Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Nikhat Parveen vs The Senior Regional Manager on 13 February, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211
1 WPS-2924-2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 13th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
WRIT PET. (SERVICE) No. 2924 of 2004
SMT. NIKHAT PARVEEN AND OTHERS
Versus
THE SENIOR REGIONAL MANAGER AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Hussain Ali Seify - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Mukesh Kumar Agrawal - Advocate for the respondents.
ORDER
The present petition is filed assailing the order dated 14.9.2001 (Annexure -P/10) passed by respondent No.1 whereby certain punishment has been awarded against the petitioner. The petitioner is further aggrieved by the order dated 22.3.2003 passed by respondent No. 2 i.e. the Appellate Authority whereby his appeal has been rejected.
2. It is pertinent to mention here that this petition is being represented by the legal heirs of the petitioner who expired during pendency of this petition.
3. It is the case of the deceased petitioner that the petitioner (now deceased) was working in Food Corporation of India since 1973. He was transferred from Baloda Bazar to Neora for Rice Procurement Work along with Shri J.S. Sisodia, Shri R.B. Pandey and Shri K.K. Thakur. They all were Technical Assistant Grade-l and were posted at Neora District Raipur for the preservation work. As per the standing instructions of headquarter New Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 2 WPS-2924-2004 Delhi each and every lot was purchased by the petitioner following instructions received from the headquarter as every lot was super checked by the Assistant Manager (Q.C.) / Preservation and the team of Technical Assistant deployed for preservation work at Neora. During the material period, the petitioner did not receive any quality complaint tips of a single lot of beyond rejection limit (BRL) nature from the Technical quartz which is also mentioned in the deposition of Shri S.K. Kundu PW-7. On 08.10.1991 Shri M.C. Tiwari the then Manager (Vigilance) visited Neora along with Shri G.S. Sethe, Asstt. Manager (Q.C.) FCI Zonal Office Mumbai and conducted test check of 3 lots purchased by the petitioner and the samples of 3 lots were brought to the district laboratory FCI Raipur by Manager (Vigilance) himself and got analyzed on 09.10.91 at District Laboratory Raipur. A memorandum against the petitioner was issued vide Annexure-P/4 dated 8.8.1997 by the respondent no. 1 whereby an inquiry against the petitioner was proposed, against which, a reply was submitted by the petitioner on 13.4.1999. After holding an inquiry and statements of the witnesses concerned, the Inquiry report dated 15.12.2000 was submitted by the inquiry officer on 27.12.2000 and same was also forwarded to the petitioner asking him to submit his reply, if he wishes, within a period of fifteen days of the receipt of the same. On 15.2.2001 the petitioner submitted his reply to the inquiry report. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 4.6.2001. A detailed reply to the same was submitted by the petitioner on 21.6.2001. After conclusion of the departmental enquiry, impugned order dated 14.9.2001 (P/10) was passed. Against which, the petitioner filed an appeal Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 3 WPS-2924-2004 before the Judicious Appellate Authority, Zonal Manager (West) Food Corporation of India, Mumbai and the Appellate Authority called the petitioner for personal hearing and after being heard the petitioner, the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected vide order dated 27.1.2003. Hence, this petition.
4. It is argued by counsel for the petitioner that the orders passed by the Disciplinary authority as well as the Appellate authority both are biased, malicious and are issued malevolently under colourable exercise of powers which are violating the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The authorities have wrongly started the proceedings against the petitioner after a period of 7 years by imposing highest penalties of damages reduction to lower post and a recovery of Rs.124591.76 Paisa, at the rate of Rs.3115/- per month in 40 equal instalments from the petitioner. The petitioner has been given major and harsh punishment indulging him irreparable damages and grievances which has brought on the threshold of hunger by way of recovery being made from his salary. Further submitted that in the similar set of evidence, Shri Meharban Singh Rajpoot (M.S. Rajpoot) has been exonerated in the same case by this Hon'ble High Court by admitting his WP No. 6166 of 2002 vide order dated 11.9.2003 by quashing the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority Food Corporation of India, Bhopal. Respondent No.1 erred by dropping Shri M.C. Tiwari the then- Manager (Vig.) the cited No.1 prosecution witness from the proceeding of the case who is the author / inventor of the case and has played a vital and key role in the petitioner's case and despite the letter given by the petitioner to the inquiry officer on Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 4 WPS-2924-2004 18/12/98 to call him as defence witness (or) allow / permit to go to Mumbai to examine / interrogate Shri M.C. Tiwari but the petitioner was not permitted. Thus, the prosecution deprived the defendant (petitioner) to bring the facts of the alleged case ignoring the demands of natural justice. The inquiry officer Shri R.G. Tailor (Dy. Manager General) erred by not making an enquiry about the work slip issued or not towards the work carried out for the segregation of rice bags from the stack on 8.10.1991 during the test check conducted by Shri M. C. Tiwari at Neora Depot, as Shri R. K. Sharma (Retd.) Dy. Manager -P.W.4 has given a false statement "that ISI procedure was followed during test check whereas Shri G.S. Sethe -D.W.2 who associated in test check on 8.10.1991 at FSD Neora, has clearly deposed in his statement given on 10.3.1999 that ISI procedure was not followed because only 3 Rice lots purchased by the petitioner were taken into consideration despite knowing the fact that the petitioner was on long leave and there was no complaint against him too. Whereas, the other technical Assistant viz. Shri J. S. Sisodiya, Shri R.D. Pandey, Shri K.K.Thakur, All Technical Assistant Grade-I deployed for Rice purchase in the material period were present on the date of test check. Their samples were not taking into test check. This act of Shri M. C. Tiwari, the then Manager (Vigilance) clearly through light on the facts that he was prejudiced, pre-conceived and induced with communal feeling which is quite & against the secular concept of constitution of India as well as against the demand of natural justice. Hence, prayer is made to allow the petition by quashing the orders under challenge.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 5 WPS-2924-2004 5 . Per contra, counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions and denied the petition's averments. It is submitted that it is a matter of imposition of punishment to a delinquent employee after conclusion of departmental enquiry. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings which he has availed. Interference in cases of departmental enquiry is limited to the extent of procedural flaw. There cannot be any reappreciation of evidence at this stage. It is submitted that the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment which was subsequently challenged in appeal and the same was affirmed, therefore, there are concurrent findings recorded by the authorities with respect to guilt of the petitioner. This Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and reappreciate the entire evidence. It is only the procedural error which can be looked into by this Court while dealing with the cases of imposition of punishment after a detailed departmental enquiry in the matter. Placing reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 and Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force vs Rajendra Kumar Dubey, (2021) 14 SCC 735 wherein, while dismissing the claim of the delinquent employee, it has been observed that "a police officer in the Railway Protection Force is required to maintain high standard of integrity in the discharge of his official functions and it shall be the duty of every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. The primary object of constituting the Railway Protection Force is to secure better protection and security of the railway Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 6 WPS-2924-2004 property", as also of this Court in Mahendra Singh Chauhan vs Northern Central Railway : WP No. 9653 of 2021 decided on 20.02.2025, he has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. On perusal of the record it is found that Food Corporation of India, Regional Office, Bhopal vide its memorandum No. V&S/4(24)RYP/92 dated 8.8.1997 issued charge sheet against the petitioner levelling the following charges :-
"Shri M. A. Qureshi, TA I, who was deployed for procurement work at FSD Neora during the year 1990- 91 has committed a gross negligence on his part in performing his duties assigned to him sincerely and honestly. He has accepted many lots of rice beyond rejection limit which were attracted quality complaints subsequently at he receiving depot i.e. Raipur for which recipient and has lodged quality complaints for various refractions viz Broken Foreign mater, Damaged, discolour, dehusk, moisture, lower grade beyond rejection limits and non-merchantable condition due to dull appearance encrustation.
Due to acceptance of stocks by him beyond rejection limit, nonmerchantable and their subsequent involvement in the quality complaints resulting upgradation of stocks, FCI has sustained huge financial losses on account of quality rebate / upgradation / reconditioning / handling charges etc. as mentioned in Annexure II statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour on his part.
By the above act Shri M. A. Qureshi. TA-I had committed grave misconduct and thereby acted to the manner unbecoming of a corporation employee and thereby violated Regulations 31, 32 and 32-A of FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971."
8. After receiving the copy of the charge sheet, the petitioner Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 7 WPS-2924-2004 submitted a detailed reply before the Inquiry officer denying all the charges proposed against him vide reply dated 13.4.1999. The Inquiry officer during the inquiry recorded the statements of the witnesses concerned and prepared a detailed inquiry report dated 15.12.2000 and submitted the same to the authority concerned vide memorandum dated 27.12.2000 for further action in the matter and a copy whereof was also forwarded to the petitioner for submitting his reply / representation, if any, within a period of fifteen days of the receipt of the communication. The petitioner received the inquiry report on 16.1.2001 and reply to the inquiry report was submitted on 15.2.2001 i.e. beyond the period of fifteen days. The FCI, Regional office, Bhopal issued a show cause notice dated 25.5.2001 to the petitioner and the petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the same on 21.6.2001. However, the Disciplinary Authority after taking into all the material facts and the statements of the witnesses concerned and the inquiry report held the petitioner guilty and imposed the penalty of reduction to the lower post of TA Gr.II and he shall draw maximum pay of TA Gr.II with the direction that he should not be considered for promotion for five years and recovery of Rs.1,24,591,76 Ps. Against which, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Judicious Appellate Authority, The Zonal Manager (West) Food Corporation of India, Mumbai and the petitioner was also called for personal hearing and after having heard the petitioner, the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Appellate authority vide order dated 27.1.2003.
9. As far as participation of the petitioner in the departmental Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 8 WPS-2924-2004 enquiry is concerned, there is no dispute with the fact that he duly participated in the departmental enquiry and he submitted his reply with regard to show cause notice issued to him from time to time for initiation of departmental inquiry. The petitioner was granted ample opportunity in the departmental enquiry. In the writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot sit over as a reviewing authority and cannot enter into correctness of the factual aspects. The scope of interference in such cases is limited.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Dubey (supra) has held as follows :
21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record, and written submissions filed on their behalf.
21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant.
21.2. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723], a three-
Judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however, interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 9 WPS-2924-2004 considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. 21.3. These principles were further reiterated in State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349]. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
21.4. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , RPF v. Sai Babu [RPF v. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 464] , Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha [Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 334 :
(2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 316] , these principles have been consistently followed.
21.5. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh [State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569] this Court has summed up the law in following words : (SCC para 37) Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 10 WPS-2924-2004 "37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy -- deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognised it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 11 WPS-2924-2004 robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain."
21.6. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (SCC pp. 616-17, para 12) "(a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence."
21.7. In para 13 of the judgment [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 12 WPS-2924-2004 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , the Court held that : (P. Gunasekaran case [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v.
Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68; Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499;
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , SCC p. 617) "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
21.8. In the present case, there is no allegation of mala fides against the disciplinary authority i.e. Chief Security Commissioner, or lack of competence of the disciplinary authority in passing the order of compulsory retirement, or of a breach of the principles of natural justice, or that the findings were based on no evidence.
21.9. We find from the record of this case that the charges under Charges 1(b) and 1(c) have been Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 13 WPS-2924-2004 concurrently found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority the Chief Security Commissioner, RPF and the Director General of the RPF Railway Board. The issue under Charge 1(b) was the non-registration of an FIR pertaining to a theft case of CST-9 plates of the Railways. The finding was that even though the respondent had prepared the FIR after conducting investigation, he did not sign the FIR, and thereafter proceeded on leave without sanction. As a consequence, the FIR was not registered, and the investigation got thwarted right at the threshold. After some delay, a second panchnama was prepared by Nirmal Toppo, who was the in-charge of RPF Thana, who visited the spot, and then registered the FIR. It is relevant to note that the High Court has not disturbed the finding with respect to Charge 1(b).
21.10. With respect to Charge 1(c), this charge was a case of a Special Report, which are covered by Rule 229 of the Railway Protection Rules which reads as under:
"229. Special Reports.--In cases of thefts registered at the post involving loss of booked consignments or railway material exceeding the value fixed by the Director General from time to time, the Divisional Security Commissioner shall submit special report to the Director General with copy to the Chief Security Commissioner and to the concerned officer as may be specified through the Directives."
Charge 1(c) pertained to the theft of one coach trolley of the Railways which was to be sold as scrap and had been valued at Rs 28,000. The allegation was that the respondent had taken sick leave, so as to avoid being present at the time of handing over the trolley on 4-12-2006. This charge was found to have been proved by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority, and the Director General of Police-RPF Railway Board.
21.11. With respect to this charge, the High Court has given a contradictory finding. In para 24 of the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] , the Court held that the theft of the trolley was detected by another officer prior to the writ petitioner proceeding on leave. Hence, the Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 14 WPS-2924-2004 question of delay in reporting the theft by the writ petitioner was held to have lost its significance. In para 25, the High Court, however, took a contrary view by holding that it concurred with the view taken by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner in the order dated 5-9-2007, wherein the charge was held to be proved. The High Court concluded by holding that the charge was not so serious so as to warrant the extreme punishment of removal from service, as there was no imputation of connivance or corrupt practices. 21.12. In our view, the aforesaid findings are erroneous, since the respondent has not been awarded the punishment of removal from service, but compulsory retirement from service vide order dated 5-12-2007. 21.13. It is further relevant to note that Charges 1(b) and 1(c) fall under Rule 146.2 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 which provides:
"146.2 Neglect of duty.--No member of the Force without good and sufficient cause shall
--
(i) neglect or omit to attend to or fail to carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which is his duty as a member of the Force to attend to or carry out; or
(ii) fail to work his beat in accordance with orders or leave the place of duty to which he has been ordered or having left his place of duty for a bona fide purpose fail to return thereto without undue delay; or
(iii) be absent without leave or be late for any duty; or
(iv) fail properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of any money or property received by him in the course of his duty."
(emphasis supplied) The various allegations made against the respondent arise out of gross neglect of duty with respect to theft of railway property. The findings of gross neglect of duty under Charges 1(b) and (c) have been concurrently upheld. The findings of the EO and the disciplinary authority are based on materials on record. The High Court was not justified in reappraising the entire evidence threadbare as a court of first appeal, and substituting the Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 15 WPS-2924-2004 order of punishment, by a lesser punishment, without justifiable reason.
21.14. Section 11 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 provides that it shall be the duty of every superior officer and member of the force to protect and safeguard railway property and passengers. The primary object of constituting the Railway Protection Force is to secure better "protection and security of the railway property". The restricted power of arrest and search conferred on members of this Force is incidental to the efficient discharge of their primary duty to protect and safeguard railway property, and to uphold the law. A police officer in the Railway Protection Force is required to maintain a high standard of integrity in the discharge of his official functions. In this case, the charges proved against the respondent "were of neglect of duty" which resulted in pecuniary loss to the Railways. The respondent was a Sub-Inspector in the Railway Police discharging an office of trust and confidence which required absolute integrity. The High Court was therefore not justified in setting aside the order of compulsory retirement, and directing reinstatement with consequential benefits, and payment of back wages to the extent of 50%.
21.15. With respect to the registration of a criminal case by the CBI Nagpur, the High Court held that it was an irrelevant consideration taken note of by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner. On this issue, we were informed during the course of hearing that the respondent had been convicted by the Special Judge, Wardha vide judgment and order dated 2-8-2017 for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo RI for one year with fine. The Counsel for the respondent informed the Court, that an appeal has been filed against the said judgment, which is pending consideration. We have therefore considered it appropriate not to advert to the findings in the CBI case, lest it prejudices the case of the respondent which is pending in appeal Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 16 WPS-2924-2004 against the order of conviction. We have decided the issue of the validity of the order of compulsory retirement on the basis of the material in the enquiry proceedings, and the orders passed by the statutory authorities in this regard.
21.16. The respondent was compulsorily retired pursuant to the order dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner. The order of compulsory retirement took effect on 5-12-2007. The respondent is being paid pension after he has been compulsorily retired. The direction of the High Court for payment of back wages was consequent upon the reinstatement of the respondent employee. Since we are upholding the order of compulsory retirement dated 5-12-2007 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner, there is no question of granting back wages. In any case, the respondent is being paid pension after his compulsory retirement.
22. We order and direct that:
22.1. The appeal is allowed, and the judgment [Rajendra Kumar Dubey v. Railways, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 10004] of the High Court is set aside for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, and the order of compulsory retirement passed on 5-12-2007 by the Chief Security Commissioner, as affirmed by the Director General, RPF vide order dated 19-5- 2008/21-5-2008 is restored.
22.2. The respondent has stated in his written submissions that the gratuity which was payable to him, has not been released by the Department so far. We direct the appellant-
department to release gratuity, if due and payable to the respondent from 5-12-2007, within a period of six weeks from today, along with interest as provided by Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 read with the applicable Office Memorandum/Notification issued by the Government of India.
23. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above terms, with no order as to costs.
Pending applications, if any are disposed of Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 17 WPS-2924-2004 accordingly."
11. Another argument raised before this Court is whether the order passed by the appellate authority is without assigning any reason and is a non speaking order and also the fact that the scope of interference in the cases of punishment after the detailed departmental enquiry.
12. As far as passing of orders by the Inquiring Officer, Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority is concerned, the Inquiry Officer has prepared the enquiry report after considering the entire material placed in the enquiry. The enquiry report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority who has issued notice to the petitioner along with the copy of the enquiry report and the petitioner has submitted the reply to the enquiry report. The appellate authority considered the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The order passed by the appellate authority reflects that the appellate authority has considered the entire record pertaining to the departmental enquiry. The principles of natural justice was duly followed in the departmental enquiry. This goes to show that the records were considered by the appellate authority.
13. The law with respect to interference in the cases of departmental enquiry is limited to the extent as has been spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra) wherein certain guidelines have been framed and has held as under-
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 18 WPS-2924-2004 Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
14. Even otherwise, this Court has limited jurisdiction to dwell on factual findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings, so also on the quantum of penalty as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749. Further, in the case of Union of India vs Dilip Paul , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423, it is held as under :
Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 19 WPS-2924-2004 "44. It is well settled that when it comes to disciplinary proceedings, it is the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority who could be said to be the fact-
finding authority and the courts in exercise of their powers of judicial review should not sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own findings. The scope of judicial review of the courts is limited only to the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure as held by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749. The relevant observations are reproduced below:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 20 WPS-2924-2004
15. This Court cannot sit as a reviewing authority and cannot re- appreciate the evidence. Therefore, the evidence cannot be looked into by this Court. As far as the argument advanced before this Court regarding non- speaking order by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority is concerned, both the orders clearly reflects proper application of mind by the authorities. All the grounds raised by the petitioner were duly considered by the appellate authority. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority is not required to assign any reasons while deciding an appeal. It is suffice to observe that the entire material pertaining to departmental enquiry was considered by the appellate authority and he is satisfied with the observations made in the enquiry report as well as the order passed by the disciplinary authority.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee : 2012 SCC Online SC 1315 has held as under-
"32- It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer.
33. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was done by the Disciplinary Authority adn the Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the respondent.Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 21 WPS-2924-2004
34. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in the Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 wherein this Court held as follows: -
"15. . . . A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court...."
35. We find that the learned Single Judge, while dealing with the writ petition29 filed by the respondent against the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, considered the entire factual matrix in detail and dismissed the writ petition preferred by the respondent vide a detailed and well- reasoned judgment dated 29th June, 2011.
3 6 . The law relating to the exercise of intra-Court jurisdiction is crystallised by this Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340 wherein it was held as under:
"5. Once the learned Single Judge having seen the records had come to the conclusion that the industry was not functioning after January 1995, there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before the Division Bench. The Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 22 WPS-2924-2004 Appellate Bench ought to have noticed that the statement of MW 3 is itself part of the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief."
(emphasis supplied)
37. The position is, thus, settled that in an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must restrain itself and the interference into the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is permissible only if the judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in law. However, the Division Bench, in the present case, failed to record any such finding and rather, proceeded to delve into extensive re- appreciation of evidence to overturn the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
38. On going through the material on record, we are of the view that the Disciplinary Authority was fully justified in imposing the penalty of dismissal from service upon the respondent. The Appellate Authority too has duly applied its mind to the facts available on record while affirming the order of the Disciplinary Authority and rejecting the appeal filed by the respondent. These two orders have rightly been affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court while dismissing the writ petition31 filed by the respondent. The judgment dated 29th June, 2011 rendered by the learned Single Judge is well-reasoned and unassailable.
39. In the wake of the above discussion, we hold that the Division Bench, while exercising the intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering with the concurrent findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority as affirmed by the learned Single Judge."
17. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank : (2021) 3 SCC 806, has opined as under
:-Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 23 WPS-2924-2004 "11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment.
The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority"
18. It will also be relevant to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v. Ajai Kumar Shrivastava : (2021)2 SCC612; has held as under -
"42- In the case on hand, the disciplinary/appellate authority was not supposed to pass a judgment however while passing the order dated 24th July, 1999, the disciplinary authority had taken note of the record of enquiry, including self-contained enquiry report dated 22nd May, 1999 and his prima facie opinion dated 29th June, 1999 which was made available to the respondent employee and after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and meeting out the written objections raised by the delinquent, expressed its brief reasons in upholding the finding of guilt and penalty of dismissal by its order dated 24th July, 1999. That apart, the appeal preferred by the respondent delinquent was examined by the appellate authority as it reveals under para 3(i) to (viii) in upholding the finding of guilt recorded by the enquiry officer in his report dismissing the respondent employee from service, rejected by order dated 15th November, 1999. After detailed discussion, we are unable to accept the finding recorded by the High Court under its impugned judgment setting aside the orders passed by the Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:25211 24 WPS-2924-2004 disciplinary/appellate authority which deserves to be set aside."
19. Applying the aforesaid principle to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority are well reasoned orders. As the petitioner has failed to point out any flaw in the departmental enquiry, no relief can be extended to him.
20. Petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE JP Signature Not Verified Signed by: JITENDRA KUMAR PAROUHA Signing time: 20-06-2025 10:34:41