Allahabad High Court
Ramandeep Singh And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 20 December, 2024
Author: Manju Rani Chauhan
Bench: Manju Rani Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:200008 A.F.R. Reserved Court No. - 52 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 22134 of 2023 Applicant :- Ramandeep Singh And 2 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Pavan Kishore,Rahul Agarwal Counsel for Opposite Party :- Dharmendra Singh Chauhan,G.A. With Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 41154 of 2023 Applicant :- Munish Chandra Mishra Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Barmeshwar Nath Tiwari,Parijat Kumar Tiwari,Venu Gopal Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. With Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 21921 of 2023 Applicant :- Arvinder Singh And 2 Others Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Atul Khaneja Counsel for Opposite Party :- Dharmendra Singh Chauhan,G.A. Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.
1. Heard Mr. Rahul Agarwal, Advocate assisted by Mr. Pavan Kishore, Mr. Atul Khaneja, Mr. Venu Gopal, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Dharmendra Singh Chauhan, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned AGA-I assisted by Mr. Mayank Awasthi, learned counsel for the State.
2. The applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Nos.22134 of 2023 and 21921 of 2023 have been filed by the applicants seeking to quash the charge sheet dated 06.12.2022 and cognizance order dated 9.12.2022 as well as the entire proceedings of Case No.6501 of 2022 (State vs. Satveer Singh and others), arsing out of Case Crime No.0949 of 2022, under Sections 447, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471, 120B IPC and Section 28(1) of U.P. Urban Planing & Development Act 1973, Police Station-Izzat Nagar, District-Bareilly, pending before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly.
3. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No.41154 of 2023 has been filed by the applicant seeking to quash the entire proceedings of Crime No.949 of 2022 (State vs. Jaswar @ Jaswir and others), under Sections 447, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471, 120B IPC and Section 28(1) of U.P. Urban Planing & Development Act, 1973, Police Station-Izzatnagar, District-Bareilly, pending before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly.
4. The brief facts of the case as placed by the counsels for the applicants are:-
(i) An FIR was lodged on 13.11.2022 by the opposite party no.2, i.e. Junior Engineer, Bareilly Development Authority, Bareilly against the applicants with the allegations that Khasra No. 825, area 0.7714 hectare, Village Biharman Nagla, Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly was registered as surplus land in the revenue records, whose possession was handed over to the Bareilly Development Authority on 16.11.1990. 2/3rd portion of the aforesaid Khasra No.825 was illegally sold on 20.03.2003 by successors/ legal heirs of erstwhile tenure holders in favour of M/s S.K. Associates for Rs. 3,80,750/- through a registered sale deed, though the circle rate value of the land was Rs. 25,70,000/-. Subsequently, M/s S.K. Associates sold various portions of Khasra No. 825 in favour of different individuals in the year 2021-2022. The difference in value itself indicates that the transaction was with a view to indulge into further sale and purchase of government land.
(ii) During the investigation, statement of complainant--Raman Kumar was recorded by the Investigating Officer on 13.11.2022, statements of Dalvinder Singh, Salim Ahmad and Julfikar Ahmad on 14.11.2022, statement of Ram Nath Singh--Lekhpal, Bareilly Development Authority on 14.11.2022, statement of Anurag Goyal, Accountant of Alliance Builders and Contractors Ltd. on 19.11.2022, statement of Anil Kumar--Tehsildar Sadar, District Bareilly on 21.11.2022 and statements of Brahma Nand Sharma--Revenue Inspector, and Naresh Chandra--Lekhpal, Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly were recorded on 21.11.2022.
(iii) The complainant--Junior Engineer concerned, Raman Kumar in his statement as recorded on 13.11.2022 reiterated the version of the FIR.
(iv) Statement of Ram Nath Singh, Lekhpal, Bareilly Development Authority was recorded on 14.11.2022. Apart from reiterating the allegations in the FIR, the Lekhpal has stated that there were seven sale deeds beginning from 15.03.2021 to 27.06.2022 that were entered into by M/s S.K. Associates in respect of Gata No. 825 for a total consideration of Rs.3,13,66,000/-. The entire money was being earned by illegal sale/purchase of government land.
(v) Statement of two of the purchasers of property, namely, Saleem Ahmed and Zulfigar, to whom M/s S.K. Associates had sold parcels of Gata No. 825, were also recorded on 14.11.2022. These purchasers have also been made an accused in the matter. The statement of Saleem Ahmad and Zulfigar only mention that they contacted Ramandeep to purchase the land and had given money to him. Ramandeep had called one Dalvinder and asked him to give them land of M/s S.K. Associates. They executed the sale deeds, unaware of the history of the land.
(vi) The statement of Dalvinder, the Power of Attorney holder of M/s S.K. Associates, who had executed the sale deeds in favour of the subsequent purchasers of land and has been made an accused was also taken on 14.11.2022. Dalvinder has stated before the Investigating Officer that he had executed the sale deed of Gata No. 825 on the strength of Power of Attorney of M/s S.K. Associates, but the money towards sale consideration was taken by Ramandeep Singh, Amandeep Singh, Harvinder Singh, Satveer Singh, Yuvraj Singh etc. and he was also given a share of the amount. He took the name of several other persons and mentioned that the company M/s Alliance Builders and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. and the firm M/s S.K. Associates and M/s Ashish Enterprises functioned out of the same premises.
(vii) The statement of Anurag Goel, Accountant of M/s S.K. Associates was taken on 19.11.2022, wherein he has stated that a company in the name of M/s Alliance Builders & Contractors is 95% partner of M/s S.K. Associates. Both M/s Alliance Builders & Contractors and M/s S.K. Associates shared the same office premises and he was the Accountant for both M/s S.K. Associates and also M/s Alliance Builders. The first two applicants (Ramandeep Singh and Amandeep Singh) are Directors of M/s Alliance Builders and the six Directors of M/s Alliance Builders and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. were the persons controlling M/s S.K. Associates. On the basis of the aforesaid statement, Ramandeep Singh and Amandeep Singh, subsequently, were included as an accused in the charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer.
(viii) The statement of Anil Kumar, Tehsildar, Sadar, Bareilly was recorded on 21.11.2022 by the Investigating Officer. The Tehsildar, Sadar, Bareilly in his statement has pointed out that in the mutation record, at Page 969, Sl. No.28, the competent officer had passed an order dated 20.09.1997 directing that the name of "the State of U.P." be entered in the revenue record against Gata No.825 area 7714.06 square meters. The Registrar Kanoongo had also signed on the Parvana Amaldaramad in the mutation register on 20.09.1997, but the then Lekhpal had not issued the necessary direction to enter the name of "the State of U.P" in the Khatauni. It is clear that the then Lekhpal had not carried out the order dated 20.09.1997 passed by the competent authority and had not entered the name of "the State of U.P." on any copies of the Khatauni. Further, in the Khatauni for 1405 fasli, it was recorded that the name of the erstwhile tenure holders be deleted and the name of "the State of U.P." be registered on account of the land having been declared surplus. However, when the Khatauni for the Fasli year 1406 to 1411 was being prepared, the direction to record the name of "the State of U.P." was interfered with and the land was bifurcated such that four plot numbers including Gata No. 825, area 0.5334 hectare were taken out and the name of the erstwhile tenure holders were recorded thereon while the name of "the State of U.P." was recorded only on 0.239 hectare land of Gata No. 825. This made it evident that when the Khatauni for Fasli year 1406 - 1411 was being prepared, Gata No. 825/0.711 hectare was divided into two and registered against Khata No. 00227 and 00370 without complying with the order dated 20.07.1997 passed by the competent officer as recorded in the mutation register. This ought to have been carried out by the then Lekhpal.
(ix) The same statement was reiterated by Brahma Nand Shukla, Revenue Inspector, Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly, and Naresh Chandra, Lekhpal Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly with the further addition that on 20.05.2003, mutation order was passed in favour of M/s S.K. Associates on the basis of Case No. 679 of 2003 instituted before the Court of Tehsildar, Bareilly on the basis of the sale deed dated 20.03.2003. In the proceedings pertaining to the said case, the statement of Lekhpal is recorded in which the then Lekhpal had suppressed necessary facts. Thereafter, by order dated 23.06.2008 passed under Section 34/35 (M/s S.K. Associates Vs. Jasveer Singh), the mutation order dated 22.05.2003 had been cancelled and this fact is recorded in the Khatauni for fasli year 1424 to 1429, but M/s S.K. Associates had continued to sell the land even thereafter. He has specifically named the then Lekhpal Bhagat Ram, Munish Chand, Satish Chandra Sagar, the original tenure holders and their successors and M/s S.K. Associates and its officers as the persons responsible for suppressing the relevant facts pertaining to the order dated 20.09.1997 by the competent authority.
(x) On the basis of the aforesaid statements, charge-sheet was filed on 05.12.2022.
APPLICATION'S SUBMISSION.
5. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the applicants, namely, Ramandeep Singh, Amandeep Singh, Hani Kumar Bhatiya, Arvinder Singh, Yuvraj Singh and Satveer Singh are the Directors of a reputed Company in the name and style of Alliance Builders and Contractors Ltd. having its registered office at Stadium Road, Bareilly, incorporated in the year 1996 and has been registered under the Companies Act, 1956.
6. In application U/s 482 No.-41154 of 2023, applicant--Munish Chandra Mishra joined his duties as Lekhpal in Village-Biharman Nagla, Bareilly in January, 2000 and posted till March, 2002. The aforesaid fact is clear from the inquiry report submitted by the Revenue Authorities as well as from the statements of Brahma Nand Sharma and Naresh Chandra as recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The inquiry report further mentions that Khatauni for 1406-1411 Fasli was prepared by one Bhagat Ram, the then Lekhpal of the area and it was his duty to maintain in the revenue records about the order dated 20.07.1997 in respect of the ceiling. It is also relevant to point out that as the revenue records were handed over to the applicant--Munish Chandra Mishra at the time of his joining in January, 2000, wherein there was no entries in respect of ceiling, therefore, he had no knowledge about the land in question being declared surplus under the Ceiling Act.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the applicants--Hani Kumar Bhatiya and Satveer Singh are named in the FIR, whereas the applicants--Ramandeep Singh, Amandeep Singh, Arvinder Singh, Yuvraj Singh and Munish Chandra Mishra are not named in the FIR. He further submits that the applicants have been falsely implicated in the present case due to ulterior motive. It is further submitted that dispute between the parties is essentially of civil nature, therefore, converting the civil dispute into criminal offence against the applicants is bad in the eyes of law on the given facts and circumstances of this case. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Wajid and others vs. State of U.P. and others1, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:-
"30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the ines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged."
8. It is evident from a reading of the FIR and the consequent charge-sheet that the entire set of allegations revolve around the purchase and subsequent sale of land allegedly vested in the State of U.P., as a result of its having been declared surplus.
9. It may be noted that the proceedings in respect of the land of Gata No.825 area 0.7714 hectare having been declared surplus and the alleged possession memo dated 16.11.1990 on the basis of which possession of the land was alleged to have been taken from the erstwhile tenure holders and allegedly handed over to Bareilly Development Authority (hereinafter referred as "B.D.A.") respectively was challenged before this Court by M/s S.K. Associates by filing Writ Petition No.19391 of 2022. This Court entertained the said writ petition on 25.11.2022 and recorded the undertaking of the Bareilly Development Authority2 that no change in the nature of the land in question would be made during the pendency of the writ petition. However, eventually, the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment and order dated 25.01.2023 was pleased to dismiss the writ petition on the ground that M/s S.K. Associates being a subsequent purchaser had no locus to file the writ petition and that the land in question was in physical possession of the B.D.A.
10. The aforesaid judgment dated 25.01.2023 was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition No. 10139 of 20233. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated 12.05.2023 was pleased to issue notice on the Special Leave Petition and further direct that status quo on the nature and possession over the land in dispute would be maintained by the parties until further orders of the Court.
11. It is evident, therefore, that civil proceedings with respect to the vesting of the land in the State of U.P. and the alleged possession by memo dated 16.11.1990 in favour of Bareilly Development Authority is sub-judice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court would adjudicate upon the legality of the proceedings adopted to declare the land of Gata No.825 surplus under the U.P. Urban Land Ceiling Act and determine as to whether the possession of Gata No.825 was validly handed over to the Bareilly Development Authority on 16.11.1990 (as claimed) or not? Dependent upon these findings, the authority of the successors/legal heirs of the erstwhile tenure holders to sell their 2/3rd share in Gata No.825 in favour of M/s S.K. Associates would be established.
12. In case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reverses the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, the substratum of the allegations leveled in the FIR and the consequent charge sheet would collapse; no proceeding would survive against the accused.
13. Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that none of the offences for which cognizance has been taken is made out; the entire proceeding is an abuse of the process of law. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the judgements of Apex Court in the cases of Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others4, Kunti and another Vs. State of U.P. and others5 and Naresh Kumar and another Vs. State of Karnataka and another6, and in several other judgments, has consistently held that where ingredients of the offences are not made out, criminal proceedings against an accused should be quashed.
14. Elaborating their argument, they submit that the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet, when viewed from a conspectus of the statements given by the various witnesses during the course of investigation (referred to above), would indicate that none of the offences under which the charge-sheet has been submitted and taken cognizance thereof by the trial court, are made out against the applicants.
15. Further, perusal of the charge-sheet would indicate that all the successors/legal heirs of the erstwhile tenure holders, the Directors and Managers of M/s Alliance Builders and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. and M/s S.K. Associates, as also the subsequent purchasers of Gata No. 825 have all been made accused in the proceedings before the trial court, on the broad allegation that they have entered into transactions of sale and purchase of government land.
16. That the then Lekhpals have been directly implicated for not giving effect to the order dated 20.09.1997 passed by the competent authority to record the name of "the State of U.P." in the revenue records and for bifurcating the land of Gata No.825 into 2 portions in the Khatauni prepared for the subsequent period and reflecting the name of "the State of U.P." against one portion and not against the other, there being no allegation levelled against the applicants that the applicants had in any manner manipulated the preparation of the Khatauni or influenced these Lekhpals.
17. It is further contended that even if these events are accepted to be true and correct, all this was done during 1997-2002, however, the firm M/s S.K. Associates came into picture only in the year 2003 upon purchase of the land from the successors/legal heirs of the erstwhile tenure holders. The allegations regarding suppression of facts, refusal/omission to sign the documents and mutate the name of "the State of U.P." in the revenue records and bifurcate the land of Gata No. 825 into two portions is specifically against the Lekhpal from 1997 till 2002. The only allegation against M/s S.K. Associates is that it had purchased the land with circle rate value of Rs. 25,70,000/- for Rs. 3,80,750/- and after nearly 20 years, sold the said land by 7 different transactions for a consideration of more than Rs.3 crores, thus profiting massively.
18. Further, at most, the statement of the Revenue Inspector, Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly and Lekhpal, Tehsil Sadar, District Bareilly mention that despite order dated 23.06.2008 cancelling the mutation in favour of M/s S.K. Associates having been passed, M/s S.K. Associates continued to deal in the property. This statement that can, at worst, point to some wrong doing at the instance of M/s S.K. Associates.
19. However, the position in this respect is totally different:-
i) Firstly, revenue record is not a document of title. The order dated 23.06.2008 has no effect on the title of M/s S.K. Associates over the land in question.
ii) Secondly, the order dated 23.06.2008 was the outcome of a dispute between M/s S.K. Associates and one of the sellers of land in favour of M/s S.K. Associates on the allegation that the Power of Attorney holder of one of the sellers, Jagdish Prasad had executed the sale deed in favour of M/s S.K. Associates despite the Power of Attorney having been cancelled. The actual fact is that parallel to the proceeding in which order dated 23.06.2008 was passed, O.S. No. 2980 of 2008 had also been instituted by Jagdish Prasad praying for cancellation of the sale deed dated 20.03.2003 before the Civil Court, which was subsequently dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 155 of 2013 (Jagdish Prasad Vs. M/s. S.K. Associates and another) was preferred before the Additional District Judge-X, Bareilly, during the pendency of which a compromise was entered into between Jagdish Prasad and M/s S.K. Associates and an application for withdrawal of the proceedings was filed on 18.11.2014. On 18.11.2014 itself, the application for withdrawal was allowed and the civil appeal was dismissed. As such, it is submitted that the order dated 23.06.2008 was of no effect.
iii) Thirdly, the order dated 23.06.2008 was not given effect to and the name of M/s S.K. Associates was not deleted as the tenure holder of Gata No.825Mi to the extent of 0.5340 hectare (being 2/3rd of 0.774 hectares) and finds mention in Khatauni for 1424-1429 fasli. Though the factum of the cancellation of the order dated 22.05.2003 by which the name of M/s S.K. Associates was first recorded as tenure holder is mentioned in the Khatauni and entry to this effect is made on 21.07.2008, but the name of M/s S.K. Associates is not deleted.
20. Merely because the name is not recorded as tenure holder on the Khatauni or that the entry by which the name was first recorded as tenure holder and subsequently being expunged would not mean that the title of the person claiming to be a tenure holder is affected in any manner. It only means that in case the person claiming to be the tenure holder wishes to alienate the land, the purchaser of the property would be put to notice of some dispute subsisting in respect of the said property and be obliged to carryout enhance due diligence to ascertain proper title and/or possession of the person claiming to be the title holder of the land. The prospective purchaser would make several enquiries and satisfy himself/herself fully before proceeding to enter into the transaction. In the present case, as the fact demonstrate, the purchaser of the property was satisfied that M/s S.K. Associates had the title to the property and have purchased different parcels of Gata No.825 at the circle rate value of the properties. None of them has complained or accused M/s S.K. Associates of transferring land to which it did not have any title.
21. He further submits that on these allegations, none of the offences for which the applicants have been charged are made out.
22. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the applicants has relied upon the following judgements of the Apex Court:-
(i) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and another vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others7, has elaborated upon the ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC. Paragraphs nos. 40 to 42 of the aforesaid judgment read as under:-
"40. Firstly, we shall deal with the section 420 IPC. Cheating is defined in section 415 IPC and is punishable under section 420 IPC. Section 415 is set out below:-
"415. Cheating. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.
Explanation. A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section."
41. Section 415 IPC thus requires--
1. deception of any person.
2. (a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person-
(i) to deliver any property to any person; or
(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body mind, reputation or property.
42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning."
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar and Another8 analyzed and elucidated the ingredients of Section 420 IPC. Paragraphs 18 to 21 of the judgment in Mohd. Ibrahim (supra) are quoted herein below:-
"18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security).
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner."
24. In the same judgement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further clarified that it is only for the purchaser of a property who has been conveyed a parcel of land by a seller, which parcel of land did not belong to the seller, that a complaint of cheating can be made. Paragraph 23 of the judgment is quoted as under:-
"When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint."
25. It is clear from the aforesaid that it is only the purchasers of the property from M/s S.K. Associates, who can complain that they have been cheated by the conveyance of a property in which M/s S.K. Associates held no title. It is not open to the State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority, as the alleged owner of land, to accuse the applicants to have committed an offence under Section 420, IPC. Far from the purchasers of the property having made any allegation of cheating against M/s S.K. Associates, they have in fact been made an accused in the case before the trial court.
26. M/s S.K. Associates, in selling land which allegedly belonged to the State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority, has not made any dishonest/false representation to the State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority, or induced it to act in any manner to its prejudice. M/s S.K. Associates has not caused the State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority to deliver any property (money) or otherwise caused any prejudice. The State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority not being a purchaser of property under the sale deeds executed by M/s S.K. Associates, no complaint of cheating can be made at their instance, as held in paragraph 23 of Mohd. Ibrahim (supra).
27. Moreover, as laid down in Inder Mohan Goswami (supra), to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should remain present from the very beginning of the transaction. In the present case, M/s S.K. Associates purchased the property in the year 2003, and sold it in 2021/2022, after nearly 18 years. When it purchased the property, the name of the successors/legal heirs of the erstwhile tenure holders was duly recorded in the revenue records; M/s S.K. Associates had no reason to suspect that it was purchasing land in which its vendors did not have title. It was after M/s S.K. Associates had entered into the sale transaction in 2021/2022 that for the first time, it was accused of conveying land that belonged to the Bareilly Development Authority.
28. Neither M/s S.K. Associates, nor its purchasers had any reason to suspect, far less any reason to believe, that land in which title belonged to Bareilly Development Authority was being sold. The statements given by the persons who have purchased property from M/s S.K. Associates do not make any allegation against M/s S.K. Associates. As a matter of fact, any prudent purchaser of property would carry out proper due diligence before parting with huge sums of hard-earned money towards purchasing a parcel of land, which is probably once in a lifetime transaction. As such, the very basic ingredient of an offence under Section 420 IPC, namely the intent to deceive from the very beginning, is absent in the present fact situation.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Inder Mohan Goswami (supra), has elaborated upon the ingredients of forgery under Section 467 IPC. Paragraphs 43 and 44 of the judgment read as under:-
"43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of section 467 IPC. Section 467 IPC reads as under:-
"467. Forgery of valuable security, will etc. Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, moveable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any moveable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
44. The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under section 467 IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it.
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section.
The basic ingredients of offence under Section 467 are altogether missing even in the allegations of the FIR against the appellants. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination, the appellants can be legally prosecuted for an offence under Section 467 IPC."
30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Ranbeer Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others9 has followed the principle laid down in Mohd. Ibrahim (supra) and further elaborated upon forgery in paragraph no.24 of the judgment, which reads as under:-
"24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed which was not actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a Power of Attorney authorizing the sale of property knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is another thing to say that the Power of Attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom how the investigating authorities could even have been prima facie satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without even examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been cited as a witness."
31. As laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Goswami (supra), in the instant case, the sale deeds to which M/s S.K. Associates is a party are not forged documents. The genuineness of the documents executed by M/s S.K. Associates is not in doubt; the only question is as to whether M/s S.K. Associates can be said to have acquired title to the land and thereafter conveyed title in the very same land as a vendor. This is very different from the deed itself being forged or a fabricated document. The applicants cannot be said to have executed a forged document.
32. Both Mohd Ibrahim (supra) and Randheer Singh (supra) were cases where the accused were charged with conveying title in property which were not theirs, and thereby having committed an offence of forgery under Sections 467, 469 and 471 IPC. Like these judgments, in the present case also, there is no allegation that the applicants executed a forged document or in any manner prepared a falsified document. The applicants may have entered into transactions claiming to be owner of land, which are eventually found not to be his, but that could not mean that the applicant has committed an act of forgery under the Indian Penal Code. The applicants cannot be said to have cheated the complainant in this case, namely, the Bareilly Development Authority.
33. As a matter of fact, if the allegations are correct, it is the applicants who have suffered and has been cheated by its sellers of the land in the year 2003 when it purchased the land. Far from being a perpetrator, the applicants are in fact a victim. The applicants firm, being a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice of the title of State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority (assuming such title to be valid), cannot be accused of forgery in the facts of the present case.
34. As mentioned above, while the witnesses in their statements recorded during the course of investigation have directly named the then Lekhpals for not giving effect to the order dated 20.09.1997 passed by the competent authority to record the name of "the State of U.P." in the revenue records and for bifurcating the land of Gata No. 825 into 2 portions in the Khatauni prepared for the subsequent period and reflecting the name of "the State of U.P." against one portion and not against the other, there is no allegation levelled against the applicants, that they had in any manner manipulated the preparation of Khatauni or influenced these Lekhpals.
35. Further, as mentioned above, these events took place during 1997-2002, while the firm M/s S.K. Associates came into picture only in the year 2003. As such, it is submitted that the ingredients of forgery contemplated under Sections 467, 468, 469 and 471 IPC are not made out against the applicants in the present case.
36. They further submit that the applicants have also been accused of committing criminal trespass punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. However, there is no allegation either in the FIR or in the charge sheet that the applicants have entered into Gata No. 825 to commit an offence or had intimidated, insulted or annoyed the officials of the Bareilly Development Authority in any manner. Further, as mentioned above, the question as to whether the property is in possession of Bareilly Development Authority is itself sub-judice, being the subject matter of adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In such circumstances, when the possession of the State of U.P./Bareilly Development Authority is itself in dispute, the basic ingredient of Section 441 IPC namely, that the entry should be "into or upon property in possession of another" is not satisfied in the present case.
37. Learned counsel for the applicants further submit that in so far as offence under Section 28 of the Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973 is concerned, it pertains to development over land or building being carried out in contravention of the Master Plan, Zonal Development Plan or without obtaining the sanction of the development authority. 'Development' is defined in Section 2(e) of the Urban Planning & Development Act, as per which one has to build, engineer, mine, or undertake any other operations in, on, over or under the land, or make any material change in any building or land.
38. In the present case, the applicants are not carrying out any development over any part of Gata No. 825. Mere alienation of portions of Gata No. 825 towards different purchasers does not amount to carrying out of development within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973 and as such, does not attract Section 28 of the Urban Planing & Development Act, 1973.
39. Further, Section 28 would be attracted only where any person refuses to comply with an order passed by the Vice Chairman directing the immediate cessation or development activity being undertaken over the land. This order by the Vice Chairman has to be in writing and it is only then that Section 28(4) makes the continued development of failure to abide by the order punishable with fine upto Rs. 200/- per day. In the present case, there is no allegation either in the FIR or in the charge sheet that any order in writing was issued by the Vice Chairman and served on the applicants so as to attract the offence contemplated under Section 28(4) of the Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973.
40. Learned counsel for the applicants, therefore, submitted that the present criminal proceedings initiated against the applicants are not only malicious but also an abuse of the process of the court of law. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the proceedings of the above mentioned criminal case are liable to be quashed by this Court.
41. While opposing the stand as taken by learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2-Bareilly Development Authority places the following arguments on the basis of records of the case:-
(a) an area to the extent of 7714.06 Sq. Meters of land of Gata No.825, situated at Village Nagla Biharman, District Bareilly, came to be declared as surplus land under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation), Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred as "the Ceiling Act 1976") followed by publication of notification under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act 1976, dated 27.06.1990. Thereafter, notification U/s 10(5) of the Ceiling Act 1976, came to be published on 19.06.1993. Bareilly Development Authority (hereinafter referred as "B.D.A.") came to be put in actual physical possession over the aforesaid land including other lands by the Competent Authority , Urban Land Ceiling, Bareilly vide possession memo dated 16.11.1990 and till date, B.D.A., Bareilly is in actual physical possession over the said subject land.
(b) He further submits that as per the settled legal position, after issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the Ceiling Act 1976 (now replaced), the land covered under the notification under Section 10(3), absolutely vest with the State Government and any transaction subsequent thereto is null and void ab-initio.
(c) He further submits that before the commencement of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, itself, the actual physical possession over the subject land had already been handed over to the B.D.A. by the Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Bareilly vide possession memo dated 16.11.1990. Thus Urban Land Ceiling proceedings initiated against Tara Chand had already been concluded before the commencement of the Repealing Act of 1999, and as such, the benefit of Repealing Act cannot be extended to the applicants.
(d) He further submits that once the applicants are not able to demonstrate the actual possession of the said land was not handed over to the B.D.A., they are liable to be prosecuted for the offence under the relevant Sections in which the FIR has been lodged.
(e) The main allegations against the applicants are that they have entered into the sale consideration of land of Khasra No.825, area 2.0771 Sq. Meters situated at Village Nagla Biharman, District Bareilly, which has been declared as surplus land in Ceiling Act by committing forgery and manipulating the revenue records. Although the possession of land had already been transferred to B.D.A.
42. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. submits that perusal of F.I.R. as well as statements of the witnesses, goes to show that, prima facie case for the alleged offence is made out against the applicants. He next submits that this High Court may not quash the entire criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at the pre-trial stage, for which he has relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal; (1992) Supp(1) SCC 335
(ii) Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of U.P. and Others; (2022) SCC Online SC 1634;
(iii) Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. vs. State of Uttranchal &Ors. (2007) 12 SCC 1;
(iv) Mohd. Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar; (2009) 8 SCC 751
(v) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. NEPC India Ltd.; (2006) 6 SCC 736
(vi) Ramdheer Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others; (2021) 14 SCC 626;
43. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the Court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.
44. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned A.G.A. as well as the learned counsel for the informant states that this Court may not exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the present case, and hence the present application is liable to be rejected.
45. Replying to the submission as made by learned counsel for the opposite party no.2, learned counsel for the applicants submits that Gata No.825 situated in village Biharman Nagla, District Bareilly had total area of 7714.06 sq.mt. The aforesaid property had three joint tenure holders, namely, Thakur Das s/o Parumal, Tara Chand s/o Jhau Ram and Tula Ram s/o Ram Dayal, who had equal share in the aforesaid property.
46. The proceedings of urban ceiling were initiated against the tenure holder-Tara Chand which was registered as Case No.1820/122/82 (State of U.P. vs. Tara Chand), in which by an ex-parte order dated 04.04.1985 passed U/s 8(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred as "the Act of 1976"), 6932.23 sq.mts. of land of tenure holder-Tara Chand from Gata Nos.801, 1196, 1197, 1207, 825, 817, 818, 798 situated in village Biharman Nagla, District Bareilly was declared surplus.
47. On 30.10.1989, notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1976 was allegedly issued. On 25.10.1989, i.e. prior notice under Section 9 of the Act, Notification U/s 10(1) of Ceiling Act was issued. Thereafter, the notification under Section 10(3) of the Act of 1976 was allegedly issued on 27.06.1990.
48. On 19.06.1993, notice under Section 10(5) of the Act 1976 was allegedly issued or sent to the heirs of Tara Chand, however, the aforesaid notices were not served upon heirs of Tara Chand. Subsequently, no further action was taken by the respondents in the matter and no effort was ever made to take the possession over the land in question, i.e. the land declared to be surplus and the actual physical possession of the said declared surplus land including Gata No.825 was never taken by any authority whatsoever and was with legal heirs of the Tara Chand when the Repealing Act came into force.
49. The Act of 1976 was repealed by Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealing Act, 1999 (the Act No.15 of 1999), which was adopted by "the State of U.P.", w.e.f. 18.03.1999.
50. According to Sections 3 & 4 of the Repealing Act, all the proceedings under the Principal Act shall stand abated if the possession of the land has not been taken by the State on the date of the application of the Repealing Act.
51. In the present case, as the actual physical possession of the aforesaid declared surplus land was never taken by the State authorities, hence the proceedings under the Act of 1976 stood automatically abated under the provisions of the Repealing Act, 1999.
52. He further submits that the possession memo dated 16.11.1990 in respect of transfer of land to Bareilly Development Authority is merely sheer paper transaction and cannot be relied upon. The aforesaid paper is of 16.11.1990, when the notice U/s 10(5) of the Act of 1976 was not even issued, as such it is barred by Section 10(4) of the Act of 1976.
53. From the aforesaid fact that the Bareilly Development Authority was never in possession of the land in question. The firm, i.e. S.K. Associates was in possession of the land of Gata No.825 situated in village Biharman Nagla, District Bareilly which is evident from the Khasra Nos.1416 Fasli, 1417 Fasli, 1418 Fasli, 1419 Fasli, 1420 Fasli, 1421 Fasli, 1422 Fasli, 1423 Fasli, 1424 Fasli, 1425 Fasli, 1426 Fasli, 1427 Fasli and 1428 Fasli, which have already been annexed as Annexure No.28 of the application.
Analysis and Findings
54. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the present application.
55. Basic facts to be noted are that:-
(i) Gata No.825 situated in vill-Biharman Nagla, District Bareilly, total are 7714.06 sq. mt. had three joint tenure holders, namely, Thakur Das s/o Sri Parumal, Tara Chand s/o Jhau Ram and Tula Ram s/o Sri Ram Dayal, having equal share, i.e. 1/3rd each in the aforesaid property. The aforesaid fact is mentioned in the Khatauni of 1382 Fasli.
(ii) Proceedings of urban ceiling were initiated against the tenure holder--Tara Chand in which by an ex-parte order dated 04.04.1985 passed under Section 8(4) of the Act 1976, 6932.23 sq. mts. of land of tenure holder--Tara Chand from several Gatas including Gata No.825 was declared surplus.
(iii) After death of Tara Chand, on the basis of inquiry report dated 17.12.1988, Ramdas and Amar Singh sons of Tara Chand were declared to be legal heirs of Tara Chand. Accordingly, their names were entered in the revenue records.
(iv) The notice U/s 9 of the Act of 1976 was issued on 30.10.1989, but neither draft statement nor notices were served upon the legal heirs of Tara Chand.
(v) Prior to the aforesaid notice U/s 9 of the Act 1976, the notification U/s 10(1) of the Act of 1976 was allegedly issued on 25.10.1985. Thereafter, on 27.06.1990, notification U/s 10(3) of the Act 1976 was issued vesting the aforesaid property in the State.
(vi) Thereafter, notice U/s 10(5) of the Act 1976 was sent to the legal heirs of Tara Chand, but the said three copies of the notice were found on record, therefore, it cannot be presumed that the notices were served upon them.
(vii) It appears that 2/3rd of the aforesaid Gata No.825 was purchased by M/s S.K. Associates, which is alleged to be connecting firm of company of the applicants, namely, M/s Alliance Builders and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. vide registered sale deed dated 20.03.2003 from Satveer Singh s/o Raghuvir Singh being power of attorney holder of Ram Das and Amar Singh sons of Tara Chand as well as Jasbir being power of attorney holder of Jagdish Prasad and Sukhpal sons of Tularam and Smt. Sunder Devi w/o Tularam.
(viii) At the time of purchase, names of legal heirs of Tula Ram and Tara Chand from whom M/s S.K. Associates purchased the property was shown in the revenue records. The name of M/s S.K. Associates was mutated in the revenue records by order dated 25.05.2003 pursuant to the sale deed dated 20.03.2003.
(ix) One of the seller, namely, Jagdish Prasad, legal heir of Tula Ram having 1/8th share of the aforesaid Gata raised objection on the aforesaid sale deed and also disputed the power of attorney. Thus, the mutation order dated 20.05.2003 was recalled vide order dated 23.06.2008. Further, Jagdish Prasad s/o Tula Ram filed a civil suit being Original Suit No.290 of 2008 for cancellation of sale deed dated 20.03.2003 executed in favour of M/s S.K. Associates, however, later the matter was compromised with M/s S.K. Associates and the said sale deed dated 20.03.2003 executed in favour of M/s S.K. Associates through his power of attorney holder, was accepted.
(x) The relevant Khasara shows that M/s S.K. Associates was in possession over the property in question till 2021.
(xi) It appears that after the proceedings under ceiling Act, the land of the tenure holder, which was declared surplus was vested in the State and later possession of the same was given to Bareilly Development Authority (B.D.A.) on 16.11.1990. Accordingly, the order for mutating the name of Bareilly Development Authority over the land in question was passed, but was not given effect to by the concerned person. About the aforesaid fact of land in question being given to the B.D.A. came to the knowledge of applicants in the year 2021-22, when the revenue authorities tried to disturb the possession of M/s S.K. Associates. Hence, they filed writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed, against which Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 10139/2023 (S.K. Associates vs. State of U.P. and Others) was filed wherein the Apex Court vide order dated 18.05.2023 directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the nature and possession over the land in question until further orders of the Court. Hence, the matter regarding the fact as to whether actual physical possession of the property in question was given to Bareilly Development Authority or not, is sub judice before the Apex Court.
(xii) The present FIR came to be registered during pendency of the civil writ petition filed by the applicants, i.e. M/s S.K. Associates.
56. Before looking into merits of the case, it would be appropriate to discuss the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. which is a very agitated and debatable issue. Nevertheless, there are some cases which have got vide acceptance in the legal fraternity and hence, are used as the minor guidelines/principles governing the cases of quashing criminal proceedings.
57. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prashant Bharti Vs. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (2013) 9 SCC 293 has held that, in order to determine the veracity of prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings raised by an accused u/s 482 Cr.P.C., the following questions are to be raised before the High Court, if the answer to all the following questions was in affirmative, then the High Court should quash the proceedings by exercising its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
"1. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable, i.e. material is of sterling and in impeccable quality?
2. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sufficient to reject and over rule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e. material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusation as false?
3. Whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or that the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
4. Whether proceeding with the trial would result in an absuse, of process of the Court and hence, would not serve the end of Justice?"
58. The Apex Court in the case of Parbatbhai Ahir Vs. State of Gujarat10, referring to various cases has summarized following principles to govern powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:-
"15 The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
59. The power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been amiably elaborated in following two cases, which are considered to be authorities on the subject of quashing of criminal proceedings. Despite all the contradicting judgments of the Apex Court the following cases provides most accepted views:-
I). In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal11, the Apex Court in paragraph 102 has enumerated 7 categories of the cases where power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by this Court, which are quoted below:-
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
II). In the case of R.P. Kapur Vs State of Punjab12, the Apex Court discussing the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. observed in paragraph 6 as follows:-
"6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under Section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the .proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the a11egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no ques- tion of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magis- trate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and' contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. xxxxxxxx"
(Emphasis supplied)
60. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court has discussed 3 clauses of cases in which criminal proceeding can be quashed. They are as follows:-
"(a) where there is a legal bar against institution or continuance of criminal proceedings;
(b) where the allegation in FIR do not discloses or constitute an offence, even if taken at face value and not their entirely.
(c) where the allegation made constitute an offence but there is no evidence which can prove them."
61. Limitation of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and held in the case of Monica Kumar (Dr.) and Anr. Vs State of U.P.13 as well as many other judgements of the Apex Court, that Section 482 Cr.P.C. powers are to be ex-debito justitiae (as a matter of right) in a manner to ensure real and substantial justice, and the administration of justice is why Court exists.
62. In recent relevant judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)14, it was observed;
"18-It is a settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. even when discharge application is pending with the trial Court. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegation are materialized in a charge sheet. On the contrary, it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of the power of any Court."
63. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A three-Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy15 held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated :
"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.''
64. Further it has been held in various judgements that in proceeding u/s 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court will not enter into any finding of facts, particularly when the matter has been concluded by the concurrent finding of facts.
65. However, in the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. And Ors.16, the Apex Court observes the following principles:-
"1. The High Courts, should not exercise the inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
2. The criminal complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce of legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the criminal proceeding should not be quashed. Quashing of complaint is warranted only where complaint to bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence.
3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out (a) purely a Civil wrong, or (b) purely or criminal offence or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial ......or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence."
66. As such, the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has very wide scope and is an essential part of the functioning in order to meet the end of justice, it must be noted that the power so assigned is so vast and can easily be misinterpreted. So, it becomes important for the Courts to use it wisely and according to the guidelines laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court.
67. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has made its space in Cr.P.C. in order to not only enable the High Court to provide proper justice but also to curb the filing of fictitious complaints.
68. In the present case as forwarded by/from both the side, the Hon'ble Court may surely take judicial notice of certain facts as provided u/s 57 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and set the law in motion by delivering substantial justice and balance be struck between the statutory obligations of investigation and rights of affected parties.
69. Further, even the framers of legislation while enacting section 482 Cr.P.C. had started with a non-obstante clause and completed the section with "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" which lays obligation upon the power of High Court to prevent the society from criminals and law-breakers and should be exercised to stop the public from filing fictitious complaints just to fulfill their personal grudges.
70. In the present case, a balance has to be struck while considering the rival submissions made by the parties in order to arrive at a judicious conclusion. The landmark judgments have been cited by both the parties considering which this Court has to arrive at a conclusion considering the guidelines and principles setup by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various cases.
71. The main thrust of the counsel for the applicants while pressing their case is :-
(a) Firstly, the informant/complainant cannot be taken as a person aggrieved for the purpose of launching the criminal proceedings.
(b) Secondly, the criminal proceedings in question is liable to be quashed on the ground that there is a dispute between the parties, which is civil in nature and is sought to be given a criminal colour, only with a view to pressurize the applicants and to hide the irregularities.
(c) Thirdly, no offence under the relevant sections is made out.
72. As regards the first argument of learned counsel for the applicants regarding the fact as to who can be the person aggrieved for the purpose of launching the criminal proceedings and against whom such criminal proceeding can be lodged, this Court considering the observations as made in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim's case (supra), finds that the sale deed has been executed by the legal heirs of original tenure holder in favour of M/s S.K. Associates (applicants) and further their names were recorded in the revenue records and, later sold the same to other persons, therefore, the applicants have not executed the sale deed to other, not having ownership of the property in question nor have forged or placed any forged document by selling the property. Thus, the State as well as B.D.A. cannot turn around to say that they have been cheated or fraud has been placed by the applicants while executing the sale deed in favour of others. Therefore, the authorities of State of U.P. or B.D.A. were not the persons who were competent to lodge the complaint.
73. Be that as it may, it is only the subsequent purchaser, i.e. persons to whom M/s S.K. Associates, after acquiring title by means of sale deed executed in their favour by legal heirs of original tenure holder, have sold the land in question, could have lodged the complaint. Thus the informant was not the right person to lodge the FIR.
74. Before dealing with second issue regarding civil dispute being given criminal colour, it would be apposite to discuss settled position of law in this regard.
75. At this juncture, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.
76. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.17 has observed that it is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
77. The Court being conscious of the interplay between civil disputes and criminal proceedings, finds it appropriate to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim vs. State of Bihar18, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurize parties to settle civil disputes."
78. From the aforesaid, it is clear that any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. It is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature.
79. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others19, a three Judge Bench of this Court laid down the following principles of law:-
"57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the 'rarest of rare cases'. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr.P.C.
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR."
80. The Courts have time and again cautioned about converting purely civil disputes into criminal cases and have noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Thus, the present dispute, which is entirely with respect to property and more particularly buying and selling thereof, cannot be doubted that a criminal hue has been unjustifiably lent to a civil natured issue.
81. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.20, this Court held:-
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of the facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court."
82. Thus it is true that only because a civil remedy is available to the complainant in given set of facts, which make out a civil wrong as also criminal offence, itself cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings.
83. It has been time and again held in several decisions of the Apex Court as well as High Courts that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
84. What is evincible from the extant case-law is that this Court has been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting pressure on the party concerned, which, this Court reiterates, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court.
85. Be that as it may, where it appears that the offence in question is primarily civil or private, where the alleged offence has not been committed or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. The mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' (in the present case under the Ceiling Act, 1976) would not refrain this Court from exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
86. It is also to be noted that while no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 Cr.P.C. more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant.
87. Thus, analyzing the second issue regarding civil dispute being given a criminal colour, this Court finds that the allegations against the applicants, in short, are that they have entered into sale consideration for a land situated at Khasra No.825 area 0.7714 hectares in Village-Biharman Nagla which was declared surplus land in ceiling proceedings by committing forgery and manipulating the revenue records. It is not disputed that prior to execution of sale deed dated 20.03.2003, names of legal heirs of Tara Chand as well as Tula Ram were entered in the revenue records. After execution of sale deed dated 20.03.2003 in favour of M/s S.K. Associates (applicants), it was mutated in the revenue records vide order dated 22.05.2003. On the basis of the aforesaid sale deed, deleting the name of erstwhile owners, i.e. legal heirs of original tenure holders. It is also not disputed that an objection was raised by one of the seller, which was ultimately settled through compromise and the sale deed as well as possession of M/s S.K. Associate was affirmed after which till 2021, the applicants were in actual possession over the property in question.
88. As the revenue authorities tried to disturb the possession of the applicants over the property in question, writ petition was filed before this Court in the year 2022, in which initially the Division Bench of this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo and finally the writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 25.01.2022 on the ground that M/s S.K. Associates being subsequent purchaser has no locus to file writ petition and the land was in physical possession of B.D.A. Against the aforesaid order, Special Leave to Appeal has been filed before the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein interim order has been granted in favour of M/s S.K. Associates directing both the parties to maintain status quo in respect to nature and possession over the land in question. Thus, the question as to who is in actual possession over the property in question is still pending consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court.
89. Thus the case which started from initiation of proceedings under ceiling Act, wherein as per the case of opposite party no.2, the land declared surplus was vested in State and later, transferred to B.D.A., actual possession was being given to the authorities is a question which is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Unless it is decided that the M/s S.K. Associates has played fraud in purchasing the aforesaid property from the legal heirs of original tenure holders having knowledge of the fact that the aforesaid land was declared surplus and vested in State and later transferred to B.D.A., it cannot be said that the applicants have committed any criminal offence. Even otherwise, matter regarding possession is under consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. In case, the same is decided in favour of applicants, allegation regarding criminal offence against applicants would have no legs to stand as the decision will be binding upon criminal court proving that the applicants have committed no criminal offence.
90. It has not been the case of the informant that the applicant have manipulated records or have played fraud in getting the sale deed executed in the year 2003, no criminal offence is made out against the applicants.
91. This Court finds that the allegations made in the FIR regarding the land in question being entered as ceiling surplus land in revenue records, is also contrary to the records of current Khatauni of 1424-1429 Fasli.
92. In the present case, M/s S.K. Associates purchased the property in question from original tenure holders after which their names were mutated in the revenue records and subsequently, sold the property by means of sale deeds to others. About the fact that the ceiling proceedings in which surplus land of the tenure holders were vested in State and then transferred to Bareilly Development Authority came to their knowledge of the applicants in the year 2021-22, therefore, it cannot be said that any criminal offence has been committed by the applicants as they were bona fide purchaser of the property in question from the original tenure holders.
93. So far as the next argument as placed by learned counsel for the applicants no offence under the relevant section is made out, this Court finds that even if the allegations as made in the FIR are presumed to be true in entirety, they did not disclose the ingredients of any forgery or cheating and there is no such credible material to prove the aforesaid offence. Thus no offence under the relevant section is made out.
94. For attracting the offence of 'cheating' as defined under Section 415 of IPC and punishable under Section 420 of IPC, it is necessary that the FIR should make out a case of "intentional inducement", "dishonesty" or "fraudulence". Further, for the offence of 'cheating', there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should also have dishonestly induced the person deceived to deliver any property to a person. Neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet contain a whisper with respect to any inducement, fraud or dishonesty by the applicants.
95. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy and Another vs. Sudha Seetharam and Another21 has culled out the ingredients to constitute the offence under Sections 415 IPC are as follows:-
"16. The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows:-
16.1. There should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him:
16.1.1. The person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or 16.1.2. The person so induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and 16.2. In cases covered by 16.1.2. above, the act or omission should be one which caused or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property."
96. Thus, fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating.
97. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC are as follows:-
"19.1. A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and 19.2. The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to
(a) deliver property to any person; or
(b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security."
98. Thus, cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC.
99. From the above, it is clear that for attracting the provision of Section 420 of IPC, the FIR/complaint must show that the ingredients of Section 415 of IPC are made out and the person cheated must have been dishonestly induced to deliver the property to any person; or to make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. In other words, for attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses:-
(i) the deception of any person;
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and
(iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement.
100. Perusal of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, reveals that the allegations with regard to inducement is missing and no role of inducement at all has been attributed to the applicants, who are bona fide purchaser of the property in question.
101. In the present facts of the case, the applicants are bona fide purchaser of the property in question after paying consideration to the legal heirs of original tenure holders without notice to the title of State of U.P. or B.D.A. (assuming such title to be true) are victims, hence cannot be accused of forgery in the facts of the present case.
102. The opposite party no.2 had no point of time raised any such allegations against the applicants that they have fabricated or manipulated the records or have played any fraud while purchasing the land in question from the original tenure holders nor while executing the sale deed further in favour of other persons. Even if it is presumed that in ceiling proceedings, the land in question was declared surplus land and vested in the State, thereafter transferred to B.D.A., it was the original tenure holders, who had got their names mutated in the revenue records, after which the same was purchased by the applicants. The applicants had no role to play in getting the names of legal heirs of original tenure holders mutated in revenue records. The applicants had no concerned with the fact that even if after notice to the legal heirs, any order was passed recording the name of State Authorities in the revenue records and the said order was not complied.
103. Even during investigation, witnesses have stated that the concerned Lekhpals have not given effect to the order dated 20.09.1997 passed by the competent authority, but nothing has been alleged against the applicants for any manner of manipulation and such event took place in the year 1997-2002, while the applicants' firm, i.e. M/s S.K. Associates came into picture in the year 2003, at the time of purchasing the property in question from the legal heirs of original tenure holders. Thus, the allegation as made by the opposite party no.2 against the applicants has no legs to stand.
104. Be that as it may, the applicants have acquired title by means of sale deed executed in their favour by legal heirs of original tenure holders, whose name was already mutated in revenue records, therefore, have not committed any forgery, hence no offence under IPC sections is made out.
105. Moreover, revenue records are not documents of title; nor would any findings pursuant to revenue proceedings under Revenue Code confer any rights, title or interest upon the respondents in relation to the subjudice property. Title can only be determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction.
106. Needless to point out that the matter regarding possession over the property in question is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thus, it cannot be said that the applicants have committed any forgery or cheated the informant or person to whom they have sold the property. Even otherwise, the subsequent purchaser from M/s S.K. Associates (applicants) have not turned up to lodge any FIR regarding any such cheating being done by the applicants.
107. In the present facts of the case, this Court is satisfied to record that there was no criminality on the part of the accused as the civil dispute has to be converted into a criminal one, thus continuation of criminal proceedings against the applicants would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
108. As already discussed above that the Revenue Officials tried to create disturbance in peaceful possession of the applicants over the property in question, therefore, writ petition was filed, whereas the present FIR has been lodged after filing of the aforesaid writ petition only for the purpose of exerting pressure upon the applicants.
109. In the present case, there is unexplained delay in ascertaining any dispute regarding possession of the property in question as the sale deed has been executed in favor of the applicants in the year 2003, since then, they were in actual possession over the property in question. For the first time after filing of the writ petition, the opposite party no.2 has proceeded to lodge the present case, which itself proves that the opposite party no.2 has resorted to criminal proceedings in dispute, which is civil in nature for oblique reasons.
110. Further, it could be gainfully said that it is only the purchaser in the sale deed, who would be considered to be the person to feel cheated by the seller. Here, in the present case, the applicants are bona fide purchaser, who have subsequently sold the property to other persons, who have not turned up to make any such allegation of being cheated or fraud being played, hence, have not come forward to lodge the FIR.
111. As pointed out earlier that the ceiling proceedings were initiated against the original tenure holder--Tara Chand and consequently, an ex-parte order dated 04.04.1985 was passed U/s 8(4) of the Act of 1976, by means of which the said land in dispute was declared surplus land. Thereafter, notice U/s 10(5) of the Act of 1976 was alleged to have been issued to the legal heirs of Tara Chand on 19.06.1993 to take possession of the land in question. However, the possession of the land concerned continued with the legal heirs of Tara Chand and their names were mutated in the revenue records. The Act of 1976 was repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealing Act, 1999. Hence, by virtue of Sections 3&4 of the Repealing Act, 1999, the alleged proceedings under the Act of 1976 stood abated by operation of law. The case set up by the opposite party no.2 is that the orders were passed by the Competent Authority for recording the name of "the State of U.P." in revenue records, which was not given effect to by the competent person, thus at the utmost, it cannot be said that the legal heirs of original tenure holders have conspired with the person concerned for manipulating the records or it may also be the case that after the Repealing Act, 1999, as possession of the property in question was still with the legal heirs of original tenure holders and their names were mutated in the revenue records as in view of the Repealing Act, 1999, initially ceiling proceedings stood abated and the applicants purchased the property by means of sale deed in the year 2003 prior to which names of legal heirs of original tenure holders have already been recorded, no fraud, cheating or manipulation has been done by the applicants.
112. This Court also finds that there is no allegation regarding any development being carried out or that there is violation of any order of any competent authority under Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973, thus offence under Section 28 of Act of 1973 is not made out.
113. From the averments made in para 54 of the application, it is evident that Bareilly Development Authority had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.11392 of 1998 (Bareilly Development Authority vs. Competent Authority Urban Ceiling and Others) before this Court in respect to some recovery in which they have mentioned that land of Gata No.797 area 2,402.74 sq. mt. of Village-Biharman Nagla was transferred and the possession of the same was given to them, to which no specific denial has been given by Bareilly Development Authority. From the aforesaid, it is clear that they have not spoken about transfer and possession of land in Gata No. 825, had it been so, same would have been specifically mentioned in the writ petition filed by Bareilly Development Authority.
114. As regards the applicant--Munish Chandra Mishra, it has already been discussed from the record and is clear that he was not the Lekhpal at the relevant point of time nor anything has been stated against him by the witnesses.
115. Keeping in mind that criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person, no greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case, continuance of prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law and will be a mental trauma to the applicants, it becomes necessary for this Court to invoke inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in present facts and circumstances of his case.
116. Therefore, in view of above discussion, this Court finds a good ground for quashing the impugned charge-sheet, cognizance/summoning order as well as entire proceedings of the aforesaid case.
117. Accordingly, the charge sheet dated 06.12.2022 and cognizance order dated 9.12.2022 as well as the entire proceedings of Case No.6501 of 2022 (State vs. Satveer Singh and others), arsing out of Case Crime No.0949 of 2022, under Sections 447, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471, 120B IPC and Section 28(1) of U.P. Urban Planing & Development Act 1973, Police Station-Izzat Nagar, District-Bareilly, pending before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bareilly are hereby quashed.
118. These applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are, accordingly, allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
119. A copy of this order be sent to the lower court forthwith.
(Manju Rani Chauhan, J.) Order Date :- 20.12.2024 Jitendra/-