Karnataka High Court
Deputy Commissioner And Special Land ... vs M/S S V Global Mill Limited on 21 October, 2022
Bench: B.Veerappa, K.Natarajan
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.NATARAJAN
REVIEW PETITION No.328/2021
IN
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.3806 OF 2019 [LAC]
BETWEEN:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
VISHWESHWARAIAH TOWERS,
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI DHYAN CHINNAPPA, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
A/W SRI KIRAN KUMAR, HCGP)
AND:
M/S. S.V. GLOBAL MILL LIMITED,
THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
AND MANAGER, HAVING ITS
REGISTERED OFFICE
AT NO.106, ARMENIAN STREET, CHENNAI.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
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AUTHORISED SIGNATORY &
MANAGER, MR.K.JOHNSON.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI SHIRISH KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT)
I.A. NO.2/2022
R. VIDHYASHANGAR
S/O MR. RAMALINGAM,
H7K, TNHB HIG FLAT,
1ST FLOOR, 70TH FEET ROAD,
SP GARDEN, T. NAGAR,
CHENNAI-600017 ... APPLICANT/INTERVENING
IMPLEADING APPLCIANT
(BY SRI N.G.R. PRASAD, ADVOCATE A/W SRI HITESH SINGHVI &
MS. RAMYA SUBRAMANIAN, ADVOCATE
FOR SRI PARAS PANDEY, ADVOCATE)
*****
THIS REVIEW PETITION IS FILED UNDER ORDER 47 RULE 1
READ WITH SECTION 114 OF CPC, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE
ORDER DATED 25.09.2019 IN MFA No.3806/2019.
I.A. NO.2/2022 IS FILED UNDER ORDER 1 RULE 10 READ
WITH SECTION 151 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
PRAYING TO PERMIT THE IMPLEADING/INTERVENING APPLICANT
TO INTERVENE IN THIS REVIEW PETITION AND THUS BE
IMPLEADED AS RESPONDENT NO.2.
THIS REVIEW PETITION AND I.A. No.2/2022 HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, B.VEERAPPA J., MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
The present review petition is filed to review the order dated 25.09.2019 made in M.F.A. No.3806/2019 on the file of the Coordinate Bench of this Court, on the basis of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
2. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the order dated 11.8.2021 permitted the petitioner to withdraw Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.10452/2021 and to approach this Court by filing a review petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relegated the parties back to this Court to argue the point relating to the maintainability of appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894 Act' for short) as the said point was not raised and argued before this Court in the appeal.
I. Brief facts of the case
3. On 7.2.2013, the review petitioner being the Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a preliminary notification under the provisions of Sections 17(2) and 17(4) r/w Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act to acquire 3.16 acres of land out of 24 acres 4 guntas in 4 property bearing No.59/1 sitauted at Binny Mill Road, Bengaluru North taluk, within the BBMP limits, invoking special powers in cases of urgency and same was published in the official gazette on 14.2.2013 and was affixed at convenient places near the land indicating the possession being taken without hearing the objections as contemplated under Section 5A of the 1894 Act and also given wide publications in the newspapers. Accordingly on 18.11.2013 final notification under section 6(1) r/w Section 17(2) of the 1894 Act was issued and possession of the land was secured. On 1.1.2014, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act' for short) came into force. On 8.10.2014 the award came to be passed under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
4. On 29.4.2015, the respondent objected the award passed by the present review petitioner and thereby filed an application for reference. The Special Land Acquisition officer ('SLAO' for short) after receipt of the said application, has made a reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority registered the same in LAC No.33/2017. The reference authority 5 considering both the oral and documentary evidence on record by the judgment and award dated 29.10.2018 allowed the reference in part holding that the respondent is entitled for market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.8624/- per square feet and also compensation under Section 29 of the 2013 Act with all statutory benefits.
5. Aggrieved by the Judgment & Award passed by the reference authority, the review petitioner filed MFA 3806/2019 before this Court. This Court by the judgment & award dated 25.9.2019 dismissed the appeal filed by the review petitioner as being barred by limitation by considering the appeal to have been filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment & award passed by this Court, the review petitioner filed SLP No.10452/2021. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by the order dated 11.8.2021 while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, has permitted the present review petitioner to approach this Court by filing a review petition and argue the point relating to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 54 of the 1894 Act. Hence, the present review petition is filed. 6
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. II. Arguments advanced by Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned Additional Advocate General for the review petitioner
8. Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned AAG for the review petitioner contended that the fundamental issue which arises for consideration before this Court is the extent to which 2013 Act applies to acquisitions that have been started under the 1894 Act, but where award is not made when the 2013 Act came into force. He would contend that under Section 24(1)(a) of 2013 act, all the provisions relating to determination of compensation shall apply, however the question which remains unanswered is whether all provisions of the 2013 Act would apply or only those provisions relating to determination of compensation apply.
9. Learned AAG would further contend that the preliminary notification was issued on 07.02.2013 followed by final notification on 18.11.2013 and the award came to be passed on 08.10.2014 and the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014 and therefore, the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable only for determination of compensation, but the reference has to be filed 7 under Section 18(1) of the 1894 Act. He further contended that once Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applied, the provisions of Sections 25 to 30 of the 2013 Act will apply and no other provisions under the 2013 Act are applicable. He would further contend that the provisions of the 2013 Act which can be applied are only Sections 25 to 30 and all other provisions of the 1894 LA Act will continue to apply including the making of an award, request to make a reference, passing of the award by the reference Court/authority, a challenge thereto etc. In addition, the provisions of the 1894 Act continue to apply for taking of possession, issuance of notification thereto, denotification etc. This clearly indicates that the provisions of the 1894 Act have not been totally repealed, but the limited repeal is only for the purposes of providing a higher compensation as provided for in the 2013 Act by extending some provisions contained therein to acquisitions that are done under the 1894 Act.
10. Learned AAG further contended that the only interpretation possible on a reading of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is that the repeal of the 1894 Act is limited only to the 8 provisions relating to determination of compensation. The provisions of 2013 Act provides for additional compensation and a requirement to provide for Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Section 31 of the 2013 Act provides for the entire process of Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The Collector is required to provide for various aspects as contemplated under Section 31 as well as Schedule II to the 2013 Act. This entire Resettlement and Rehabilitation is part of the compensation mechanism of the 2013 Act. Chapter VI of the Act provides for appointment of an Administrator in terms of Section 43 of the 2013 Act and appointment of a Commissioner for the purposes of rehabilitation and resettlement in terms of Section 44 of the 2013 Act. The entire Chapter VI ending with Section 47 deals with quantification of the rehabilitation and resettlement amount. A bare reading of Schedule II of the 2013 Act indicates very clearly the various sums of money that is payable to the land losers depending on their status, their income, their position etc., as well as for the loss of land. He contended that under the 2013 Act, the compensation payable and resettlement and rehabilitation forms one package to be distributed to the land losers.
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11. Learned AAG would contend that if the interpretation is that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 LA Act applies to provide for the entirety of the compensation provisions, then the provisions relating to Resettlement and Rehabilitation would also automatically apply. The initial draft of Section 24(1)(a) provided for Resettlement and Rehabilitation where the Award had not been made. The provisions of Section 24(1)(a) limits the extent of application of the 2013 Act only to that part which deals with determination of compensation. Such determination can only include within its fold. The provisions of Section 24(1)(a) does not deal with making of an Award. The making of an Award has to be under Section 11 of the 1894, Act but should apply the provisions relating to compensation under the 2013 Act. The Legislature in its wisdom believed that the benefit of compensation under the 2013 Act should be given to those where Awards have not been made as on the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act i.e., w.e.f. 1.1.2014. If the intention of the law makers was that the provisions of the 2013 Act should apply to all acquisitions that are resorted to under the 1894 Act, but where an Award is not made, then there was no requirement to limit it only to the provisions 10 relating to compensation. The intention appears to have been only to extend only the provisions relating to determination of compensation and not to create a situation where the entire 2013 Act is made applicable to acquisitions.
12. Learned AAG would contend that the reference to be made under Section 64 of the 2013 Act to the Authority is also a significant issue. A reference under Section 64 is not merely for the amount of compensation but also for the rights of rehabilitation and resettlement. In making a determination under Section 69 of the 2013 Act, the Authority is required to take into consideration the compensation awarded including the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements and also to check whether the Collector has followed the parameters set out in Section 26 to 30 as well as the provisions of Chapter V of the Act. He would further contend that an Award so made under Section 69 can be challenged before this Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
13. Learned AAG also contended that making of the Award under the 2013 Act is in terms of Section 23. Section 23 requires that the Award shall be made by the Collector as follows: 11
a. True area of the land;
b. Compensation as determined under Section 27
along with the Rehabilitation and Resettlement award as determined under Section 31;
c. Apportionment of compensation;
14. In view of the above, learned AAG contend that making of an award under Section 23 can never occur in respect of acquisitions under the 1894 Act. This is also because of the scheme of the 2013 Act which is as follows:
a. A preliminary notification is issued under Section
11. Various steps have to be taken in this regard.
Prior to issuance of a preliminary notification, a social impact assessment report has to be prepared. The preliminary notification must be issued within 12 months of the social impact assessment report.
b. Thereafter under Section 12, a preliminary survey of the land is carried out and payment is made for any damage that may result therefrom.
c. Hearing of objections for land notified under Section 11 is to be done within sixty days of 12 issuance of preliminary notification under Section
15. d. After issuance of a preliminary notification, a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is to be made by the Administrator in terms of Section 16 which shall be reviewed under Section 17 by the Collector and then once it is so approved it is made public in the local language and duly published under Section 18. This scheme is then notified by the Government.
e. A final declaration is made under Section 19(4) of the Act.
f. Thereafter notice is issued under Section 21 to take possession of land and to allow claims for compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement be made to him. An inquiry is then carried out. g. Thereafter under Section, an Award is made by the Collector under Section 23. In making such award, the provisions of Sections 25 to 30 will apply for compensation and the Collector is also required to pass a Resettlement and Rehabilitation Award in terms of Section 31 of the 2013 Act.
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15. Learned AAG would further contend that the provisions of Sections 11, 12, 13, 13A, 14. 15A, 16, 17, 18 to 22, 25, 26, 28A, Part IV (Sections 29 to 30) relating to apportionment of compensation, Part V (Sections 31 to 33) dealing with payment, Part VI (Sections 35 to 37) dealing with temporary occupation of land, Part VII dealing with acquisition of land for companies, Part VIII dealing with service of notices, penalties for obstructing acquisition of land, Magistrate to enforce surrender; Section 48 which deals with withdrawal from acquisition, Section 49 which deals with acquisition of part of house/building, Section 50 acquisition for local authority or company and other provisions including the appellate provision i.e., Section 54 continue to apply to all notifications for acquisition issued under the 1894 Act. He would contend that under the 1894 Act, acquisition is completed only after taking of possession as land vests in the Government only after such taking of possession.
16. Learned AAG would further contend that Section 114 deals with repeal of the 1894 Act. Section 114 preserves the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. A 14 right to approach a Court or to file an appeal is a valuable right and would have to be specifically repealed.
17. Learned AAG would further contend that Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority constituted under Section 51 of the 2013 Act is not a Court much less a Civil Court, given the bar on jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 63. When the right to approach a Court is taken away, the same has to be specifically done. The right to approach a Court is a valuable right and cannot be taken away, especially where the repeal is a limited one as contemplated under Section 114 of the 2013 Act. He would further contend that the right to file an appeal is an equally valuable right which cannot be taken away unless specifically so done. The mere fact that the Government of Karnataka has issued a notification declaring the Authority to be one of the Judges of a Civil Court does not make the Judge the "Civil Court". That will be violative of Section 63 of the 2013 Act. In the circumstances, learned AAG would contend that the appeal lies under Section 54 of the 1894 Act and not under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and sought to allow the review petition.
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18. In support of his contentions, learned AAG relied upon the following judgments;
(i) Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and paragraphs - 125, 126, 162, 191, 284, 287, 288 and
295.
(ii) Others reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 {relevant (ii) The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd v. Mahesh and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1034 (relevant paragraphs - 7, 8, 10 and 18)
iii) Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry (AIR 1957 SC 540), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised that a right to appeal is a substantive right, is a vested right and exists on the date of initiation of the proceeding first. Such vested right can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise (relevant paragraphs - 23,24).
III. Arguments advanced by Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
19. Per contra, Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent brought to the notice of the Court that under the 2013 Act -
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(i) Section 11 provides for preliminary notification;
(ii) Section 19 provides for final notification;
(iii) Award under Section 23 includes rehabilitation etc;
(iv) Under Section 25, twelve (12) months time is prescribed to pass Award.
(v) Section 69 provides for determination of compensation, as contemplated under Sections 26 to 30.
20. Sri Udaya Holla further contended that once Reference Petition is made to the Authority under Section 64, determination has to be made under Section 69. Once the Reference Authority determines the compensation under Section 69, appeal lies to this Court under Section 74 within 60 days from the date of the reference. He further referred to Rule 29 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement (Karnataka) Rules, 2015. He also contended that under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, all the provisions relating to determination of compensation shall apply. Thereby learned senior counsel would contend that the provisions of Section 17 74 of the 2013 Act would apply to the appeal in question and sought to dismiss the review petition.
21. In support of his contentions, Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and others reported in (2020)8 SCC 129 (relevant paragraphs - 26, 96, 165, 191, 366.1, 366.2)
(ii) Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation reported in (2022)2 SCC 772 ( paragraphs 18, 20, 21, 22, 23).
(iii) Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Rajeev L.Sangtani and others reported in (2019)5 MahLJ 889 (Full Bench) .. (relevant paragraphs- 83, 84, 85, 87, 88,89).
IV. Point for determination
22. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the only point that would arise for our consideration in the present Review Petition is: 18
"Whether the Miscellaneous First Appeal No.3806/2019 filed by the review petitioner before this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act is maintainable, when the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 i.e., after 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014, in the facts and circumstances of the present case ?"
V. Consideration
23. It is not in dispute that the review petitioner/Special Land Acquisition Officer ('SLAO' for short) has proposed for acquisition of land measuring 3 acres 16 guntas in property bearing No.59/1, Ward No.29, within the limits of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahangara Palike, out of the larger extent of 24 acres 4 guntas, belonging to the respondent, situated on Binny Mill Road, Bengaluru North taluk. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner issued preliminary notification on 7.12.2013 under the provisions of Section 17(2) and 17(4) r/w Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, invoking special powers in cases of urgency and the same was published in official gazette on 14.2.2013. Subsequently, final notification under Section 6(1) r/w 17(2) of the 1894 Act came to issued on 19 18.11..2013 and possession of the land was secured on the same day.
24. It is also not in dispute that 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014. Thereafter, the SLAO proceeded to pass the award on 8.10.2014 fixing the market value of the acquired land at Rs.4,620/- per square feet with all statutory benefits. The respondent being not satisfied with the market value fixed by the SLAO in respect of the acquired land, has filed an application (protest petition) to make reference to the authority contemplated under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of the market value for the acquired land. The SLAO on receipt of the application, has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority registered the same in L.A.C. No.33/2017. Before the reference authority, the landlord examined as PW.1 and got marked the documents as per Ex.P1 to Ex.P34 and the present review petitioner/respondent has not adduced any evidence nor produced any documents. The reference authority considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, has allowed the reference and fixed the market value of the acquired 20 property at the rate of Rs.8624/- per square feet instead of Rs.4,620/- per square feet, awarded by the Special LAO with all statutory benefits.
25. It is an undisputed fact that though the acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 after the 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014. Thereby, the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act are applicable, which reads as under:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land 21 Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any order, stay, suspension or 22 injunction issued by any Court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in a Court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose, shall be excluded.
26. A careful perusal of the said provisions make it clear that where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, all provisions of 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. Where an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made before the 2013 Act came into force, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act contemplates that in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an award under the said section 11 has been made, five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it is so chooses, shall initiate the 23 proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of 2013 Act.
27. The 1st proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 contemplates that where the award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. The 2nd proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24 contemplates that in computing the period referred to in this sub-
section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any order, stay or suspension or injunction issued by any Court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken, but the compensation is lying deposited in a Court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose, shall be excluded.
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28. It is not in dispute that 2013 Act operates prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed.
29. By examination of phrasing of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, we would prefer to read the words "all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation" in said section as including the period of limitation in Section 25 of the 2013 Act. To elaborate, the word "all" and the expression "relating to" used in Section are required to be given a wide meaning to ensure the legislative intent. The expression "relating to" or "in relation to" are words of comprehensiveness which may have a direct as well as indirect significance depending on the context. The expression "relating to" when used in legislation normally refers 25 to "stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer, to bring into association with or connection with". Therefore, the expression "relating to" when used in legislation has to be construed to give effect to the legislative intent when required and necessary by giving an expansive and wider meaning. Given this trend in interpretation, the words "all the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation" must not be imputed a restricted understanding of the word "relating" only to the substantial provisions on calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given an expansive meaning. From the above, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature is to provide expansive and wider application in relation to applicability and scope of Section 24 of the 2013 Act.
30. It is also not in dispute that the respondent/landlord being not satisfied with the market value fixed by the SLAO in respect of the acquired land, has filed an application (protest petition) to make reference to the authority contemplated under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of the higher market 26 value for the acquired land. Accordingly, the SLAO on receipt of the application, has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority registered the same in LAC No.33/2017.
31. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 64 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
"64. Reference to Authority.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, as the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested:
Provided that the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate Authority:27
Provided further that where the Collector fails to make such reference within the period so specified, the applicant may apply to the Authority, as the case may be, requesting it to direct the Collector to make the reference to it within a period of thirty days.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made--
(a) person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire:
Provided further that the Collector may entertain an application after the expiry of the said period, within a further period of one year, if he is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the period specified in the first proviso."28
32. A careful perusal of Section 64 of the 2013 Act depicts that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, as the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested: Provided that the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate Authority
33. At this stage, it is also relevant to refer to Sections 23, 69 and 74 of the 2013 Act, which read as under:
"23. Enquiry and land acquisition award by Collector.-On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 21, to the measurements made under section 20, and into the value of the land 29 at the date of the publication of the notification, and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement, shall make an award under his hand of--
(a) the true area of the land;
(b) the compensation as determined under
section 27 along with Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Award as determined under section 31 and which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and
(c) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, or whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him.
[23-A. Award of Deputy Commissioner without enquiry in case of agreement of interested persons. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 23, if at any stage of the proceedings, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Deputy Commissioner in the form prescribed by rules made by the State Government, he may, without making further 30 enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement.
(2) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (1) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other land in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908), no agreement made under sub-section (1) shall be liable to registration under that Act.]
69. Determination of award by authority.-(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired including the Rehabilitation and Resettlement entitlements, the Authority shall take into consideration whether the Collector has followed the parameters set out under section 26 to section 30 and the provisions under Chapter V of this Act.
(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Authority shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of 31 the preliminary notification under section 11 in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation.--In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded.
(3) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Authority shall in every case award a solatium of one hundred per cent. over the total compensation amount.
74. Appeal to High Court.-(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
(2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and 32 endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, ―High Courtǁ means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated."
34. Once the Authority as contemplated under the provisions of Section 64 decides the reference and award the compensation based on the material evidence on record, the requiring body or any person aggrieved by the award passed by the authority under the provisions of Section 69 of the 2013 Act may file an appeal to the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act within sixty days from the date of award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Sub- section (2) of Section 74 contemplates that every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. 33
35. As stated supra, 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014 and the award passed in the present case on 8.10.2014. Thus, the award came to be passed subsequent to the 2013 Act came into force, thereby automatically the provisions of Section 24 (1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable. Once the SLAO determines the compensation under the 2013 Act, the aggrieved party may request the authority to make reference to the authority as contemplated under Section under Section 64.of the 2013 Act for determination of market value for the acquired land. Once the reference authority determines the compensation under section 69, then the aggrieved party has to file an appeal under section 74 of the 2013 Act within the time stipulated. Thereby the MFA filed by the review petitioner before this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act was not maintainable.
36. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority - vs- Manoharlal reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129, wherein at paragraphs - 26, 96, 165, 191, 366.1, 366.2 it is held as under: 34
"26. The context of Section 24, the learned counsel urged, is to provide for a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the 2013 Act is brought into force w.e.f. 1-1-2014. The purpose and object of making this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis-à-vis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that where acquisition proceedings under the LA Act have reached an advanced stage and investment of public money had already been made, firstly, the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as far as possible, the landowners also can, without disturbing the process of acquisition, be given the compensation under the 2013 Act.
96. Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act read with the non obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions of the 2013 Act, relating to the determination of compensation would apply. However, the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act. It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the 2013 Act came into force shall continue, and taken to their 35 logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1)(b) is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act.
165. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29-8-2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with respect to Section 24 thus:
"... The Hon'ble Member has also raised question about retrospective clause. This is about Section 24 under which it has been provided that if the award has not been passed under the previous law than the new law will be applicable. Secondly, if the award has been passed and no compensation has been given and no physical possession has been taken the new law will be applicable. The third situation where this clause 36 will be applicable is when award has been passed but farmer has not been given more than 50% compensation which will entail enforcement of this law. The Hon'ble Member and several others have raised this apprehension that this Act will ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In regard to this apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed time-limit at every level of the procedure and I hope that the States will adhere to these timelines."
191. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no award is made in a pending acquisition proceeding; in such event all provisions of the new Act relating to determination of compensation would apply. Section 24(1)(b) logically continues with the second situation i.e. where the award has been passed, and states that in such event, proceedings would continue under the 1894 Act. Section 24(2) -- by way of an exception, states that where an award is made but requisite steps have not been taken for five years or more to take possession nor compensation has been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of the steps has been taken, then the proviso can operate. Time is the essence. It is on the basis of time-lag that the lapse is provided and in default of payment for five years as provided on failure to deposit higher compensation is to 37 be paid. It is based on that time-lag higher compensation has to follow. It is not the mere use of colon under Section 24(2) but the placement of the proviso next to Section 24(2) and not below Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is not permissible to alter a placement of the proviso more so when it is fully in consonance with the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) completely obliterates the old regime to the effect of its field of operation. Under Section 24(1)(a), there is a partial lapse of the old regime because all proceedings, till the stage of award are preserved. The award, in such proceedings, made after coming into force of the 2013 Act has to take into account its provisions, for determination of compensation. Thus, proceedings up to the stage of the award are deemed final under the old Act. In the case under Section 24(1)(b), the old regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to Section 24(2) and in part the new regime for payment of higher compensation in case of default for 5 years or more after award.
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
38
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed."
37. Our view is also fortified by the judgment in the case of Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. v. Mahesh reported in (2022)2 SCC 772, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 24(1)(a), 25(1) and 114(1) & (2) of the 2013 Act and Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, has held at paragraphs 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 as under:
"18. In para 295 of Indore Development Authority, the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act operates prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Our 39 interpretation of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act respectfully follows this precedent.
20. We begin by examining the phrasing of clause
(a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. We would prefer to read the words "all the provisions relating to determination of compensation" in Section 24(1)(a) as including the period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act. To elaborate, the word "all" and the expression "relating to" used in Section 25 are required to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the legislative intent. The expressions "relating to" or "in relation to"
are words of comprehensiveness which may have a direct as well as indirect significance depending on the context. [State Wakf Board v. Abdul Azeez Sahib, 1966 SCC OnLine Mad 80 : AIR 1968 Mad 79]
21. Similarly, interpreting Section 129-C of the Customs Act, 1962, this Court while giving the phrase "in relation to" a narrower meaning of direct and proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for purpose of assessment, did observe that ordinarily the phrase "in relation to" is of a wider import. [Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320] Several cases assigning a wider import to the expression 40 "relating to", in view of the contextual background, find reference in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta [Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] .
In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co (1984) 4 SCC 679] , this Court held that the term "in relation to", when used in the context of arbitration clause, is of widest amplitude and content.
22. In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale [1995) 2 SCC 665] the expression "relating to"
in the context of the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has been held to be comprehensive in nature that would take in its sweep all types of suits and proceedings which are concerned with recovery of possession. Broad and wider interpretation was again preferred in Doypack Systems (P) Ltd.v. Union of India [ (1988) 2 SCC 299] , observing that the expression "in relation to" is a very broad expression which presupposes another subject- matter. In Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. [Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299] , in the context of Section 3 of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986, the expression "relating to"
was held to mean "bring into association or connection with". [Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 41 (1988) 2 SCC 299, para 50] The words are comprehensive and might have both direct as well as indirect significance. The decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. [Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] refers to Corpus Juris Secundum, wherein the expression "relating to" has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous with as to "concerning with" and "pertaining to". It has been observed that the expression "pertaining to" is an expression of expansion and not of contraction.
23. The expression "relating to" when used in legislation normally refers to "stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer, to bring into association with or connection with". [ See judgment of Mitter, J. (para 308) in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.] Therefore, the expression "relating to" when used in legislation has to be construed to give effect to the legislative intent when required and necessary by giving an expansive and wider meaning. Given this trend in interpretation, the words "all the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation" must not be imputed a restricted understanding of the word "relating" only to the substantial provisions on 42 calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given an expansive meaning so as to include the provision on limitation period for calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the 2013 Act."
38. Our view is further fortified by the judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation v. Rajeev L. Sangtani, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1492, wherein the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court while considering the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act has held at paragraphs 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 as under
"83. Shri Dhakephalkar would then urge that the Act, 2013 takes away an accrued right of appeal to the Supreme Court, against a decree passed by the High Court, which was available under section 54 of the Old Act. Under section 74 of the Act, 2013, only one appeal is provided to the High Court against an award passed by the Authority under section 69 of the Act. If the right to make a reference is construed to be a vested right, which accrues to a land owner upon the acquisition of land, then right of appeal to the Supreme Court, provided under section 54 deserves to be recognized and protected. Thus, reference to the Authority under section 43 64 would take away this vested right of appeal, urged Shri Dhakephalkar.
84. Though the aforesaid submission appears alluring at the first blush yet, on a close scrutiny, it does not carry much conviction. Under section 54 of the Old Act, it was provided that from a decree of the High Court, on appeal against an award by the Reference Court, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code. It would be suffice to note that section 110 of the Code was omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act) 1973. It would be contextually relevant to note that in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra), it was observed that having regard to the contents of Article 135 and sections 109 and 110 as adapted, it may be stated that, broadly speaking, matters in respect of which, appeal would have been competent under section 109 and 110 of the Code, will now be governed by Article 133, if the judgment, decree or final order, appealed against is made after the Constitution, and other matters by Article
135. Moreover, the basis of the value of the subject- matter of the suit, which gave a right to appeal was also omitted from Article 133, which had been amended by the Constitution (30th Amendment Act, 1972), with effect from 27th February, 1973. Thus, the later part of 44 the provisions of section 54 of the Old Act, which envisaged a further appeal to the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code, was a spent provision. To sum up, no such right of appeal to the Supreme Court existed and could be enforced under section 54 of the Old Act.
85. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that a cumulative reading of the provisions of section 24(1)(a) with section 114; the provisions of sections 28 to 30, which have incorporated significant changes in the matter of determination of compensation by the Collector; the provisions of section 51, which have provided a new forum; the provisions of section 69, which again herald a material departure in the approach of the Authority adjudicating the claim, raising objection to the award, and the provisions of section 63, which expressly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, leads to an irresistible inference that under the Act, 2013, there is a clear and unmistakable intendment to provide a new forum constituted under section 51 read with section 64 of the Act, 2013, instead of Reference Court. We are, therefore, of the view that even in the cases where an award is passed after the enforcement of the Act, 2013, though the acquisition was initiated under the provisions of the Old Act, reference objecting to the award made by 45 the Collector is required to be made to the Authority constituted under the Act, 2013.
87. We have observed that the words, "all provisions"
are required to be construed in their plain, natural and common sense. There is no quarrel over the proposition that the Collector is enjoined to consider the parameters prescribed in sections 26 to 30 while determining the compensation. We have indicated that such restricted interpretation of the expression, "all provisions would do violence to the plain and literal meaning of the said expression. If the parameters of determination of compensation, provided in sections 26 to 30, indubitably fall within the ambit of the said expression, the controlling and enabling provisions under section 23, which empower the Collector to make an award, inter alia, providing for the compensation as determined under section 27, and apportionment thereof, a priori would fall within the ambit of the said expression.
88. The matter can be looked at from another angle. If the submission that only the parameters provided in sections 26 to 30 are to be taken into account while determining the compensation, and the award is to be passed under the Old Act, and a reference objecting to such an award is to be made before the Reference Court 46 under section 18 of the Act, then clause (a) of sub- section (1) of section 24 would be required to be read and construed in completely different manner. To accord with such construction, clause (a) should read as under:
(a) where no award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. Provided that the provisions of sections 26 to 30 of this Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply.
89. Such a course is simply impermissible and fraught with hazards. Firstly, there is no authority for such substitution of the legislative prescription; secondly, there would be no effect to the will of the legislature to repeal the Old Act; and thirdly, the distinction between the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24 would be completely obliterated. We have, therefore, extracted above, under the caption interplay between clauses (a) and (b), the judgments of the Supreme Court pointing out the well marked distinction between clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24." 47
39. Learned AAG while arguing with regard to the extent to which 2013 Act applies to the acquisitions that have been started under the 1894 Act, but where award is not made when the 2013 Act came into force, has mainly contended that the provisions of the 2013 Act which can be applied are only Sections 25 to 30 and all other provisions of the 1894 Act will continue to apply relating to making of an award, request to make reference, award by the reference Court/authority and challenge thereto etc., According to the learned AAG, in the present case, though award passed after the 2013 Act came into force, the reference has to be made only under Section 18(1) of the 1894 Act and after passing of the award by the reference Court, the aggrieved party may file an appeal before this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable.
40. The contentions of the learned AAG cannot be accepted in view of the words, "all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply" used in Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. Admittedly, in the present case, the preliminary notification came to be issued on 7.2.2013 followed by 48 final notification on 18.11.2013 under the provisions of the 1894 Act and the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 under the provisions of 2013 Act and therefore, the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable, thereby all provisions of 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. Therefore, in the present case, the reference has to be made only under the provisions of Section 64 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 18 of the 1894 Act and after passing of the award by the reference authority under Section 69 of the 2013 Act, the aggrieved party may file an appeal before this Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act. Hence, the contention of the learned AAG that appeal lies under Section 54 of the 1894 Act, cannot be accepted.
41. As stated supra, once the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies to the case on hand, then the provisions of 2013 Act to pass award, request to make a reference, award by the reference authority and challenge thereto, automatically applies. Admittedly in the present case, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the 49 reference authority passed the award as contemplated under Section 69 of the 2013 Act and therefore, automatically the provisions of Section 74 of the 2013 Act applies for filing the appeal before this Court. Thereby, the contention of the learned AAG that 1894 Act is applicable for all other purposes, is without any basis and cannot be accepted.
42. Learned AAG relied upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540, wherein the question that was referred to the Full Bench is:
"Does the appeal against the decree in a suit in which the valuation of the relief claimed according to the law in force at the date of the plaint was more than Rs.5000 but, at the time of appeal is less than Rs.5000 owing to the amendment of the Court Fees Act, lie to the High Court or to the district Court ?".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the said reference at paragraph-23 of the judgment as under:
50
"23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides 51 expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise."
43. The said proposition of law has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the question that arose for consideration is as to whether the appeal lies under Section 74 of the 2013 Act or Section 54 of the 1894 Act. 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014. Admittedly, in the present case, the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 under the provisions of 2013 Act i.e., after the new Act came into force. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24 (1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable and the reference has to be made only under Section 64 of the 2013 Act to the reference authority and the reference authority has to determine the compensation under Section 69 of the 2013 Act. Then the appeal lies to this Court under section 74 of the 2013 Act. Therefore, the said judgment is no way helpful to the review petitioner.
44. The limited scope and issue in the instant review petition is relating to maintainability of appeal under Section 54 of the 1894 Act alone. In pursuance of the directions issued by the Hon'ble 52 Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal No.10452/2021, this Court considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that the award passed under the provisions of 2013 Act, is of the considered opinion that the appeal filed under section 54 of the 1894 Act is not maintainable and the aggrieved party has to file appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
45. This Court by the judgment & award dated 26.9.2019 rightly dismissed MFA No.3806/2019 as being barred by limitation by considering the appeal to have been filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act. There is no error apparent on the face of the record as contemplated under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
46. Our view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Madhusudhan Reddy, vs. V. Narayana Reddy and Others reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 685, wherein at paragraph-26 it is held as under: 53
"26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in 54 Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as "for any other sufficient reason". The said phrase has been explained to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule"
47. Our view is also fortified by the judgment in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure has held at paragraphs 15, 18, 19 20.1. and 20.2 held as under:
15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under
: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9) "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.55
In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined :
(AIR p. 1377, para 11) '11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is 56 reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."57
18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter.
The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., [(2006) 5 SCC 501] held as under : (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12) "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be 58 exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of 'second innings' which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due 59 diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.60
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order,
undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."61
VI. Conclusion
48. For the reasons stated above, we answer the point raised in the present review petition in the negative holding that the Miscellaneous First Appeal No.3806/2019 filed by the present review petitioner before this Court is not maintainable under Section 54 of the 1894 Act and the appeal lies under Section 74 of the 2013 Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, the review petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of any merit.
VII. ORDERS ON I.A. No.2/2022 FOR IMPLEADING
49. The present application is filed by the impleading applicant (Mr. R. Vidhyashangar s/o Mr. Ramalingam, H7K, TNHB HIG Flat, 1st Floor, 70 Feet Road, SP Garden, T. Nagar, Chennai) under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying to implead him as Respondent No.2 in the present Review Petition.
62
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by the order dated 11.08.2021 made in Special Leave to Appeal © No.10452/2021 has given liberty to the applicant to file an application for impleadment/intervention in the Review Petition, which shall be considered subject to the objections that may be raised by the respondent.
VIII. Case of the impleading applicant
51. In the affidavit accompanying the application, the impleading applicant has stated that the reference authority by the judgment & award dated 29th October 2018 made in L.A.C. No.33/2017, has allowed the reference made by the SLAO under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act in the following terms:
(a) Respondent is entitled for market value of its acquired property measuring 3 acres 16 guntas at the rate of Rs.8624/- per sq ft instead of Rs.4620/- per sq.ft. awarded by the Review Petitioner/SLAO;
(b) Under Section 29 of the 2013 Act, Respondent is entitled for compensation of Rs. 55,53,400/- as 63 determined by the Review Petitioner/SLAO for the building and things attached to the acquired property such as compound wall etc.;
(c) Market value is to be multiplied in this case with factor 'one' (1)as per Section 26(c) of the 2013 Act as contemplated in First Schedule appended to the Act; and
(d) Respondent is entitled to additional compensation of 75% of the total compensation as determined under Section 27 of the 2013 Act and 100% solatium of the total compensation under Section 30 of the 2013 Act. An interest, on the amount calculated at the rate of 12% under Section 69(2) of 2013 Act from the date of publication of notification, until passing of award or taking of possession of acquired property, which-ever is earlier, was also awarded. Further, interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the excess amount from the date of taking over of possession of the acquired property i.e., from 16.01.2014 for the first year and interest at the rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent years till deposit of entire compensation amount under Sections 72 and 80 of 2013 Act was awarded.64
52. It is further case of the impleading applicant that the review petitioner filed appeal before this Court and this Court dismissed the appeal on the issue of limitation without rendering any findings on merits. By way of the present application, the applicant seeks to intervene in the review petition to bring to the notice of the Court certain vital factors, for just and proper adjudication of the present matter. The Applicant contends that the facts enumerated hereinunder will also save hundreds of crores of public funds or even thousands of crores from being squandered in a clandestine and illegal manner. It is further contended that the Applicant, a long-standing shareholder of M/s Binny Limited and its demerged entities including the Respondent herein, believes that companies should make profit only through ethical means and not at the cost of public exchequer. Further, it is clarified that the instant Application is not being filed by the Applicant in the capacity of the shareholder of the Respondent. The present Application has been filed purely in the public interest. In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that, if public interest demands, intervention by third parties would be permitted by the courts.
65
53. It is further contended that M/s Binny Ltd. had its textile mill in the city of Bengaluru right from the year 1900. The textile mill originally owned a land admeasuring 4,45,448 sq. meters (110 Acres) for the mill, staff quarters and ancillary facilities, and attracted the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 (ULCRA Act') after its enactment. That pursuant to the enactment of the ULCRA Act, an exemption under section 20(1) of Act was sought by M/s Binny Ltd by making an application before the State of Karnataka. It is learnt that the State of Karnataka vide its order dated 15.12.1978 granted the exemption subject to following conditions:
"(a) the exemption is operative as long as the land is utilised for industrial purpose.
(b) the entire land utilisation should be completed within a period of five years from the date of this order.
(c) any deviation in implementing the project proposed or land utilisation should have the prior approval of the Director, Commerce and Industries, Bangalore.66
(d) this exemption is granted based on the facts and information furnished by the applicant. If any of the facts and information etc. are found to be false or incorrect, the exemption so granted stands cancelled.
(e) the applicant should not transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease of otherwise the lands exempted without prior permission of the Government and such permission shall be subject to such conditions as Government may deem fit to impose".
54. That the State of Karnataka considered the request for exemption under the UCLRA Act only because the land was utilized for manufacturing of textile goods and readymade garments which is expedient in the public interest. This is evident from the fact that the order for exemption is only valid until such the time the land is used for industrial purposes. Therefore, the time period of the exemption granted was limited, it was from the date of the exemption till such time the land was used for industrial purposes. When land is put to any other use, the time period for the exemption ends and the exemption is no longer operative. 67
55. It is further contended that over the years, it appears that, M/s Binny Limited had sold the major portion of the very same land for which exemption under section 20 of ULCRA Act was granted by the State of Karnataka. Further, the operations of the textile mill ceased way back in the year 1998-99. At the time of closure of the Mill, it was left with about 28 Acres of land. It is apposite to note that neither the Review Petitioner nor the Respondent have brought this most significant fact to the notice of the Courts.
56. Subsequently, the Madras High Court sanctioned a scheme of demerger of M/s Binny Ltd. Accordingly, the applicant believes, the said land of about 28 Acres came to be vested with the respondent herein, which was also one of the demerged entities of M/s Binny Ltd. It is submitted that even though the Respondent styled itself as 'SV Global Mill Limited', in reality, it is a company primarily operating in Real Estate activities. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the Respondent can be said to be a "Mill" engaged in textile production. More importantly, there is no income from any industrial activity in the Respondent company. 68
57. Subsequently, the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) exercising the powers vested in him under the provisions of the 1894 Act, issued a notification dated 07.02.2013 under section 4(1) for acquisition of 3 Acres and 16 Guntas of land out of 23.44 Acres purportedly owned by the Respondent. The SLAO fixed the market value of the land @ Rs. 4620/- per square feet, awarding a total compensation of Rs.142.56 crore and an addition of interest on delayed compensation amounting to Rs.12.26 crore. The Applicant has strong reasons to believe that this acquisition process, which is highly questionable, glossed over Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
58. It is learnt that the respondent accepted the valuation and received the amount under protest and, thereafter, filed a protest petition before SLAO, requesting to make a reference to the Authority contemplated under the 2013 Act. Thereafter on the reference made, the Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore by the judgment & award dated 29.10.2018 valued the land @ Rs. 8624/- per square feet and granted the additional compensation along with damages, etc. amounting to Rs. 207.76 Crores and 69 further interest on the additional compensation. The same is in contravention of Section 26 read with Section 11 of the 2013 Act. It is contended that the Review Petitioner, before the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, had pointed out that the compensation fixed was as per the 2013 Act which will not apply to the present case. However, it is submitted that the same was not appreciated in the right perspective by the Learned Trial Court.
59. In the light of the above factual background, the applicant seeks to bring to the notice of the Court the following aspects:
a) First and foremost, it is submitted that the entire parcel for land was allowed to be held by the M/s Binny Ltd., the predecessor of the Respondent, in the city of Bangalore solely on account of the exemption granted vide Notification dated 15.12.1978 under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act.
Most importantly, the exemption was granted on a condition that it will operate only for industrial activity. It is submitted that the Respondent undisputedly ceased the industrial activities several years back.
70
b) Secondly, neither the State of Karnataka nor the Review Petitioner have brought to the notice of the court, the lapse of the time period of the exemption granted under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act, which survives even after the repeal of the said Act by virtue of Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Section 3 of Repeal Act, reads as under:
3. Savings (1) the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of section 20 or any action thereunder, taken notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary;71
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub section (1) of section
20.
(2) Where -
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.
c) It is submitted that in view of the clear mandate of the Savings provision under Section 3(1)(b) of the abovementioned Repeal Act, the Review Petitioner or the State of Karnataka, was statutorily bound to repossess the land which was 72 in illegal possession of the Respondent, when the industrial activity in the land ceased. As stated in the earlier paragraphs, the exemption ceased to be operative and the time period during which the exemption was valid concluded, once the industrial activity was no longer being carried out in the company. Needless to state, the usage of land by the Respondent for any other purpose, other than for which the exemption was granted, clearly violate or breach the conditions of exemption. Hence, the Review Petitioner ought not to have acquired 3.16 Acres from the Respondent for such an exorbitant price of over Rs. 400 Crores, when the land would have perforce vested in the State on account of violation of the conditions of the exemption order.
d) The act of the Review Petitioner has thereby caused a huge loss to the public exchequer and, in turn, unduly benefited the Respondent. More importantly, the failure on the part of the State and the Review Petitioner to act as the custodian of public interest, at the threshold, has given teeth to the Respondent to seek further compensation of over Rs.250 Crores.
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e) The Applicant bonafide believes that the issue of non-compliance or breach of the exemption conditions, as stated above, was never raised at any stage before the Court below as both the judgments do not record any such discussions on the same.
f) It is most respectfully submitted that on strict interpretation of Repeal Act of 1999, harmoniously read along with the exemption Notification dated 15.12.1978, the entire parcel of land with the Respondent ought to have been vested with the State Government, especially when the industrial activity ceased to operate for which exemption was granted in the very first place.
g) The Applicant submits that the Respondent in collusion with the Government officials, was in illegal possession of the land of about 24 Acres and it has received more than Rs. 160 Crores as compensation for the parcel of land which it is not entitled to and is further pursuing for getting additional compensation at the cost of the taxpayers and the public. This is nothing but a malfeasance by the Authorities.
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h) It is submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in 1st Order, has clearly observed the laxity on the part of the State and its officers for the delay in filing the MFA. It is further submitted that the latches on the part of the State and its officials for extraneous reasons is writ at large, as the financial implication to the exchequer is over Rs. 400 Crores which only benefits a private party. Further, the Applicant has strong reasons to believe and doubt that several high-ranking officials could be hand in glove with the Respondent and the said actions of the Authorities are marred by the malafide.
i) The role of the private party for causing the delay in filing the appeal and the latches on behalf of the Review Petitioner also deserves to be looked into thoroughly. If there is any culpability on the part of the Respondent or the Review Petitioner, the same should be dealt with accordingly. Under the given circumstances, the issue of limitation ought to be reconsidered in public interest.
60. It is further case of the applicant that the Review Petitioner has acquired the 3.16 Acres of land in public interest to decongest the railway infrastructure in the city of Bengaluru, which 75 was necessitated by the growing population of the city and the urgent need for better public transport. It is unfortunate that the State instead of enforcing its rights under the law with the strongest case, is agitating peripheral grounds.
61. It is also contended that disturbingly, the Review Petitioner Authority, for reasons best known to it, has not been diligent in defending/pursuing the underlying case. In this regard, the findings of the High Court are as under:
a. There has been laxity on the part of the Appellant in appearing before the concerned Officer in the reference court so as to receive the certified copy of the award for the purpose of filing the appeal.
b. The application seeking condonation of delay is not filed under the proviso to Section 74 (1) of the 2013 Act. It is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Ignorance of law is no excuse. In the instant case, there is a blatant ignorance of law on the part of the Department.
62. In the circumstances, the impleading applicant prays to implead him as Respondent No.2 in the present review petition. 76
IX. Objections to the impleading application on behalf of the respondent
63. The respondent filed objections and contended that the application and the accompanying affidavit consist of false, vexatious and frivolous averments and therefore, the impleading application deserves to be dismissed in limine with exemplary costs.
64. It is contended that the present review petition has been filed by the Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer seeking review of the Judgment dated 25.09.2019 in MFA No. 3806/2019 passed by this Court, pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 11.08.2021 in SLP No. 10452/2021.
65. It is contended that the expression "person interested" is defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act as including the following categories:
"(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act;77
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who have lost any forest rights recognised under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007);
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws including share-croppers by whatever name they may be called; and
(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be adversely affected;"
66. In terms of Section 21 of the Act, the collector is required to notice and hear only the persons interested before passing orders in respect of the acquisition. This is clearly indicative of the fact that it is only a person interested who can maintain an objection to the land acquisition proceedings, under the scheme of the Act.
67. Admittedly, the intervening/impleading applicant here is not a person interested in terms of the Act. Consequently, the 78 intervening/impleading applicant neither has a legitimate interest nor is a necessary or proper party to the proceedings. The Applicant who falsely claims himself to be a 'public spirited person has not approached this Court with clean hands. The Applicant is holding 1 (one) share together with his wife in folio no, 12033200 08872884 has been making various false allegations against the company without any basis in various forums since last 3 years. All such frivolous complaints made have been closed by various authorities upon hearing the response of the Respondent herein. Hence, the intervention application is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed in limine.
68. It is further contended that the claim of the intervening applicant that he is a shareholder in the respondent company also does not entitle him to intervene in the land acquisition proceedings pertaining to the property of the company. It is settled law that a shareholder does not have any interest in the property of the company while the company is a going concern and hence cannot be termed to be a necessary or proper party or a person interested in proceedings pertaining to the property of a company. 79
69. It is contended that the instant Review Petition deals specifically with only one point, i.e., the question of maintainability of the appeal under section 54 of 1894 Act. It is contended that a completely incorrect and unrelated factual aspects cannot be raised in review proceedings, either in the petition itself or by way of an intervention/impleading application, and that too by a person who was not a party in any of the earlier proceedings in relation to the dispute at hand.
70. It is contended that ownership of land is undisputed. No issue of ownership of the land in question arose before the learned Courts below or this Court or before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Consequently, a non-existent and irrelevant issue cannot be raised in review proceedings, and that too at the instance of an intervenor who is not even a 'person interested' in terms of the Act.
71. The claim of the applicant that he is a 'public-spirited person' is denied. On the contrary, the Applicant along with his wife jointly holding only 1(one) share in the equity capital of the Respondent company. The Applicant has been making various false allegations against the company without any basis in various 80 forums since last 3 years. All such frivolous complaints made have been closed by various authorities upon hearing the response of the Respondent herein. Recently, the Applicant made one such frivolous complaint making false allegations against the Respondent before SEBI on 08.01.2021. Thereafter, a detailed Response was filed by the Respondent herein vide Response dated 11.02.2021. Upon examining the same, SEBI was pleased to close the complaint vide e-mail acknowledgement dated 23.03.2021. As such, the very baseless allegations made in the instant application itself shows that the Applicant has not approached this Court with clean hands and has filed the instant application with malafide intention. Further, since the instant application itself is not maintainable, the application for direction also is liable to be rejected at the outset.
72. The Applicant has approached this Court only to mislead this Court by suppressing various facts. The Respondent is the resultant Company from Binny Limited, based on the Scheme of De-merger as approved by the High court of Judicature of Madras. The Respondent Company was incorporated in 2007 under the Companies Act, 1956 and is listed with Bombay Stock Exchange 81 Ltd. The Respondent is the owner of various properties in Bangalore and in Chennai also was the owner of the property in question prior to its acquisition. The larger property including the property in question ie., Municipal. Nos.59/1 and small portion of Municipal No.59 (which were acquired by the government) were initially purchased by The Bangalore Wollen Cotton and Silks Mills Ltd., a textile manufacturing company through various sale deeds between the periods 1885 and 1978. Pursuant to the purchase, the properties were converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose and the said property was in the ownership and possession of The Bangalore Wollen Cotton and Silks Mills Ltd. During 1969, the then High Court of Mysore at Bangalore vide Order dated 03.10.1969 was pleased to sanction the scheme of amalgamation wherein "The Bangalore Woollen and Cotton Silk Mills Ltd., merged to 'Binny Limited'. As such, all the properties of "The Bangalore Woollen and Cotton Silk Mills Ltd.' including the Property in question stood transferred to 'M/s. Binny Limited'. Further, on 26.04.1979 M/s. Binny Limited made an ex-change cum sale deed with Bangalore Mahanagara Palike for an extent of 12834 Sq.ft; thus the total extent coming to 10,20,528 sq.ft. Pursuant to the 82 aforementioned merger, M/s. Binny Limited continued to be the lawful owner and in peaceful possession of all its properties including the Property in question. Meanwhile, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'ULC Act') came into force and as such, an exemption order dated 15.12.1978 under Section 20 (1) of the ULC Act was issued in favour of M/s. Binny Ltd. It is pertinent to note that the ULC Act was repealed vide Repealing Act, 1999. However, pursuant to the repeal of ULC Act coming into force, M/s. Binny Ltd., underwent loss of business and was declared a sick industrial company under Section 3 (1) (o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. As such, as per directions of the High Court of Madras, the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as BIFR) vide Order dated 22.10.2003 sanctioned the scheme for rehabilitation Subsequently, the High Court of Judicature at Madras vide Order dated 22.04.2010 was pleased to sanction the scheme of arrangement wherein 'M/s. Binny Limited' demerged into 'M/s. Binny Limited', "M/s, S.V. Global Mill Ltd.' and M/s. Binny Mills Limited'. In view of the said scheme of arrangement being sanctioned, all the properties in Bangalore 83 belonging to M/s. Binny Limited including the Property in question were transferred to the Respondent herein. As such, the Respondent in pursuance to the said scheme of arrangement sanctioned by the Madras High Court during 2010 became the lawful owner and was in possession of the Property in question. The Respondent has remained in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the larger Property including the Property in question from the date of execution of the scheme of arrangement as sanctioned by High Court of Judicature at Madras during 2010. However, it was only pursuant to the initiation of acquisition of the property in question that the possession of 3 Acre and 16 Guntas was taken by the Petitioner only on 16.01.2014. Further, the relevant Khatha certificate and the encumbrance certificate depict the name of the Respondent as the lawful owner of the Property. Therefore, the Applicant by suppressing material facts is trying to mislead this Court and hence the instant application deserves to be rejected at the outset. Copy of the Order dated 22.04.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras alongwith the Scheme of Arrangement is also produced along with the objections. 84
73. It is contended that in the instant case, the land to the extent of 3 Acre and 16 Guntas has been acquired by the State and pursuant to the Award made by the SLAO dated 24.11.2014, an amount of Rs. 153,59,63,348/- was paid by the Government to the Respondent. However, the Respondent received the said amount under protest and thereafter reference was made under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for enhancement. The very act of the State in acquiring the land and disbursing part of the compensation itself shows that there is no dispute as regards ownership and entitlement for compensation. The Applicant without having any locus cannot approached this Court on such grounds especially at this stage of proceedings and hence the instant application is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
74. It is further contended that the Applicant has no locus to question the legality of the proceedings either before this Court or Hon'ble Supreme Court or the Trial Court in the instant matter inasmuch as the Applicant is neither an 'interested party' under the 2013 Act nor is a necessary or proper party to the instant proceedings.
85
75. The entire basis on which the Applicant has approached this Court is misconstrued and with malafide intention and hence the application deserves to be dismissed in limine. The Applicant in guise of being an intervener is trying to convert the instant private lis into public interest litigation which is impermissible and illegal and contrary to the rule of law, more particularly in matter dealing with subject matters of land acquisition. The Applicant has no locus to question the veracity or legality of the actions of the State or any Court or Authority in the instant lis inasmuch as the Applicant was neither a party nor an interested party. The Applicant is neither the owner nor claims any interest over the property in question nor has any nexus in any manner relating to the acquisition proceedings. On this ground alone, the impleading application deserves to be rejected.
76. It is further contended that the Applicant has suppressed the fact before this Court that the Applicant has already filed a representation to the Petitioner - state on 11.06.2021 which the Applicant had stated in his Application before the Supreme Court. 86 This is a deliberate exercise of suppressio veri suggestio falsi and this itself is sufficient cause to reject the instant application. On these among other grounds, the respondent sought to reject the impleading application.
77. The State Government has not filed any objections for the impleading application.
78. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the application for impleading.
X. Arguments advanced by Sri N.G. R. Prasad for Sri Paras Pandey, learned counsel for the impleading applicant.
79. Sri N.G.R. Prasad for Sri Paras Pandey, learned counsel for the impelading applicant while reiterating the averments made in the impleading application, has contended that the applicant is share holder of the respondent/company and present application is filed in public interest since in the name of the acquisition, the respondent is going to benefit crores of rupees meant for public. He filed the written submissions in the office on 26.9.2022, which reads as under:
87
"I. The following issues are being brought to light by the Intervening Applicant
a) First and foremost, it is submitted that the entire parcel for land was allowed to be held by the M/s Binny Ltd., the predecessor of the Respondent, in the city of Bangalore solely on account of the exemption granted vide Notification dated 15.12.1978 under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act (Ref Page No:38 to the documents submitted along with the intervening application filed by the intervening applicant). Most importantly, the exemption was granted on a condition that it will operate only for industrial activity. It is submitted that the Respondent undisputedly ceased the industrial activities several years back. A specific assertion to this effect was made by the Intervening Applicant and the same is not disputed or denied by the Petitioner and the Respondent.
b) Secondly, neither the State of Karnataka nor the Review Petitioner have brought to the notice of the court, the lapse of the time period of the exemption granted under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act, which survives even after the repeal of the said Act by virtue of Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.88
c) It is submitted that in view of the clear mandate of the Savings provision under Section 3(1)(b) of the abovementioned Repeal Act, the Review Petitioner or the State of Karnataka, was statutorily bound to repossess the land which was in illegal possession of the Respondent, when the industrial activity in the land ceased. As stated in the earlier paragraphs, the exemption ceased to be operative and the time period during which the exemption was valid concluded, once the industrial activity was no longer being carried out in the company. Needless to state, the usage of land by the Respondent for any other purpose, other than for which the exemption was granted, clearly violate or breach the conditions of exemption. Hence, the Review Petitioner ought not to have acquired 3.16 Acres from the Respondent for such an exorbitant price of over Rs.
400 Crores, when the land would have perforce vested in the State on account of violation of the conditions of the exemption order.
d) The act of the Review Petitioner has thereby caused a huge loss to the public exchequer and, in turn, unduly benefited the Respondent. More importantly, the failure on the part of the State and the Review Petitioner to act as the custodian of public interest, at the threshold, has 89 given teeth to the Respondent to seek further compensation of over Rs. 400 Crores.
e) The Applicant bona fide believes that the issue of non-compliance or breach of the exemption conditions, as stated above, was never raised at any stage before the Court below as both the judgements do not record any such discussions on the same.
f) It is most respectfully submitted that on strict interpretation of Repeal Act of 1999, harmoniously read along with the exemption Notification dated 15.12.1978, the entire parcel of land with the Respondent ought to have been vested with the State Government, especially when the industrial activity ceased to operate for which exemption was granted in the very first place.
g) The Applicant submits that the Respondent, in collusion with the Government officials, was in illegal possession of the land of about 24 Acres and it has received more than Rs. 160 Crores as compensation for the parcel of land which it is not entitled to and is further pursuing for getting additional compensation at the cost of the taxpayers and the public. This is nothing but a malfeasance by the Authorities.
90
h) It is submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in 1st Order, has clearly observed the laxity on the part of the State and its officers for the delay in filing the MFA. It is further submitted that the latches on the part of the State and its officials for extraneous reasons is writ at large, as the financial implication to the exchequer is over Rs. 400 Crores which only benefits a private party. Further, the Applicant has strong reasons to believe that several high-ranking officials could be hand in glove with the Respondent and the said actions of the Authorities are marred by the malafide.
i) The role of the private party for causing the delay in filing the appeal and the latches on behalf of the Review Petitioner also deserves to be looked into thoroughly. If there is any culpability on the part of the Respondent or the Review Petitioner, the same should be dealt with accordingly. Under the given circumstances, the issue of limitation ought to be reconsidered in public interest. II. For the sake of brevity, the Intervening Applicant has out forth the objections raised by the Respondent and the responses provided by the Intervening Applicant.
91Objection by Respondent Response by intervening applicant Only "person interested" as 1) The term "person interested" has defined under Section 3(x) nowhere been used in relation to the of the Right to Fair right to intervene.
Compensation and "person interested" throughout the Transparency in Land Act has only been used in reference Acquisition, Rehabilitation to notices to be sent by the and Resettlement Act, 2013 collector, enquiries to be raised by can object and maintain the collector and objections to be objections to the land made by such person interested.
acquisition proceedings The Act does not restrict, by this definition, the right to intervention by a person, such as the Applicant seeking to bring to light facts crucial in public interest.
The Intervening Applicant came to know about the extent of proceedings and the award compensation only subsequent to the MFA 3806 of 2019, the Order of the High Court which publicly made available. Subsequent to the Intervening Applicant coming to know about the compensation and the violations of exemption, the 92 Intervening Applicant pursued the matter by filing an intervention application before the Hon'ble Supreme court of India in SLP No. 10452 of 2021, Therefore, from the date of knowledge, the intervening applicant has pursued the matter.
The Intervening Applicant Under Order 1 Rule 8A of the Code holds one share and has of Civil Procedure 1908, a person in approached the Hon'ble public interest may be permitted to Court with unclean hands. intervene and take part in the The Applicant is neither a proceedings, irrespective of whether proper or necessary party. they are a necessary and proper party. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent that the Applicant is not a necessary and proper party and that the Applicant is an "interested party" since the Applicant holds one share is irrelevant to the instant case. The instant case is not a public interest litigation and therefore the fact that the Applicant holds one share would not hold relevant. The test therefore for permitting the Applicant to intervene would be as per Order 1 93 Rule 8A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The above named Applicant/ Intervening Applicant is a senior citizen and a public-spirited person.
The Applicant is also a renowned social activist and crusader against corruption. The Applicant is a member of Anti-Corruption Movement', which is a registered entity fighting against corruption for the past more than two decades. In this respect, it is pertinent to point out that the complaints filed by the Applicant with the regulators/authorities against the statutory violations, non-transparent manner of functioning and related party transactions of companies has ensured due compliance of the law by several companies.
Ownership of the land is These judgments have passed sub- undisputed. No issue of silentio, because this fact has never ownership has arisen been brought to light. Therefore, the before, either before the issue of ownership not being 94 lower courts or the disputed is a non-starter, given that Supreme Court. the Courts were not aware of the same.
Applicant has made several While it is correct to state that the allegations against the Applicant had approached SEBI on Respondent. Even a 08.02.2021 by way of a complaint complaint before SEBI was regarding a related party transaction filed and SEBI closed the entered by the Respondent, it may complaint. Applicant has be relevant to state that the not approached with clean complaint was closed only after the hands. Respondent explained its position including that "even though the transaction has been approved, the same has not yet been implemented due to various reasons".
Pursuant to the scheme of The Scheme of Arrangement does arrangement passed by the not guarantee title to the said Madras High Court, the properties. In any event, as stated Respondent became the earlier, the issue of the exemption lawful owner of the order no longer being valid passed properties in question sub-silentio before the lower courts. While the Intervening Applicant has sought a limited prayer of permitting the Intervening Applicant to intervene in the said matter and put forward the above positions, the Intervening Applicant submits that the circumstances necessitate that this 95 Hon'ble Court also directs for an investigation to commence against the Respondent pertaining to the validity of the exemption of the properties exempted under the exemption order 15.12.1978."
XI. Arguments advanced by Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel for the respondent on the impleading application
80. Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel for the respondent while reiterating the averments made in the objections filed to the impleading application, has contended that the applicant has no locus to file the impleading application in the present review petition and he has not challenged the order dated 22.4.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Annexure-R1) along with the scheme of arrangement declaring the respondent as the lawful owner in possession of the land in question. He would further contend that the impleading applicant has neither challenged the initiation of the acquisition proceedings by the State in the year 2013 nor challenged the award and he is only a holder of one share in the company and therefore, the impleading application is not maintainable. The ownership of the respondent is not questioned either by the State while acquiring the land in 96 question or the impleading applicant. The present impleading application is filed in the present review petition in collusion with the review petitioner only to deprive the respondent from taking the benefit of the award passed by the reference authority though the respondent is legally entitled for the same. The applicant has not come to the Court with clean hands and suppressed the material facts of the case and he has no locus to question the legality of action of the State or any authority of acquiring the land and passing the award. In the present review petition, the only point to be determined is with regard to maintainability of the appeal under Section 54 of the 1894 Act as per the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the SLP. Further, the applicant is not a 'person interested' as defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act. Therefore, learned senior counsel sought to dismiss the application with exemplary costs.
XII. Point for Determination
81. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the only point that would arise for consideration is:
97
"Whether the impleading application filed by the impleading applicant under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w 151 CPC is maintainable and as to whether the impleading applicant has made out any case to implead him in the present review petition in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case?"
XIII. Consideration
82. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent - M/S S.V. Global Mill Limited is originally owner of larger extent of land measuring 110 acres as admitted by the impleading applicant in paragraph-11 of the application. It is also not in dispute that the respondent has alienated some of its properties and as on the date of the notification issued to acquire the land of the respondent, 24 acres 4 guntas belong to the respondent - M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited. The preliminary notification issued by the SLAO on 7.2.2013 for acquisition of 3 acres 16 guntas out of 24 acres 4 guntas in Sy.No.59/1 invoking urgency clause followed by the final notification dated 18.11.2013 and subsequently the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 i.e., after the 2013 Act came into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014 and the SLAO awarded the compensation at the 98 rate of Rs.4,620/- per square feet. Admittedly, the present applicant, who is holding one share together with his wife in the respondent company has not challenged the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government admitting the ownership of the respondent in respect of the property in question nor challenged the award passed by the SLAO under the provisions of 2013 Act. It is also not in dispute that the respondent being aggrieved by the award, has filed the protest petition to make reference to the authority contemplated under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of the higher market value for the acquired land. The SLAO on receipt of the application, has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority registered the same in L.A.C. No.33/2017. The applicant if really interested in the property, he should have filed an application for impleading before the reference authority. Admittedly, the reference authority considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, has proceeded to award compensation at the rate of Rs.8624/- per square feet. The said award passed by the reference authority has not been challenged by the applicant. The SLAO being aggrieved by the judgment & award passed by the reference 99 authority, has filed MFA No.3806/2019 before this Court. This Court by the judgment & award dated 25.9.2019, has dismissed the appeal filed by the present review petitioner on the ground of limitation. From the date of initiation of acquisition proceedings in the year 2013 till the proceedings ended in MFA No.3806/2019 at the instance of the State Government/DC & SLAO, the applicant was fence-sitter. On that ground also, the present application is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
83. It is also not in dispute that the scope of the present review petition is limited only to decide the question with regard to maintainability of the appeal under Section 54 of the 1894 Act, in pursuance of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No.10452/2021. In the application, the applicant at one breath has stated that he is a share holder and in another breath, he has stated that the application is filed purely in public interest. It is not the case of the State Government or the applicant that the respondent is not the owner of the property in question. Once the State Government admitting the ownership of the respondent in respect of the property in question, has initiated the acquisition 100 proceedings and passed the award and paid the compensation to the respondent in terms of the award passed by the SLAO, the applicant is estoped to contend that the respondent is not entitled to the compensation amount. Though the applicant contended the exemption order passed by the State Government under Section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 subject to certain conditions, no document is produced for violation of any conditions.
84. Throughout it is the case of the State Government before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that appeal lies under section 54 of the 1894 Act before this Court against the order passed by the reference Court/authority and not under Section 74 of the 2013 Act. The applicant except stating that the present application filed in public interest, has not stated what is the locus standi to question the acquisition proceedings when the payment of the compensation amount as per the award having been allowed and the proceedings under the 1894 Act and 2013 Act attained finality. As stated supra, the applicant is a fence-sitter till disposal of the MFA before this Court and when the matter reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court, 101 applicant sought for permission to file an application for impleadment/intervention in the review petition. Accordingly, while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, applicant is given liberty to file an application for impleadment/intervention before this Court which shall be considered subject to objections that may be raised by the respondent.
85. At this stage, it is relevant to state that 'person interested' is defined under the provisions of Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
"3(x) ―person interestedǁ means--
(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act;
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest
dwellers, who have lost any forest rights
recognised under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007);
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;102
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws including share-croppers by whatever name they may be called; and
(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be adversely affected;"
86. By careful perusal of the said provisions, it makes it clear that the applicant has not come under any of the categories as contemplated under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act. On that ground also, the application is liable to be rejected.
87. It is well settled that the applicant who is a share holder of the company does not have any interest in the property of the company while the company is going a concern and hence he cannot be termed to be necessary and proper party or interested party in the proceedings, at this stage of the review petition filed by the petitioner under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
88. Throughout the proceedings, the ownership of the respondent in respect of the land in question is not in dispute. No 103 issue of ownership was raised either before the acquisition or after the acquisition. In fact, the issue of ownership was not raised either in the reference proceedings or before this Court in the MFA and the applicant was a fence-sitter and for the first time, he filed an impleading application in the present review petition just to harass the respondent though, he has no locus standi and wasted precious public time. The conduct and attitude of the applicant has to be deprecated.
89. In the objections, it is specifically contended by the respondent that the applicant has been making various false allegations against the company without any basis in various forums since last three years and all such frivolous complaints made have been closed by various authorities. In fact one frivolous complaint filed by the applicant against the respondent before the SEBI on 8.1.2021 and the SEBI closed the complaint on 23.3.2021.
90. It is also to be stated that the respondent in pursuance of the scheme of arrangement sanctioned by the Madras High Court on 22.4.2010 became the lawful owner and was in possession of the property in question till the date of acquisition by the petitioner. 104 The same has been suppressed by the applicant in the present application. The assertions made by the respondent in the objections to the impleading application including the order dated 22.4.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Annexure-R1) so also the Scheme of Arrangement and receipt of the acquisition amount by the respondent before the LAO, have not been challenged by the impleading applicant. According to the appellant, the present application for impleading is filed in public interest, but the applicant has not shown how the public interest is involved when the acquisition proceedings in respect of property of the respondent were initiated in the year 2013 itself. In the absence of the same, the application for impleading is not maintainable in the present review petition filed by the review petitioner/Deputy Commissioner & SLAO under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
91. Learned counsel for the impleading applicant relied upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smriti Madan Kansagra -vs- Perry Kansagra reported in 2021 SCC OnLine 909 with regard to 'fraud vitiates everything'. Admittedly 105 in the present case, the State has admitted the ownership of the respondent in respect of the property in question and the impleading applicant has not made out any fraud on the part of the State Government in its action to initiate the acquisition proceedings in respect of the property belonging to the respondent, thereby the said judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
92. Learned counsel for the impleading applicant also relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ramaiah -vs- Shivalingaiah reported in 2016 SCC OnLine kar 4501 with regard to scope of intervention. In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge of this Court dealt with power of the Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in the proceedings. The said judgment has only persuasive value and not applicable to the facts and circumstance of the present case.
93. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant in respect of exemption granted under Section 20 of the 106 Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
94. The present application is filed by the impleading applicant, who all along the fence-sitter only to harass the respondent and wasted precious time of the Court. The experience of this Court depicts that in recent years there has emerged a trend of filing speculative litigations before various Courts of law, not just in the Court of first instance, but also in the High Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is the duty of the Courts to ensure that such litigations shall be weeded out at the first instance rather than allowing to be festered and thereby coming in the way of genuine litigants seeking justice treating the Court as "Temple of Justice" and to protect precious public & judicial time of the court.
"This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system".
95. Like any other organ of the State, the Judiciary is also manned by human beings - but the function of the judiciary is distinctly different from other organs of the State - in the sense its function is divine. Today, the judiciary is the repository of public faith. It is the trustee of the people. It is the last hope of the 107 people. After every knock at all the doors fail, people approach the judiciary as the last resort. It is the only temple worshipped by every citizen of this nation, regardless of religion, caste, sex or place of birth. It is high time the judiciary must take utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. We must remember that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm outside.
96. Viewed from any angle, the applicant has no locus standi to come on record in the present Review Petition. Thereby, the application is liable to dismissed with costs.
XIV. Conclusion
97. For the reasons stated above, the point raised is answered in the negative holding that the impleading application filed by the impleading applicant under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w 151 CPC is not maintainable and the applicant has not made out any case to implead him in the present Review Petition, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. 108
XV. Result
98. In view of the above, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Review Petition is dismissed as devoid of any merit.
(ii) I.A. No.2/2022 filed by the impleading applicant is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.2,00,000/-
(Rupees two lakhs only) payable by the 'impleading applicant/R. Vidhyashangar' to the Advocates' Welfare Fund within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE Gss/-