 37 of 45 plaintiffs that after the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amended) Act 2005, w.e.f. 09.09.2005, the concept of coparcenary property has been revived in respect of agricultural land which otherwise was the subject matter of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. None of the judgments relied upon by counsel for plaintiffs lays down any such legal proposition.
34.At this stage, I would like to note that though Ld. Counsel for plaintiffs has cited a number of judgments in his submissions, however, how he seeks to derive assistance from the said judgments in the absence of material facts in the plaint which form the basis for claim of plaintiffs in the present suit is not understandable. In the absence of statement of material facts, in the pleadings or even in response to queries of the Court, forming the basis of cause of action in favour of plaintiffs, this Court was constrained to take hypothetical fact situations to analyze whether the plaintiffs could have any clear right to sue against the defendants and has ultimately come to a CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 38 of 45 conclusion that in none of the fact situations plaintiffs have any clear right to sue against the defendants.
35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion, on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue and hence is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of CPC.
Whether the jurisdiction of this court is barred under provisions of Section 185 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1985?
36.It is submitted by counsel for defendants that present suit of plaintiffs is barred by provisions of Section 185 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, in as much as, the plaintiffs under the garb of declaration of their respective shares in the suit land and regrading they being in joint possession of the suit property with the defendants are trying to seek relief of declaration of their bhumidari right, possession and partition of the suit property and the jurisdiction of this court to grant CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 39 of 45 the aforesaid reliefs is barred under the provision of Section 185 of Delhi Land Reforms Act read with item no.19 and item no.4 in Schedule I of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
37. On the other hand, it is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that none of the reliefs prayed for by plaintiffs in present suit can be granted by revenue courts as per ScheduleI of Delhi Land Reforms Act, as there is no entry in Schedule I of Delhi Land Reforms Act, conferring powers upon the Revenue Assistant to grant the reliefs prayed for in the present suit. In support of his aforesaid submissions, counsel for plaintiffs has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Ashok Kumar & Ors. vs. Munni Devi & Ors., 188 (2012) DLT 589.
38.I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also carefully perused the record.
39.There can be no dispute about the legal proposition laid down by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the judgment relied upon by counsel for plaintiffs that unless the suit before the court falls CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 40 of 45 within the Section as stated in Column 2 of Schedule I of Delhi Land Reforms Act, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not barred to try such suits by virtue of Section 185 of Act. However, as has already been observed hereinabove, in the case in hand, the plaintiffs are seeking a decree of decalration as to their ownership and joint possession with the defendants to the extent of specific share in the suit land and the court has jurisdiction to decide the issue of title in respect of agricultural land only on a reference by the revenue court in terns of Section 186 of DLR Act as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hatti v. Sunder.
Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be rejected u/o 7 Rule 11 (b) & (c) of CPC on account of non valuation and no payment of sufficient court fee?
40.It is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that suit has been properly valued by plaintiffs for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fees, in as much as, the present suit is a suit for simpliciter declaration and permanent injunction which is CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 41 of 45 required to be valued @Rs.460/ whereas, the plaintiffs have valued the same @Rs.1000/.
41.On the other hand, it is submitted by counsel for defendants that considering the nature of reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs as to the declaration of their rights in respect of an immovable property, the present suit was required to be valued by them as per the market value of the suit property. Moreover, according to him, each of the reliefs was required to be valued separately by the plaintiffs and since they have failed to separately value each of the reliefs, the plaint is liable to be rejected.
42.I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also carefully perused the record.
43.I find force in the submission made on behalf of defendants that the plaintiffs were required to value each of the reliefs prayed for by them in the plaint separately and to pay the requisite court fees accordingly. However, before rejection of the plaint in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 (b) & (c) of CPC, the CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 42 of 45 court is required to give an opportunity to the plaintiffs to properly value the suit both for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fee and to pay deficient court fees. The Court would have certainly given an opportunity to the plaintiffs to value the suit property and to pay the requisite court fee, however, in view of the finding of this court that the present suit is liable to be rejected u/o 7 Rule 11 (a) CPC, the question of grant of any opportunity to the plaintiffs does not arise and in the absence of any such opportunity, the plaint cannot be rejected u/o 7 Rule 11 (b) & (c) of CPC on account of improper valuation and nonpayment of requisite court fee. Whether the prayer clause (B) of the plaint is barred u/s 83
(c) of Delhi Land Revenue Act ?
44.It is submitted by counsel for defendants that the relief prayed for by plaintiffs in prayer clause (B) of the plaint seeking directions to the revenue authorities to mutate the suit property in the joint names of plaintiffs and defendants cannot be granted by this court in view of the bar u/s 83 (c) CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 43 of 45 of Delhi Land Revenue Act.
45.On the other hand, it is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that the aforesaid suit being consequential to the relief prayed for by plaintiffs in prayer clause (A) of the plaint there is no bar on the jurisdiction of this court to direct the revenue authorities to mutate the suit property in joint name of plaintiffs and defendants.
46.I do not find any force in the submissions made on behalf of plaintiffs. In my considered opinion, the jurisdiction of this court to direct the revenue authorities to mutate the suit property in joint names of plaintiffs and defendants is clearly barred u/s 83 (c) of Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954.
47.Be that as it may, the plaint could not have been rejected on the aforesaid ground alone in view of the settled legal position that a plaint cannot be rejected in part.
48.Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, plaint of plaintiff is hereby rejected under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC as the same does not disclose any clear right to sue in CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 44 of 45 favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants.
49.Ordered accordingly.
Announced in the open court on 19th day of December, 2018 This order consists of 45 signed pages.
(Arun Kumar Garg) ACJ/CCJ/ARC Dwarka/19.12.2018 CS No. 426363/16 Sarla & Ors. Vs. Rajpal & Ors.
Order dated 19 .12.2018 Page no. 45 of 45