Delhi District Court
Rajiv Sharma vs Ramesh Kumar on 19 May, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN, ARC-01,
CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
RC ARC NO. 77839/2016 (Old No. 1076/2014)
Sh. Rajiv Sharma
S/o Late Jitendra Nath Sharma,
R/o 51-AF, Kolhapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007. ..........Petitioner
Versus
1. Ramesh Kumar
S/o late Sh. Phool Chand,
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
2. Smt. Chandrawati (since deceased and through respondent no.1, 3, 4 and 5)
W/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
3. Sh. Suresh Kumar,
S/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 104, Old Gupta Colony, Arjan Gali,
Delhi - 110009.
4. Sh. Krishan Kumar,
S/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 104, Old Gupta Colony, Arjan Gali,
Delhi - 110009.
5. Sh. Harish Chand
S/o Late Phool Chand
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 1 of 40
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
6. Smt. Kamlesh,
S/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
7. Smt. Gori,
D/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
8. Smt. Krishna
D/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009.
9. Smt. Heena
S/o Late Phool Chand
Shop No. 1 (pvt) 51-AF, Kohlapur Road,
Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007
R/o 5/21, Vijay Nagar Double Storey,
Delhi - 110009. ......Respondents
Date of Institution of the case 24.05.2010
Under Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B,
Delhi Rent Control Act.
Date of reserving Judgment 11.03.2025
Date of judgment 19.05.2025
Decision Eviction petition is allowed
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 2 of 40
JUDGMENT
1) This judgment shall dispose of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act ( hereinafter called as the DRC Act).
PETITION
2) It is alleged by the petitioner that he is landlord/owner of the property bearing no. 51AF, also called F-51A, Kohlapur Road, Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007 (hereinafter referred to as subject premises). It is stated that respondents are successors of erstwhile tenant Phool Chand who was inducted as a tenant in one shop measuring about 100 sq. ft. bearing pvt no. 1 on the ground floor of the property bearing no. 51AF, also called F-51A, Kohlapur Road, Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan. It is further stated that Jitender Nath Sharma (father of the petitioner) executed registered Will dated 27.02.2004 in favour of the petitioner and by virtue of the said Will, petitioner is the owner of the subject premises. It is further stated that the family of the petitioner consists of his wife and one son. Further, parents of the wife of the petitioner are also dependent upon him and his wife. It is further stated that petitioner is a practicing advocate. It is stated that the wife of the petitioner is also well educated and therefore, as the son of the petitioner is now grown up, wife of the petitioner intends to start her own business to supplement the income of the family. It is also stated that during his lifetime, father of the petitioner was compelled to sell RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 3 of 40 shop bearing pvt no. 3 existing on the ground floor on the subject premises to Ravi Sachdeva due to financial constraints. It is also stated that the subject premises consists of three floors. It is stated that on the ground floor, there are five shops marked as A,B,C,D, and F which are under the occupation of various tenants. Further, it is stated that there is also a scooter garage marked as Mark G in the site plan. It is further stated that on the ground floor, there is also one small store marked as Mark H, one baithak-cum-makeshift office of the petitioner as Mark I, one toilet and bathroom marked as Mark L and M respectively, small covered verandah as marked as Mark K and open courtyard marked as Mark J on the ground floor. It is further stated that the first floor consists of two rooms marked as Mark O, P and Q which are being used as dining room, living room and dressing-cum-storeroom respectively. It is also stated that the first floor additionally consists of one kitchen, two toilet- cum-bathrooms, one small lobby, verandah, terrace and balcony. With respect to second floor, it is stated that it consists of rooms marked X, Y, Z which are being used as study room for the son of the petitioner, bed/guest room and pooja room respectively. Additionally, it is stated that the second floor also consists of one kitchen, toilet, bathroom, small lobby/verandah and balcony. It is stated that the neither the petitioner nor any of his family members, owns any other residential or commercial property nor does the petitioner has any other office/chamber in any of the court complex or any other premises. Hence, it is stated that the petitioner is compelled to operate his office from his residence from the small storeroom in the rear portion of the ground floor which is marked RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 4 of 40 as Mark I in the site plan. It is also stated that the said makeshift office has been made after putting wooden partition for separating it from the main entrance /dyorhi marked as Mark N in the site plan which opens in the service lane on the rear side of the building. It is further stated that the portioned marked as Mark E is always kept locked due to privacy and security reasons. It is also stated that since the entrance at point E is not adjacent to the aforesaid baithak and any visitor to reach the said baithak from entrance at point E will have to be given entry from a portion which will require that person to cross the whole open courtyard and staircase which goes to the residential floors of the petitioner's house, therefore, granting entry from the said entrance will compromise the security and privacy of the petitioner and his family. It is stated that therefore, the petitioner wants to use entrance marked E to his own house for own purpose with separate and independent office having separate entry for his clients. It is stated that the said baithak/makeshift office is very small in size and is not sufficient for running an office as well as baithak for entertaining the personal family guests. It is also stated that the said baithak is small and does not have sufficient space to keep necessary furniture, office equipments, library, files and records of the cases, stenographers, computer operator and associate lawyers. Thus, it is stated that petitioner needs a bigger and better space for his office. It is also stated that petitioner is chronic patient of gout and therefore, finds it difficult to climb up and down on the stairs. Hence, petitioner requires the office on the ground floor only. It is also stated that the petitioner had also met with an accident damaging his telus bone in the foot. It is stated RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 5 of 40 that the tenanted premises open towards the main road and is connected with covered verandah on the rear side with a door. It is stated that the said verandah is in the possession of the petitioner and therefore, the tenanted premises is combination with the covered verandah can to a great extent need the aforementioned bonafide need of the petitioner for a separate office with separate entrance opening from the main road. Hence, it is prayed that eviction order may be passed against the respondents.
LEAVE TO DEFEND
3) Upon issuance of summons under the Third Schedule of the DRC Act, the respondents no.1 to 5 filed leave to defend application contesting the matter. Respondent no. 6 to 9, however, moved a separate application stating that they have no concern with the tenanted premises.
4) Vide order dated 06.01.2012, leave to defend application was dismissed and eviction order was passed in favour of the petitioner. However, respondents approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in revision petition. Vide order dated 15.10.2014, the revision petition was disposed off with consent order allowing the respondents to file written statement.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
5) No written statement was filed on behalf of the respondents no. 6 to 9. Further, they also did not appear before the Court. Hence, RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 6 of 40 respondents no. 6 to 9 were proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 20.11.2019.
6) Written statement was filed only on behalf of the respondents no.1,3, 4 and 5 in terms of order dated 15.10.2014. However, thereafter, applications dated 23.11.2016 and 01.02.2017 seeking amendment in the written statement was moved. On 21.04.2018, petitioner stated that he is not opposing the said applications. Therefore, amended written statement was taken on record vide order dated 21.04.2018. Furthermore, during the pendency of the petition, respondent no.2 (mother of the respondents no.1, 3, 4 and 5) had expired and therefore, vide order dated 23.11.2016 under Order 22 Rule 2 CPC, entry in this regard was made in the memo of parties since the legal heirs were already on record.
7) In the amended written statement, it is contended on behalf of the respondent no.1, 3, 4 and 5 that the petition is liable to be dismissed as it is abuse of process of law. It is stated that the petitioner has no requirement at all of the tenanted premises since he is already in possession of ample vacant space at the ground floor, first and second floor of the subject premises. It is stated that the petitioner is having ample space on the upper floors also since the family of the petitioner only comprises of three members. It is stated that unlike kiryana shop, office of the lawyer is best suitable at first floor. Secondly, it is contended that the petitioner is not having any practice at all as an advocate nor is the portion mark I used by the petitioner as his office. It RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 7 of 40 is also contended that the said vacant portion I is having entrance from the back gali and is regularly used by residents and shopkeepers and therefore, it is a much more suitable for the projected bonafide need. Thirdly, it is contended that the petitioner is also in vacant possession of shop marked as G and H. It is also contended that the petitioner can easily connect the portion Mark G, H and I and then he will have huge space for his need. Fourthly, it is contended that during the pendency of the petition in January 2017 that a shop in the name of Prince Kids Wear has opened in the said Mark H as the same has been given on rent by the petitioner. It is also stated that the petitioner had also rented out shop mark D in October 2016 to a person namely Mahesh Chand who is running a shop in the name of Yuva Collection. Fifthly, it is contended that the petitioner is in possession of huge open courtyard mark J which is attached with covered verandah mark K and can easily be converted for the purported bonafide need alongwith the other portions I, G and H. Sixthly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide as petitioner has rented out two shops in the year 2007. Seventhly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide as he has sold shop mark C for Rs. 40 Lacs. Eighthly, it contended that the sole purpose is to evict the respondents and seek higher rent or sell the shop in premium. Lastly, it is contended that the petitioner is guilty of material concealment and has not to come with the clean hands. It is stated that in another suit filed by the late father of the petitioner, it was pleaded that there are eight shops on the ground floor whereas the petitioner in the present case has stated that there are only five shops. It is further RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 8 of 40 stated that the site plan is also incorrect as the portion mark E has a shutter installed for use as a shop and was earlier rented out. It is also stated that the petitioner has wrongly shown mark G as scooter garage whereas he does not own any scooter but two cars. It is also stated that the main entrance is from the portion Mark E and not I. Further, it is stated that the father of the petitioner was also in possession of ample space at premises number 4612, Charkhe Wala, Delhi-06 which is in the demise of his father has fell to the share of the petitioner.
REPLICATION
8) Thereafter, petitioner denied the averments of the respondents in the replication and reiterated his need of the tenanted premises.
SUR-REPLICATION
9) Respondents no.1, 3, 4 and 5 by way of sur-replication denied the assertions made by the petitioner made in the replication and reiterated that the need is not bonafide.
TRIAL PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE
10) In order to prove his case, petitioner examined himself as PW-1. He tendered in evidence, affidavit Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B. In addition, he relied upon the following documents:-
(i) Ex. PW-1/1 is original site plan of the suit premises.
(ii) Ex. PW-1/2 is original rent agreement.
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(iii) Ex. PW-1/3 is original death certificate of petitioner's father.
(iv) Ex. PW-1/4 is certified copy of Will dated 27.02.2004.
(v) Ex. PW-1/5 is certified copy of plaint in case titled as Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Rajiv Sharma & Ors.
(vi) Ex. PW-1/6 is office copy of legal notice dated 16.12.2008.
(vii) Ex. PW-1/7 (colly) is original postal receipt.
(viii) Ex. PW-1/8 (colly) is acknowledgment.
(ix) Ex. PW-1/9 is original UPC certificate.
(x) Ex. PW-1/10 is copy of enrollment certificate issued in the name of the petitioner issued by Bar Council of Delhi.
(xi) Ex. PW-1/11 is original continuity certificate issued by Bar Council of Delhi.
(xii) Ex. PW-1/12 is copy of ID Card issued by Bar Council of Delhi.
(xiii) Ex. PW-1/13 is copy of ID card issued by Delhi High Court Bar Association.
(xiv) Ex. PW-1/14 is copy of ID card issued by Delhi Bar Association.
(xv) Ex. PW-1/15 (colly) is income tax return for financial year 2010-11.
(xvi) Ex. PW-1/16 (colly) is income tax return for financial year 2011-12.
(xvii) Ex. PW-1/17 (colly) is income tax return for financial year 2012-13.
(xviii) Ex. PW-1/18 (colly) is income tax return for financial year 2013-14.
(xix) Ex. PW-1/19 (colly) are the 12 photographs taken by the deponent which certificate u/s 65B dated 12.03.2019 which bears my signatures at point A is also on record. (xx) Ex. PW-1/20 (OSR) is the copy of the certificate of Importer-Exporter Code (IEC) (xxi) Ex. PW-1/21 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 27.02.2004.
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 10 of 40 (xxii) Ex. PW-1/22 (OSR) is the copy of the RC of the scooter bearing registration number DL 8SL 9451.
(xxiii) Ex. PW-1/23 and Ex. PW-1/24 are also the photographs taken by deponent. The certificate u/s 65B of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the same has already been Ex.
PW-1/19A.
11) However, petitioner did not tender the document Ex. PW-1/25 and the same was de-exhibited. Further, he also relied upon the document issued by Bar Council dated 28.04.2010 which is mark A. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 10.02.2021.
12) Petitioner also summoned record from the office of Sub- Registrar with respect of the Will of his father already Ex. PW-1/4 and the sale deed of shop D already Ex. PW-1/21. Summoned witness Praveen Kumar Rana had appeared as PW-2 but since the aforesaid documents were admitted by counsel for the respondents on 20.11.2019, therefore, the said witness was discharged unexamined.
13) Petitioner also summoned record from the Bar Council of India and examined Vinod Kumar Sharma as PW-3 on 20.11.2019 and 18.01.2020. He produced the record of the petitioner qua his enrollment with Bar Council of India, the copy of which is already Ex. PW-1/10. He, however, stated that as a matter of practice, they do not keep the certificate of practice in their record. He also identified the signatures of authorized person on the certificate of practice and verified the original certificate of practice shown by the petitioner, the copy of which is Ex.
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 11 of 40 PW-3/3. In his cross examination, he stated that while issuing the certificate of practice, Bar Council of Delhi only verifies the degree of law from the concerned universities. He also admitted that there does not exist in the record of Bar Council of Delhi either original or copy of certificate of practice and further that there does not exist any endorsement in his record qua the receipt of certificate of practice from the petitioner by the Bar Council of Delhi.
14) Petitioner also examined the draftsman Krishan Gopal as PW-4 and he identified the signatures on the site plan Ex. PW-1/1. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 20.11.2019.
15) Further, N. Hassan, Head Clerk, Delhi Waqf Board, Daryaganj, Delhi was inadvertently again examined as PW-4. He produced the record with respect to property no. 4612, Charkhe Walan, Delhi-06 and stated that the said property was let out by the Delhi Waqf Board to father of the petitioner till August 2008 and that the tenancy was never transferred in the name of the petitioner. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 18.01.2020.
16) Petitioner lastly examined Amit Chaudhary as PW-5. He tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-5/A. In addition, he relied upon his affidavit dated 15.01.2015 which is Ex.PW-5/1. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 06.03.2020.
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17) Thereafter, vide separate statement dated 10.02.2021, petitioner closed his evidence.
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE
18) Matter was then adjourned for respondents' evidence. Respondent Ramesh Kumar examined himself as RW-1. He tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A and relied upon the following documents:-
i) Ex. RW-1/1 is the site plan. (objected by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner as to the mode of proof)
ii) Mark-A is the true copy of suit filed by father of the petitioner against tenant of shop no.D (De-exhibited as the same is shown as Ex.RW1/2 in the affidavit).
iii) Mark-B is the true copy of written statement filed by tenant of shop no.D (De-exhibited as the same is shown as Ex.RW1/3 in the affidavit).
iv) Mark-C is the true copy of replication filed by the petitioner to the written statement of tenant of shop no.D (De-exhibited as the same is shown as Ex.RW1/4 in the affidavit).
V) Ex. RW-1/5 (colly) is the certified copy of the application bearing No.C.M. No.4886/2013 with CTC of photographs.
iv) Ex. RW-1/6 is the certified copy of reply of petitioner to application baring no.C.M. No.4886/2013.
v) Ex. RW-1/7 (OSR) is the certified copy of rejoinder of respondent to reply of petitioner to application bearing No.C.M. No.4886/2013 with CTC of photographs.
vi) Mark-D is the original plastic envelope with magazine dated 14.07.2015 (De-exhibited as the same is shown as Ex.RW1/8(colly) in the affidavit).
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vii) Documents marked as Ex.RW1/9 is de-exhibited as the same is already filed by the petitioner.
viii) Mark-F is the true copy of order dated 14.05.2021 passed in revision petition no.218/2012 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi (De-exhibited as the same is shown as Ex.RW1/10 in the affidavit).
ix) Ex. PW-1/11 is the true copy of order dated 15.10.2014 passed in revision petition no.218/2012.
19) He was cross examined at length and discharged on 12.05.2022.
20) Respondents also summoned record of RC Rev. No. 218/2012 titled as Ramesh Kumar & Anr. Vs. Rajiv Sharma which is Ex. RW-2/A (colly). However, as the said CD was not supported, therefore, the witness produced the digitized record in pendrive which is Ex. RW-2/B and certificate under Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act is Ex. RW-2/BA. The pendrive was opened in the court computer and he confirmed the following :-
(i) Ex. RW-2/BA is certificate under Section 65 B (4) (C) of Evidence Act.
(ii) Ex. RW-2/C is order dated 14.05.2012.
(iii) Ex. PW-2/D is order dated 15.10.2014.
(iv) Ex. RW-1/5 (colly) is certified true copy of CM No. 4886/2013 in RC No. 218/12 alongwith annexures thereto.
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(v) Ex. RW-1/6 (colly) is certified true copy of reply to CM No. 4886/2013 in RC No. 218/12 already Ex. RW-1/16 (colly).
(vi) Ex. RW-1/7 is certified true copy of rejoinder to the reply to CM No. 4886/2013 in RC No. 218/12 alongwith annexures thereto already Ex. RW-1/7.
21) He was cross examined at length and discharged on 30.05.2022.
22) Further, respondent examined draftsman Divya Prakash Gautam as RW-3 who identified his signatures on the site plan Ex. RW-1/1. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 12.01.2023.
23) Respondents, thereafter, examined Chanchal Gupta as RW-4. He tendered in evidence his affidavit as Ex. RW-4/A and he relied upon the following documents :-
(i) Ex. RW-4/1 is original visiting card of the petitioner.
(ii) Ex. RW-4/2 (colly) is three photographs filed with CM No. 4886/2013 in RC Rev. No. 218/2012.
(iii) Ex. RW-4/3(colly) is sixteen photograph alongwith newspaper.
(iv) Ex. RW-4/4 is certificate in the form of affidavit under Section 65B vide order dated 23.03.2015.
(v) Ex. RW-4/5 (colly) is three photographs dated 09.10.2014, 10.10.2014 and 11.10.2014 with original RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 15 of 40 newspaper dated 09.10.2014, 10.10.2014 and 11.10.2014.
(vi) Ex. RW-4/6 (colly) is five photographs (original) dated 07.11.2014 and 08.11.2014 with original newspaper dated 08.11.2014.
(vii) Ex. RW-4/7 (colly) is two photographs (original) dated 08.11.2014.
(viii) Ex. RW-4/8 (colly) is four photographs.
(ix) Ex. RW-4/9 (colly) is three photographs dated 03.01.2017 with original newspaper dated 03.01.2017.
(x) Ex. RW-4/10 (colly) is two photographs (original) dated 10.01.2017 with original newspaper dated 10.01.2017.
(xi) Ex. RW-4/11 (colly) is photographs (original) dated 19.01.2017 with original newspaper dated 19.01.2017.
(xii) Ex. RW-4/12 (colly) are photographs (original) filed with sur-replication vide index dated 17.07.2015.
24) He was cross examined at length and discharged on 12.01.2023.
25) Further, respondents examined Nortan as RW-5. He tendered in evidence his affidavit as Ex.RW-5/A. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 23.11.2023.
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26) Thereafter, respondents examined Som Nath Saini as RW-6. He tendered in evidence his affidavit as Ex. RW-6/A. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 23.11.2023.
27) Then, respondents examined Lakshmender Singh as RW-7. He tendered in evidence his affidavit as Ex. RW-7/A. He was cross examined at length and discharged on 23.11.2023.
28) Lastly, respondents summoned record of suit no.
1547/2011/2002 titled as Jitender Nath Sharma Vs. Suresh Kumar and the same is Ex. RW-8/A (colly). The summoned witness further stated that the copy filed on record of the plaint in suit no. 1547/2011/2002 is not clear and the signatures on the documents are also not clear. The copy is Mark A. However, he stated that though signatures on Ex. RW-8/A are also not visibly clear but appear to the same as the court record. He was cross examined by the counsel for the petitioner and thereafter re-examined by counsel for the respondent. He was again cross examined by counsel for the petitioner and discharged on 20.01.2024.
29) Thereafter, the respondents closed their evidence vide separate statement of their counsel dated 20.01.2024.
FINDINGS
30) Then, final arguments were advanced by the respective counsels on behalf of both the parties. Both the parties also filed written RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 17 of 40 submissions in support of their arguments. At the outset, it is stated that there is no doubt regarding the case laws relied upon on behalf of both the parties where the Superior Courts have laid down the principles with respect to provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios. However, each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances and each matter has to be decided in its own factual background. It is trite to state that in a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an eviction order the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the following: -
(i) That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property;
(ii) That he/she requires the premises bonafide and
iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable accommodation for this purpose.
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
31) As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the respondents have not disputed the same. Therefore, no contentions have been advanced on the said aspect. Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner /landlord of the tenanted premises and the respondents are tenants in the said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in the present case, stands established.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON-AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
32) Since the two issues are interconnected, therefore, the said two issues are taken up together. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 18 of 40 the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 where it was stated by the Hon'ble court that requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. Further, it is a well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with tenanted premises, where from the landlord is seeking eviction.
33) In the present matter, petitioner has averred that he is need of space for his law office as an advocate and presently is running his RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 19 of 40 practice/home office from makeshift baithak. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the need is not genuine and the eviction petition has been filed with an ulterior motive to evict the respondents for seeking higher rent. It is contended that the petitioner had not mentioned about his purported need in the legal notice dated 16.12.2008 Ex. PW-1/6 and hence, it is clear that the purported bonafide need has been manufactured solely to evict the respondent. It is stated that PW-1 has admitted that shop C was sold by his father in February 2004 and no documents have been filed by him to substantiate his averment that his father was a cancer patient and needed money for the same. It is also contended that the petitioner had let out two shops in 2007 and therefore, his need is not genuine. It is, however, not in dispute that there is no requirement of sending any legal notice for seeking eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. Hence, the mentioning or non- mentioning of the bonafide need in the legal notice has no bearing on the merits of the case. Further, it is trite to state that time is not static. With lapse of time old needs may extinguish and new needs may emerge which were not existing earlier. Legal notice was sent in the year 2008 whereas the petition has been filed in the year 2010. Furthermore, sale of any shop in the year 2004 also, would not render the need of the petitioner in the year 2010 for the tenanted premises as malafide. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Shyam Sunder Ahuja Vs. Sushil Kumar, 2017 SCC Online Del 10624, wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held that the plea that the landlord has sold some RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 20 of 40 property or let out some property is not a ground to deny the order of the eviction to the landlord. The relevant extract is reproduced here under :-
" 16. Not only so, the petitioner/tenant also di not state that there was no change in the requirement of the respondent/landlord since then. Merely taking a plea that the respondent/landlord has in the past sold som property or let out some property has in Narender Kumar Shah Proprietor Jay Bharat Steels Vs. Malti Narang 2014 SCC Online Del 3839 and Anil Kumar Bagania Vs. Shiv Rani 2014 SCC Online Del 6645 been held to be not a ground for denying order of eviction to landlord on the ground of self requirement of premises."
34) Next, it is contended that the petitioner has also alternative accommodation in the form of property at 4612, Charkhe Wala, Delhi-06. However, petitioner through PW-4/ N. Hassan has proved that the said property was a tenanted premises of his father which his father had taken on rent from Delhi Waqf Board. Further, perusal of record shows that PW-4 categorically deposed that on the demise of father of the petitioner, the tenancy of said property was not transferred in favour of the petitioner. Hence, the said property cannot be said to be alternative accommodation available to the petitioner. Also, no material has been brought on record by the respondents that the said property was actually owned by the father of the petitioner. Even otherwise, in the case of Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, the Hon'ble Supreme court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 21 of 40 purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Reference may also be made to the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353.
35) Further, the contention that respondents have no other place for business or are dependent upon tenanted premises for livelihood has no bearing on the merits of present case. In case titled as "Satyawati Sharma Vs. U. O. I. AIR 2008 SC 3148", it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 14 (1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. Thus, there is no bar on landlord for seeking recovery of non-residential premises on the ground of bonafide need under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act.
36) Next, it is contended that the tenanted premises opens on Kohlapur Road Market which is very chaotic and therefore, not suitable for running of any law office since a peaceful environment is needed for the law office. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the photographs Ex. RW-4/8, Ex. RW-4/11 and Ex. RW-4/12. Hence, it is submitted that the tenanted premises is not suitable for the projected bonafide need. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 22 of 40 repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and is the best person to decide which property is to be utilized in what way. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Thus, the court cannot make choices for the landlord qua the portion of the premises from where he should run his business/profession. Hence, the said contention does not render the need of landlord as malafide.
37) Further, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as the petitioner could easily run his law office from the first floor of the subject premises alongwith the portion already in his possession on the ground floor. It is stated that PW-1 has admitted that there are only three persons including himself in his family who are residing in the subject premises and therefore, there is ample space on the first floor as well as the second floor. Further, it is stated that PW-1 has also admitted that he does not have any documents regarding the purported ailment of gout and therefore, he can easily establish his office on the upper floor. It is stated that as per the regulations, an advocate can use 50% of the first floor for an office. However, in this regard it is pertinent to note the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503 is to be noted where it was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to the first RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 23 of 40 floor or any higher floor as it is well known that shops and businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a ground floor premises is more suitable for commercial purpose than the premises on upper floor as it has more footfall of the customers. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs. Neeraj Khanna & Anr, RC.REV. 66/2017, decided on 31.08.2022. Furthermore, the landlord being the best judge of his own requirement is the best person to decide as to which premises he has to chose for conducting his business and a tenant cannot force the landlord to conduct his business from upper floors. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998) DLT 629 that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery of the possession of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is also in possession of first floor and second floor so long as the court is satisfied with respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted premises. Therefore, merely because law permits running of advocate's office from the first floor does not mean that the court can direct the landlord to run his office from the first floor when in comparison the tenanted premises on the ground floor are available to him. It is the prerogative of the landlord to decide the same and he exercises full autonomy in this regard. The contention that a law office is not similar to a grocery shop does not assist the case RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 24 of 40 of the respondent since it is not in dispute that various clients would visit a law office as well and would prefer not to climb stairs for the same. Also, in this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Chaman Lal Mittal Vs. Kamini Sharma bearing RC Rev. No. 467/2019 dated 06.09.2019 whereby it is observed that there can be no comparison of an advocate's office on ground floor of main commercial street with Advocate's office on the mezzanine floor. Furthermore, the respondent cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. Thus, the said contention that the petitioner could have adjusted on the first floor of his premises is devoid of merits as it is for the landlord to choose his place of business/livelihood.
38) Next, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide as despite obtaining possession of the shop Mark D and Mark H during the pendency of the petition, he did not use the same for the purpose of his office but let out the said shops at higher rents. It is stated that PW-1 has admitted that he let out shop D in 2016 at monthly rent of Rs. 45,000/- and shop H in January 2017 at the monthly rent of Rs. 25,000/-. However, in this regard, it is pertinent to note that a person cannot be expected to sit idle and reach a state of starvation before his need is considered bonafide. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. AIR 1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that :
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 25 of 40 "A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business."
39) Therefore, merely because the petitioner has let out two shops during the pendency of the petition for earning income does not mean that his need of the tenanted premises in question is not genuine or malafide. It is a matter of common knowledge that litigation can continue for many years and therefore, the petitioner cannot expected to remain idle during the said period. From the record, it is clear that though the present petition was instituted in the year 2010, and it is only after 15 years that the matter has reached the stage of judgment.
Therefore, for these 15 years, it would be unjust to expect the petitioner not to increase his sources of income as it is a matter of common knowledge that inflation reduces the purchasing power of an individual. It is pertinent to note that in case of Gaya Prasad Vs. Shri Pradeep Srivastava, Appeal Civil No. 1071/1072 of 2001, it was observed as under :-
10. "..... During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building. Neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 26 of 40 sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the glose. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an appellant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendentelite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period."
40) Further, I also find it pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 31.10.2002 in case titled as Savitri Sahay Vs. Sachindanand Prasad, AIR 2003 SC 156 and reproduced the observations made therein as relevant for the purpose of present matter:
"9. The next question which, however, arises is whether the conclusion of the High Court that the findings of the Trial Court were perverse can be said to be correct. Under normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally suitable and chooses to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 27 of 40 in the Eviction Petition, was not reasonable or in good faith. However, as seen above, the said Act provides specifically, in Explanation II, that even though a landlord may have two or more premises which have been let out, it is for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant could not question such preference. In this case, the Appellant had indicated a preference for the flat occupied by the Respondent. She had given a reason why she preferred this flat. She was an old lady. She therefore could not climb to the first floor and thus the two flats on the first floor were not suitable to her. The other flat on the Southern side of this building faced a road which was a very busy road and would therefore be noisy. This particular flat faced the Bungalow in which she has been residing for so many years and also faced an open piece of land belonging to her husband. The Trial Court accepts these reasons. The High Court has merely set aside the decree on the ground that the Appellant had chosen not to occupy the three other flats which became available in the same building. In our view, Explanation II to Section 11(1)
(c) permitted the landlord to ignore other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The Appellant having made a preference cannot be forced to occupy other premises which may become available. Further the Appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her Eviction Suit was pending, nor was there any duty cast on the Appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to the Respondent. If the RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 28 of 40 Respondent had so desired, he could have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the Appellant had refused to accept such an offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. In that case it could have been inferred that the need of the Appellant was not genuine and/or in good faith. No such case has been made out. In view of the specific provision in the said Act the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained."
41) Similarly, in the present matter, the landlord has exercised his preference for the tenanted premises and stated that the same can be combined with the covered verandah on the rear side with a door to meet his requirement for bigger and better space for his office. Further, the tenanted premises lie on commercial street and therefore, is much more suitable than the portion Mark D and H. It is also not in dispute that individually portion Mark D and Mark H, both are smaller than the tenanted premises. Therefore, when seen in comparision with the tenanted premises, individually either of the said purported accommodations cannot be considered as suitable alternative. Even otherwise, the landlord possesses the prerogative to determine his specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing any standard or RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 29 of 40 guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or commercial). Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Tarun Kumar Vs. Parmanand Garg in RC. Rev. No. 56/2018 decided on 09.11.2023. Hence, once the landlord has exercised the said preference, he cannot be forced to occupy the other premises which may have available during the pendency of the trial. Also, the Hon'ble Supreme court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine and bonfide. Furthermore, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits and does not render the need of the petitioner as malafide.
42) Further, it is contended that petitioner has not come to court with clean hands and is guilty of material concealment. It is stated that PW-1 has falsely averred in the original petition that portion G was a scooter garage and portion H was a store. It is stated that PW-4 in his cross examination has admitted portion H and G as shop. Further, it is stated that PW-1 himself in his evidence affidavit, Ex. PW-1/B has stated RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 30 of 40 that portion Mark H has opening on two sides and he has let out the said shop in January 2017. It is therefore stated that the site plan filed by the petitioner is incorrect and there were eight shops on the ground floor including G and H as it evident from Ex. RW-8/A. It is further stated that PW-4 /draftsman has admitted in his cross examination that when he took the measurement shop G and H were closed implying thereby that the same has been prepared at the dictates of the petitioner. However, the identity and extent of the tenanted premises is not in dispute. Further, the total extent of the subject premises as available on the ground floor is also not in dispute. In fact, during cross examination dated 21.09.2021, attention of RW-1 was drawn towards site plan of petitioner Ex. PW-1/1 and the site plan filed by him i.e. Ex. RW-1/1. When he was asked to tell the differences between the site plan of the ground floor of the premises, he admitted that both are same. Though he again said that portion G has been mentioned as shop in Ex. RW-1/1 whereas it is mentioned as scooter garage in Ex. PW-1/1. Similarly, he referred to other differences with respect to the description of the portions. However, the dimensions were not disputed. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the respondents that the site plan of petitioner is incorrect since the draftsman PW Kishan Gopal examined by the petitioner admitted that he did not took the physical measurement of two shops does not assist the case of the respondents. It is also pertinent to note herein that RW-1 in his cross examination admitted that he has given the details of the dimensions to the draftsman to prepare the site plan and he or his draftsman did not enter the building to take the dimensions of the portion RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 31 of 40 of the building. Therefore, the fact that the area of the other portions individually is less than the area of the tenanted premises is not in dispute. Here, I also find it pertinent to refer to the case of Nalini Kant Gupta Vs. Lajja Gupta, 2017 SCC Delhi 10247, wherein it was held that once the tenant has had full opportunity and the parties have gone to trial on all facts, the petition for eviction for self requirement cannot be dismissed on the ground of suppression. It was held that the argument of concealment is not available in as much as no prejudice can be said to have been suffered by the tenant after having an opportunity to lead evidence on all pleas. Therefore, even if the petitioner had concealed certain facts, the same is not a ground for dismissal of the present eviction petition since the parties had an opportunity to lead evidence.
43) Even otherwise, it is trite to state that even if the landlord has other commercial premises available to him and even if the landlord is letting out the said portions for earning income/livelihood, since the petitioners intend to use the premises in occupation of the tenant for needs of his profession already being carried out from subject premises, the Court cannot intervene in the same. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises . It is the right of the petitioner to look after his affairs and if the tenanted premises is suitable as per his needs, he has every right to possess the said premises and the respondent cannot contend that he should manage his work otherwise.
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 32 of 40
44) Further, I also find it relevant to refer to the observation of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the matter bearing RC Rev. 411/2019 titled as Kuldeep Singh Baweja Vs. Amarjeet Singh Khurana dated 11.07.2020 wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that the fact that landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business. Reference is also made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of M/s A.K. Woolen Industries and Ors. Vs. Shri Narayan Gupta RC Rev. 495/2017 dated 31.10.2017 in which the following was held: -
"19. The law to be applied in this regard has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, Sait Nagjee Purushottam & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimlabai Prabhulal (2005) 8 SCC 252 and Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610. It has been held that even if the landlord has other commercial premises available to him and even if the landlord is carrying on other businesses, if it is found that the landlord intends to use the premises in occupation of the tenant for carrying on his business therefrom, the landlord is entitled to an order of eviction and the Courts cannot intervene in the same."
45) Next, it is contended that as per the case of the petitioner himself, he was in possession of shops marked as G and H as well as portions I, J and K with bathroom and W. C. and adjoining portion F at RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 33 of 40 the time of filing of present petition. It is stated that the said portion amounts to roughly 389 sq. ft and would have been sufficient for his purported need as he has claimed that he only requires 180 sq. ft. of area. It is also stated PW-1 could have easily connected the portion G and H through any door with I and J, however, he has not made any effort to use the said space till date. It is further contended that petitioner on getting possession of shop D in 2012 did not use the same for office. It is stated that the said shop D is also connected to the covered verandah K which opens up to the unused courtyard space J. However, while deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have adjusted. It is not for the court or the tenant to dictate to the landlord to make alterations in his property for making it suitable for his need when on the contrary he can use the tenanted premises. Also, in case the petitioner fails to occupy the premises as has been claimed by him, the Delhi Rent Control Act also provides for recovery of possession by the respondent/tenant of the tenanted premises for his re-entry and occupation. It is pertinent to note herein the case of Ravichandran and Ors. Vs Natrajan Nadar and Ors. (2004) 1 MLJ 458, wherein it was held:
"Even assuming that other premises are available, then the choice is left to the landlord to decide as to which non- residential premises he should occupy, and the tenant cannot have any say in the matter. If the landlord is able to show the bonafide, then the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord that he should occupy some other building and not the one mentioned in the petition."
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 34 of 40
46) Thus, it is not for the tenant to dictate to landlord that he could merge other parties of the subject premises, rather than use the tenanted premises in his occupation. It is neither open for the court nor for the tenant to decide as to how else the landlord could make alterations/modification in his property. Hence, the said contention is also devoid of merits.
47) Lastly, it is contended that petitioner has failed to establish that he was practicing advocate at the time of filing of petition and therefore, his makeshift office space was insufficient. It is submitted that in cross examination, PW-1 has admitted that during his LLB course, he was also doing the business of desktop publishing and designing since 1993. Thus, it is argued he did not have any need to do law practice. It is also submitted that no income tax return has been filed by PW-1 for the period of 2005-2010, thereby, implying that there was no practice as an advocate. It is also stated that the documents filed by the petitioner i.e. photocopies of vakalatnamas, interim orders of various cases showing his appearance as an advocate do not pertain to the prior to filing of the eviction petition and therefore, at the time of institution of the eviction petition, the petitioner was not practicing advocate. It is also stated that the bar association identity cards filed by the petitioner are also of the period subsequent to the filing of the present eviction petition and therefore, do not assist the case of the petitioner. It is also stated that even otherwise, the said documents do not show any law practice of the petitioner. Furthermore, it is stated that PW-3 during cross examination RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 35 of 40 has admitted that at the time of issuance of certificate of practice, the bar council only verifies the law degree and thus, it does not assist the case of the petitioner. However, perusal of record shows that in the leave to defend application itself, the respondents had averred that petitioner being an advocate has cleverly drafted the pleading. Thus, the factum of petitioner being an advocate at the time of filing of petition is not in dispute. Rather, the plea taken is that petitioner has failed to prove that he is actually practicing and facing insufficiency of space for his need . Thus, it is contended that petitioner has failed to substantiate that the space available is insufficient as no proof of associates visiting him or clerks and stenographers has been proved by the petitioner. It is also stated that he has not filed any document with regard to any junior advocate employed by him. It is also stated that despite mentioning various witnesses, petitioner only examined Amit Chaudhary with respect to the assertion of running of law practice and he too admitted that he does not have any document to show that he was working as associate with petitioner prior to 24.05.2010. However, perusal of record shows that the respondents themselves have averred in their pleadings that petitioner also has a chamber no. 226 in Western Wing, Tis Hazari and has also filed purported visiting card of the petitioner. In this regard, it is submitted on behalf of respondents that if the petitioner accepts that he has chamber at Tis Hazari, then his bonafide need is satisfied.
48) Here, I find it pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in RC Rev. No. 280/2011 titled as "Yash Pal Vs. Gopal Singh RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 36 of 40 Nim" (2015) 1 RCR (Rent) 622 and reproduced the observations of the Hon'ble High Court as relevant for the purpose of present matter.
"2. The petitioner/tenant contested the petition by filing leave to defend application and following grounds were urged before this Court for setting aside of the impugned order:-
(i) ....
(ii) ...The respondent-landlord is alleged not to be a practicing Advocate and that he has not filed any Vakalatnama in any case, and therefore, since the respondent-landlord has no practice, he therefore does not require the tenanted shop.
(iii) The respondent-landlord has an alternative accommodation because he has been allotted a chamber in the Karkardooma Courts.
(iv) ...
(v) ...
....
4. Even the second argument urged that the respondent is not a practicing Advocate is totally without any substance for various reasons. Firstly, the respondent has filed in the Court his membership number of the Shahdara Bar Association. It is only because of this that the respondent stands allotted chamber No. E-705 in the Karkardooma Courts. In fact, the petitioner-tenant is guilty of blowing hot and cold by stating that the respondent is not a practicing Advocate allegedly although it is simultaneously stated that he has been allotted a chamber in the Karkardooma Courts. Also, the petitioner- tenant cannot insist that a person who wants to practice as an Advocate should not have a office, that too at a place just below his residence, on the ground that he is not practicing RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 37 of 40 because if this argument is accepted then a new Advocate who is not practicing will not be allowed to evict the tenant so that he would have a practice or for increasing his practice. In my opinion, for being a successful Advocate or being a practicing Advocate, having many cases is not a pre-condition for seeking eviction of a tenant from a shop from where the respondent-landlord as an Advocate wants to commence/carry on his professional work, and which shop/tenanted premises is situated just below the premises of the respondent-landlord. The second argument urged on behalf of the petitioner is also rejected.
5. The third argument which is urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the respondent-landlord has a chamber in Karkardooma Courts which should be taken as an alternative accommodation, however, the argument is misplaced because chambers in courts are only very small areas. Also, merely because an Advocate has a chamber in court cannot mean that he is not entitled to have an office which is just below his residence to carry out his professional work and which premises would also be used when the landlord is not in the court or in late hours or early hours; as also on holidays. Therefore, in my opinion, the third argument is also misconceived and merely because the respondent-landlord has a chamber in Karkardooma Courts, the same would not amount of having an alternative accommodation for dismissing the eviction petition.
49) The aforesaid observations and findings in the case of Yash Pal Vs. Gopal Singh Nim (supra) also cover the factual scenario of the present matter. As observed therein by the Hon'ble High Court, being a successful advocate or being practicing advocate, having many cases, is RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 38 of 40 not a pre-condition for seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises from where the landlord wants to carry/commence his professional work. Even otherwise, it is not in dispute that as an advocate, one need not only practice in court but one can also work as a consultant or do drafting or act as an arbitrator as well. Therefore, in view of the admission of the respondents that the petitioner is an advocate, the argument that his practice is not successful or that he does not face shortage of space is liable to be rejected. Similarly, the contention that the petitioner already has a chamber in court does not mean that the petitioner is not entitled to have an office which is just below his residence to carry out his professional work and which premises would also be used when the landlord is not in court or in late hours or early hours; as also on holidays. Therefore, the contention that the petitioner already has a chamber at Tis Hazari would not amount to an alternative accommodation for the purported bonafide need of the present petition. Hence, the said argument is liable to be rejected. Further, the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and therefore, he cannot be expected to use smaller accommodation when larger accommodation is available. Moreover, the prerogative to determine the said requirement is also of the landlord itself and neither the court nor the tenant had right to intervene in the same. Therefore, the contention that the space is sufficient in the portion Mark I is also liable to be rejected.
50) Hence, in the light of the aforesaid observations and findings, I find that petitioner has been able to establish his bonafide need and RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 39 of 40 respondents have failed to show any suitable alternative accommodation for the said bonafide need.
RELIEF
51) Therefore, I find that the petitioner has established the ingredients of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly, eviction petition stands allowed and eviction order is passed in terms of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents with respect to the tenanted premises i.e. one shop measuring about 100 sq. ft. bearing pvt no. 1 on the ground floor of the property bearing no. 51AF, also called F-51A, Kohlapur Road, Kamla Nagar, Delhi - 110007 and more specifically shown in red color in the site plan Ex. PW-1/1.
Digitally
signed by
RUPINDER
RUPINDER SINGH
52) File be consigned to the record room.
SINGH DHIMAN
DHIMAN Date:
2025.05.19
17:00:40
+0530
(RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN)
ARC-01, Central District, THC
Delhi/19.05.2025
RC ARC No. 77839/2016 Rajiv Sharma Vs. Ramesh Kumar & Ors. Page no. 40 of 40