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Allahabad High Court

Smt. J.K. Kalra vs Regional Inspectress Of Girls Schools, ... on 19 July, 1996

Equivalent citations: AIR1997ALL44, (1996)3UPLBEC1691, AIR 1997 ALLAHABAD 44, 1997 LAB. I. C. 324, 1996 ALL. L. J. 2006, 1997 (3) SERVLR 531, 1997 (2) SCT 202, 1996 ALL CJ 912, 1997 (31) ALL LR 43, 1996 (3) UPLBEC 1691

ORDER
 


U.P. Singh, J. (Majority view)
 

1. The
question as framed for decision by the Full Bench is as follows:
 
"Whether Section 16-G(3)(a) of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, is applicable to a recognised and Government aided minority institution which provides for taking of the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools in writing before discharging, removing or dismissing from service or reducing in rank or subjecting to any diminution in emoluments or terminating the service of a teacher of a recognised institution under the Act?"

 


2. The necessary facts leading to making the reference to the Full Bench may be stated briefly. Sri Guru Nanak Deo Girls Inter College, Saharanpur is a minority institution. It is aided by the State Government. Smt. J. K. Kalra, the petitioner, was appointed as a teacher by the Committee of Management of Sri Guru Nanak Deo Inter College, Saharanpur on 8th July, 1954 and confirmed on the said post on 8th July, 1955. She was promoted as Principal of the said college on 22-7-1957 and later on she was confirmed on the said post by the order of the Joint Director of Education, U. P., Lucknow.
 


3. The Committee of Management received a complaint dated 27-4-1985 from the District Inspectress of Girls Schools, Saharanpur and on receipt of the said complaint a resolution was passed by the Committee of Management on 6th August, 1985 to set up an inquiry against the petitioner. An Inquiry Committee was constituted. This Committee submitted its report on 20-8-1985 which was considered by the Committee of Management and Sub-Committee was formed to inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner. The said Committee issued a charge sheet to the petitioner. In the charge sheet it was stated that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation of funds of the institution and she also was guilty of mismanagement and her attitude towards subordinates was not proper. The petitioner submitted her reply dated 15-9-1985. The Manager of the college placed the report of the Sub-Committee before the Committee of Management of the College. The petitioner was given a show cause notice to which the petitioner submitted a reply.
 


4. The Committee of Management in its meeting held on 10-5-1986 passed a resolution terminating the services of the petitioner and the petitioner was intimated about the said resolution by letter dated 12-5-1986 that she has been dismissed from the post of Principal of the college. The petitioner submitted a representation to the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools and to the Joint Director of Education U. P. Allahabad. The Joint Director of Education by his letter dated 19-12-1987 informed the petitioner that as the institution is a minority institution provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was not applicable and in view of the non-applicability of the said provision the appeal filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. The petitioner filed writ petition seeking writ of certiorari quashing the order of dismissal passed on the basis of the resolution dated 26-4-1986 and the order of the Joint Director of Education dated 19-12-1987 declining to entertain her representation/ appeal under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act on the ground that it is not applicable to the minority institution.
 


5. There were conflicting decisions of this Court which shall be later on referred to, on the question as to whether Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act shall be applicable to a minority institution. The learned single Judge referred the matter to be decided by a Larger Bench. The Full Bench was constituted and the question of law which needed to be answered has been framed as indicated above. His necessary to refer Section 16-G(3)(a)(b) and (c) which reads as under:
 
 


"16-G. (Conditions of service of Head of Institutions, teachers and other employees).
 


(1) Every person employed in a recognized institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by Regulations and any agreement between the management and such employee insofar as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or with the Regulations shall be void.
 

.....
 


(3)(a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior

approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations.
 


(b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management;
 


Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, the Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause notice within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted.
 


(c) Any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, against an order of the Inspector under clause (b), whether passed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1966, within one month from the date of communication of the order to that party, and the Regional Deputy Director may, after such further enquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, confirm, set aside or modify the order, and the order passed by the Regional Deputy Director shall be final. In case the order under appeal was passed by the very person holding the office of Regional Deputy Director, while acting as Inspector, the appeal shall be transferred by order of the Director of some other Regional Deputy Director for decision, and the provisions of this clause shall apply in relation to decision by that other Regional Deputy Director as if the appeal had been preferred to himself.
 

.....
 


6. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that a minority institution is entitled to establish and administer an educational institution without interference by any outside authority or agency. He has placed reliance upon Article 30 of the Constitution of India, Article 30 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
 
 


"30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
 


(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.
 


 (2) The Slate shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language."

 


7. It is now settled by catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that all minorities have the right to establish and administer their educational institution but the State can impose regulatory measures in functioning of the institutions.
 


8. In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956, Hon'ble S. R. Das, C. J. considering the provisions of Kerala Education Bill which con-tainsmany provisions imposing considerable State control over the management of the educational institutions of the minority in the State aided or recognized, upheld the power of the State to make the Regulations to control the affairs of the minority institutions. It was observed (Para 31):
 
"We have already observed that Art. 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities (1) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The righl to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings. Without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which docs not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional, right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militates against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. Learned Attorney-General concedes that reasonable regulations may certainly be imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even for recognition."

 


9. In St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389, it was contended that under Article 30 of the Constitution the right to admin-

ister is autonomy in the administration and there should not be any restriction on the right of administration in educational institution. Hon'ble Ray C. J. following the decision in the Kerala Education Bill case (AIR 1958 SC 956) observed as follows (Para 20):
 

"The right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. Das, C.J., in the Kerala Education Bill case. 1959 SCR 995 : AIR 1958 SC 956 (supra) summed up in one sentence the true meaning of the right to administer by saying that the right to administer is not the right to maladminister."

 


10. In Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, AIR 1979 SC 52 the Hon'ble Sen, J. while considering the provision of Article 30(1) of the Constitution observed that though Article 30(1) is couched in absolute terms in mark contrast with other fundamental freedoms enunciated in Art. 19, has to be read subject to the regulatory power of the State. Hon'ble Fazal Ali J. in All Saints High School v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 1042, considered the scope of Article 30(1) of the Constitution and quoted with approval the observation of Hon'ble Das, C. J. in re Kerala Educational Bill (AIR 1958 SC 956). It is now well settled that regulatory measures can be taken by the State in the administration of the miniority institutions.
 


11. The next question arises as to the extent and power of the State to interfere in the administration of the educational institutions run by the minorities. In the present case it is not necessary to refer to the various kinds of the regulatory measures which may be adopted by the State in running the educational institutions by the minorities. The question involved before this Bench is as to whether a regulatory measure can be imposed by the State or its authorities in the matter of dismissal, discharge or other penalties which may be imposed by the Management of the institution on the teachers working in the institution. The requirement of obtaining prior approval of an authority constituted under any Act before imposing any penalty on terminating his service can be treated as valid regulator measure without offending the right of the minorities to take disci-plinary proceedings against the teachers employed in the institution.
 


12. In the Kerala Education Bill (AIR 1958 SC 956) sub-clause (4) of Clause 12 provided as follows.
 

"No teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the Manager without the previous sanction of the officer authorised by the Government in this behalf."

 


This provision was upheld with this observation (at p. 983):
 
"These are no doubt serious in roads on the right of administration and appear perilously near violating that right. But considering that those provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of Cls. 9, 11 and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes or we are prepared, as at present advise, to treat these clauses 9, 11(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulation which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their education institutions."

 


In St. Xaviers College case (AIR 1974 SC 1389) (supra) validity of Section 51A of Gujarat University Act came up for consideration which provided that no member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of affiliated college shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after on inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and until (a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation on any such penally to be inflicted upon him is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf. The Supreme Court took the view that the provision for obtaining approval will be a regulatory measure but the majority view was that as there was no guideline provided under the Act or Regulations on the basis of which the approval is to be given or refused, the provision to that extent was invalid but there was no divergence of opinion on

the question that the State can impose regulatory measure of seeking prior approval when the punishment is sought to be imposed on a member of the teaching staff. Hon'ble Khanna, J. gave the following reason (Para 105):
 

"Although disciplinary educational institution would be with the governing council, regulations, in my opinion, can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service of the teachers and for security of fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against the teachers. Such provisions which are calculated to safeguard the interest of teachers would result in security of tenure and these inevitably attract competent persons for the post of teachers. Such a provision would also eliminate a potential cause of frustration amongst the teachers. Regulations made for this purpose should be considered to be in the interest of minority educational institutions and, as such, they would not violate Article 30(1)."

 


13. In Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina (AIR 1979 SC 52) the Court considering Ihe provision under Kerala University Act which provided right of appeal to a teacher dismissed from service, held that it is a regulatory provision and safeguards the security of tenure of teachers and such regulatory measure ultimately improves the excellence and efficiency of the educational institution. Such regulatory measure is valid one.
 


14. In All Saints High School v. Government of A.P. (AIR 1980 SC 1042) (supra) the Supreme Court considering Section 3(1)ofAndhraPradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act which provided (hat except with the prior approval of the competent authority no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated, held that the requirement of obtaining prior approval of competent authority to an order of dismissal and removal etc. is itself not violativeof Article 30(1) because its object is to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice or the elimination of mala fide of victimisation of teachers. This provision was, however, held invalid by majority decision on the ground that no guidelines were given for according or refusing approval.
 


15. In All BiharChristian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305, the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Clause (d) of Section 18(3) of Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over Management and Control) Act (33 of 1982) which provided that the Managing Committee of a minority institution shall have power to remove, terminate, dismiss or discharge a teacher with the approval of the School's Service Board. This provision was held to be valid as it was regulatory provision for administration of the minority institution. These decisions have settled the law that the State can make Regulations whereby the action of Ihe Management in discharging, dismissing removing or imposing any penalty on a member of leaching staff will be subject to approval of the authority appointed in that behalf by the State.
 


16. The third question is what should be the guidelines which have to be followed by the authority while according or refusing approval by a decision of a Commiltee or Management of minority institution in dismissing, discharging, removing or imposing any kind of penalty on a member of teaching staff of the institution. There are large number of decisions when the Court was faced with this problem while interpreting the Regulations or Ihe Rules which provided for seeking approval of the authority against the decision of the Commiltee of Management.
 


17. The first leading case orr the question is Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society's case (AIR 1974 SC 1389) (supra). The Supreme Court was considering sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 51A of Gujarat University Act (50 of 1959) which reads as under:
 
 


"51-A(1) No member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college and recognised or approved institution shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and until-
 
 


(a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on any such penalty proposal to be inflicted on him, and
 


(b) the penalty to be inflicted on him is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-

Chancellor in his behalf.

 


(2) No termination of service of such member not amounting to his dismissal or removal falling under sub-section (1) shall be valid unless-
 
 


(a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed termination, and
 


(b) such termination is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf:
 


Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only."


 


Hon'ble Ray C. J. expressing the majority view held that clause (b) of Section 51A was invalid as it confers unlimited and undefined power an the Vice-Chancellor. He is given a blanket power without any guidelines and secondly, the words "any other officer of the University authorised by him" also confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to authorise any one and no guidelines are to be found there. It is pertinent to note that discordant note was made by Hon. Dwivedi, J. expressing minority view that Vice-Chancellor's power is not unguided and unreasonable as he is to act according to reason and justice. He has further to give opportunity of hearing both to the Management and the teacher before passing the order.
 


18. In Lilly Kurian's case (AIR 1979 SC 52). . (supra) the question was whether the power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to decide an appeal under Ordinance 33(4) framed under Kerala University Act against an order imposing penalty by Ihe Committee of Management for a minority institution, is valid. In para 52 of the judgment Hon'ble Sen, J. gave the reason and held that the power given to the Vice-Chancellor is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. It was observed that the extent of the appellate power of the Vice-Chancellor was not defined, and indeed, his powers are unlimited. The grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor can interfere in such appeals are also not defined.
 


19. In All Saints High School v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1980 SC 1042, the provisions of Section 3(1) of Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act which provided that subject to any Rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority. It was held that as there was no Rule framed for guidelines, the said provision was invalid. Chandrachud, C.J. observed as under (Paras 8, 9 and 10 of AIR):--
 
 



"The requirement of prior approval of dismissal or removal etc., may not by itself be violative of Article 30(1) because it may still be possible to say on a reasonable construction of the provision laying down that requirement that its object is to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice or the elimination of mala fide or victimisation of teachers but I find it difficult to read down Section 3(1) so as to limit its operation to these or similar considerations".
 


"Section 3(1) is subject to any Rules that may be made in the matter covered by it. If the State Government were to frame rules governing the matter, there, would have been tangible circumstances or situations in relation to which the fractional operation of Section 3(1) could have been limited. But in the absence of any rules furnishing guidelines on the subject, it is difficult to predicate that in practice the operation of the section will be limited to a certain clause of cases only. The absence of rules on the subject makes the unguided discretion of the competent authority the sole arbitrator of the question as to which cases would fall within the section and which will fall outside."
 


"The two sub-sections together confer upon the competent authority, in the absence of proper rule a wide and untrammelled discretion to interfere with the proposed order, whenever, in its opinion, the order is based on grounds which do not appear, to it either adequate or reasonable."

 


20, The provision relating to the prior approval before passing an order of suspension or imposing any penalty came up for consideration in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311. The Court held the validity of Section 8(4) of Delhi School Education Act, requiring prior approval of Director before suspension of school staff as it did not confer blanket power on Director but provision of Section 3(2) providing for prior

approval before an employee is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank was held invalid as it conferred blanket power on the Director without any guidelines. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the provisions of Section 8(3) of me Act providing for appeal to the Tribunal against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The same view was reiterated in V. Thechamma v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1210.
 


21. The provisions of sub-clause (d) of subsection (3) of Section 18 of Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Teaching Staff and Management Control) Act 1982 (33 of 1982) which provided that the Managing Committee of a Minorily Institution shall have a power to remove, terminate, dismiss or discharge a teacher with the approval of the Service Board, was under challenge in All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305. Their Lordships held that the School Service Board was to accord or refuse approval of the termination of service of imposition of any penalty on a teacher after examining whether the managing committee has taken disciplinary action in accordance with the rules framed by the managing committee itself. These rules were itself taken as sufficient guidelines.
 


22. In BiharSlate Madarsa Education Board v. Anjuman Ahle Hadeas, (1994 Suppl 92) SCC 509 the Supreme Court did not uphold Section 24 of Bihar State Madarsa Education Board Act which inter alia provided that no teacher of the Madarsa shall be discharged or dismissed from service wilhout the prior approval of the Board. There was no rule framed under the Act providing any guidelines to the Board while taking decision in the matter of granting approval.
 


23. The analysis of all these decisions clearly indicales that the test laid down was that in case there is guideline provided under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder for granting or withholding the approval of any order imposing a penalty on a teacher or employee of a minority institution, such provision would be invalid but in case there is sufficient guideline, the provision requiring the prior approval will be valid. Section 16-G(3)(a) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1922 provides that no Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The question as to whether this provision will be applicable to minority institutions has been'considered in various decisions of this Court.
 


24. The first case decided by the Division Bench of this Court in St. Joseph's Higher Secondary School, Meerut Cantt v. Ravi Shankar Sharma. AIR 1976 All 390. The Court relying upon the decision in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389, held that in absence of any guideline, the provision requiring the prior approval under Sec-tion 16-G(3)(a) of the Act is invalid. The following observation was made (Para 14 of AIR):
 
"The power conferred on the Inspector is a check on the administration. It is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no facts have been mentioned on the basis of which alone the Inspector may exercise his power. In the absence of any guideline, it cannot be held that the power of approval conferred on the Inspector was solely a check on mal-administration of the institution. As discussed by the Supreme Court in St. Xavier's College case (AIR 1974 SC 1389), such a blanket power directly interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers."

 


25. The Court was not invied attention to Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the Act relating to conditions of service of the teachers which provided for the manner in which the inquiry was to be conducted and the grounds on which punishment may be imposed upon the teachers. The view expressed by the Division Bench was followed in Jain Swetambar Mahasabha U.P. v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1979 All LJ 1070. In this case one additional argument was raised that Clause (11) of the Scheme of Administration itself provided for applicability of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Acl. This was, however, repelled with the observation that there was no indication in the Scheme of Administration that the Committee of Management intended to curtail its power regarding termination of services of the principal and teachers of the institution by making it subject to the approval of the District Inspector of Schools.
 


26. In Management Committee of M. M. Inter College, Chandpur district Bijnor v. Director of Education III Region Barcilly, 1984 UPLBEC

271, the learned single Judge, following the decision in St. Joseph's case (AIR 1976 All 390) (supra) held that the requirement of (he prior approval in dismissing a teacher from service was invalid in relation to a minority institution but the Regulations framed under Chapter III were appli-cable. The order of dismissal of a teacher from service passed by the Committee of Management was quashed on the ground that Regulations 35, 36 and 37 of Chapter-III were not followed. It was, however, not considered in that case whether these Regulations may be taken as guidelines while granting the approval by the District Inspector of Schools. The view expressed in St. Joseph's case (AIR 1976 All 390) (supra) was reaffirmed by a Division Bench in Smt. Saran Kumari Gaur v. State of U.P., 1988 UPLBEC 629 : (1988 All LJ 947).
 


27. A learned single Judge, however, in Committee of Management Hamidia Girls Degree College, Allahabad v. Deputy Director of Education, IVth Region, Allahabad, (1989) 1 UPLBEC 781 considered Statute 24.03 of First Statutes of Allahabad University which provided that every decision of the appointing authority regarding dismissal or removal from service, etc. before it is communicated to the employee, be reported to the District inspector of Schools and shall not take effect unless it is approved by him in writing. This provision was held applicable to minority institutions and not violativc of Article 30 of the Constitution. It was observed that the decision of this Court in St. Joseph's case (AIR 1976 All 390) (supra) had no occasion to consider the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union, AIR 1988 SC 37 and also Bihar Christian School Association case, AIR 1988 SC 305.
 


28. The validity of Section 16-G (3)(a) was again considered in Shamim Jafar v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, (1992) 1 UPLBEC 598 and considering the various decisions of the Supreme Court it was held that the requirement of obtaining prior approval of Inspector by a Committee of Management of minority institution is valid, and the decisions of this Court taking the contrary view were held to be per incuriam. It was held that the Regulations framed under the Act provided sufficient guidelines to the District Inspector of Schools while granling or refusing to grant the approval under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act.
 


29. It has to be examined in detail as to whether any guideline has been provided to the District Inspector of Schools in according or refusing to accord approval to the decision of the Committee of Management in discharging or passing order of removal, dismissal from service or reduction in rank or diminishing emoluments of a teacher of a minority institution.
 


30. The guideline means when an authority has to act he must be guided as to which way he is to act and what principle he is to apply. It does not leave any matter to his-discretion to evolve a principle on which he has to act. If there is no way to choose his own principle in determining a matter and leave it to his discretion, it can be said that there is no-guideline and he is free to act according to his own views or the principle which he himself may think proper. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary 'guideline' means a line by which one is guided. In New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 'guideline' means a line for guiding, directing or standardising principle laid down as to guide, to procedure, policy etc.
 


31. An examination of the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder clearly indicates that there are sufficient guidelines provided to the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act while according or refusing approval to the decision of the Committee of Management under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act. The following points are relevant in this resepct:--
 
(1) Chapter III of Regulations framed under the Act relates to the conditions of service of Head Masters, Principal and Teachers. Regulations 24 to 28 provide the manner in which the service of a teacher, Principal or Head Master can be terminated. Regulation 31 provides for punishment of an employee that would require prior approval of the Inspector namely, (a) dismissal (b) removal or discharge (c) reduction in rank (d) diminution in emoluments. Regulation 32 provides lhat an employee may be dismissed from service on ground, such as gross insubordination, deliberate or serious neglect of duly, gross misconduct or commission of an act which constitutes criminal offence for dishonesly, corruption, misappropriation of funds, sex perversity or moral turpitude. Clause (2) of Regulation 32 lays down the condi-

tion when an employee may be removed from service on the grounds mentioned under Clause (I) of Regulation 32 and also on the grounds of inefficiency in administration or in (uitional work or unauthorised tuilion on employment. Sub-clause (3) of Regulation 32 laid down guidelines providing that an employee may be reduced in rank or subjected to diminution in emoluments on grounds such as deficiency in administration, unsatisfactory work or conduct, lack of interest in co-curricular activities or dis-charge of examination duties or doubtful integrity. Reduction may be to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale. Regulation 33 provides for stoppage of increment in a time scale for a period with temporary or permanent effect. This punishment does not require any prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. However, an appeal lies under Clause (2) of Regulation 33 to the Inspector within 30 days of the communication of this order. Regulation 34 further provides that in deciding upon the punish-ment to be imposed mitigating factors, if any, and past record of service of the employee concerned may be taken into account. These Regulations clearly lay down the guidelines as to on what grounds the punishment and what kind of punishment can be imposed by the Management.

 


32. Regulations 35 to 40 provide the procedure to be followed by the Committee of Management in framing the charges giving opportunity of hearing to the employee and the manner in which the decision is to be taken. Regulation 44 requires the Inspector on receiving the papers to communicate his decision within six weeks. Regulation 44 reads as under:
 
"44. The Inspector or Regional Inspectress shall communicate his/her decision to the management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal in complete form for action mentioned in sub-section (3)(a) of Section 16-G of the Act. If incomplete papers are received from the management the approving officer shall require it to re-submit its proposal in complete form within two weeks, and the period of six weeks prescribed in this regulation shall be reckoned from the dale on which complete papers are received by the approving officer. The papers shall either be sent by registered post or by special messenger."

 


Regulation 44-A was added by notification dated 27th February, 1978 conferring power on Ihe District Inspector of Schools to enhance or reduce the punishment proposed by ihe Commissioner of Management. An appeal lies to the Regional Deputy Director of Education against any decision of the Inspector under sub-section (2) of Regulation 44-A. Regulation 44-A reads as under:
 
 


(Matter in vernacular omitted--Ed.)

 


 These Regulations clearly lay down the guidelines relating to the substantive part when and on what grounds the punishment can be imposed on an employee. The second part relates to the procedure which is to be followed and third part relates to the guidelines to the Inspector within which time and on perusal of what papers he is to form opinion in according the approval for grant of approval to the Management with regard to the punishment sought to be imposed by it. The District Inspector of Schools has to examine the papers of the Committee of Management which has framed the charges, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the reply submitted by the employee and the evidence in support of the charges and on examining these papers he is to form opinion whether the punishment has been imposed following the procedure as provided therein and on the basis of the evidence which supports the grounds mentioned under Regulations 31 and 32. These are sufficient guidelines provided to the District Inspector of Schools to come to a conclusion whether he would grant the approval or not to the decision of the management in respect of the punishment of an employee of the institution. 33. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that these Regulations are only the guidelines to be followed by the Management and there is no Regulation or provision under the Act which makes it obligatory upon (he Inspector of Schools to follow them. This conlention of learned counsel for the respondent has no subsiance. If the Regulations are being framed laying down the. guidelines for the Management in respect of awarding punishment lo an employee and the procedure to be followed, the same is applicable to the Inspector of Schools. The Inspector of Schools has only to see whether the Committee of Management has acted in accordance with the Regulations. Regulation 44 clearly envisages that the Committee of Management after having taken recourse to the procedure to be followed for imposition of penalty on its employee it has to

submit those papers relating to disciplinary proceedings to the Inspector of Schools. It has lo submit the entire papers. Regulation 44 provides that if the papers are received from the Management, the approving Officer shall require it to resubmit its proposal in complete form within two weeks. The Inspector has to communicate his" decision to the Management within six weeks of the receipt of its proposal. The Inspector of Schools has to examine only as to whether the Management has followed the substantive and procedural pan of the Regulations and the decision taken by it is in accordance with law and the Regulations framed therein. In St. Xaviers Colleges' case (AIR 1974 SC 1389) (supra) there was no regulation framed which could guide Ihe Vice-Chancellor in according the approval.
 


33. In All Saints High School's case (AIR 1980 SC 1042) (supra) it was specifically pointed out that mere was no Rule framed under the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act and in absence of the Rules furnishing guidelines it was held that the power conferred on the authority was void and untrammelled. Hon'ble Fazal Ali, J. Observed :
 
"In the incident case although the Act does not at all provide any Rules or Regulations by which Ihe conditions of service of the teachers are to be governed yet it prohibits dismissal or removal of teachers without prior sanction of a competent authority to be declared by the State Government. Similarly it provides for an appeal to appellate authority without laying down any guidelines and no right of appeal is given to the Management, (para 38). If the State wanted to regulale the conditions of service of the teachers, it should have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient powers to the Managemeni in the manner in which it was to act." (para 68).

 


34. These observations relate to the Rules framed for guiding the Management in which it has to act while taking the action against its employee and not for the competent authority. The power of the competent authority is limited to the extenl to see that the Management Committee has followed the Regulations framed under the Act and it has to examine the papers only to that extent as is clear from the reading of Regulation 44 read with other Regulations. He has also lo take decision within a specified lime. The Regulalions do not leave any discretion in the matter to the Inspector of Schools while granting or refusing to grant the approval.
 


(2) Under the proviso to Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Seclion 16-G of the Act the Inspector has to give an opportunity to the Principal, the Head Master or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice and the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. This provision contemplates that the Inspector has to give the notice before he takes a decision in the matter before granling approval to the proposed punishment. Once an opportunity is given to the teacher concerned, the Management has also to be given an opportuily to justify its action in the matter. This opportunity to the parties affected by order will further help him to come to the conclusion whether the Regulalions have been followed in imposing the penalty.
 


35. In All Saints High School's case (AIR 1980 SC 1042) (supra) one of Ihe objections was that there was no provision giving opportunity of hearing while giving approval without ascertaining the views of the Governing Body or the Managing Committee as to why and how it has taken action against the teacher concerned and what procedure was followed by it. Similarly there was no provision giving opportunity of hearing to the teachers concerned. The proviso lo Section 16(3)(a), however, provides for giving opportunity of hearing before the approval is granted. The Inspecior of Schools before passing any order has lo give an opportunity to the Com-mittee of Managemeni also to ascertain its view in the matter. The Inspector of Schools after giving an opportunity of hearing and asecertaining the viewsof the Managing Commillee and the teacher concerned has to record its reasons. In case the reason is given it will clearly disclose as to whether he has acted in accordance with the provision of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder.
 


(3) The decision of the District Inspector of Schools is subject to an appeal by any party before the Regional Deputy Director of Education against an order of the District Inspeclor of Schools passed under Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act. This is a further check on the exercise of the power on the District Inspecior of Schools. The Regional Deputy Di-rector of Education will have to scrutinise whether the District Inspector of Schools has passed the order granting or refusing to grant approval or validly reduced or enhanced the punishment in

accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed therein. In All Saints High School's case (AIR 1980 SC 1042) (supra) Hon'ble Fazal Ali, J. observed that Section 3(1) of the Act was also invalid for the the Management. Here, under Clause (c) of sub-section (3) the Management is also given a right of appeal against any order passed by the District Inspector of Schools.
 


(4) If power conferred on the Inspector of Schools for granting or refusing approval to the decision of the Commitfee of Management under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act is treated as unguided and arbitrary, it will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The validity of this section and various other provisions of Intermediate Education Act were challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Katra Education Society, Allahabad v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307. One of the plea was that Sections 16-G to I6-I were violative of Articles 14, 19 and  of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court negatived the contentions and held that those provisions are not violative of Article 14 of the Constiluiion of India.
 


36. In Committee of Management v. Joint Director of Education, 1982 UPLBEC 533, the validity of Section 16-G(3) of the Act was challenged on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court, relying upon the decision of the Katra Education Society case (AIR 1966 SC 1307) (supra) held that this provision is not violalive of Article 14 of the Constilution. Similar view was expressed in Shamin Zafar v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, (1992) I UPLBEC 598. There is no reason to take a contrary view.
 


37. Hon'ble R. H. Zaidi, J. has dealt with two other points, namely, whether the question re-ferred in the case were redundant, i.e., enforcement of U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982, and the other question, whether the reference made by the learned single Judge was incompetent.
 


38. In our recollection, these points were not raised by the learned counsel for the parties in the arguments. It is mentioned in the written arguments by the counsel for the one of the parties. With the concurrence of brother R. H. Zaidi, J., we have been given the liberty to deal with these points and accordingly, we are dealing with these two points also.
 


39. The one point is whether (he question referred in case is redundant in view of enforcement of U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982 (Act 5 of the 1982). This Act was framed basically for the purpose of appoint men! in nort-minority institutions. Section 3 provides for establishment of the commission. Section 9 defines the powers of the Commission. It confers power to prepare guidelines in the matters relating to the method of recruitment and promotion, to conduct examinations, to select and invite experts etc. Section 12 provides for establishment of Regional Selection Boards. Section 14 provides the powers duties and functions of the Board. The appointment of promotion has to be made on the basis of recommendations of the Commission or the Board notwithstanding anything contrary lo the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations made therein. Similarly, Section 21 puts a restriction on dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of teachers except unless prior approval of the Commission has been obtained. Section 30 of the Act exempts the minority institutions. The result is that the minority institutions are to be governed by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 in the matter of the selection, promotions and appointment of teachers in the institution. As none of the provisions of Act 5 of 1982 are applicable the question of exclusion of applicability of Section 21 of Act No. 5 of 1982 is hardly relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy involved in the case.
 


40. The provisions of Act 5 of 1982 are not applicable to the minorily institutions. Any provision contained therein cannot be taken into consideration for holding that the provisions of Intermediate Education Act, 1921 has been repealed by any provision in the U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. If the minority institution has lo make the appointmenl, it has lo make the selection in accordance with Section 16-FF of U. P. Intermediate Act 1921. Section 16-FF(1) provides that the member of the Selection Committee shall, in the case of appointment of head of the institution, be an expert selected by a Commit-tee of Management from a panel of experts prepared by the Director and in case of appointmenl of a teacher be the head of the institution

concerned. Sub-section (2) provides the procedure to be followed by the Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (1) as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) provides that no person selected under that section shall be appointed unless in the case of head of an institution the proposal of appointment has been approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, and in the case of a teacher such proposal has been approved by the Inspector. In case the provisions of U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982 had been made applicable, this provision would also be redundant. It is not the case of either of the parties that Section 16-FF of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 has become redundant after the enforcement of Act No. 5 of 1982. Similarly, where Act No 5 of 1982 is not applicable the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 will be applicable. The mere fact that object and reasons for enactment of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982 were given in its preamble does not in any way indicate that the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 which was otherwise applicable to the institutions not covered by the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, will be taken as repealed.
 


41. In Maganti Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 403, the Supreme Court observed (at p. 405):--
 
 


"Apparently, because of the preamble of the Act, it was contended that with the enactment of the repeal of the Permanent Settlement by the Act of 1948 which also provided for the acquisition of the rights of land-holders in permanently settled States the Act stood repealed. We fail to see how because of the preamble of the Act it can be said that it stood repealed by the enactment of the later Act unless there were express words to that effect or unless there was necessary implication."

 


42. It is well settled principle of law that there is presumption against implied repeal. The Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Palai v. T. U. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561 held that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. It was observed as under (Para 9):--
 

"It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication. But it isequally well settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeat. Upon the assumption that the legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject the failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation. Of course, this presumption will be rebutted if the provisions of the new Act are so inconsistent with the old ones that the two cannot stand together."

 


Secondly, a prior general Act may be affected by a subsequent particular Act provided the subject matter of the latter Act is the same. In case, however, particular Act is not at all applicable and does not provide for the specific field of enactment covered by the general Act, the question of repeal of any of the provisions of the general Act does not arise. Further, the doctrine of implied repeal cannot be invoked if there is no repugnancy in the provisions of the Statute. Act No. 5 of 1982 being not applicable at all to the minority institutions, the selection, appointment and promotion as well as termination, removal, dismissal from service and other actions against the teachers of recognised minority institutions are governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and not by Act No. 5 of 1982. The minority institutions are governed by the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act and they continue to be governed by the said provisions unless there is specifc provision contained in the Act giving the exemption to minority institutions. In these circumstances as the provisions of Act No. 5 of 1982 are not at all applicable to the minority institutions, the question of implied repeat of Section 16-G(3)(a) does not arise and the reference has not become redundant.
 


43. The next point is whether the reference made by the learned single Judge was incompetent. There were two decisions of the learned single Judges which had taken the view that provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (in short 'the Act') shall be applicable to the principal, headmaster or teacher employed in an institution recognised under the provisions of the Act. In Committee of Management Hamidia Girls Degree College, Allahabad v. Director of Education, I Vth Region, Allahabad (1989) 1 UPLBEC 781, the learned single Judge in paragraph 17 of the judgment after

considering the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the High Court took the view that Section 16-G(3) was a measure of protection to teachers in the institution without intefering with the management's right to take disciplinary action, hence Section 16-G(3)(a) could not be said to offend Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, Again, the matter was considered by another learned single Judge in Shamin Zafar v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, (1992) 1 UPLBEC 598, the learned Judge held that Section 16-G(3)(a) is applicable to minority institutions as well.
 


44. The learned single Judge took into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Xavier College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389; Frank Anthony P.S.E. Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 and Katra Education Society v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 and also the Division Bench cases of this Court in Smt. Joseph Higher Secondary School. Meerut Cantt. v. Ravi Shankar Sharma, 1976 All LJ 527 : (AIR 1976 All 390); J. S. Mahasabha U.L.P. v. D.I.O.S., 1979 ALJ 1970. These decisions, taking contrary view required an authoritative interpretation by a larger Bench. The learned single Judge, in those cases held that the earlier Division Benches which were based on the decisions of St. Xavier College Society case (supra) cannot be taken as a good law after the decision in Frank Anthony P.S.E. Association case (supra). It was further pointed out that in Katra Education Society case the validity of Section 16-A to 16-I of Intermediate Education Act has been held valid by the Supreme Court on the ground of Articles 14, 19 and  of the Constitution. The learned single Judge in the present petition when faced with the situation that earlier decisions of the Division Benches and later decisions of the Hon'ble Judges had taken conflicting views, the matter may be referred to a larger bench of this Court and directed that the records of the case may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for necessary orders.
 


44-A. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice directed the matter lo be placed before Ihe Full Bench. When the matter was placed before the Full Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. N. Khare (as he then was), Sudhir Narain and R. H. Zaidi, JJ., it was found that no specific question of law was framed by the learned single Judge. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the order of the learned single Judge by a detailed reason, the question of law was framed. The order is quoted below :--
 
 



"One of the questions that arises in this case is as to whether Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is applicable to the minority institutions. When this case came up before learned single Judge, he was faced with conflicting decisions on the point raised in this petition and, as such, he was of the view that the question requires consideration by larger Bench. Hon'ble the Chief Justice by an order dated 30-8-1994 referred this case to the Full Bench, this is why this Full Bench has been constituted. Since no question was referred to us, therefore, we ourselves have framed the question which arise out of the order of learned single Judge. According to our view, the following question arises out of Ihe order of learned single Judge :--
 
"Whether Section 16-G(3)(a) of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, is applicable to a recognised and Government aided minority institution which provides for taking of the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools in writing before discharging, removing or dismissing from service or reducing in rank or subjecting to any diminution in emoluments or terminating the service of a teacher of a recognised institution under the Act"?

 


After the question of law itself has been framed by the Full Bench it is now not open to reconsider that the order requesting the Chief Justice to refer the matter toa larger Bench was incompetent. The Supreme Court has cautioned in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 that whenever there is conflicting decision it is appropriate that the matter should be referred to larger Bench. The observation may be quoted here :--
 
 


"Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be Ihrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled.
 

.....
 


The better course would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without

taking upon itself to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other. We have no doubt that when such situations arise, the Bench hearing cases would refer the matter for the decision of a Full Court."


 


45. There is no direct decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that Section 16-G(3)(a) is not applicable to the minority institutions. The Supreme Court decided the validity of the regula-tory measures imposed on minority institutions in various decisions. It is not necessary to repeat all those cases which have already been referred to in the judgment. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, however, have made it clear in State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Sekhar Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 647 that "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of Ihe essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor that logically follows from various observations made in it." "It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and therefrom a judgment and to build upon it."
 


46. In Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. S. G. Mehta, AIR 1963 SC 1436 it was made clear that the cases on the consideration of one Statute are rarely of value in construing another statute, for each case turns on the language with which it is concerned and statutes are not often expressed in the same language. In Rana Pratap Singh v. State, 1996 All LJ 301, the Full Bench was considering a case where the learned single Judge had referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench on the ground that earlier decision of the Full Bench was per incuriam. It was held that when there is binding decision, there is hardly any reason to refer the matter. This decision approved the view taken by Ihe Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritam Kaur v. Surjit Singh, AIR 1984 Punj & Har 113 that even a learned single Judge can refer the matter to larger Bench in respect of the Full Bench decision of the same High Court for certain reason. It was observed (Para 16 of All LJ) :--
 
"From the above, it would follow as a settled principle that the law specifically laid down by the Full Bench is binding upon the High Court within which it is rendered and any and every veiled doubt with regard thereto does not justify the reconsideration thereof by a larger Bench and thus put the law in a ferment afresh. The ratios of the Full Benches are and should be rested on surer foundations and are not to be blown away by every side wind. It is only within the narrowest field that a judgment of a larger Bench can be questioned for re-consideration. One of the obvious reasons where it is unequivocally manifest -that its ratio has been impliedly overruled or whittled down by a subsequent judgment of the superior Court or a larger Bench of the same Court. Secondly, where it can be held with certainty that a co-equal Bench has laid the law directly contrary to the same. And, thirdly, where it can be conclusively said that the judgment of the larger Bench was rendered per incuriam by altogether failing to take notice of a clear-cut statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent. It is normally within these constricted parameters that a smaller Bench may suggest a reconsideration of the earlier view and not otherwise. However, it is best in these matters to be neither dogmatic nor exhaustive yet the aforesaid categories are admittedly the well-accepted ones in which an otherwise binding precedent may be suggested for reconsideration."

 


47. What will be justifiable grounds for making the reference will depend upon the facts of each case. When a decision of the Division Bench is based on the interpretation of a judgment of the Supreme Court in respect of other enactments and, thereafter, the matter is again considered by a learned single Judge after taking into consideration the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court holding that the view taken by the Division Bench is no longer good law and take a contrary view than the view taken by the earlier Division Bench, and when such decision is placed before another learned single Judge the judicial propriety is that he should refer the matter for consideration by a larger Bench.
 


48. In view of the fact that there were conflicting decisions, it was necessary that the question involved in the precedent case should be decided by a larger Bench and the Full Bench having framed the question of law to be answered, the order does not require any review and the reference orderof the learned single Judge, requesting the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to refer the matter to a larger Bench was competent.
 


The discussions, made above, clearly indicate that the provision of Section 16-G(3)(a) is applicable to minority institutions also. Our answer to

the questions framed above is in affirmative.
 


Sudhir Narain, J.
 

49. While concurring the view expressed by Hon'ble U.P. Singh, J. on all points, I may further add that a legislation which confers upon the executive or administrative authority an unguided or uncontrolled discretionary power in the matter of application of law has been held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. For, where the application of law is left to the absolute and unfettered discretion of the administrative authority, there is nothing to guide or control its action. Such legislation will be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. It is, however, not necessary thai guidelines are to be provided in the Statute itself.

50. In Jyoti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602, the provision of Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, was challenged on the ground that there was no guideline provided in'the Act for the exercise of discretion by the competent authority under Section 19(1) of the said Act for granting the permission to execute the decree or not to execute the same. The Court laid down the principle that it is not necessary that the guidelines should be provided in the Statute in specified terms. It was observed (at p. 1609):

"It is not however, essential for the legislation to comply with the rule as to equal protection, that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority, which is to exercise the power which is vested with the discretion, should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself."

51. In Katra Education Society's case (AIR 1966 SC 1307) (supra) the provision of Section 16-G was challenged on the ground that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution but the argument was repelled. In case where a teacher is working in a non-minority institution recognised under the provisions.of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, is dismissed without obtaining prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act, his contention that the provision is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that no guideline has been provided for the exercise of the power under that section, will be repelled but the same teacher when he is dismissed from a minority institution, his argument that guidelines have been provided forexcrcise of the power by the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G(3)(a) will be rejected holding that no guideline has been provided for the exercise of power. The provision shall be taken as hit by Article 30 of the Constitution as the regulatory measure provided therein is without any guidelines. This will be wholly inconsistent. If guideline is provided for exercise of the power by the District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act in respect of non-minority institutions, it cannot be held that there is no guideline provided to him when he exercises the power in respect of minority institutions.

52. The District Inspector of Schools exercises quasi-judicial functions while deciding the rights of a teacher vis-a-vis the Committee of Management. He is to follow the principles of natural justice by giving opportunity of hearing to the Committee of Management and the teacher concerned so as to examine the matter objectively. 'Objectively' means upon a proposal and the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their case. In R. Vs. L. C. C. (1931) 2 KB 215 (233), it was held that 'objectively' means to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition. He has to pass the order after giving opportunity of hearing and looking of the evi-dence on the record. He is to assign the reasons in support of his order.

53. In Union of India v. M. L. Kapoor, AIR 1974 SC 87, where the decision of the Selection Committee was challenged, it was held that it is incumbent upon the Selection Committee to state reasons which should disclose the record of each superseded officer stood in relation with the record of others who were to be preferred. This is in (he context of the effect upon rights of aggrieved persons who are entitled to protection under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that is the only visible safeguard against the injustice and arbitrariness in making the selection. Same principle is applicable while the District Inspector of Schools exercises power in granting or refusing to grant the approval. Considering in this light, there is sufficient guideline provided to the District Inspector of Schools for exercise of the powers conferred upon him under S. 16-G(3)(a) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and there is further safeguard that a right of appeal is provided against his order.

R.H. Zaidi, J.

54. I have read the judgment prepared by learned brother U. P. Singh, J., but with profound respect to him I am unable to agree with the view taken therein. This separate judgment contains reasons for disagreement and my answer to the question under consideration.

55. Relevant facts of the case giving rise to present reference as unfolded in the affidavits filed by the parties are that Sri Guru Nanak Dev Girls Inter College, Saharanpur, hereinafter referred to as the College, is a Government aided and recognised Inter College, which is managed by the Committee of Management, constituted in accordance with the Scheme of Adminisiration approved under S. 16-A of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner was appointed as aTeacher on 8-7-1954 and thereafter on 8-7-1955 she was confirmed on the said post. On 22-5-1957 the petitioner was promoted as Principal of the College and was confirmed on the said post. In the year 1985, the petitioner took 6 months' leave and went abroad. After expiry of the said leave she reported for duty but was not allowed to join. On a complaint dated 27-4-1985 received from District Inspectress of Girls Schools, Saharanpur, against the petitioner, the Committee of Management resolved to conduct an inquiry. The inquiry Committee was set up, which submitted its report on 2p-6-1985. Thereafter, a sub-Committee was formed to inquire into the allegations made against the petitioner. Petitioner was served with charge sheet, in reply to which the petitioner submitted her explanation. Petitioner was, thereafter, suspended by the Committee of Management. On receipt of the report of the Sub-Committee, a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner calling upon her to appear before the Committee of Management in its meeting scheduled to be held on 26-4-1986 and to show cause as to why she be not dismissed from service. Thereafter, on receipt of the reply of the petitioner, a resolution terminating the petitioner from service was passed on 10-5-1986, intimation of which was given to the petitioner on 12-5-1986, in writing. The petitioner, thereafter, according to her own case submitted a representation to Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Saharanpuras well as Secretary, Education Department, Lucknow and Dy. Director of Education, U. R, Lucknow. She also claims to have filed an appeal before the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh against her dismissal. It is further stated that the petitioner received a letter dated 19-12-1987 from the Joint Director of Education, U. P., Allahabad, intimating that no action would be taken on her appeal as the institution, being a minority institution, provisions of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act were not applicable to it. The petitioner, thereafter, has approached this Court and filed the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the resolutions dated 26-4-1986 and 10-5-1986 conveyed vide letter dated 12-5-1986 and also the letter dated 19-12-1987.

56. In the counter affidavit, the facts stated in the writ petition have been controverted by the contesting respondent No. 2. It was stated that the Institution in question was minority institution, declared as such by the State Government and also recognised by the Education Department. It was alleged that on receipt of the complaint in which serious charges of embezzlement of the College funds and mismanagement of the affairs of the College were made against the petitioner and disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with the Regulations framed under the Act, were initiated and concluded and, thereafter, she was dismissed from service in accordance with law. It was asserted that provisions of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act were not applicable in the present case. The petitioner was dismissed from service after following the procedure prescribed under the law and the writ petition filed by her was totally misconcieved and was liable to be dismissed.

57. It may be noted that petitioner herself stated that on the representation filed by her no action was taken by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, and it has not been stated that the appeal was filed before the Regional Dy. Director of Education as provided in the Act by her. Further the Joint Directorof Education (Women), Allahabad, who is alleged to have written the letter dated 19-12-1987 has not been impleaded as one of the respondent in the writ petition.

58. After affidavits were exchanged, the writ petition was heard by one of us (S. N. Agrawal, J.) who found that there were conflicting decisions on Ihe question regarding applicability of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act to the minority institutions. He was, therefore, of the opinion that the question formulated by him required consideration by a larger Bench of this Court. The record of the case was, therefore, directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for necessary orders on 16-7-1993. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, thereafter, directed the case to be listed before the Full Bench consisting three Hon'ble Judges.

59. Since no specific question was referred by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the following question was framed for consideration :--

"Whether Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, is applicable to a recognised and aided Govt. minority Institution which provides for taking approval of the Dist. Inspector of Schools in writing before discharging, removing, dismissing from service, reducing in rank or subjecting to any diminution in emoluments or terminating the service of a Teacher of a recognised Institution under the Act?

60. The matter was, thereafter, heard by us and judgment was reserved. After hearing the learned counsel for parties, perusing the record and relevant decisions on the question referred to above. I am of the considered view that:--

"the question referred to above stands already decided/conduced in negative by a catena of decisions of Supreme Court and this Court, which have got binding effect.

(ii) the question referred to above is redundant in view of change of law; and

(iii) the reference made by learned single Judge was incompetent.

61. Before I deal with the decisions of Supreme Court and High Courts on Ihe aforesaid question, it is necessary to refer to Art. 30 of the Constitution of India and S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act, which are quoted below :

"30. Rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions : (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or langauge, shall have Ihe right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."

(I-A)..... .....

(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language."

"Section 16-G, conditions of service of Head of Institutions, teachers and other employees -

(1) and (2)..... .....

(3) (a) No Principal. Head master or Teacher may be discharged or removed ordismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emolutions, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations.

(b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management.

Provided that in the cases of Punishment, before passing orders, Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, the Head master or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted.

(c) Any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director, Education, against ah order of Inspector under cl. (b), whether passed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1966 within one month from the date of communication of the order to that party, and the Regional Deputy Director may, after such further enquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, confirm, set aside or modify the order, and the order passed by the Regional Deputy Director shall be final. In the case the order under appeal was passed by the very person holding the office of Regional Deputy Director while acting as Inspector, the appeal shall be transferred by the order of the Director to some other Regional Deputy Director for decision, and the provisions of this clause shall apply in relation to decision by that other Regional Deputy Director as if the appeal had been preferred to himself.

(d) .....

62. In Sidhraj Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540, the Apex Court of the country defined the scope of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India as under (para 15):

"The right established by Art. 30(1) is a funda-mental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19, it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institutions, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution, destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1) will be but a 'teasing illusion', a promise of unreality. Regulations wich may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it."

In Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 465, it was ruled by the Supreme Court as under (para 8):

"In our opinion the width of Art. 30(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Art. 29(1) is bastd. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities lo conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational instilulion of their choice. This choice is nol limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstances irrelevant tor the application of Art. 30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case."

63. Again in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others, AIR 1979 SC 52, it was ruled by the Supreme Court as under (Para 32):

"Unlike Art. 19(1) the fundamental freedom under Art. 30(1) is absolute in terms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated in Art. 19 may be subjected to. All minorities, linguistic or religious, have by Art. 30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Art. 30(1) would to that extent he void.

64. Thus the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 30 of the Constitution of India is absolute in terms and the same cannot be subjected even to the reasonable restrictions.

65. In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, case, AIR 1958 SC 956, the Supreme Court was called upon to express its opinion on the constitutional propriety of various provisions of the enactment by the Kerala Legislature including cl. 12(4) which provided that "no teacher of aided schools shall be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the manager without the previous sanction of the authorised officer in the light of Art. 30 of the Constitution, S. R. Das, C. J., speaking for the Court felt pursuaded by consideration of expediency to allow cl. 12(4) as permissible. It was observed as under (at pp. 982-83):

"We have already observed that Art. 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to establish and'(2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice, the right to administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-administer. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of Iheir choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the Slate may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. Learned Attorney General concedes that reasonable regulations may certainly he imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even for recognition. There is no right in any minority, other than Anglo-Indians, to get aid, but, he contends, that if the State chooses to grant aid then it must not say -- "I have money and I shall distribute aid but I shall nol give you any aid unless you surrender to me your right of admin-

istration". The State must not grant aid in such manner as will take away the fundamental right of the minority community under Art. 30(1).

"Power of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or suspension is an index of the right of management and that is taken away by cl. 12(41. These are, no doubt, serious inroads on the right of administration and appear perilously near vio-lating that right. But considering that those provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of cls. 9, 11 and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers, who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes, we are prepared as at present advised, to treat these clauses 9, 11 (2) and 12 (4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions."

66. Thereafter, the Supreme Court considered the scope and applicability of various statutory provisions analogous to S. 16-G(3)(a) in the following cases:--

i) State of Kerala v. Rev Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079.

ii) St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.

iii) Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, AIR 1979 SC 52.

iv) All Saints High School v. State of A. P., AIR 1980 SC 1042.

v) Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311.

vi) Managing Committee of Khalsa Middle School v. Mohinder Kaur, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 26.

vii) Bihar State Madarsa Education Board v. Anjuman Ahle Hadis, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 509.

67. In Rev. Mother Provincial case, AIR 1970 SC 2079 (supra), the provisions of S. 56(2) & (4) of Kerala University Act came to be considered by Supreme Court in the light of Art. 30 of the Constitution of India. Sub-sections (2) & (4) of S. 56 of the said Act provide as under:

"56. Conditions of service of teachers of private colleges..... (1) .....

(3) No teacher of a private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the governing body or managing council without the previous sanction of the Vice-Chancellor or placed under suspension by the Governing body or managing council for a continous period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction.

(3).....

(4) A teacher against whom disciplinary action is taken shall have a right of appeal to the syndicate and the syndicate shall have power to order reinstatement of the teacher in cases of wrongful removal or dismissal and to order such other remedial measures as it deems fit and Ihe governing body or managing council, as the case may be, shall comply with the order."

68. It was held that the aforesaid provisions clearly take away the power of disciplinary action from the governing body and managing council and confer it upon the University, therefore, were held to be ultra vires Art. 30 of the Constitution of India, in respect of minority institutions.

69. In St. Xaviers College case (AIR 1974 SC 1389) (supra), the validity of S. 51A of Gujarat University Act came to be considered by a Constitutional Bench consisting of 9 judges. Section 51A reads as under :

"51. A(1) No member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college and recognised or approved institutions shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and until -

a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on any such penalty proposed to be inflicted on him; and

b) the penalty to be inflicted on him is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf.

(2) No termination of service of such member not amounting to his dismissal or removal falling under sub-section (1) shall be valid unless -

(a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed termination, and

(b) such termination is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any officer of the University "authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person, who is appointed for a temporary period only."

That provisions of aforesaid sections are analo-gous to the provisions of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act read with the Regulations framed thereunder.

70. The Supreme Court by 7:2 majority found that requiring the management to afford opportunity of hearing and representation has been merely regulatory but took serious note of the provisions which confer upon the Vice-Chancellor a power of approval of disciplinary action. Ray, C. J., Palekar, Reddi and Alagiriswami, JJ., held that power as bad for the reason that it was 'undefined' 'arbitrary' and 'unguided' and that the power was intended to be a check on the administration. Khanna, J. shared the view with the majority that the power of approval was in the nature of a veto over disciplinary control by Ihe educational institutions arid was a blanket power: but added alittte more:

"clause (b) of those sub-sections which gives a power to the Vice-Chancellor and officer of the University authorised by him to veto the action of the managing body of the educational institution in awarding punishment to a member of the staff in my opinion, interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. It is significant that the power of approval conferred by cl. (b) in each of the two sub-sections of S. 51A on the Vice-Chancel lor or other officer authorised by him is a blanket power. No guidelines are laid down for the exercise of that power and it is not provided that the approval is to be withheld only in case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service is mala fide or by way of victimisation or other similar cause. The conferment of such blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him for vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of an educational institution makes a serious inroad on the right of the managing body to administer an educational institution. Clause (b). of each of the two sub-sections of S. 51A should, therefore, be held to be violative of Art. 30(1) so far as minority educational institutions are concerned."

Similarly Mathew, J. speaking for himself and Chandrachud, J. was pleased to hold as under:--

"It was argued for the petitioners that clause (1)(b) of S. 51A has the effect of vesting in the Vice-Chancellor a general power of veto on the right of the management to dismiss a teacher. The exact scope of the power of the Vice-Chancellor or of the officer of the University authorised by him in this sub-section is not clear. If the purpose of the approval is to see that the provisions of subsection 51A(1)(b) are complied with, there can possibly be no objection in lodging the power of approval even in a nominee of the Vice-Chancellor but an uncanalised power without any guideline to withhold approval would be a direct abridgement of the right of the management to dismiss or remove a teacher or inflict any other penalty after conducting an enquiry."

71. Thus 7 out of 9 Judges who constituted the Bench held the provisions providing for approval of orders passed by Vice-Chancellor, violative to Art. 30 of the Constitution as the same was a check/restriction on the fundamental right of administration which was uncanalised and unguided.

72. In case of Lilly and Kurian (AIR 1979 SC 52) (supra), the provisions of Ord. 33(4) framed under S. 19(j) of Kerala Universities Act, 1957, were considered. Ordinance 33 provides as under:--

Ordinance 33, Chapter LVII of the Ordinances framed by the Syndicate under S. 19(j) are as follows:--

"33(1) Suspension : The management may at any time place a teacher under suspension where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending. He shall be paid subsistence allowance and other allowances by the management during the period of suspension at such rates as may be specified by the University in each case. The teacher shall have right to appeal against the order of suspension to the Vice-Chancellor of the University within a period of two months from the date of suspension.

(2) Nature of penalties : The following penal-ties may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed on a teacher by the Management :--

(i) Censure

(ii) Withholding of increment.

(iii) Recovery from pay or any pecuniary loss caused to the institution/monetary value equivalent to the amount of increment ordered to be withheld.

(iv) Reduction to a lower rank in the seniority list or to lower grade or post.

(v) Dismissal from service.

The Management shall be the Disciplinary Authority in imposing the penalties."

..... ..... .....

(4) Appeal : A teacher shall be entitled to appeal to the Vice-Chancellor of the University against any order passed by the Management in respect of the penalties referred to in items (i) to (v). Such appeal shall be submitted within a period of 60 days the appellant receives the order of punishment."

73. The question involved in the case was whether an educational institution established and managed by religious and linguislic minorities is bound by the provisions of Ord. 33(4) Ch. LVII of the Ordinance framed by the Syndicate of University of Kerala under S. 19(j) of the Kerala Universities Act, 1957. After considering all relevant cases and the arguments of the parties it was ruled by the Supreme Court as under (AIR 1979 SC 52, Paras 37 and 54) :--

"The conferral of a right of appeal to an outside authority like the Vice-Chencellor under Ordinance 33(4) takes away the disciplinary power of a minority educational authority. The Vice-Chencellor has the power to veto its disciplinary control. There is a clear interference with the disciplinary power of the minority institutions. The State may "regulate" the exercise of the right of administration but it has no power to impose any restriction which is destructive of the right itself. The conferral of such wide powers on the Vice-Chencellor amounts in reality, to a fetter on the right of administration under Art. 30(1). Thus, it seems to us, would so affect the disciplinary control of a minority educational institution as to be subversive of its constitutional rights and can hardly be regarded as a 'regulation' or a 'restriction' in the interest of the institution."

..... ..... .....

"We must accordingly hold that Ordinance 33(4), Chapter LVII of the Ordinance framed by the Syndicate of the University under S. 19(j) of the Kerala University Act, 1969, would not be applicable to an educational institution established and managed by a religious or linquistic minority like St. Joseph's Training College for Women, Ernakulam".

74. In the All Saints High School (AIR 1980 SC 1042) (supra), the validity of provisions of Ss. 3(1) & (2), 4 and 5 of Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, (II of 1975), came into consideration. Sections 3(1) & (2), 4 and 5 referred to above, are extracted below (paras 68 and 69):--

"3(1). Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.

Provided that if any educational institution contravenes the aforesaid provisions, the teacher affected by the contravention shall be deemed to be in service."

3(2). Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority that authority shall approve the proposal, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for the proposal.

4. Any teacher employed in a private educational institution -

(a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or (b) whose pay or allowances or whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, may prefer an appeal to such authority or officer as may be prescribed and different authorities or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private educational institution.

Explanation:-- In this section, the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date."

Section 5 merely provides for transfer of appeal pending before any authority to the Appellate Authority.

75. Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the argument of the parties and its previous decisions on the point was pleased to hold that Ss. 3(1) & (2), 4 and 5 of the Act were invalid and inapplicable to the minority educational institutions as they amounted to a check/restriction on the fundamental right of administration.

76. While dealing with the aforesaid sections, it was ruled by the Supreme Court as under in paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72 of the judgment:--

.....

A perusal of this section would clearly reveal, that while no rules regulating the conditions of service of the teachers employed in private institutions had been made the power to do so has been reserved with the Government. The proviso enjoins that any contravention of the provisions would not affect the teachers who would be deemed to be in service. It is manifest that in the absence of any rules the proviso would have no application. Even if the proviso applies it would amount to a serious inroad on the fundamental right of the minority institutions to administer or manage their own affairs.

.....

The Solicitor General (Mr. S. N. Kacker) submitted that the word 'satisfy' as used in the section is a strong term and regulates the power of the competent authority and the words "adequate and reasonable grounds contain sufficient guidelines to exclude exercise of any arbitrary power. I am, however, unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, it was the inherent and fundamental right of the institution to deal with its employees or teachers and take necessary action against them. If the State wanted to regulate the conditions of service of the teachers it should have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient powers to the management in the manner in which it was to act. Secondly, the induction of an outside authority over the head of the institution and making ils decision final and binding on the institution was a blatant interference with the administrative autonomy of the institution. Sub-section (2) does not contain any provision that while giving approval the competent authority was to ascertain the views of the government body or the managing committee so as to know their view point and the reason why action has been taken against any particular teacher or teachers. Similarly, the words "adequate and reasonable" are too vague and do not lay down any objective standard to judge the discretion which is to be exercised by the competent authority whose order will be binding on the institution. Thirdly, while S. 4 gives a right to the aggrieved teacher to file an appeal before the appellate authority, no such right has been given to the management to file an appeal against the order of the competent authority if it refused to, grant sanction to the order of the managing committee of the institution. Thus, in my option, sub-section (2) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and confers undefined, uncanalised, absolute and arbitrary powers to grant or to refuse sanction to any action taken by the managing committee and almost reduced the institution to helpless position. Such a provision, therefore, not only interferes with the right of the management of the institution but is completely destructive of the right conferred on the institu-tion under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

.....

77. This section gives a right of appeal to a teacher who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and whose services are terminated. No guide-lines are provided in which manner this power is, to be exercised nor does it contain any provision which may entitle the minority institution to be heard by the appellate authority. No principles or norms are laid down on the basis of which the order passed by the institution could be examined by the appellate authority. Even what would amount to misconduct has not been defined or qualified in Ss. 2, 3 or 4. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the appellate Court would exercise this power in deciding whether or not the teacher was guilty of misconduct and what is the correlalion between the degree of misconduct and the appropriate punishment which may have been awarded by the institution and approved by the competent authority. The conferment of such an absolute and unguided power on the appellate authority which if passed against the management it cannot even file acivil suit to set aside this order amounts not only to a direct interference with the right enshrined in An. 30(1) of the Constitution, but makes the minority institution a limp, lifeless and powerless body incapable of effective teaching and/or attaining excellence in the standards of education. Such a course of aciion is bound to hurt the feelings of the founders of the institution. For these reasons, therefore, I am of the opinion that S. 4 is also ultra vires as violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution and would, therefore, have no application to the minority institutions who are appellants in this case.

Section 5 merely provides for transfer of an appeal pending before any authority to the appel-late authority and if S. 4 fails and is inapplicable to the minority institutions S. 5 also follows the same fate and will not apply to the minority institution."

78. In Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association's case (AIR 1987 SC 311)(supra), the validity of provisions of S. 8(2) of Delhi School Education Act, 1973, came as under :--

"8(2). Subject to any rule that may be made, no employee of a private recognised school shall be deemed, removed, dismissed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director."

79. After considering the St. Xaviers' case (AIR 1974 SC 1389) (supra) and after holding that the power of approval given to the Director was violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution of India. It was held in paragraph 20 of the judgment that Ss. 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) do not encroach upon any right of minorities to administer their educational institutions. Section 8(2), however, must in view of the authorities he held to interfere with institutions.

80. Again in Managing Committee, Khalsa Middle School's case (1993 AIR SCW 3006) (supra), the applicability of S. 8(2) of Delhi School Education Act, referred to in Frank Anthony case (AIR 1987 SC 311) (supra) came into consideration with respect to the minority institutions. The validity of the order of termination dated 31 December, 1979, which was passed without prior approval of the Director of Education was upheld on the ground that the institution in question was a minority institution. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under (at p. 3012 of AIR):--

"The impugned order of termination of the services of the respondent was passed on December 31, 1979 i.e. after the school had become a minority institution. The said order cannot, therefore, be held to be in valid on the ground that it was passed in contravention of S. 8 of the Education Act."

81. In Bihar State Madars a Education Board's case (1994 Supp (2) SCC 509) (supra) the validity of Ss. 7(2)(n) and 24 of Bihar State Madarsa Education Board Act, was considered. Sections 7(2)(n) and 24 are extracted below :--

"7(2). Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder, the Board shall have the powers to direct, supervise and control Madarsa education and in particular have the powers.....

(n) to get the Managing Committee of Madarsa constituted in a manner so as to include the Head Maulvi, two donor representatives, one teacher representative, two guardians' representatives and one member nominated by the Board and two other persons interested in Madarsa Education or Islamic studies co-opted by the above seven members."

24. Services of teachers and non-teaching staff-

The services of the approved teachers and non-teaching staff of a recognised Madarsa shall be under the supervision of the Board, subject to the Regulations prescribed under this Ordinance their services shall be controlled by the Board or Madarsa Managing Committee, no teacher of the Madarsa shall be discharged or dismissed from service without the prior approval of the Board."

82. Sections 7(2)(n) and 24 were held to be invalid and violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution of India. It was held by the Supreme Court as under :--

"The reasons adduced by the High Court for striking down these two provisions appear to us unexceptionable as these provisions are patently violalive of Art. 30 of the Constitution. As is evident tremendous control is put in the hands of the Board to meddle with the affairs of the minority institutions. Such control is inconceivable in the scheme of things and specially in the context of Art. 30 of the Constitution. In the situalion, it is for the State Legislature to consider and examine whether it would be prudent and feasible to redraft these two provisions in the manner in which the Board appellant is attempting to have these provisions read down. We do not think that this would be healthy and prudent in the facts and circumstances to redraft legislation by means of judicial interpretation. If the Board wants to assume some power in the context it may have to request the Govt. to introduce legislation in the spirit of Art. 30 of the Constitution to carry out the aims and objects of the Act."

83. In the aforesaid cases, the provisions of Kerala University Act, Gujarat University Act, Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975, the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board Act, which are analogous to S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act have been held to be ultra vires to Art. 30 of the Constitution and not applicable to the minority institutions on the ground that power of approval of the orders of dismissal or termination of service conferred on the authorities has been held to be a check/restriction on the fundamental rights of the minorities and on the ground that the same was arbitrarily unguided and blanket.

84. The validity of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act, also came up for consideration before this court in the following cases :--

i) St. Joseph Higher Secondary School v. Ravi Shanker Sharma, AIR 1976 All 390 (DB).

ii) Jain Shvetambcr Mahasabha, U. P. v. District Inspector of Schools, 1979 All LJ 1070 (DB).

iii) Khalsa Girls Schools v. R. I. G. S. 1982 UPLBEC 504 : (1982 Lab IC 1902).

iv) Management Committee of M. M. Inter College v. Dy. Director of Education, IIIrd Region, Bareilly, 1984 UPLBEC 271.

v) Smt. S. K. Gaur v. State of U. P. 1988 UPLBEC 629 : (1988 All LJ 947) (DB).

vi) Syed Vakil Ahmad v. Managing Committee, B. G. M. Inter College (1994) I All LR 620.

85. This Court in the aforesaid cases, relying upon the decision of Supreme Court referred to above, was pleased to rule that the provisions of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act were inapplicable to minority institutions as the same were check/ restriction on the fundamental rights conferred by Art. 30 of the Constitution of India.

86. In St. Joseph's Higher Secondary School's case (AIR 1976 All 390) (supra) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that (paras 14 and 16):--

"The power conferred on the Inspector is a check on the administration. It is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no facts have been mentioned on the basis of which alone the Inspec-tor may exercise his power. In the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that the power of approval conferred on the Inspector was solely a check on maladministration of the institution. As discussed by the Supreme Court in St. Xaviers' case, such a blanket power directly interferes With the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. The decision in the case of St. Xaviers' case is directly applicable to the present case and accordingly it may be held that the impugned provision is violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

"In the result our answer to the question referred to is that S. 16-G(3)(a) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act is violative of Art. 30 of the Constitution and accordingly is not applicable to an educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority."

.....

In J. S. Mahasabha, U. P.'s case (1979 All LJ 1070) (supra), it was held as under by a Division Bench of this Court (para 7):--

"The order of the State Government recognising Sri Alma Nand Jain Uehtar Madhamik Vidyalaya as a minority community educational institution renders the provision of S. 16-G(3)(a) in applicable to that institution. It must, therefore, be held that the District Inspector of Schools had no power to set aside the decision of the Committee of Management dismissing respondent No. 2 from service on the ground that his prior approval had not been obtained."

87. Yet in another case-of Smt. Saran Kumari Gaur's case (1988 All LJ 947) (supra) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court after taking into consideration the decisions in Mrs. Y. Theclamma case (AIR 1987 SC 1210), Frank Anthony'scase (AIR 1987 SC 311) and All Bihar Christian School Association's case (AIR 1988 SC 305) (supra) as under :--

"After giving our careful consideration to the facts of these cases and the principles laid down in this case, we areof the opinion that the petitioners' contention cannot be accepted and S. 16-G(3) as it stands today gives a blanket power to the Inspector of Schools either to give or to refuse approval and as such is hit by Art. 30(1)."

88. Aforesaid view taken by the Three Division Benches, was followed in all other cases decided by learned Single Judges of this Court.

89. In the teeth of aforesaid authentic pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, there came two decisions of learned single Judges of this Court, taking a contrary view to the view taken by the Supreme Court and Division Benches referred to above.

90. In Committee of Management of Hamadia Girls Degree College v. Dy. Director of Education, IVth Region, (1989) I UPL BEC 78, learned single Judge held that the Division Benches did not take intoconsideration the decision in Mrs. Y. Theclamma's case (AIR 1987 SC 1210) (supra) and in Christian Medical College's case (AIR 1988 SC 37) (supra). Therefore, they had no binding effect on him. Without going into the correctness of the said statement of fact, it may be stated that in Smt. S. K. Gaur's case (1988 All LJ 947) (supra), the Division Bench noticed the cases of Mrs. Y. Theclamma (supra), Frank Anthony (AIR 1987 SC 311) (supra) and All Bihar Christian Schools Association's case (AIR 1988 SC 305) (supra), as it would appear from para 20 of the said judgment, which is extracted below :--

Reliance has been placed on the cases of Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1210. In this case, the case of Frank Anthony P. S. E. Associafion v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311, has been referred and other case relied on in All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305."

91. The Christian Medical College's case (AIR 1988 SC 37) (supra) was not relevant for the controversy involved in the present ease as Mated above. The learned single Judge was, therefore, not right in not accepting the verdict of the Division Benches referred to above. The learned Single Judge without assigning any reason look the view that S. 16-G(3)(a) was a major protection to a teacher without interfering with the management's right to take disciplinary action, therefore, the same was not violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India. In the same decision, learned Single Judge was also pleased to hold that the point was whether S. 16-G(3)(a) conferred blanket poweron the District Inspector of Schools to grant or refuse the approval and whether the said provision was violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India, was a different case than the provision contained in Statutes 24.03 and 24.04 of the First Statute of Allahabad University. The said case was, thus, also sought to be distinguished.

92. The decision in Mrs. Y. Thechimma's case (AIR 1987 SC 1210) (supra) is also not relevant for the purposes of the present case as ildeals with the question of suspension of teacher under S. 8(4) of Delhi Schools Education Act, 1973 and not with the approval of dismissal, removal etc. of Teachers. Section 8(4) of the said Act was not analogous to S. 16-G(3)(a), but to S. 16-G(5) to (8) of the Act.

93. Section 8(2) of Delhi Schools Education Act, 1973, which was analogous toS. 16-G(3)(a) was held ultra vires Art. 30 of the Constitution of India and not applicable to minority institutions in Frank Anthony's case (AIR 1987 SC 311) (supra) as stated above. It was held that S. 8(4) of the said Act did not confer blanket power upon Director and in view of earlier decisions it was held to be valid.

Similarly the decision in Christian Medical College and Hospital Employees Association v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 37, dealt with the maintainability of the claim petition filed under the Industrial Disputes Act by an employee of an educational institution. The same is also not relevant for the purposes of the present case.

94. In Shamim Zafar v. R. I. G. S. (1992) 1 UPL BEC 598, learned single Judge declined to follow the decision of Division Benches on the ground that the decision in Katra Education Societies v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1307 was not brought to the notice of the Division Benches and that the Regulations 25 to 37contained in Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the Act provide sufficient guidelines for exercise of power conferred upon the District Inspector of Schools and same was not it by Art. 30 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid decisions of Division Benches were stated to be per incuriam by the learned single Judge.

95. So far as the decision in Katra Education Societies case (AIR 1966 SC 1307) (supra) is concerned, the same does not deal with Section 16-G(3) (a) of the Act and Article 30 of the Constitution of India at all. In the said case, it was held that the provision of Sections 16-A to 16-1 of the Act were not hit by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India.

96. So far as the regulations framed under the Act are concerned, Regulations 31 to 38 and 40 provide the procedure for taking disciplinary action by Committee of Management against the Principal, Head Master or teacher of the Institutions. Regulations 39, 41 to 43 deal with the suspension of teachers pending enquiry before Committee of Management & Regulation 44 simply provides that the District Inspector of School should communicate his decision within six weeks. They are totally silent with regard to manner and mode of exercise of power by District Inspector of Schools while granting or refusing the approval to the orders of dismissal. removal or reduction in rank etc. passed by the Managements of the Schools.

97. In Windless Steel Crafts v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, 1984 UPL BEC 118 : (1984 Lab IC 781)(F.B.). it was held that:-- (at P. 785 of Lab I.C.) "It is well settled that while interpreting the Statute it is not permissible to read, words into provisions-which are not there. The statute has to be read as a whole and the words used therein must be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The general rule of construction is to look at the words context, collocation and object of such words relating to such matter and then to interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the word under the circumstances. See Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 997."

98. Learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, not right in his submission that District Inspector of Schools has to examine the papers submitted by Committee of Management and on examining them has to form his opinion whether punishment has been imposed following the Regulations or that the same procedure, which is provided for Committee of Management, shall apply before the District Inspector of Schools, when the Regulations are totally silent and do not provide the procedure.

99. In B. M. Lakhani v. Malkapur Municipal-ity,AIR 1970 SC 1002, itwas held that Supreme Court decision is binding on HighCourt. It cannot be ignored on ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. In my opinion, same principle will apply to the decisions rendered by larger bench for the smaller one.

100. Similarly, in Ram Manohar Lohia v. Slate, AIR 1968 Allahabad 100, it was held that a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court remains a binding declaration irrespective of the fact whether all the pros and cons of the matter to which it relates were put forward and argued before it. And this would be specially so when the law declared is in regard to the Constitutionality of a Statute or a rule and in such acase the binding effect of the declaration cannot be measured by or limited to the points raised on behalf of the parties or to which express reference is made in the judgment.

101. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the judgments of the Supreme Court and Division Benches were binding upon the learned Single Judges. It was not open to them to take contrary view from the view taken by the Supreme Court and the Division Benches with respect to the applicability of the provision of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act to the minority institutions.

102. The view taken by the Supreme Court in the said decision and of this Court, except last two single Judge decisions, that the power given to the District Inspector of Schools to approve or disapprove the orders of dismissal etc. passed by the Management of the Institution against the teachers was nothing, but a check/restriction on the fundamental rights of administration and since no guidelines for exercising the said powers of approval or disapproval was provided in the Act or Regulations framed thereunder the same has been termed as unlimited, arbitrary, blanket unguided. untrammalled, blatant and naked, by the Supreme Court and this Court.

103. The provision contained in Regulations framed under Section 16-G, cannot be said to be the guidelines for exercising of power by the District Inspector of Schools. They are simply the guidelines for the Administration to take disciplinary action against the Principal and teachers of the Institutions. Therefore, there is no escape from conclusion that provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) are violalive of Article 30 of the Constitution of India are not applicable to the minority Institutions and the question referred to us stands concluded and decided in negative by authoritative pronoucements by the Supreme Court and this Court referred to above.

104. Now I proceed to deal with the other aspects of the matter.

i) Whether the question referred to above is redundant in view of change of law:

105. It may also be noted that the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982, came into force with effect from 14th July, 1981, except section 21, which tame into force with effect from 1st January; 1984. The objects and reasons for enactment of the said Act read as follows:--

Under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Managements were authorised to impose punishment with the approval of Districl Inspector of Schools in matter pertaining to disciplinary action. This provision was found to be inadequate in cases where the management proposed to impose the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and so it was considered necessary that this power should be exercised subject to the prior approval of the Commission or the Selection Board, as the case may be, which would function as an independent and impartial body." Sections 21 and 30 of the said Act provide as under:--

"21. The restrictions on dismissal etc. of teachers The management shall not except with prior approval of the Board, dismiss any teacher or remove him from service or serve on him any notice of removal from service, or reduce him in rank or reduce his emoluments or withhold his increment for any period (whether temporarily or permanently) and any such thing done without such prior approval shall be void."

30. Exemption to minority institutions:--Nothing in this Act shall apply to an institution established and administered by a minority referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India."

106. Since Section 30 referred to above exempts the minority institutions from application of the Act, therefore, the position that emerges after 1st January, 1984 is that for dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of teachers the provision of Section 21 of the Commission Act will apply and according to Section 30 of the Commission Acl, Section 21 will not apply to the minority Institutions. Thus the intention of the legislature is clear that no prior approval of either the District Inspector of Schools or the Commis-

sion & Selection Board is necessary, in case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank etc. of teachers of the minority institutions. In my opinion Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act stands impliedly repealed by Section 21 read with Section 30 of U. P. Secondary Education Serv ice Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982. Reference was thus, for all practical purposes redundant.

(ii) Whether the reference made by learned, Single Judge was incompetent.

107. In Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari, (1973) 2 SCC 35 : (AIR 1973 SC 291, it was held by the apex Court of the country that:--(at P. 294, Para 8 of AIR) "In the mailer of the interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can aptly be invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed M. R. in the case of Brownse Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn, (1958) Ch. 574 (C.A.), there is well established authority for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged, their affairs should not lightly be dislurbed by a supe-rior Court not strictly bound itself by the decision."

From above noted decision it is apparent that even the Supreme Court declined to upset and unsettle the view taken by the High Court which has been followed in that State for years and directed to adhere to and not to disturb, the same.

108. Apparently, the question under consideration, is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court and Division Benches of this Court, referred to above, no conflicting viewof the Supreme Court or Division Bench has been cited in the referring order. Reliance has been placed instead of decisions of the Supreme Court and Division benches, on two decisions of the learned Single Judges, which in view of the Division Bench decisions referred to above had no binding effect upon the learned Single Judge. Reference has also been made to the cases of Y. Theclamma, AIR 1987 SC 1210 (supra) and Frank Anthony, (AIR 1987 SC 311) (supra). In the said decisions pro-

visions regarding suspension of teachers were held to be invalid, which were not relevant for the purposes of the present case as in the present case thequestion of applicability of Section 16-G(3)(a) is involved and not the question of validity or applicability of the provision of Section I6-G(5) to (8) of the Act to the minority Institutions. It may be noted that under Section 16-G(5) to (8) of the Act, detailed guide lines and procedure of passing an order of suspension against the Head of Institutions or teachers have been given and the validity and applicability of the said provision to the minority institutions is not involved in the present case.

109. The learned Single Judge has also not expressed his opinion that the law laid down by the Division Benches was not a good law. He simply observed that in view of the confiding decision, the question framed by him required consideration by a larger Bench of this Court.

110. In Radhey Sham v. State, 1984 All LJ 666, a Full Bench of this Court comprising three Hon'ble Judges took the view that:-- (Para 22) "Before concluding it may be mentioned that it was contended by the learned Single Judge was not competent to make this reference as the Division Bench decision of this Court in State v. Gyan Chand (Cri Misc. CaseNos. 747 of 1971 and 3318 of 1972, D/- 17-9-1974) (supra) was binding on him. This contention is without force. It was open to the learned Single Judge to refer the question framed by him to a Full Bench for decision as he was not in agreement with the view taken in State v. Gyan Chand (supra)"

111. The aforesaid view, however was disapproved by a larger Bench in Rana Pratap Singh v. State, 1996 All LJ 301 (A Full Bench comprising five Hon'ble Judges) it was held that:-- (Para 20) We are, with respect, unable to concur or accept as correct these observations in so far as they imply that a Single Judge can seek, by reference, reconsideration of a binding decision of the Division Bench and much less that the question framed by him, doubting the correctness of a Division Bench, be referred for decision to a Full Bench."

112. The Supreme Court in T.P. Thakkar v. R. M. Patel, AIR 1968 SC 372, as pleased rule that:-- (Para 8) "Precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reasons for the rule, which makes aprecedent binding in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law."

113. The Full Bench in Rana Pratap Singh's case (1996 All LJ 301) (supra) in the similar circumstances, after noticing several decisions of the Supreme Court and several other decisions and also the Full Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Preetam Kaur Case, AIR 1984 Punj & Har 113, held that the reference made by the learned Single Judge was not competent.

114. In view of the said decisions, the reference made by the learned Single Judge in the present case was incompetent.

115. In view of aforesaid discussions, my answer to the question referred to us is in negative.

BY THE COURT

116. In view of the majority decision, the question framed by us for consideration is answered in affirmative. The writ petition shall now be decided on merit by the learned Single Judge.

117. Order accordingly.