Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Sri Kishori Mohan Sinha Alias Singha vs Sri Kumaresh Saha & Ors on 30 July, 2019
Author: Bibek Chaudhuri
Bench: Bibek Chaudhuri
Form J(2) IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :
The Hon'ble Justice Bibek Chaudhuri
S. A. 67 of 2015
Sri Kishori Mohan Sinha alias Singha
-Versus-
Sri Kumaresh Saha & Ors.
For the appellant : Mr. Kartick Kumar Bhattacharyya,
Ms. Soumashree Dutta.
For the respondents: Mr. Jayanta Das,
Ms. Soumita Ghosh.
Heard on :. 03.07.2019 Judgement on : 30.07.2019.
Predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs/respondents filed other suit no. 246 of 1997 against the defendant/appellant praying for his eviction from the suit premises, recovery of khas possession and other consequential reliefs on the grounds of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding, reasonable requirement for own use and occupation of the plaintiffs and their family members, default, subletting and causing substantial damage of the suit premises.
The defendant/appellant contested the said suit by filing written statement. The learned Trial Judge on consideration of the evidence 2 on record, both oral and documentary, adduced by the parties to the suit decreed the same on the grounds of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding as well as for their own use and occupation as contemplated in Section 13(1)(f) and Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereafter described as the said Act). The Judgement and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge in other suit no. 246 of 1997 was assailed in appeal at the instance of the defendant/appellant which was registered as other appeal no. 63 of 2007. By a Judgement dated 22nd September, 2008, the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Paschim Medinipore dismissed the said appeal on contest.
Against such concurrent findings of fact the defendant/appellant preferred second appeal before this Court which was registered as S.A.T. No. 674 of 2008. The said appeal was admitted for hearing under order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure vide order dated 2nd February, 2009. The Division Bench of this Court framed the following substantial questions of law :-
(a) Whether the learned Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in affirming the decree for eviction on the ground of subletting without discussing the evidence given by the appellant on such point;3
(b) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement by totally overlooking the fact that the plaintiff-landlord really made out a case of requirement for building purpose, and as such, the case comes within the purview of Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and in such circumstances, in the absence of any direction for putting in the appellant back in a portion of the constructed building in terms of Section 18A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the decree was liable to be set aside;
(c) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for construction of a new building notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs could not even produce sanctioned plan by the concerned Municipality for such construction;
(d) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs-respondents had sufficient accommodation elsewhere in the Town of Midnapore itself.4
At the time of hearing of the instant appeal Mr. Kartick Kumar Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate for the appellant submits that though the Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of subletting on the basis of solitary oral evidence of P.W. 1 to the effect that the appellant does not carry on business in the suit shop room and he had sublet the said suit shop room in favour of one Shyamal Singha, the plaintiffs/respondents could not produce any scrap of documentary evidence in support of oral evidence of P.W. 1. It is further submitted by Mr. Bhattacharyya that in order to prove sub-tenancy, it is the duty of the plaintiffs to produce evidence in support of his pleading that the defendant had parted with possession of the suit premises in favour of the sub-tenant. The said Shyamal Singha is the younger brother of the defendant. Admittedly, the suit room was let out for commercial purpose. The defendant carries on a business of stationary shop in the suit shop room. Trade licence and other documents required for carrying on such business scanned in the name of the appellant. Thus, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that learned Courts below committed gross error in law in decreeing the suit on the ground of subletting.
Mr. Jayanta Das, learned Advocate for the respondents, on the other hand, frankly submits that he will not press the issue of 5 subletting in the instant appeal. He candidly admits that evidence on record is really inadequate to hold that the appellant had sublet the suit shop room in favour of his brother, Shyamal Singha.
I have carefully perused the evidence on record. It is ascertained from the evidence of the appellant who deposed in the suit as D.W. 1 that in course of his evidence he produced trade licence in respect of his business receipts showing payment for obtaining trade licence, certificate of enlistment issued by Midnapore Municipality, notice regarding weekly closer of the suit shop room issued by the Inspector, Shops and Establishment Department, Midnapore to prove that the business stands in his name and he carries on the business in the suit shop room. The above-mentioned documents were marked as exhibit - 'A' series, exhibit - 'B', exhibit - 'C' series and exhibit - 'D' respectfully. Thus, I also do not find any iota of evidence in support of the pleading made by the plaintiffs and oral evidence adduced by P.W. 1 that the defendant/appellant had sublet the suit premises to one Shyamal Singha.
Substantial questions of law as ground (a) recorded hereinabove is, therefore, decided against the appellant.
It was the case of the plaintiffs/respondents that they are goldsmith by profession. Original plaintiff, Ranjit Kumar Saha, since 6 deceased, had two sons and two daughters. According to the plaint case the original plaintiff used to run a jewellery shop under the name and style of 'Saha Guinea Mansion Classic Jewelleries' in a small room at Burrabazar. Both his sons are engaged in the same business. The original plaintiff constructed a shop room at Rajabazar in the township of Midnapore and established one of his sons in the said shop room. He carries on business of jewellery shop under the name and style of 'New Saha Guinea Mansion'. Further case of the plaintiff is that Burrabazar area is the main business place in the township of Midnapore. Saha Guinea Mansion Classic Jewelleries is being run from a very narrow shop room measuring about 20' X 6'. Since the original plaintiff had no other alternative suitable accommodation elsewhere for commercial purpose, he inducted his elder son as a partner with him in his business. It is pleaded by the plaintiff that the suit shop room is situated in a premises approximately 100 years old. The said premises is almost dilapidated. Therefore, he pleaded that he reasonably required the suit premises for building and rebuilding. He wanted to construct a multi-storeyed structure after demolishing the existing suit shop room where his elder son and one unmarried daughter might be accommodated to run conveniently their jewellery business.
7
Defence on the issue of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding, as is evident from the written statement, is mainly of denial. The defendant further pleaded that apart from one jewellery shop at Burrabazar, the plaintiff had one two storeyed building at Rajabazar which is also a business area. The younger son of the original plaintiff runs a shop room in the ground floor of the said premises. Beside the said premises, they have a big house at Cotbazar within the city of Midnapore. The plaintiff can set up business places for his son and daughter, if necessary, in the said premises at Rajabazar or Cotbazar.
Learned Advocate for the appellant first submits that the plaintiff had reasonable alternative suitable accommodation elsewhere in the township of Midnapore. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff for requirement for building and rebuilding cannot be entertained.
He further submits that Section 18A of the said Act provides for restoration of tenancy where decree for possession is passed on the ground of building and rebuilding and addition or alteration. It was the duty of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court at the time of decreeing the suit for bona fide requirement on the ground of building and rebuilding to specify the period within which proposed construction would be made by the plaintiffs/respondents and when 8 the defendant would be inducted in respect of his tenancy after construction of the building. Both the Courts below failed to consider the provisions of Section 18A of the said Act and, therefore, they erred substantially in law in decreeing the suit on the ground of building and rebuilding.
It is further submitted by Mr. Bhattacharya that during pendency of the suit original plaintiff died. The widow, sons and daughters of the original plaintiff have been substituted in the suit. It is also on record that one of the daughters, named Sujata has been given marriage and she has been permanently residing at her matrimonial home. Therefore, she has no requirement for any business. She also did not appear before the trial Court to depose that she intended to engage herself in jewellery business. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiffs regarding requirement of the said Sujata cannot be considered at this stage. The plaintiff prayed for eviction of the defendant on the ground of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding stating, inter alia, the premises in suit is an old and almost dilapidated structure. Secondly, it was constructed about 100 years back. Thirdly, if the said building is demolished and a multi storeyed commercial structure is established on the said site, it would augment the business as well as financial position of the plaintiffs/appellants to a great extent. In this regard, it is pointed out 9 by the learned advocate for the appellants that in an action for eviction on the ground of building and rebuilding under the provisions of Clause (f) of sub-Section (1) of Section 13 the appellants required to show his bona fide by producing sanctioned plan and financial means that they were really in genuine requirement of having the suit premises vacant for carrying on such construction. However, from the evidence of P.W.1, it is clear that the plaintiffs/respondents did not take any attempt to obtain sanctioned plan from the competent authority i.e., Medinipur Municipality. No evidence is forthcoming to establish the financial means of the plaintiffs. In support of their desire to construct a multi storeyed commercial structure on the site after demolishing the suit shop room. He also refers to the relevant portions of the judgment passed by the learned Judge in First Appellate Court where the learned Judge held that as the plaintiffs are goldsmiths by profession, they are rich persons and have adequate means to construct house. Neither the trial Court nor the First Court of Appeal made any discussion with regard to necessity of sanctioned plan in order to prove bona fide of the plaintiffs that they are really interested to raise a multi storeyed commercial structure over the suit premises. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in absence of such evidence, Court cannot pass a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding. In support of his 10 contention he refers to a decision of this Court in the case of Sahadeb Chandra Paul & Ors. vs. Manmatha Nath Mondal & Another reported in 75 C.W.N. 979. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is relevant for our purpose and is quoted below:-
"11. The other ground on which ejectment is sought for is for building and re-building. On this point also the decision of the appellate court suffers from serious infirmity. It would appear that in the proceedings no final plan in respect of the proposed constructions was submitted by the plaintiffs. What was filed was a sketch plan and a provisional one, as admitted by the plaintiffs' engineer. The sketch plan is of no importance since it is not a final plan as it could be altered or amended at any time. The requirement of a plan becomes all the more necessary in view of the provisions of clause (f), which, along with clause (ff), was substituted for the original clause (f) in sub-Section (1) of Sec.13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 by its Second Amendment Act (Act XXXIV) of 1969). By the said Act the provisions of the new clause (f) as stated above, as also of Sec.18A as a new section were made to apply to all pending suits and appeals. For the purposes of giving adequate relief to 11 the tenants, if they are found entitled to the same, as provided in sec. 18A, it is also necessary that there should be a final plan of building and rebuilding on the basis whereof the court would decree the plaintiffs' suits if their claim is established."
Mr. Das, learned advocate for the plaintiff/respondent, on the other hand submits that requirement of sanctioned plan is not a statutory requirement and it cannot be held in all cases that for want of sanctioned plan case of the plaintiffs/respondents for eviction of tenant on the ground of building and rebuilding should be thrown away. A sanctioned plan is only a piece of evidence in support of the conclusion that the landlord reasonably requires the premises for rebuilding without such plan, the same conclusion can be reached, other things being there.
In that no such sanctioned plan, no reasonable requirement. In support of his argument, Mr. Das refers to a decision of this Court in the case of S.C. Mitter vs. Messrs. Auto Service reported in 72 C.W.N. 828. Relying upon another case of this Court in Mahananda Das Karmakar vs. Biswanath Dey and others reported in AIR 1976 Calcutta 185. It is submitted by Mr. Das that the impugned judgments delivered by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be said to 12 be vitiated for non-compliance of Section 18A of the said Act because this Court while disposing of the second appeal can pass necessary direction under Section 18A of the said Act directing the plaintiffs/respondents to complete the construction of proposed multi storeyed structure on the site where the suit shop room is situated within a specific period of time and further directing them to induct the defendant/tenant in a room in the newly built structure.
Mr. Das next refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagat Pal Dhawan versus Kahan Singh (Dead) by LRS. And others reported in (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 191. This judgement is under H P Urban Rent Control Act. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned report that the plea of the plaintiffs for demolition and reconstruction of the premises in suit for the purpose of modernization, making additional space available and / or augmentation of earning of the landlord should be considered as relevant factors for determining the bona fide of the requirement for demolition and reconstruction. In the aforesaid reported decision, according to Mr. Das, factual background is also similar to that of the instant case. In the said report also the structure of the building was more than 100 years old. The locality where the premises were situated has, with the 13 lapse of time, become a busy commercial locality like that of the case in hand. Under such circumstances, the landlord wanted to demolish the old structure and construct a commercial structure thereon. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held the requirement of the landlord bona fide and reasonable. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that at the site of the premises in suit, if a new commercial structure is built, it would augment the income of the plaintiffs' family. Moreover, the plaintiffs will get adequate space for running their business in a more convenient way. It is repeatedly urged by Mr. Das that these are the relevant factors and evidence which should be considered at the time of dealing with the issue of reasonable requirement on the ground of building and rebuilding and the case of the plaintiff cannot be discarded for want of sanctioned plan which is nothing but a piece of evidence in a suit for eviction.
There are several conflicting decision of this Court on the issue as to whether the sanction plan of the Corporation or of the Municipality is a sine qua non for the landlord to prove his reasonable requirement for building or rebuilding. In Sahadeb Chandra Paul (supra) this Court held that the requirement of sanction plan is essential in view of introduction of separate clause (f) being incorporated in Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy 14 Act, 1956 by way of subsequent amendment along with clause (ff). Original clause (f) of the said Act was substituted by new clauses (f) and (ff) and Section 18A was also introduced as a new section to give relief to the tenants in pending suits and appeals. So, for the purpose giving adequate relief to the tenants, if they are found to be entitled to the same, as the eviction on the ground of building and rebuilding is subject to the provision of Section 18A of the Act, it is necessary that there should be a final plan on the basis of which the court can pass the decree for eviction on the ground stipulated in clause (f).
It is already mentioned that this Court in SC Mitter's case (supra) took the view that sanction plan is only a piece of evidence and the landlord's reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding can also be granted without such sanction plan. In Motilal vs. Suresh Ch. Das, reported in 77 CWN 921, this Court, however, held that the landlord failed to prove his case of reasonable requirement on the ground of building and rebuilding when it was established that the landlord/plaintiff had not taken any step for sanctioning the plan and that he did not make any exercise to ascertain any estimate on the basis of sanction plan. In a subsequent decision in Bishnu Tewari vs. Maloti Dulla reported in (1981) 2 CLJ 382, this Court followed the ratio of S.C Mitter's case and held that the requirement of asking for a sanction plan is merely a matter of prudence and not a 15 rule of law and the court wants sanction plan for the satisfaction of its conscience that the landlord's claim for eviction is bona fide and not mala fide. However, the decision in Bishnu Tiwari (supra) overlooked the provisions of Section 18A. in Sarashibala vs. Monorama reported in 1986(1) CHN 253, the Division Bench of this Court held that the necessity of sanction plan in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding is for the purpose of giving proper relief to the tenant which he is entitled to get under Section 18A of the said Act. In S.K Majumdar vs. R. Bose reported in 2001 (3) CHN 141, this Court did not wish to uphold the decree for eviction on the ground of building and rebuilding because the landlord failed to obtain sanction plan from the appropriate authority till the matter was heard in the second appeal. This court further held that in the light of the provision of Section 18A in which the landlord had the obligation to put the tenant back into the possession after completion of the building and rebuilding, existence of sanction plan is absolutely necessary for the purpose of giving protection to the tenant.
Mr. Das heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagat Pal Dhawan (supra) to establish that existence of sanction plan is not a sina qua non when the respondent led adequate evidence to the effect that the tenanted 16 premises is an old structure situated in a busy commercial locality of Midnapur. Instead of out dated old one storied structure, the respondents proposed to construct a multi-storied building which would obviously provide additional space and better return to them. Under such circumstances, requirement of sanction plan for construction of such building should not be taken to be mandatory. Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the respondents probably overlooked paragraph 12 of the aforesaid report. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal on due consideration of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal, the landlord/appellant got the building plan sanctioned and the said fact was brought to the notice of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Both the courts below failed to consider the requirement and necessity of a building plan not only to prove the bona fide of the respondents, but also to give adequate relief to the tenant under Section 18A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
It is true that this Court sitting in second appeal can pass necessary direction under Section 18A of the said Act directing the landlords to complete the construction of the proposed multi-storied building on the site where the suit shop room situates within a specific period of time and reinduct the tenant in the newly constructed premises. However, in order to ascertain the time limit to complete 17 the proposed construction, some material in the form of evidence is absolutely necessary. To enable this Court to pass any such direction under Section 18A of the said Act, again sanction plan is required. For want of such plan for construction of new building after demolishing the suit shop room, no effective decree could be passed under Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Both the Courts below failed to consider the provision contained in Section 18A of the said Act.
Last but not the least, the plaintiffs/respondents did not adduce any evidence with regard to their means to construct a multi- storied building. On careful perusal of the judgment passed by the trial court, I do not find any discussion on the question of means of the respondents. Surprisingly enough, the learned 1st Appellate Court held that the respondents must have sufficient means to construct a multi-storied building as they are Gold Smith and they would obviously be granted monetary loan for construction of new building by any Nationalized Bank taking into account their magnitude of business. Such finding of the learned lower appellate court, I am constrained to record, is not based on evidence but on surmise and conjecture.
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In view of the above discussion substantial questions of law formulated as grounds B and C are answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondents.
On perusal of the judgments passed by the learned trial court as well as the lower appellate court, it is found that both the courts below amalgamated two grounds of reasonable requirement, viz, for building and rebuilding, provided in Clause (f) of Section 13 of the said Act and for own use of occupation as well as for the use and occupation for whose benefit the premises is held, provided in Clause (ff) of Section 13 and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents. Both the courts below failed to consider that above mentioned two grounds are distinct and separate grounds for eviction of a tenant and the same is not mutually inclusive. The learned Courts below came to the finding that the suit shop room was reasonably required by the landlords/respondents for the purpose of building and rebuilding and accordingly it was held that the landlords/respondents reasonably required the suit shop room for their own use and occupation. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate the case of the respondents on reasonable requirement for own use and occupation.
19
Case of reasonable requirement under Clause (ff) of Section 13 was made out by the original plaintiff in paragraphs 4-7 of the plaint. It is summarised hereinbelow:-
The plaintiff has two sons and two daughters. The plaintiff is a gold smith by profession. The youngest son of the plaintiff has been carrying on a separate business of selling gold ornaments at Rajabazar in Midnapur. The plaintiff got a room measuring about 6 ft. X 20 ft. by dint of amicable partition with his cosharers. He has been carrying on the business of selling gold ornaments in the said room. As the plaintiff had no suitable accommodation, his eldest son could not start his own business. He has been carrying on business with the plaintiff as a partner. The said shop room belonging to the plaintiff and his eldest son is very narrow and insufficient. As the plaintiff had no alternative suitable accommodation for his business, he could not extend his business in his present shop room. Further case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff wanted to induct his two daughters in family business of selling gold ornaments. Therefore, the plaintiff reasonably required the suit shop room for separate business of his eldest son Kumaresh Saha as well as his daughters Sujata and Sunita.
Thus the plaintiff reasonably required the suit shop room for the business of his eldest son and two daughters. 20
It is on record that the original plaintiff died during the pendency of the first appeal. Legal heirs of the original plaintiffs have been substituted and they are contesting the instant appeal as respondents. From the evidence of the original defendant who deposed in the suit as DW1, it is ascertained that the DW1 did not deny that the son of the original plaintiff, being respondent No.1 herein has been carrying on business of selling gold ornaments in the shop room where he used to carry on business as a partner with his father. It is also found from the evidence on record that the eldest daughter of the original plaintiff, namely, Sujata is now married and she has been residing at her matrimonial home. The younger daughter of the original plaintiff, namely Sunita is unmarried and she wants to start her business independently.
The defendant, on the other hand, pleaded that the original plaintiff had a house at Kotbazar within the township of Midnapur. He had also suitable accommodation at Rajabazar where his youngest son had been carrying on the same business as a gold smith and the eldest son and younger daughter of the original plaintiff could has been easily accommodated in either of the said premises situated at Kotbazar or Rajabazar.
On due consideration of the evidence on record, both the courts below concurrently held that Kotbazar residence is a dwelling 21 house of the plaintiff and his family members. The said premises is not situated in business area or busy market place. Therefore, the said premises is not suitable for carrying on business by the eldest son of the original plaintiff who is now respondent No.1 in the instant appeal. Both the courts below also found concurrently that the plaintiff had no other alternative suitable accommodation elsewhere for the purpose of providing accommodation to his eldest son and younger daughter to establish a business of Jewellary shop.
Concurrent findings of both the courts below in this regard cannot be questioned in the instant appeal as the dispute as to existence of alternative suitable accommodation is a question of fact and finding of fact by both the courts below cannot be scrutinized in the instant second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
From the report of local inspection it is found that the measurement of the suit shop room is 19 ft. and 5 inch. in length and 13 ft. 4 inch. in breadth. The suit shop room is undoubtedly a spacious room in comparison to the present shop room of the respondent No.1. It is not at all disputed that the respondent No.1 has been carrying on business in a very narrow room measuring about 6 ft X 20 ft. Both the courts below concurrently found that a jewellary shop cannot be conveniently run in a room measuring about 22 6 ft. X 20 ft. Under the backdrop of above mentioned factual circumstances, substantial question of formulated in ground (d) as mentioned above is required to be adjudicated.
In Chandra Bhan vs. Ram Dayal reported in (2004) 10 SCC 150, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that requirement of suit shop room by the landlord for his son to start the general merchant business cannot be held to be a mala fide. The plea of the tenant that the son of the plaintiff/landlord is doing business in Delhi and the suit premises at Alwar would be of no use for him was held untenable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that old aged landlord wanted his son to settle in Alwar so that the son could look after both the business and home is a bona fide requirement and on this score, the tenant is liable to be evicted. It is not in dispute that the respondent carry on business of manufacturing and sale of gold ornaments as their family business. The original plaintiff, since deceased used to run the same business in partnership with his eldest son. He prayed for eviction of the tenant from the suit shop room for starting a business for his son of same nature. Such requirement of the landlord must be held to be genuine and bona fide. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gulraj Singh Grawal vs. Harbans Singh reported in AIR 1993 SC 1574 may be relied on in this regard.
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The instant appeal was admitted and substantial questions of law were framed by the Court and, therefore, while considering substantial questions of law, if the court finds that interference is required even in findings of fact arrived at by the 1st Appellate Court, it can do so. The decision of the Apex Court in the cases of D.R Rathna Murthy vs. Ramappa reported in (2011) 1 SCC 158 ; Abdul Raheem vs. Karnataka Electricity Board reported in (2007) 14 SCC 138, Surain Singh (Dead) by Lrs vs. Mehenga (Dead) by Lrs reported in (1996) 2 SCC 624, Leela Soni vs. Rajesh Goyal reported in (2001) 7 SCC 494 and Shri Bhagwan Sharma vs. Smt. Bani Ghosh reported in AIR 1993 SC 398 may be referred to in support of the observation made hereinabove.
1. Both the courts below concurrently found that suit shop room is situated at the busiest commercial place of Midnapur town. On the contrary residential house of the respondents is situated at Kotbazar which is not a commercial area. The present accommodation where respondent No.1 has been carrying on business is narrow and insufficient where from a jewellary shop cannot be effectively run. Only because the original plaintiff and present respondent No.1 was compelled to carry on their family business from such insufficient accommodation, it cannot be treated as suitable one when the 24 measurement wants to extend his business situated at commercial locality of the township.
2. It has been established in the facts of the case that the original landlord was compelled to induct his son as a partner of his business as he had no alternative accommodation to start an independent business of the same nature for his eldest son. The original landlord not only intended to engage his son in their family business but already both the sons were engaged in the business of jewellary shop during the lifetime of their father. There is no wrong on the part of a landlord in making plan for providing a good business place with sufficient space in a busy commercial locality for the business of his son and daughter. Under such circumstances, I am of the considered view that genuine need for the suit shop room was established by the original plaintiff/landlord under the facts and circumstances of this case, decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehmooda Gulshan vs Javaid Hussain Mungloo, reported in (2017) 5 SCC 683 is squarely applicable.
3. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the learned Courts below correctly held that accommodation available to the plaintiffs/respondents elsewhere in the town of Midnapur cannot be treated as alternative accommodation for starting a business of manufacturing and selling of gold ornaments moreover the present 25 accommodation wherefrom the respondent No.1 has been running on business is not at all suitable. The respondents cannot be denied decree for eviction on the ground envisaged in Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
4. Accordingly the instant appeal is dismissed on contest, however without cost.
5. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court in Title Suit No.246 of 1997 and affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.63 of 2007 is affirmed.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J.)