Patna High Court
S.K. Sahana & Sons Ltd. And Anr. vs The State Of Bihar And Ors. on 15 December, 1952
Equivalent citations: AIR1953PAT161, AIR 1953 PATNA 161
JUDGMENT Sarjoo Prosad, J.
1. This application under Article 226 of the Constitution has been presented by the two petitioners, S. K. Sahana & Sons Ltd. and Sahana Industries Ltd. which are sister concerns, carrying on business in mica, the share -holders in each of them being common. They have moved for a writ of certiorari against an order cancelling their license on the authority of which they worked mica mines.
2. The facts alleged in the petition are these. The first petitioner is a lessee in respect of 50 mica squares which it holds under leases originally granted by the Government of India. The said leases were renewed in the year 1930 by the Government of Bihar for a period of 30 years in favour of the petitioner and the leases are still subsisting. Out of the 50 mica squares under lease, 12 are fully mechanised in the sense that they are being worked with modern mechanical implements. The said petitioner employs a very large number of miners, labourers and home-splitters, their number running into thousands and pays about Rs. 5,000/- per day in wages to his employees. The mica business of the petitioner was started as early as the year 1880 by its predecessor, and the business has been continued ever since. Mica is a dollar earning commodity, and in the year 1950-51 the petitioner no. 1 claims to have exported mica to the United States of America worth about 25 lakhs of rupees and has also secured forward contracts for the supply of mica for three years from July 1952 onwards valued at about a crore of rupees. The case of the petitioners is that the forward contracts are of great advantage to the Union of India, and failure to comply with the same is likely to create complications in the international relationship between the Union of India and the United States of America.
3. The above facts have not been controverted on behalf of the State of Bihar, which is the opposite party in this case. It is also not disputed that one Gupta Mica concern had also certain mica leases held under the Government of Bihar. This Concern, being unable to work the said mines, entered into a contract with the petitioner No. 2 sometime in January 1950 appointing the said petitioner its agent with the right of working the mines as raising contractor on certain terms and conditions embodied in an agreement dated 15-1-1950, Accordingly possession of the mines was delivered to petitioner No. 2, and the said petitioner had been working the mines as such and had paid the concern in the course of working a sum of Rs. 35,000/-. This petitioner claims that by about November or December 1950 the mines of Gupta Mica Concern of which the petitioner was the lessee had been fully developed and had proved to be a profitable concern, and the said petitioner had been working the mines under miner's license granted to its lessor.
The Gupta Mica Concern, however, wanted to take possession of the mines even before the expiry of the agreement, but the petitioner No. 2 refused to make over the mines to the said concern. The latter then sent a report to the inspector of mines alleging that they had stopped working the mines in question. This dispute arose sometime in December 1950, although under the terms of the agreement the petitioner No. 2 was entitled to work the mines as a raising contractor for a period of five years from January 1950 and had made investments and developed the mines on the faith of that agreement. The petitioner No. 2, Sahana Industries Ltd., then appointed petitioner No. 1, S. K. Sahana and Sons Ltd. its managing agent, the latter having a miner's license which was necessary under the Bihar Mica Act (10 of 1948) for the purpose of carrying on business as a miner. It is also asserted that the Chief Inspector of Mica Mines recognised the petitioner No. 2 as virtual owner of the said mines, and the two petitioners continued to work the same.
4. In November 1950 an inspector of Mica accounts visited the mines which belong to the Gupta Mica Concern and which were being worked by the petitioner No. 1 as managing agent of the petitioner No. 2. The inspector demanded an explanation as to why the petitioners were in possession and were working the mines which be-longed to the said Concern. On 15-12-1950, the petitioners submitted their explanation to the inspector. Thereafter, for about a year and a half nothing seems to have happened, and the petitioners continued to work the mines of the Gupta Mica Concern peacefully and without any intervention or interference by the authorities. Later, on 5-7-1952, the petitioners were served with a notice over the signature of a Secretary to the Government of Bihar in the Revenue Department calling upon them to show cause before the Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh, who was also the Mica Controller, as to why action should not be taken against them under Section 25, Mica Act, for cancellation of the miner's license in their favour. On 14-7-1952, the petitioners hastened to show cause.
5. The notice in question indicated that it had been reported to Government that these petitioners had been working the mica squares leased out by Government to the Gupta Mica Concern and were transporting the mica from the mines in those squares on their own passes without having the squares endorsed on their miners' license. The stand taken by Government is that the working of any mica mine without its being entered in the miners' license was a violation of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act (Act 10 of 1948), and the notice called for an explanation peremptorily as to why the license of the petitioners snould not be cancelled: "for repeated violation" of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act.
6. The petitioners explained that under the agreement between the Gupta Mica Concern and the petitioner No. 2 dated 15-1-1950, the petitioner had been appointed the sole raising contractor in respect of the above squares and plots, and the agreement was to last for a period of- five years with an option of renewal for a further period of five years; and as such the petitioners were carrying on the mining operations and were in possession of those mines; that in the course of working they had invested large sums of money in clearing and developing the mines and in making advances to the Gupta Concern; and, therefore they could not submit to the illegal and unjust demand of handing over the mines to the latter. They also pointed out that they had been working the mines, openly and with the knowledge of the mining authorities; and even the Chief Inspector of Mines in his Setter dated 15-7-1950, had recognised the petitioners as "owners" of the mines within the meaning of the Mines Act. The petitioners further submitted that they wore not contravening any of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act, inasmuch as they held a miner's license and were working on the authority of the same. According to the petitioners, any condition that the mica mines authorised for working had to be entered on the license was ultra vires the Act itself and did not in any case apply to the license granted to the petitioners.
7. In spite of the said explanation, the Government of Bihar issued a notification on 6-11-1952, cancelling the miners' license which had been issued to the petitioner No. 1. In this order of cancellation, it was observed that the petitioner No. 1, S. K. Sahana & Sons Ltd., were guilty of repeated violation of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act, and they had been working mica mines of Messrs. Gupta Concern "with impunity since November 1950 without caring to have it (them) endorsed in the miners' license". ('It' seems to be a mistake for 'them'). The notification in question was served on the petitioners on the 10th of November last by the inspector of mica accounts, who issued an order on the petitioners directing them to stop all mining operations not only in the mica mines appertaining to the squares of the Gupta Concern but also in the squares leased out by Government to the petitioners. The inspector of mica accounts also passed certain other orders directing the petitioners to produce all accounts and pass-books on threat of prosecution in case of failure to comply; and it is alleged that the Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh, acting as Mica Controller, has deputed police officers to keep watch over the properties in order to prevent working. The result has been that the entire mining operation by the petitioners has been stultified and thousands of workers have been thrown out of employment, though the petitioners have to pay their daily wages which in itself runs into thousands of rupees. The submission of the petitioners is that the order of Government cancelling their license and also causing the stoppage of their work amounts to interference with their fundamental right of trade and business and is without jurisdiction. They have accordingly prayed that the entire proceedings together with the order passed by the State Government should be removed to this Court and should be quashed by an appropriate writ of certiorari. On the above facts a rule nisi was issued by this Court which has been heard in the presence of the parties.
8. As I have already stated, most of the material allegations of fact have not been controverted by Government. The case of Government is that under the law it was necessary that the mica squares worked by a licensee had to be endorsed on the license itself, and in the absence of such an endorsement, it was not open to the petitioners to carry on mining operations in the mines belonging to the Gupta Concern. The petitioners in violation of the law carried on these operations, and under Section 25, Mica Act, Government was justified in cancelling their license. It was entirely within the discretion of the authorities to cancel the license in question, and according to the submission of the Advocate General, a writ of certiorari could not go in a case of this character.
9. The argument of Mr. P. R. Das, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has been mainly two-fold. He submits in the first piace that under the Bihar Mica Control Order of 1940 under which a license had been granted to the petitioner No. 1, there was nothing either in the provisions of the law or in the form of the license to show that the mines worked by the licensee had to be mentioned in the license before he could work them, and failing such an endorsement the licensee could not work at all. Secondly, he contends that although under the new form of license granted under the rules framed under Act 10 of 1948 a specification of the mines to be worked is apparently necessary, yet there being no provision in the body of the Act itself prohibiting the working of a mine not mentioned in the license, the said requirement in the form was ultra vires the Act and could not be enforced. Mr. R. S. Chatterji, who followed Mr. P. R, Das, raised a further contention challenging the vires of the Bihar Mining Control Act (Sic-Bihar Mica Act?) itself. In the view which I propose to take of the case, it would be perhaps unnecessary to decide this last contention of Mr. Chatterji, and I will, therefore, address myself primarily to the questions raised by Mr. Das.
10. The Mica Control Order, 1940, was promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules. Clause (2) of the Order contains the relevant definitions. The word 'Licensee' as defined means a person to whom a miner's licence or a dealer's license has been granted; and a 'miner's license' has been defined as a license granted under Clause 6 authorising a person to whom it is granted to have in his possession and sell mica extracted from a mica mine of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he is not the proprietor. The word 'proprietor', according to the definition, has the meaning assigned to the term in the Land Registration Act, 1876 (Bengal Act 7 of 1876) which was in force in Bihar. A "proprietor's certificate" means a certificate granted under Clause 5 authorising the person to whom it is granted to have in his possession, and sell, mica extracted from a mica mine of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he is the proprietor.
Clause 4 requires inter alia that no person shall have in possession and extract or sell mica except under miner's license, a digger's permit or a proprietor's certificate. Under Clause 6 of the order the Controller was authorised on an application made by a person and on payment of a certain fee to grant a miner's license in Form B. The provisions which follow impose certain duties and obligation on the licensees or the proprietors concerned, and Clause 7 indicates that the Controller may on the application of a licensee or registered proprietor, endorse on his license or a proprietor's certificate, as the case may be, the names of persons who shall be entitled to exercise on behalf of such licensee or registered proprietor any of the powers conferred on him under this order, and no person whose name is not so endorsed snail be entitled to exercise any of the said powers. Under Clause 23, the Provincial Government was entitled to cancel any dealer's license, miner's or proprietor's certificate granted under the Order, provided that the person affected had been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against cancellation, and alter Government had taken into consideration any representation made by him.
11. It is significant that there is no provision in the Order to show that the mines worked by the 'miners' or the 'proprietors' had to be endorsed or specified on the body of the license or certificate before they could work the mines. There is a whole gamut of rules given in the Order as to the maintenance of accounts, as to the working of the mines, as to the storage of mica and the transport thereof, and for the inspection of the mines, the certificates and licenses. Form B of the Order authorises the licensee to have in his possession and to sell mica extracted "from any mica mine" of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of v/hich he is not the proprietor. This, of course is subject to two conditions given in the form which are irrelevant for the present discussion. The form shows that particulars of mines in possession of the licensee have to be given. This may be only for the purpose of showing that the license is granted to a person who intends to work mica mines, and is in 'bona fide' possession of certain mines in which he is to carry on mining operations; but it does not mean that if other mines come into his possession and occupation, he would not be entitled to work the same without having those mines endorsed on the body of his license. Evidently, such a prohibition was never contemplated by the Order itself, because if it were so, the Order must have specifically provided for such a contingency regard being had to the elaborate scheme which it embodies. The form, therefore, cannot be read as imposing a restriction which is not to be found anywhere in the Order itself. The license granted to the petitioner was under the terms of this Order, and this license continued to be in force on the payment of the requisite annual fee by the licensee.
The Bihar Mica Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 10 of 1948) received the assent of the Governor General on 30-1-1948, and was notified in the Bihar Gazette on 4-3-1943. Under Section 28 of the Act the Mica Control Order, 1940, in its application to the Province of Bihar stood repealed, but it also provided that any permit or license issued or granted under that Order and in force immediately before the commencement of the Act should continue in force and be deemed to be a permit or license given, issued or granted under the Act. Therefore, by virtue of this provision, the license granted to the petitioner No. 1 continued to operate in spite of the fact that the Mica Control Order had been repealed. The license appears to have been cancelled by the Provincial Government under Section 25 of the Act, and the reason stated by Government for the cancellation is that there has been repeated violation of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act, inasmuch as the petitioners were working the mica squares leased out to the Gupta Mica Concern without having those squares endorsed on their miner's license, and in the opinion of the authorities such working was in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Section 25 authorises the Provincial Government to cancel the license or proprietor's certificate under two circumstances: (a) where he is convicted under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code of an offence committed in respect of mica, or (b) is guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Act.
Mr. Das contends that there has been no violation of any provision of the Mica Act by the petitioners much less any "repeated violation" so as to entail the penalty of cancellation under that section. It is nobody's case that the petitioners have been convicted of any offence under Chapter 17 of Penal Code, and the only charge against them is that they worked mica or the mica squares without having the squares endorsed on their license. The question is whether this conduct was in violation of the law. On behalf of Government reliance has been placed on certain provisions of the Act to support this charge. Section 2(m) of the Act defines a 'miner's license' authorising the person to whom it is granted to have in his possession and sell mica extracted from a mica mine of which he is in possession. Section 4 prohibits the possession or sale of mica extracted from a mica mine except under and in accordance with a miner's license. The provisions of this section are substantially the same as clause 4 of the Mica Control Order, 1940. Section 6 of the Act provides for the grant of license by the Controller on the payment of a certain fee prescribed under the Act. Here again in this Act there is an elaborate scheme specifying the duties of licensees and registered proprietors and diggers and for transport and sale of mica. There are also offences & penalties mentioned in Section 17 & other cognate sections of the Act and various other miscellaneous provisions investing officers to arrest without warrant any person found committing an offence and for seizure and detention of mica and also for search and cancellation of licenses etc. But here again on a close examination of the Act, it nowhere appears that a licensee who has been granted a miner's license under the Act is prohibited from extracting mica from a mine which was not endorsed on his license, and that in doing so, he was committing some offence under the Act. I fail to see how such a working would defeat the purpose of the Mica Act which is to regulate and control the sale and transport of mica, specially when the complex machinery otherwise provided by the Act is adequate to satisfy its purpose. In any case, it is contrary to all rules of interpretation to spell out such a prohibition on some forced interpretation of the definition clause or the form of the license appended to the rules. The Act has to be strictly construed especially where an offence is sought to be made out and on that account a corresponding penalty is sought to be imposed. It is true that under Section 27 of the Act Government have been authorised to make rules to give effect to the purpose of the Act, and in doing so Government could prescribe the form of the proprietor's certificate or digger's permit or of any license; but any rules framed or forms prescribed could not go beyond the restrictions or penalties imposed by the Act itself and forge new restrictions and penalties not intended by the Act.
12. The learned Advocate-General has endeavoured to spell out such a prohibition on a perusal of the definition of 'miner's license' in Section 2(m) of the Act along with the conditions mentioned in form B of the license framed under the rules. It is contended that one of the conditions in the form of the license is that the licensee shall not extract mica from any mine the particulars of which are specified in the miner's license. The definition does not help the contention because it may refer to any mine in possession of the licensee whether actually endorsed on the license or not so endorsed. There is nothing to prevent the licensee, therefore, on the terms of the definition in Section 2(m) of the Act from extracting mica from a mine which comes into his possession even, alter the grant of the license. So far as the new form of the license is concerned, undoubtedly such a "condition" has been introduced. But the answer is that, in the first place, the license granted to the petitioner under the Mica Control Order did not contain any such condition; on the contrary, it authorises him to sell mica from any mica mine in his possession; and, in the second place, even if by any stretch of language the new condition mentioned in the form provided under the rules of the Mica Act are imported into the license granted to the petitioner, there is no doubt that such a condition could not be sustained in view of the fact that in the statute itself there is no warrant for such a condition being imposed on the licensee. The principle is well illustrated by both English and Indian decisions to which reference has been made by Mr. P. R. Das on behalf of the petitioners.
An apposite case on the point is the decision of the House of Lords in -- 'Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation', (1905) A C 21 (A). In the case in question it was provided by a Corporation Act that any person selling ice-cream without a license from the Magistrates, who were thereby empowered to grant the same should be liable to a penalty. It was further, provided that such license shall run from the date of issue until 15th of May next ensuing, & upon renewal from the date of the expiry of the license so renewed to May 15 succeeding such expiry, unless the license was in the meantime forfeited, revoked or suspended. It also provided that the licensee was not authorised to sell ice-cream, except during the hours of 8 A. M. and 11 P. M. or at such extended hours at night as the Magistrates might by special regulation in particular cases permit, and, in case of sale beyond the permissible hours, the licensee was liable to a penalty. No form of license was annexed to the statute. The Magistrate proposed to issue the following license:
"(1) That the said licensee shall not keep open said premises, or sell or permit the sale of ice-cream therein, on Sunday or on any other day set apart for public worship by lawful authority. (2) That the said licensee shall not keep open said premises or sell or permit the sale of ice-cream therein before 8 o'clock in the morning or after 11 o'clock at night. (3) That the said Magistrates, or any of them, may at any time suspend or revoke this license".
It was held that the conditions of the license were ultra vires. The Lord Chancellor in his speech observed thus:
"I can only look at the statute itself and construe it, and when I construe the statute I find there is in the statute itself a plain prohibition with respect to certain things. The Magistrates, of course, are not only empowered but bound to give effect to legislation which has been passed; but when it is argued that because they are given the power to restrict, within certain hours, the sale of ice-creams, therefore they have implied power to do all that might be desirable or expedient with reference to the times and circumstances under which ice-cream shall be sold, it seems to me, the argument entirely fails. What is sought to be done whether directly by by-laws, or indirectly by the language of the license that is issued, is something that can only be done by the legislature. It is a restraint of a common right which all His Majesty's subjects have -- the right to open their shops and to sell what they please subject to legislative restriction -- &, if there is no legislative restriction which is appropriate" to the particular thing in dispute, it seems to me it would be a very serious inroad upon the liberty of the subject if it could be supposed that a mere single restriction which the Legislature has imposed could be enlarged and applied to things and circumstances of other than that which the Legislature has contemplated".
Lord Davey in dealing with the conditions held the same opinion and observed that the so-called conditions in the way of restricting the pursuer's trade went beyond anything that was sanctioned by the Legislature in the Act or the provisional order.
13. There is another case reported in the same volume of the 'Appeal Cases at p. 161'. The case is -- 'Municipal Council of Sidney v. Austral Freezing Works Ltd.', (1905) AC 161 (B), and the decision in that case is to the same effect where their Lordships held a certain by-law to be ultra vires because it went beyond the provisions of the Act itself under the authority of which the by-law in question had been framed. It was observed that there was no antecedent provision in the Act contemplating imposition of a charge upon a person as provided under the by-law. I, therefore, hold that the 'condition' mentioned in Form B of the Rules framed under the Mica Act that the licensee shall not extract mica from arty mica mine the particulars of which were not specified in the miner's license was beyond the authority of the Act, and therefore, without jurisdiction. In my opinion, the petitioners, who had a license, were entitled to work the mica mines of the Gupta Mica Concern without having those squares endorsed on their license, and In doing so, they committed no offence; and the working of the mines was not in violation of any of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act", 1947. The opposite party, therefore, had no jurisdiction to cancel the license of the petitioner No. 1 on the supposition that the petitioners were guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act.
14. Even if the contention of the learned Advocate-General is sound, there is no reason why the license should be cancelled, at any rate in respect of the squares which have been leased out to the petitioner No. 1 and which the petitioner had been working on the authority of that license. The leases in favour of the petitioner are still subsisting. If the authorities considered that it was illegal on the part of the petitioner to work the mines of the Gupta Concern, inasmuch as those mines were not specified in the license granted to the petitioner, the authorities could prevent the petitioner from working those mines but the petitioners having obtained a valid lease from Government of mica squares which they had been working on the authority of the license, there was no justification for stopping the working of those mines and for cancelling the license altogether.
15. The question which then remains is whether the rule nisi in the present case should be made absolute and the orders dated 6-11-1952, and 10-11-1952, should be quashed. The material facts disclosed in this case, which have been set out above, have not been seriously challenged. The petitioners have obviously no other effective or expedient remedy open for the redress of the wrong done to them by the cancellation of the license resulting in the stoppage of their operation in the mica mines not only belonging to the Gupta Mica Concern but also the squares which have been leased to the petitioners by Government, in which the petitioners have still a subsisting interest and are entitled to work the same. It is a matter of regret that the authorities should have hastened to cancel the license and thereby caused great loss and harassment bo the petitioners. In the circumstances I have no option but to make the rule absolute and quash the orders aforesaid. I, therefore, propose to leave the contention of Mr. Chatterji that the Bihar Mica Act is 'ultra vires' unanswered, because the question does not necessarily arise for decision in the present case.
16. I will, however, make no order for costs.
Ramaswami, J.
17. Three questions arise in this case; (1) whether upon the true construction of the license in form B the petitioner has authority to work mines which are not mentioned in the license; (2) whether the condition in the new form B of the Mica Act of 1947 that the licensee shall not extract mica from any mica mine, particulars of which are not specified therein is a condition which is ultra vires of the Act; and (3) whether the Government of Bihar has authority to forfeit the petitioner's license under the provisions of Section 25 of the Mica Act of 1947.
18. The material facts are not controverted. (After stating the facts which are to be found in paras 2 to 7 of this report His Lordship proceeded :) 18a. The first question is whether there is an implied condition in the license granted in form B that the petitioner shall not extract mica from mica mines, particulars of which are not endorsed on his license. The question turns on the construction of the terms of the license. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P. R. Das argued that the license granted in form B imposed only two conditions. (1) that the licensee shall not sell mica other than manufactured mica to any person resident or carrying on business in a controlled area unless such person possesses a dealer license; and (2) that the licensee shall not sell any mica to any person resident or carrying on business in Bihar outside a controlled area unless such person is in possession of an authorisation granted under Clause 17. It is true as the learned counsel maintained that there is no express condition in form B which prohibits the license from extracting mica from a mica mine which is not endorsed on the license. But it is impossible to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the grant of license in form B authorises the petitioner to extract mica from any mine of which he may subsequently obtain possession without having it endorsed on the license. The interpretation of the license in form B must be approached in the setting of the other important provisions of the Mica Control Order of 1940. The license states in the first paragraph that the licensee is authorised to have in Ms possession and to sell mica "extracted from any mica mine of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he 'is' not the proprietor".
In this connection it is important to take note of the definition of 'miner's license' given in Clause 2(1). Clause 2(1) defines 'miner's license' to mean a licence granted under Clause 6 authorising the person to whom it is granted to have in his possession and soil mica extracted "from a mica mine of which he 'is' in possession" and "which is situated in land of which he 'is' not the proprietor". Clause 6 of the Order states that the Controller may, on the application of any person and on payment of a prescribed fee grant to such person a miner's license in form B and the decision of the Controller to grant or refuse to grant such licenses shall be final. It 5s important to consider that there is a schedule attached to the miner's license specifying the particulars of mines in possession of the licensee. Column 1 of the schedule specifies the area or areas for which the licensee holds a mining lease or prospecting license. Column 2 of the schedule relates to the name of proprietor or tenure-holder in whose estate or tenure the area is situated. Column 3 mentions the date of commencement and termination of the mining lease or prospecting license of the area. In the body of the document, there is the recital that the license is granted to the petitioner authorising him to have in his possession and to sell mica "extracted from any mica mine of which he 'is' in 'possession'".
On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P. R. Das laid stress upon the phrase "any mica mine" but it is manifest that this phrase must be read subject to the clause "of which he is in possession" and "which 'is' situated in land of which he 'is' not the proprietor". It is important to mark the use of the present tense. Grammatically the whole sentence means that the license is granted with respect to the mica mines of which the licensee is in possession on the date the license is, granted. This inference is supported by the fact that the schedule attached to the license describes with great particularity the mines in possession of the licensee. If it was the intention of the legislative authority that the licences would be at liberty to work any mica mine in his possession not only at the time of the grant of the license but also the mica mines which he may acquire on a subsequent date, no meaning or purpose can be ascribed to the schedule which gives detailed particulars of the mica mines, like plot number, the area in the name of the proprietor or tenure-holder in whose estate the area is situated and the date of commencement and termination of the mining lease. If the construction for which the petitioner contends is correct, the schedule attached to the form of the license would be meaningless and inoperative. In this context it is important to remember the familar principle that every part of a statute should be given as far as possible its full meaning and effect and only in an exceptional case mav a word or clause be rejected as superfluous. The principle is that such an interpretation must be adopted 'ut res magis valeat quain pereat'. In a recent case --'Hill v. William Hill (Park Line) Ltd.', (1949) A. C. 530(C), the House of Lords had occasion to construe Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 and overruled by a majority the decision of the Court of Appeal in --'Hyams v. Stuart-King', (1908) 2 K. B. 698(D).
It was argued that the two branches of the section in fact meant the same thing. Viscount Simon said :
"It is to be observed that though a Parliamentary enactment (like Parliamentary eloquence) is capable of saying the same thing twice over without adding anything to what has already been said once, this repetition in an Act of Parliament is not to be assumed. When the Legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before. The rule that a meaning should, if possible, be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary the words add to something which has not been said immediately before."
19. Upon the first question I am of opinion that in form B there is an implied condition that the licensee has no authority to extract mica from mica-mine, the particulars of which are not specified in the miner's license.
20. On behalf of the respondents the Advocate General pointed out that in the license in the form prescribed under the Bihar Mica Act of 1947 there is an express condition that the licensee shall not extract mica from any mine, particulars of which are not specified in the miner's license. It was however argued by Mr. P. R. Das that such a condition was ultra vires of the Act and cannot be enforced. In support of his argument learned counsel referred to (1905) AC 21(A), in which it was held by the House of Lords that certain conditions inserted in the license issued by the Edinburgh Corporation were ultra vires of the Edinburgh Corporation Act. Tne Act provided that every person licensed.... to sell ice-cream, under the provisions of this Act who shall .... sell ice-cream except during the hours of 8 A. M. and 11 P. M. on any lawful day, shall be liable to a penalty. No form of license was annexed to the statute. The Edinburgh magistrates proposed to issue the following license :
"(1) That the said licensee shall not keep open said premises, or sell or permit the sale of ice-cream therein, on Sunday 'or on any other day set apart for public worship by lawful authority'; (2) that the said licensee shall not 'keep open said premises' or sell or permit the sale of ice-cream therein before 8 o'clock in the morning or after 11 o'clock at night."
It was held by the House of Lords that the restraints imposed by the license travelled beyond the permissible limit imposed by the statute and that the Court cannot by implication extend the jurisdiction in restraint of trade further than the legislature has sanctioned. It was pointed out by Lord Davey that the condition of the license not only prohibited sale of an ice-cream but also prohibited the licensee from keeping open the said premises for sale of other goods. Lord Davey also observed that the Corporation had no authority to prohibit the sale of ice-cream 'on any other day set apart for public worship by lawful authority'. It was held that Sunday was properly included as a lawful day on which ice-cream may not be sold, but the prohibition cannot be extended to any other day set apart for public worship'. It was decided by the House of Lords that the conditions imposed by the license travelled beyond the ambit of the restriction specified in the Act.
The material facts in the present case are different. The condition that the licensee cannot extract mica from a mine which is not endorsed is a condition which is wholly consistent with the scheme and policy of the Mica Act. The preamble states that the object of the Act is to regulate the possession and transport of and trading in Mica, in the province of Bihar. Section 4 of the Act states that no person shall have in his possession or sell mica extracted from a mica mine of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he is not the proprietor, except under and in accordance with a miner's license. Section 2 (m) defines 'miner's license' to mean a license granted under section 6 authorising the person to whom it is granted to have in his possession and sell mica extracted from a mica mine of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he is not the proprietor. Section 14 prohibits removal of mica by any person unless he carries a pass in the prescribed form specifying the date and time of its issue signed by the licensee or registered proprietor showing the place from which the mica has been removed and certain, other particulars. Section 17 makes it an offence for any person to have in his possession or sale any mica extracted from a mica mine, of which he is in possession and which is situated in land of which he is not the proprietor except under and in accordance with a miner's license.
Upon examination of these sections it is clear that the Act imposes a complex scheme of controls on the production, transport and trade in Mica which is one of the key-raw materials from the national standpoint. In the context of the scope and the policy of the Act, it is evident that Section 2 (m) read with Section 4 must be interpreted to mean that a person who is granted the miner's license has no authority to extract mica from a mica mine which is not endorsed on his license. It follows that the condition in the new form of license under the Bihar Mica Act of 1947 prohibiting the licensee from extracting mica from a mine which is not specified in the license is not ultra vires of the Act.
21. The next question is whether the Bihar Government had jurisdiction to cancel the license of the petitioner under Section 215 of the Act in the circumstances disclosed in the affidavit. Section 25 states that the Government may cancel the license of any licensee who (a) is convicted of an offence under Chapter 17, Penal Code, committed in respect of mica, or (b) is guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Act. It was argued by the learned Advocate General that the petitioner was guilty of failure to comply with the provisions of the Act since he did not get the mica squares in the name of the Gupta concern endorsed on his own license. But the question for determination is whether Clause (b) of Section 25 covers a case of this character. Sections 10 to 16 of the Act describe in great elaboration the duties of licensees, registered proprietors and dealers. Section 17 provides for penalties for various offences described therein. In my opinion Section 25 (b) does not refer to violation of any condition imposed by a license, the form of which is prescribed by a rule. If there was any such intention on the legislature's part, the language of Section 25 (b) is not apt to effectuate such intention. Section 25(b) speaks of "repeated failure to comply 'with the provisions of the Act". I think it refers to Sections 10 to 1(5 which'impose duties on the licensees and registered proprietors. Section 10 relates to accounts to be kept, by the licensees. Section 11 relates to production of such accounts before the officers authorised by the Government. Section 12 imposes a duty upon the licensee to notify all places used by Mm for storing mica and Section 13 requires the dealer to give to an authorised officer every facility for inspecting the mica mine. Sections 14, 15 and 16 impose various restrictions concerning transport and sale of mica. Learned Advocate General rightly said that if a licensee, committed breach of the condition of the license by extracting mica from a mine which is not endorsed on the license it would be open to the Government to prosecute him for committing an offence under Section 17 of the Act. But I do not think that Section 25 (b) can be given extended interpretation so as to include a case of breach of a condition of license which is not enacted in the body of the Act but which is part of a rule enacted by the Government under Section 27. It should be remembered that Section 25 is a section relating to forfeiture and it is not a sound principle in construing such a section to extend its provision by implication. I am of opinion that the Government of Bihar had no authority in this case to cancel the license of the petitioner under Section 25 of the Bihar Mica Act.
22. For these reasons I agree that the rule should be made absolute and that the notification of the State of Bihar dated 6-11-1952, cancelling the petitioner's license should be quashed.