A. Ahmed Pasha And Anr. vs C. Gulnaz Jabeen on 29 May, 2001

[Cites 54, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

A. Ahmed Pasha And Anr. vs C. Gulnaz Jabeen on 29 May, 2001

Equivalent citations: AIR2001KANT412, ILR2001KAR3729, 2001(6)KARLJ413, AIR 2001 KARNATAKA 412, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1953, (2001) ILR (KANT) (3) 3604, (2001) 6 KANT LJ 413, (2002) 1 RENTLR 228

1. This revision by the respondents in the eviction petition in H.R.C. No. 838 of 1999 pending on the file of the Rent Court i.e., Court of Small Causes, Bangalore; is directed against its order dated 5-8-2000, passed rejecting their I.A. No. VII which was filed under Sub-clause (i)(b) of Section 20(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (the 'Act' for short), praying to refer the case to Lok Adalat for settlement.

2. Respondent Mrs. C. Gulnaz Jabeen, herein is the petitioner in the said H.R.C. No. 838 of 1999. She is hereinafter referred as the landlady. The petitioners herein, who were respondents therein, are referred to as the tenants herein below.

3. The said H.R.C. No. 838 of 1999 was instituted by landlady against tenants for their eviction from the petition premises on the ground under clauses (a) and (h) of Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('Rent Control Act' for short).

4. The relevant facts of the dispute leading to this revision may be stated as under:

Admittedly, the landlady Mrs. C. Gulnaz Jabeen is the owner of the petition premises and the petitioners herein are in occupation thereof as the joint tenants under her, they having occupied the premises under an agreement of rent dated 6-9-1980. The case of the landlady pleaded in eviction petition is that at the time of its filing, the monthly rent payable by the tenants with respect to the petition premises was Rs. 200/-per day and that they have not paid the same to her from 10-2-1998 till 9-8-1999. Thus, they were in total rental arrears of Rs. 1,08,000/- payable for 18 months from 10-2-1998 to 9-8-1999. They failed to pay the same despite the demand notice dated 11-1-1999 got issued calling upon them to pay the said arrears and deliver the vacant possession of the premises to her. An untenable reply thereto was sent by them and they failed to comply with the demand made in her quit notice. The petition premises was purchased by her for self-occupation of herself and her family and also for the purpose of the furniture business of her husband. Landlady and her family members were residing in a small premises on the second floor of the house shown at landlady's description in the petition cause title. It was taken from its owner on a mortgage agreement for a period of three years and which period was to expire shortly after filing of their eviction petition dated 19-8-1999. Hence, her eviction petition.

5. The tenants filed their statement of objections contesting the landlady's claim to the said arrears of rent and her case of bona fide requirement of the premises. In para 2 of their statement of objections they have, in turn, set up their defence case stating that the landlady had agreed to sell the petition property to them for a sum of Rs. 6,25,000/- by executing an agreement of sale on 1-12-1989. An amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid to her in advance for the premises towards the said consideration. It was further agreed between the parties that tenants should go on paying rent at Rs. 4,100/- per month to her with respect thereto till the completion of the sale deed. Its execution was being postponed by her and her husband. When they pressed for its execution, another agreement for sale dated 10-2-1998 was executed by her in their favour by taking further sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- from them towards the said sale consideration. The rent receipts from 1-12-1993 for collecting monthly rent from the tenants by her and her husband incorrectly showing therein the monthly rent at Rs. 6,000/- in respect of the said premises, which mistake was realised by them only recently. They (tenants) were not liable to pay rent for the petition premises exceeding Rs. 4,100/- per month. However, as the landlady has received from them almost whole of the consideration under the said sale agreements she is not entitled to get any arrears of rent at all from them. They have cleared all rental dues at the rate of Rs. 4,100/- per month payable upto 30-11-1993, in that, the said additional amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- paid by them would cover the arrears of rent payable with respect to petition premises at Rs. 4,100/- per month upto the period ending 31-1-2000, that is for 73 months - leaving the balance of Rs. 700/- only. The eviction petition is filed by the landlady against tenants with an oblique motive to cheat them. Her husband has been doing his business of trading in weighing scales in his own premises at Avenue Road, Bangalore City, and he having let out several other premises of his own to other tenants. He does not need any portion of the petition premises to establish any business therein. The petition filed is false and baseless.

Another significant aspect of tenants' case is that they had got a legal notice dated 18-12-1998 issued to the landlady calling upon her to execute the sale deed in their favour in respect of the petition property in performance of her part of the agreement under the agreement of sale dated 24-11-1990. This notice was got duly replied by the landlady through her Advocate by reply notice dated 11-1-1999. Strangely, in their written statement they have given a clean go-by to that sale agreement dated 24-11-1990.

6.1 Landlady's eviction petition was filed in the Court below on 19-8-1999. Her application under Section 29(1) and (4) of the Rent Control Act, I.A. No. II was also filed in the proceeding on 25-9-1999. Tenants' objection statement to this application was filed on 6-1-2000. The case was then posted to 21-1-2000 by the learned Trial Judge to record evidence of the parties on LA. No. II. Landlady's husband was examined as P.W. 1 and her evidence on the application was closed. Then, the case was adjourned by the Trial Court for tenants' evidence. It was at that stage of the proceeding, which they on 7-6-2000, instead of leading their evidence on I.A. No. II, made an application i.e., I.A. No. VII, under Section 20 of the Act praying that the Trial Court may be pleased to refer the case for settlement to the jurisdictional Lok Adalat. I.A. No. VII was opposed by the landlady.

6.2 On consideration of the nature of pleadings of both parties as also having due regard to the nature of oral and documentary evidence which was to be produced at the trial by the parties in support of their respective case, the Court below arrived its considered opinion that this was not a fit case under Sub-clause (i)(b) of Section 20(1) of the Act to refer to Lok Adalat for settlement. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 5-8-2000 has been passed by it.

7. The tenants have now approached this Court with their revision petition on the grounds that the Trial Court has not correctly appreciated the scope and purpose of Section 20 of the Act and has misconstrued the same and thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in refusing to refer the dispute to Lok Adalat for settlement; that it has abdicated for itself the authority under Section 20 of the Act when in law the Lok Adalat was empowered and was required to decide the dispute on being referred to it by the Trial Court; and also that the petitioners would suffer irreparable injury by reason of the impugned order and the same would result in miscarriage of justice if it is not set right in this revision by allowing their said LA. No. VII.

8. The material provisions of the Act on the basis of which the impugned order of the Court below was assailed by Mr. D'sa, learned Counsel for tenants are its Sections 19 and 20 occurring in Chapter VI which deals with "Lok Adalats". It was strenuously argued and contended by him that by virtue of Sub-section (5) of Section 19, a Lok Adalat is vested with the jurisdiction to deal with and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties in respect of any case pending before any Court and which has been referred by that Court to the Lok Adalat, at the instance of a party to the dispute, in exercise of the power vested in the Court by Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i). Elaborating the arguments, Mr. D'sa maintained that these specific provisions in Sections 19 and 20 operate independent of Sections 12 and 13 - by which the criteria for giving legal services to a person are laid down. He sought to substantiate this point of contention by distinguishing a litigant requesting for grant of legal services contemplated under Sections 12 and 13 from the request of a party to a legal proceeding pending in any Court to refer the case to Lok Adalat for compromise or settlement of the dispute as provided by Sub-section (5) of Section 19 read with Section 20(1)(i)(b). Further, it was argued by him that having due regard to the scheme of the Act, when a party to a pending case applies under clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) to the Court requesting it to refer the same to Lok Adalat for settlement, then, as a rule, the Court is bound to refer it to the Lok Adalat, and its refusal to do so would tantamount to refusal to properly exercise its jurisdiction conferred on it by this provision of law. So, it was submitted that the impugned order is unsustainable and, therefore, tenants' prayer in the said I.A. No. VII may be allowed by quashing the impugned order.

9.1 On the other hand, Mr. A. Mohd. Masihuddin, learned Counsel representing landlady (respondent), countered the contentions of Mr. D'sa submitting that the tenants being the persons who do not, indisputably, fulfill the criteria for entitlement to legal services prescribed under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Karnataka State Legal Services Authorities Rules, 1996 ('the Rule of 1996' in short), they are not entitled to invoke the benefit of the Act and seek reference of the pending dispute between the parties to the Lok Adalat for settlement. His submission was that as expressed by the preamble of the Act and as could be ascertained from the scheme thereof, the scope of its application is restricted and confined to citizens/persons who are basically poor and belong to weaker sections of the society since the intention of the legislature in enacting the Act is to carry out its obligations under Article 39 of the Constitution which mandates the State to so secure the operation of the legal system as to ensure availing of opportunities for securing justice to those who are economically weak and suffering from such other disabilities by reason of which they may be deprived of redressal of their just claims and benefits of their legal rights. Since the tenants do not meet the criteria laid down in Section 12 to avail the legal services under the Act, they cannot ask the Trial Court to refer the case to Lok Adalat, more so, when Rule 11 of the Rules, 1996 states that:

"Any person whose annual income from all sources does not exceed Rs. 18,000/- (Rupees eighteen thousand) only shall be entitled to legal services under this Act".

Furthermore, Mr. A. Mohd. Masihuddin, submitted that the provisions of Sections 12 and 13, and the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 are interdependant and are controlled by each other in their operation and that they do not operate and function independently as was contended by Mr. D'sa. In that view of the legal position, Mr. A. Mohd. Masihuddin argued that unless tenants are shown to be the persons falling in one or the other categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (h) of Section 12, they are not and cannot be held entitled to seek the remedy of referral of the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement as provided under Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) of the Act.

9.2 He also maintained that assuming for the sake of arguments that for whatever reason, the tenants are entitled to seek the said remedy, then, having regard to nature of the dispute in the instant case, it cannot be stated as the fit case deserving reference by the Trial Court to the Lok Adalat for settlement, and, therefore, the impugned order does not warrant interference.

10. Therefore, the material question which calls for my determination is whether the learned Judge of Rent Court is legally justified and correct in passing the impugned order rejecting tenants' application i.e., LA. No. VII, refusing to refer the case to Lok Adalat for settlement in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under Sub-clause (b) of Section 21(1)(i) of the Act? The satisfactory answer to this question, in turn, depends on decision on the basic point: Whether petitioners have a right under the Act to seek reference of the said case i.e., H.R.C. No. 838 of 1999, to the Lok Adalat for compromise or settlement by it, since in his said I.A. No. VII he does not claim to be, and is not a person who met any of the criteria laid down in Section 12 to become entitled to legal services in terms of Section 13 thereof?

11. The proper and correct determination of the above questions call for interpretation and construction of the relevant provisions of the Act so as to ascertain the true intention of the legislature. This judicial exercise turns upon the text and context of those provisions. In this regard, the following pertinent observation of Supreme Court made in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Limited, may be usefully recalled:

"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when, we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.........".

It is a settled elementary rule of interpretation of a statute or a statutory provision that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered by reading the statute as a whole [Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras]. Further, in Poppatlal Shah's case, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded that:

"(7) It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself........".

In the case of Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Ramjee, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly stated that: "To be literal in meaning is to see the skin and miss the soul......". Hence, the need to examine the object, scope and scheme of the Act.

12. We find it from the prefatory note of the "Statement of Objects and Reasons" appended to the Bill of the Act that the Act has been legislated by the Parliament mainly to meet the directive principle of the State Policy enjoined under Article 39A of the Constitution which envisages that:

"39-A. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities".

(emphasis supplied) The preamble to the Act declares:

"An Act to constitute legal services authorities to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity".

(emphasis supplied) 13.1 The Act consists of seven chapters. Chapter I is a preliminary chapter comprising of Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 relates to title and commencement of the Act, and Section 2 provides for definitions of various terms of the Act. Chapter II contains Sections 3 to 5. It is on "Establishment and Constitution of the National Legal Services Authority" which is denoted by Section 2(1)(aa) as the "Central Authority" meant to exercise the powers and perform the functions conferred on or assigned to it under the Act. Section 3 provides for constitution of this Authority by the Central Government, While, Section 3A deals with formation of "Supreme Court Legal Services Committee". Section 4 lays down various functions enumerated at clauses (a) to (n) thereof to be performed by the Central Authority. Section 5 enjoins that Central Authority shall act in co-ordination with other governmental and non-governmental agencies stated therein, which are engaged in the work of promoting the cause of legal services to the poor.

13.2 Coming to Chapter III, it contains Sections 6 to 11 which deal with "Constitution of State Legal Services Authority"; "High Court Legal Services Committee"; "District Legal Services Authority" and "Taluk Legal Services Committee", and also lays down functions of these respective authorities.

13.3 Sections 12 and 13 of the Act are the only provisions of Chapter IV which deals with "Entitlement to Legal Services". The provisions in Sections 12 and 13 spell out the criteria for acquiring a right by a person to entitle him to legal services under the Act. Chapter V comprising of Sections 14 to 18 relates to "Finance, Accounts and Audit".

13.4 Chapter VI, which is very important for our purpose is on the subject of "Lok Adalats". It contains Sections 19 to 22. They are dealt with in detail at the appropriate stage herein below.

13.5 Chapter VII is the last chapter which contains provisions relating to miscellaneous matters, and they are spread over from Sections 23 to 30. By Section 25, the provisions of the Act are made to have overriding effect over the inconsistent provisions of other Acts or any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. Section 27 confers power of the Central Government to make rules, in the manner stated therein, generally to carry out the provisions of the Act and, in particular, in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (m) of Section 27(2). Similarly, Section 28(1) empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act in general, and in particular, in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (p). Sections 29 and 29A respectively empowers the Central Authority and the State Authority generally to make regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder, to provide for all matters for which provisions are necessary or expedient for giving effect to the provisions of the Act, and, in particular, in respect of the matters spelt out in Sub-section (2) of respective Sections 29 and 29A.

This, in substance, is the brief picture of the Act.

14. For just and proper decision on the material questions stated in para 10, supra, in the light of the rival viewpoints canvassed and argued by both parties, it is necessary to advert to the provisions of the Act which are material for our purpose and to construe their scope and extent of applicability with the aid of its other related provisions, keeping in view one of the basic principles of interpretation that:

"Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter".

(Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain)

15. The relevant portion of Section 19 of Chapter VI dealing with Lok Adalats is extracted below:

"19. Organisation of Lok Adalats.---(1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit.

(2).......

(3).......

(4).......

(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of-

(i) any case pending before; or

(ii) any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not brought before, any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised:

Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law".

Section 20 provides for cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats and it runs:

"20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.--(1) Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of Sub-section (5) of Section 19,

(i) (a) the parties thereof agree; or

(b) one of the parties thereof makes an application to the Court, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such Court if prima facie satisfied that there are chances of such settlement; or

(ii) the Court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one to be taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat, the Court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat:

Provided that no case shall be referred to the Lok Adalat under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) or Clause (ii) by such Court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of an application from any one of the parties to any matter referred to in clause (ii) of Sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok Adalat, for determination:

Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the other party.

(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under Sub-section (2) the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.

(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles.

(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the Court, from which the reference has been received under Sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law.

(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in Sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advise the parties to seek remedy in a Court.

(7) Where the record of the case is returned under Sub-section (5) to the Court, such Court shall proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before such reference under Sub-section (1)".

16. Sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 19 deal with composition of Lok Adalat. They provide for the composition comprising respective judicial officers and other members. They provide for experience and qualification of the persons other than the judicial officers who could be members of the Lok Adalat. Sub-sections (1) and (5) are the very material provisions which create and circumscribe the jurisdiction for Lok Adalats to deal with and dispose of a dispute by compromise or settlement between the parties. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 enumerate the circumstances in which the Lok Adalats could take cognizance of any case for compromise or settlement at its proceedings. Sub-sections (3) to (7) thereof lay down the manner and procedure for Lok Adalat to deal with a case of which the cognizance was taken by it in accordance with subsections (1) and (2) of Section 20. Original Sections 19 and 20 of the Act have been amended in the aforequoted present form, by amending Act 59 of 1944 ("Act of 1994" for short). By this Act of 1994, several other provisions of the Act have also been amended. But, for our purpose, suffice it to consider the amendment brought about in the relevant provisions of Sections 19 and 20 to determine the extent of the jurisdiction of Lok Adalats, which could be made out by adverting to unamended Sections 19 and 20 which are extracted below:

"19. Organisation of Lok Adalats.--(1) The State or District Authorities may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas, as they think fit.

(2)...........

(3) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any matter falling within the jurisdiction of any civil, criminal or Revenue Court or any Tribunal constituted under any law for the time being in force in the area for which the Lok Adalat is organised.

20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.--(1) Where, in any suit or other proceeding which is capable of being taken cognizance of by a Lok Adalat under the provisions of this Act and pending before any Court or Tribunal, if the parties thereof make a joint application to the Court or Tribunal indicating their intention to compromise the matter or to arrive at a settlement, the presiding officer of the Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, may, instead of proceeding to effect a compromise between the parties or to arrive at a settlement himself, and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, pass an order that the suit or proceeding shall stand transferred to the Lok Adalat for arriving at a compromise or settlement.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the District Authority may, on receipt of an application from any person that any dispute or matter pending for a compromise or settlement needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such dispute or matter to the Lok Adalat for determination.

(3)......

(4)......

(5).......

(6).......".

17. It could be seen from the text of amended and unamended Sub-section (1) of Section 19 that the Lok Adalats are empowered by this provision "to exercise such jurisdiction..........as they think fit". If this provision alone is taken into account for determination of the extent of jurisdiction of a Lok Adalat, it makes it appear that a Lok Adalat is invested with unlimited jurisdiction and over all conceivable disputes between the parties. Civil or criminal, irrespective of their nature, complication and gravity, which obviously would be likely to lead to absurd situation in some cases. But, Sub-section (3) of unamended Section 19 to some extent and corresponding Sub-section (5) of amended Section 19 intended to prevent such an absurd result flowing from the unspecified jurisdiction of Lok Adalats, by explicitly circumscribing the limit and ambit of the jurisdiction of a Lok Adalat. It was provided by Sub-section (3) of original Section 19 that a Lok Adalat had jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any matter falling within the jurisdiction of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court or any Tribunal constituted under any law for the time being in force in the area for which the Lok Adalat was organised. Evidently, the limit and extent of jurisdiction was created by Sub- section (3) in a Lok Adalat, was portent of ominus results, in that, it purported to empower the Lok Adalat to deal with and bring about a compromise or settlement of any dispute including the heinous offences which are not compoundable. Therefore, on the face of it, this piece of unamended legislation was likely to give raise to undesirable consequences. Therefore, this anomalous and undesirable situation created by original Sub-section (3) of Section 19 was duly taken note of by the legislature and a suitable amendment thereof had been brought in by the amending Act of 1994, with its substitution by the existing Sub-section (5) of Section 19 which lays down that a Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute arising out of two situations. First, from a case pending before any Court of the area for which Lok Adalat is organised. Second, in respect of a dispute arising from any matter falling within the jurisdiction of such Court, but is not instituted before it. Further, by the proviso of Section 19(5), an embargo is also created on exercise of this jurisdiction by the Lok Adalat in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. Thus, the jurisdiction of a Lok Adalat in respect of non-compoundable offence stands excluded. The jurisdiction of a Lok Adalat is thus explicitly and clearly defined by Sub-section (5) of Section 19.

18. Section 20 is another significant provision which provides for when a particular Lok Adalat could take cognizance of cases for the purpose of compromise or settlement between the parties thereto, and it also prescribes the manner in which such cases will have to be dealt with by it. A conjoint reading of original (unamended) Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 and the Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the existing (amended) Section 20 of the Act makes it clear that significant changes have been brought in the matter and manner of cognizance of cases by Lok Adalat with amendment of original Section 20. One such change is that under unamended Sub-section (1) of Section 20, the Court's power to refer a pending case to a Lok Adalat was limited one, in that, it had restricted jurisdiction to transfer the pending case to Lok Adalat only if both parties thereto made a joint application seeking such transfer. With amendment of Sub-section (1) of Section 20, this limited jurisdiction of a Trial Court stands enhanced and widened by covering the two more circumstances in which the Court may refer a case to a Lok Adalat, they are:

(i) When an application for reference of the case to Lok Adalat is made by either party thereto; and

(ii) Suo motu by the Court on examination of the case by it.

Consequent upon this amendment, the Lok Adalat's ambit to take cognizance of cases has been correspondingly expanded, so as to cover the cases falling in the above stated two categories as well. The Court's obligation under Sub-section (1) of unamended Section 20 to refer the pending case to Lok Adalat on a joint application of parties to the case is retained in Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of amended Section 20(1). Therefore, the present legal position is that a Lok Adalat has, under Sub-section (1) of Section 20, jurisdiction and power to take cognizance of cases when they are referred to it under aforementioned circumstances by the concerned Courts.

19. An anomalous situation was created by original Sub-section (2) of unamended Section 20 which also related to Lok Adalat's jurisdiction. By that provision, it was contemplated that "any person", interested or disinterested in the dispute, was entitled to make an application to the District Authority that "any dispute or matter pending for compromise or settlement" be referred to the Lok Adalat for its determination, irrespective of the fact whether such a dispute or matter is pending in a Court of law or elsewhere. Obviously, such a provision in Sub-section (2) was highly ambiguous and was capable of mischievous consequences.

Furthermore, only the concerned District Authority under the Act was authorised to refer a case to Lok Adalat under this provision. This provision has been also suitably amended by the amending Act of 1994.

20. The existing Sub-section (2) of Section 20 specifically provides for a reference of the case coming within the purview of Clause (ii) of Section 19(5) to the Lok Adalat by any Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat under Section 19(1) on receipt of an application from any one of parties to such dispute.

21. The structural pattern of various Legal Services Authorities and the Committees and their respective functions have been provided by Sections 3 to 11-B contained in Chapters II and III of the Act. Suffice it for our purpose to consider the constitution of State Legal Services Authority, High Court Legal Services Committee, District Legal Services Authority and the Taluka Legal Services Committee, and their relative functions. These are dealt with under Chapter III. Section 6 envisages constitution of a body by the State Government to be called the Legal Services Authority for the State to exercise powers and perform the functions conferred on or assigned to a State Authority under the Act. Sub-sections (2) to (9) thereof provide for its composition, appointment of a District Judge as its Member-Secretary, the terms of his office and other conditions relating thereto, of members of the State Authority, for staff on its establishment, etc. Section 7 relates to functions of State Authority. It states that the State Authority is duty-bound to give effect to the policies and directions of the Central Authority i.e., "National Legal Services Authority" constituted under Section 3, and in particular to perform all or any of the following functions, viz., "(a) give legal service to persons who satisfy the criteria laid down under this Act;

(b) conduct Lok Adalats, including Lok Adalats for High Court cases;

(d) perform such other functions as the State Authority may, in consultation with the Central Authority, fix by regulations".

Section 8A requires the State Authority to constitute a Committee called "the High Court Legal Services Committee" for every High Court, for the purpose of exercising such powers and perform such functions as may be determined by regulations made by the State Authority. Its other provisions in Sub-sections (2) to (6) relate to the composition of the said Committee, their office-bearers, its employees, their tenure, and their service conditions. It is Section 9 which pertains to formation of the "District Legal Services Authority" for every district in the State by the State Government in consultation of the Chief Justice of the High Court. It enjoins that a District Judge shall be its Chairman and such number of other persons, possessing such experience and qualification as may be prescribed by the State Government to be nominated by that Government in consultation of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Other provisions in Sub-sections (3) to (9) of Section 9 provide for appointment of Secretary to the District Legal Services Authority, its employees, their tenure and conditions, etc. The constitution by the State Authority, "Taluka Legal Services Committee" at each taluk or for group of Taluks or Mandals, its composition, and employees are enjoined by Section 11A. Its functions are laid down by Section 11B as to perform all or any of the following functions, viz.,

(a) co-ordinate the activities of legal services in the taluk;

(b) organise Lok Adalats within the taluk; and

22. Thus, for our purpose, it transpires from consideration of Sections 6 to 11-B of the Act that, "the Authority or Committee" occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 20 means any of the authorities or the committees constituted as contemplated under these provisions viz., the State Legal Services Authority i.e., "State Authority" as defined by Section 2(h), High Court Legal Services Committee; District Legal Services Authorities i.e., "District Authority" as defined by Section 2(b); and the Taluka Legal Services Committee.

23. By Sub-clause (ii) of Section 19(5), a Lok Adalat is also vested with the jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not brought before any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised, excepting a case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. In other words, a Lok Adalat is empowered by Section 19(5)(ii) to decide a dispute which a concerned regular competent Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the same, but which in fact has not been instituted before it, barring a dispute involving a non-compoundable offence.

24. Now, let us advert to and elaborate the legal aspect of taking of cognizance of a case by Lok Adalats. Section 20 makes it crystal-clear that a Lok Adalat can and has to take cognizance of a case only when it is received by it from the Court on a reference made in the manner provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 20; or when the case has been referred to it by the concerned Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat, in the manner prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 20 and in no other manner. It has no power to take cognizance of a case and decide it, at the instance of any party thereto, independently of the references specified in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20.

25. Sub-section (3) of section contemplates that after any pending case is referred by a Court to a Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) are where a reference has been made to it by the concerned Authority or Committee under Section 20(2), then the Lok Adalat can dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. The approach and practice to be followed by it in dealing with/or disposal of such a case or matter is prescribed by Sub-section (4) of section which states that:

"Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles".

Section 20(5) states that when the Lok Adalat is not in a position to make any award, in the case referred to by the Court in the manner provided by Section 20(1), on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall have to be returned by it to the concerned Court for disposal by it in accordance with law. Similarly, Sub-section (6) of Section 20 provides for return of the case to the concerned Authority or Committee stipulated under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 if the Lok Adalat fails to bring about any compromise or settlement between the parties to the dispute and make an award, advising the parties to seek remedy in an appropriate Court.

26. Section 21 of the Act declares every award of the Lok Adalat as deemed decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court. Section 21(2) makes every award of a Lok Adalat final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and bars the remedy of appeal to any Court against it. Then, Section 22 relates to powers of Lok Adalat. By Sub-section (1) of this section, for the purposes of its functioning under the Act, a Lok Adalat is conferred with the same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, while trying a suit in respect of the following matters:

"(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath;

(b) the discovery and production of any document;

(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any Court or office; and

(e) such other matters as may be prescribed".

Sub-section (2) of Section 22 invests further power in Lok Adalat to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it. Section 23 declares that "all proceedings before the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (46 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

27. The consideration of the structural and functional character of a Lok Adalat as a whole, in the light of various provisions of Sections 19 to 22 there cannot be any doubt to hold that a Lok Adalat under the Act is a Court within the meaning of this term (i.e., Court) as defined by Section 2(aaa). By this defining clause, "Court" is defined as meaning "a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court and includes any Tribunal or any other Authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions". A fortiori, the proceedings held by the Lok Adalat at its sitting in determining and deciding a dispute on a reference of it, having been made either under Section 21 or under Section 22 as the case may, are undoubtedly "the legal proceedings".

28. From the above discussion and construction of various provisions of the Act, it becomes clear that a person could be a party to a case or dispute which is either pending in a competent Court or which is not at all pending before any such Court. In the former situation, if he intends to get the case or dispute settled at the Lok Adalat, he has to apply to the Court seeking a reference thereof to the Lok Adalat for the said purpose. In the latter situation, he has to make an application before the concerned Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat as is made clear by Sub-section (2) of Section 20.

29. At this juncture, it is essential to examine the scope of Sections 12 and 13 which deal with as to when a person is entitled to legal services under the Act for just decision of the material point if the tenants herein are entitled to seek reference of the said case to Lok Adalat by the Rent Court. Section 12 lays down the criteria for giving legal services. It states:

"12. Criteria for giving legal services.--Every person who has to file or defend a case shall be entitled to legal services under this Act if that person is-

(a) a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

(b) a victim of trafficking in human beings or begar as referred to in Article 23 of the Constitution;

(c) a woman or a child;

(d) a person with disability as defined in clause (i) of Section 2 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995;

(e) a person under circumstances of undeserved want such as being a victim of a mass disaster, ethnic violence, caste atrocity, flood, drought, earthquake or industrial disaster; or

(f) an industrial workman; or

(g) in custody, including custody in a protective home within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (104 of 1956), or in a juvenile home within the meaning of clause (j) of Section 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (53 of 1986), or in a psychiatric hospital or psychiatric nursing home within the meaning of Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987); or

(h) in receipt of annual income less than rupees nine thousand or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the State Government, if the case is before a Court other than the Supreme Court, and less than rupees twelve thousand or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the Central Government, if the case is before the Supreme Court".

Section 13 clarifies the right of a person to legal services falling within one or other criteria prescribed by Section 12, stating:

"13. Entitlement for legal services.--(1) Persons who satisfy all or any of the criteria specified in Section 12 shall be entitled to receive legal services provided that the concerned Authority is satisfied that such person has a prima facie case to prosecute or to defend.

(2) An affidavit made by a person as to his income may be regarded as sufficient for making him eligible to the entitlement of legal services under this Act unless the concerned Authority has reason to disbelieve such affidavit".

It could be noticed from the context of Section 12 that Section 13(1) appears in the statute as a proviso thereto and it should have been rightly engrafted to Section 12 as such, by appending Sub-section (2) of Section 13 as an explanation to that proviso.

30. The term "Legal Services" is defined by Clause (1)(c) of Section 2 thus:

"2. Definitions.--(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

(a)......

(aa).....

(aaa)......

(b) ......

(bb) .....

(c) "Legal service" includes the rendering of any service in the conduct of any case or other legal proceeding before any Court or other Authority or Tribunal and the giving of advice on any legal matter".

31. There is no dispute that the services rendered by a Lok Adalat in dealing and deciding any case or dispute by it whether or not resulting in an award contemplated under Section 21, are the legal services rendered to the parties, in that, all proceedings before it are the legal proceedings.

32. Admittedly, Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Section 12 are inapplicable to the tenants herein (petitioners), as they do not fall under any of these categories of persons. Nor did the claim to be the poor persons falling within the ambit of Clause (h) of Section 12, it being not their any case pleaded in their application i.e., I.A. No. VII, that their annual income is less than Rs. 12,000/-, or Rs. 18,000/- as fixed by the aforequoted Rule 11 of the 1996 Rules framed by the Government of Karnataka under the Act. The pertinent question whether the tenants are still entitled to legal services of the Lok Adalat by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act needs consideration in the context of the other provisions in the Act or the Rules providing for the manner and procedure for making an application by a person requesting for grant of legal services under the Act and the nature of the legal services which could be provided to a person entitled to the same by the concerned functionary under the Act. In the Act proper, we do not have such procedure or the manner prescribed by any of its provisions, excepting a reference to an application made by a party to a case contained in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20. However, in the Rules of 1996 also, excepting the said Rule 11 fixing the maximum annual income of Rs. 18,000/- for entitlement of a person to the legal services under the Act, there is no provision made providing for making of an application by a person seeking legal services. But, the necessary provisions are made for the same in the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority Regulations, 1977 ("Regulations of 1977" in short), made by the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 29A of the Act. Chapter X of the Regulations contains Regulations 30 to 32 relating to making of an application for legal services by any eligible person and disposal thereof. Regulation 30 states that such an application by an eligible person be given to the Authorities or Committees as the case may be. Regulation 31 states:

"On receipt of the application, the authorities or the Committees shall scrutinize the application for providing legal service and such decision of the Authority or the Committee, to provide legal service shall be final and the same may be intimated to the applicant".

Regulation 32 empowers the Authorities or Committees to withdraw legal services granted to any aided person under the circumstances stipulated therein. Further provisions are made in the regulations for preparation of panels of Advocates by the concerned Authorities and Committees and the scales of Advocates' fee payable to any of these Advocates engaged to prosecute or defend a case in a Court, on behalf of a party thereto who is granted legal services by the concerned Authority or the Committee. A combined reading of all these provisions, viz., Sections 12 and 13, Rule 11 of the 1996 Rules, Regulations 30 to 32 and other relevant provisions of the Regulations of 1997, make it clear that they all regulate and govern the procedure for grant of legal aid to an eligible person by the concerned Authority or Committee under the Act, Therefore, it follows that a person who approaches the concerned Authority or Committee undef- the Act seeking aid of any legal services thereunder attracts the applicability of the criteria prescribed by Section 12 thereof. The examination of this criteria goes to show that they are consistent and in consonance with the main object of the Act as enshrined in its preamble viz., "....to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity". But, then the moot point for consideration would be whether the criteria fixed by Section 12 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Rules of 1996 would be applicable also to a party to a case pending before the Court, when he applies to the Court for a reference of the case under Section 20(1)(i)(b) to the Lok Adalat for settlement of the dispute.

33. On examination of the object and subject of the Act, the text of its relevant provisions and their context, I find that the criteria laid down in Section 12 for a person to qualify to claim eligibility for the benefit of legal services under the Act are not attracted and applicable to the parties to a case pending before a Court, and which case is the subject of reference to a Lok Adalat in exercise of Trial Court's power under Section 20(1) of the Act. In this behalf, it is necessary to take a look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill when introduced in Parliament for legislation of the Act, while keeping in view one of the settled proposition of interpretation of statutes enunciated by a Bench of six Judges of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Union of India, that:

"(13).....It is however well-settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation..........".

(emphasis supplied) Therefore, for the limited purpose of understanding the background and antecedent state of affairs leading to the legislation of the Act, the reasons accompanying its Bill needs to be looked into. The material portion thereof, given on page 1 of the sixth edition of the Act, published by Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, is extracted below:

"3. For some time now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at various places in the country for the disposal, in a summary way and through the process of arbitration and settlement between the parties, of a large number of cases expeditiously and with lesser costs. The institution of Lok Adalats is at present functioning as a voluntary and conciliatory agency without any statutory backing for its decisions. It has proved to be very popular in providing for a speedier system of administration of justice. In view of its growing popularity, there has been a demand for providing a statutory backing to this institution and the awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a statutory support would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular Courts, but would also take justice to the doorsteps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive.

4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.......".

(emphasis supplied)

34. The object of the Act as stated in its preamble is, that the Act is enacted by the Parliament to provide free and competent legal services by the State to the weaker sections of the society to secure them speedy justice and to ensure that they are not deprived of it by reason of economic or other disabilities, and also to organise Lok Adalats with a view to ensure that the operation of the legal system in the country promotes justice among citizens on a basis of equal opportunity.

35. The aforequoted objects and reasons in the "Statement of Objects and Reasons" accompanying the Bill throw sufficient light on the subject and scope of the Act contained in its preamble. It is two-fold in its sweep. The first part of the preamble covers the subject of providing free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society so as to ensure that justice is not denied to them by reason of economic and other disabilities. The later portion of the preamble deals with general object of the Act, which states "and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity". It is more broader in its width and sweep which aims at securing successful operation of the legal system towards effective furtherance and promotion of justice among the litigant public. It is needless to state that quicker and inexpensive justice to the disputant parties is an essential feature of any legal system to effectively promote justice, of course, on a basis of equal opportunity. As far as workload pending in all regular Courts of our country is concerned, it is an universally acknowledged fact that the Courts are saddled with heavy and unwieldy burden of arrears of judicial work and it has reached the point of alarming proportion. In such a situation, it would be a nerve-racking job for the presiding officers of the Trial Courts in our country to successfully dispose of the same within a reasonable them, albeit, it cannot be gainsaid, they are doing their best to expedite trial and disposal of the cases pending on their files. It is in this backdrop of the disturbing situation of the ever mounting pendency of the workload in regular Courts, which the Parliament has, in its wisdom, instead of taking adequate measures in the right earnest to increase the strength of the regular Trial Courts, manifold in proportion to the pending cases to secure their speedy trial and disposal to meet the ends of justice in accordance with law, legislated the Act to provide alternative fora in the form of Lok Adalats for decision and disposal of the cases by functioning within the schemes framed under the Act, so that the arrears of work in regular Courts be reduced to considerable extent, and quick and inexpensive or less expensive justice be made available to the needy parties and litigants. If the limitations, prescribed by Section 12 and Rule 11 of the Rules of 1996 for a person's right to seek legal services under the Act are to be read as operating on and controlling the exercise of the power of Trial Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 in referring any suitable pending case to a Lok Adalat for settlement, this laudable object of the Act would get defeated, and such an interpretation of any statutory provision would be impermissible and unwarranted. The factors stated in Section 12 as criteria for giving the aid of legal services to any person will have to be, therefore, necessarily held as exclusively operating against exercise of the power of the concerned Authority or the Committee under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 organising the Lok Adalat, when a person approaches the Authority or the Committee directly with an application seeking the aid of any legal services under the Act, inasmuch as the exercise of this power by the Authority or the Committee is further regulated by the express provisions contained in Regulations 27, and 30 to 32 of the Regulations 1997; whereas, no such provisions are provided in the Act or the Rules or the Regulations casting an obligation on a presiding officer of a Trial Court to process the application made to it by a party to a pending case, for the purpose of finding if it satisfies one or the other eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 12. In the absence of each provisions in the Act, Rules or Regulations it follows that the power of a Trial Court to refer a case to Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 cannot be curtailed or fettered by the constraints envisaged in Section 12. Thus, Section 20(1) operates independently of Section 12 as was rightly contended by Mr. D'sa, learned Counsel for the tenants. But, the power of the concerned Authority or the Committee under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 organising the Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 is controlled by the criteria prescribed by Section 12. This power of the Authority or the Committee and the power of the Trial Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 in making reference of any particular case to a Lok Adalat for disposal by settlement or compromise, operate in two separate legal compartments independently of each other. In that view of the legal position, it has to be held that the tenants who are parties to the said case before the Court below had an independent right to make an application under Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) to it seeking reference of the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement. Therefore, the contentions of Mr. A. Mohd. Masihuddin, learned Counsel for landlady to the contrary is without sufficient legal force and weight.

36. Then, the next question which requires consideration is whether the impugned order rejecting the tenants application i.e., I.A. No. VII deserves interference and is liable to be upset. In this regard, it was argued by Mr. D'sa, learned Counsel for tenants that the impugned order is legally unsustainable since, when an application by a party to the case was made before the Trial Court, it was under legal obligation to refer the case to Lok Adalat and it has no discretion, whatever, to decide whether or not it was a fit case for the purpose. As already dictated, the said application was made by the tenants before the Court below invoking the aid of Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) which runs as follows:

"20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.--(1) Where in any case referred to in Clause (i) of Sub-section (5) of Section 19,

(i)(a)......

(b) one of the parties thereof makes an application to the Court, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such Court if prima facie satisfied that there are chances of such settlement; or

(ii)......

the Court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat:

Provided that........

(emphasis supplied) The phrase "if such Court if prima fade satisfied that there are chances of such settlement" occurring in Section 20(1)(i)(b) makes it crystal-clear that this provision is not a mandatory provision of law and that it gives sufficient discretion to the Court either to allow or to reject an application made by a party to the case, in the light of peculiar facts and circumstances thereof. On the other hand, for a Court to refer a case to Lok Adalat on an application by only either party to a case, the said phrase casts an obligation on the Court to apply its mind to the facts of the case and the nature of the dispute, and to get itself satisfied that there are sufficient chances of settlement of the dispute at the Lok Adalat and therefore, the reference of the case by it to Lok Adalat is justified. The proviso to Section 20(1) further enjoins that this exercise has to be done by the Court only after hearing the opposite party and on due consideration of his objection, This plain meaning of the unambiguous language employed in Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) and the proviso to Section 20(1) finds ample support from the amendment of original Section 20 effected by amending Act 59 of 1994. The unamended provision under Sub-section (1) of Section 20, as we have already seen, contemplated: "Where, in any suit or other proceeding ..... pending before any Court or Tribunal, if the parties thereof makes a joint application to the Court or Tribunal indicating their intention to compromise the matter or to arrive at a settlement, the presiding officer of the Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, may, instead of proceeding to effect a compromise between the parties or to arrive at a settlement himself,........ pass an order that the suit or proceeding shall stand transferred to the Lok Adalat for arriving at a compromise or settlement". The context of the provision indicated that once a joint application was made to the Court by the parties before which the case was pending, it was imperative on its part to refer the case to Lok Adalat for settlement. By amending Section 20, the request of the parties to a case by their joint application is separately specified and incorporated in Sub-clause (a) of Clause (i) of Section 20(1). This is one of the three modes stated in Section 20(1) by which, a reference of the case can be made by a Court to the Lok Adalat. Sub-clause (a) of the existing Section 20(1)(i) also makes it mandatory on the part of the Trial Court to refer a case to the Lok Adalat, if the parties thereto agree for the same. But then, there is no such obligatory duty placed on the Trial Court to make a reference of the case to the Lok Adalat when only either of the party thereto moves the Court for the purpose. In that event, Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) leaves it to the discretion of the Court to refer or not to refer the case to the Lok Adalat, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the contention of Mr. D'sa that it is imperative on the part of the Trial Court to refer to Lok Adalat a pending case, coming within the purview of Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) is legally untenable. So, his further submission made as an offshoot of this contention that in rejecting tenants' LA. No. VII the Court below abdicated for itself the jurisdiction of Lok Adalat to decide the case is unsustainable in law, more so, in view of the mandate of Sub-section (5) of Section 20 that in the event of non-settlement or non-compromise of dispute between the parties at the Lok Adalat proceeding, the case is required to be sent back to the Trial Court for its further proceeding and decision in accordance with law. We are dealing with the revision petition of the tenants filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

37. The impugned order is passed by the Court below in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction vested in it by Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i). Tenants' application i.e., I.A. No. VII was strongly resisted by landlady on the ground that it was a mala fide application. The order shows that it was passed by the learned Trial Judge on application of his mind to the peculiar facts of the case and nature of the dispute, particularly, having regard to the inconsistent defence case set up by the tenants in their pleadings. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be stated an arbitrary, perverse or unreasonable order warranting interference therewith. The fluctuating and inconsistent case set up by the tenants and the stage of the proceeding at which the said LA. No. VII was made by them, indicates that it was not a bona fide application and the same was made with an oblique motive to protract the proceeding. Moreover, the proceeding to be conducted in the case by the Rent Court is a summary proceeding under the Rent Act. The tenants cannot be permitted to set-up their defence that if the case is decided on merits by the Rent Court they would suffer irreparable injury.

38. Apart from above, in view of the restricted scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, I find this revision against impugned interim order liable to be dismissed. The limitations of revisional jurisdiction of a High Court circumscribed by Clauses (a), (b), (c) of Section 116 are enunciated by Privy Council in N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar and Anr. v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, as under:

".....The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate Court on questions of fact or law.........".

39. The Supreme Court in Misrilal Parasmal v. H.P. Sadasiviah and Anr., dealing with revisional powers of High Court under Section 17 of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (now repealed), also laid down;

".........Now, under the proviso it is clear that the powers of the High Court while dealing with an appeal (a revision?) from the order of the District Court are exactly the same as those conferred on it by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That is to say, it can interfere with an order of the subordinate Court only if there is an error pertaining to jurisdiction in that order. The High Court thus has no power to reverse the order of a District Court merely on the ground that it was vitiated by an error of law or upon the ground that a question of fact, however, vital it may be, was erroneously decided by the District Court....,,".

40. In the instant case, the impugned order is found to have been passed by the Court below in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction vested in it by Sub-clause (b) of Section 20(1)(i) of the Act and it has not acted illegally or with any material irregularity in exercise of that jurisdiction. Therefore, the revision directed against it is not maintainable in law.

41. For all the reasons stated and discussed above and in the light of the conclusions arrived at by me, the revision is bound to fail and it fails. Parties to bear their own costs in the circumstances.

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