Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhagwan Singhkanyal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 February, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY DWIVEDI
ON THE 17th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 21250 OF 2022
BHAGWAN SINGH KANYAL & OTHERS
VS.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER
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Appearance:
Shri Manoj Sharma - Senior Advocate assisted by Ms Lavanya Verma
- Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Abhijeet Awasthy - Deputy Advocate General for the
respondents/State
Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal - Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Rahul
Rawat and Shri A.S. Khan - Advocates for the intervenor.
Shri Akash Choudhary - Advocate for the intervenor.
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Reserved on: 12.08.2024
Pronounced on : 17.02.2025
ORDER
Petitioners have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of gradation list - Annexure P/1 pertains to Inspector (Special Armed Forces) and also asking correction in the seniority list by giving them proper placement as per Rule 12(1)(a) of 2 the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 (for short "Rules, 1961"). The petitioners are also seeking quashing of the order dated 22.02.2024 (Annexure P/11), which has been passed during the pendency of the petition and by way of amendment the said relief has also been added in the relief clause and the order dated 22.02.2024 has been filed as Annexure P/11.
2. The respondents and the intervenors have denied the claim of the petitioners and submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed inter- alia on the ground that it suffers from delay and laches.
3. Considering the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of record, to answer the questions involved in the case, it is apt to mention the facts of the case, which in a nutshell are as under:-
4. The petitioners are working as Inspectors (SAF) in the State Police Department. They had been recruited in the years 1999, 2000 and 2007 (Annexure P/2 to P/4) respectively on the post of Platoon Commander and, as mentioned in the petition, their seniority is maintained as per the provisions of Rules, 1961, particularly as per Rule 12 of the said Rules.
4.1 As per the orders Annexure P/2 to P/4, all the selected candidates were required to undergo the basic training and after completing the said training successfully, inter-se seniority of the incumbents had to be determined in view of the result of the marks obtained in the final examination of the said training. It is averred in the petition that although in the appointment orders such precondition pertaining to seniority being 3 based on the final result was made, but w.e.f. 02.04.1998, the seniority rules stood amended and Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961 had occupied the field and thus all the appointment orders that had to be issued after 02.04.1998 could not provide anything contrary to the statutory Rule 12(1)
(a) of the Rules, 1961. As per the petitioners, ignoring the said position, the department has determined the seniority in the cadre of Platoon Commander and also on other posts and it had been incorrectly fixed contrary to the provision of Rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules, 1961. The issue with regard to the illegality committed while determining seniority was raised from time to time and consequently orders were also issued by the Director General of Police clarifying position saying that the seniority has to be determined in view of the amended rule and modified order of gradation in the matter of Sub-Inspector (Special Branch) of 1999-2000 batches was issued on 26.02.2014 and earlier gradation list of Sub- Inspector (Special Branch) of 1999-2000 was revised and corrected.
4.2 Likewise, for the Sub-Inspectors of DEF Cadre and Subedar Cadre, who were recruited through the same selection process, as the petitioners, corrections were done as per Rule 12 of the Rules, 1961 correcting their gradation list of the year 1999-2000. The petitioners also pursued this issue and submitted various representations asking that the gradation list of their cadre is also required to be corrected as per Rule 12 of the Rules, 1961, but all went in vain and nothing was done and surprisingly, ignoring the fact that for the other Branches gradation list has been corrected, the seniority of the petitioners has been incorrectly fixed on the basis of final result of the basic training and with the defect seniority showing position as on 4 01.01.2020, a gradation list has been published, which is impugned in this petition and filed as Annexure P/1.
4.3 The Director General of Police issued an order on 18.10.2021 directing that for direct recruitment seniority has to be maintained on the basis of order of merit in which the candidates are recommended for appointment, but, still, according to the petitioners, the respondents are not correcting the gradation list of Platoon Commander (SAF) and consequently the gradation list of promotional post is also defective and the same also requires correction.
4.4 The petitioners have contended that on account of incorrect fixation of gradation ignoring the provisions of Rules, the petitioners have already suffered significant hardship and would also suffer in the future. Consequently, they have no other alternative but to approach this Court. According to the petitioners, in view of the incorrect gradation and rejecting their representations by order dated 22.02.2024 (Annexure P/11), which is also impugned in this petition, intervention of this Court is called for to set aside impugned orders and to issue the direction to correct the gradation list as per the provisions of Rules, 1961.
5. The petitioners have asserted that the gradation list, which is impugned in this petition, is required to be corrected in accordance with the direction issued by the DGP from time to time. According to them, the impugned order of rejection of representations is nothing but a clear example of malafide attitude of the respondents and it is creating class within class lacking intelligible differentia thereby rendering the order vitiated and as such it deserves to be set aside.
56. The respondents have filed their reply raising preliminary objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Court saying that the petitioner No. 6 belongs to Indore and this petition on against him is not maintainable before this Court.
7. It is also contended by the respondents that the gradation list has not been prepared as per the M.P. Police Executive (Non-gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1997 and Rules, 1961. As per the respondents, the petitioners are working on the post of Inspector (SAF) and seeking modification in the inter-se seniority as per Rules, 1961 whereas between 1999-2015, the inter-se seniority of the Sub Inspectors (SAF) was to be determined on the basis of marks obtained by them in the final examination of the basic training and that was done as per the conditions contained in the order of appointment and the gradation list was prepared as per the Police Regulation 48 vis-à-vis the condition contained in the order of appointment. According to the respondents, the Police Regulation is silent with regard to determining the inter-se seniority and it was followed till 2016. According to respondents, the Police Regulation is a special provision and prevails over the employees of Police Department and appointment of police persons is done on the basis of Rule 2 of the Police Regulation and their seniority is determined as per the merit list prepared on the basis of marks obtained in the final examination of basic training. It is further contended that the controversy involved in the present case has already been set at rest by the then State Administrative Tribunal in Original Application No. 830/2001 wherein the gradation list of Sub Inspectors (Finger Prints) was prepared by the respondent-department on the basis of marks obtained in the basic training examination and the said 6 Original Application was dismissed by the Tribunal vide order dated 20.07.2001 (Annexure R/2)
8. The interevenors have contended that a long-standing seniority cannot be disturbed reason being the present petition was filed in the year 2020 whereas the cause of action giving rise to this petition arose much earlier. From 2004 onwards, the gradation list was being prepared, but no challenge to that effect was ever made claiming that the impugned gradation list is defective and needed to be corrected. It is also submitted by the intervenors that they have prepared a comparative chart showing positions of the petitioners as well as the intervenors pertaining to the years 2004, 2010, 2015 and 2020 vis-a-vis the impugned seniority list and on the basis of the said comparison, it is contended that the claim of the petitioners is contrary to law and the same is not maintainable in the eyes of law and a long-standing seniority cannot be disturbed belatedly. According to intervenors, the petition suffers from delay and laches and accordingly it deserves to be dismissed.
9. Additional return has also been filed by the respondents denying the amendment sought vide IA No. 11028/2024 challenging the order dated 22.02.2024. The respondents have objected the said application saying that the said order has rightly been passed considering all material aspects and therefore, the order does not call for any interference by this Court.
10. To counter the basic objection raised by the respondents with regard to delay and laches and seeking dismissal of the petition on the said ground, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the said objection is misconceived. He has tried to convince this Court by saying 7 that there is no delay in the petition. He has submitted that there is a reasonable explanation for condoning the delay saying that the gradation lists were being corrected periodically by the department and the orders and instructions were being issued by the respondents from time to time for correcting the gradation list and also for applying the provisions of Rules, 1961 and hence it was expected by the petitioners that their gradation list would also be corrected and they would be given proper seniority. He has submitted that the order that was issued by the DGP on 26.11.2012 clarifying that the condition in the order dated 28.06.2012 appointing Subedars/Sub-Inspectors, which states that the inter-se seniority would be determined on the basis of marks obtained in the final examination of basic training, shall be deemed to have been deleted. Thereafter, an amended order was issued on 26.02.2014, correcting the gradation list issued earlier on the basis of marks obtained in the final examination of basic training and directing that the inter-se seniority will be determined as per Rule 12 of the Rules, 1961.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that when consistently the Department has been issuing orders adopting Rules, 1961 and directing that inter-se seniority be determined as per rule 12, the petitioners were under the impression that their seniority would also be determined accordingly and they would also be granted the seniority by correcting the gradation list applying Rule, 12 of the Rules, 1961. As such learned counsel has submitted that there is no delay in raising the grievance and the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. According to him, the cause of action basically arose in the year 2020 when respondents had issued the order correcting the gradation list of 8 the other cadres of the Police Department, but not corrected the gradation of the petitioners and therefore, there is no delay in filing the petition.
12. Learned counsel for the State as well as intervenors have opposed the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners contending that the petitioners are trying to establish that the cause of action arose in the year 2020 but otherwise they are seeking correction in the seniority, which was determined in the year 1999-2000 and 2007 as per the condition contained in the order of appointment for determining their inter-se seniority. They have submitted that the amended Rule 12 of Rules, 1961 for determining inter-se seniority came into force w.e.f. 02.04.1998 and therefore, if at all, the petitioners had any grievance about their inter-se seniority, they could have raised their grievance immediately after their appointment. They have submitted that the petitioners have very intelligently tried to mould their relief saying that the cause of action arose in the year 2020 whereas it arose from the very date of their appointment. They have contended that the petitioners had accepted the same and not raised any grievance about their inter-se seniority and also accepted further promotions and as such they are now stopped from raising their claim as they have already crossed the limitation and waived their rights to raise the grievance about their seniority and after such a long lapse of time, they cannot be permitted to unsettle the settled position of the seniority. The intervenors have placed reliance upon catena of decisions of the Supreme Court so as to substantiate that the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. They have placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court:
91. (1970) 1 SCC 84 - Rabindranath Bose and others vs. Union of India and others.
2. (2010) 12 SCC 471 - Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others vs. State of Orissa and others
3. (2019) 15 SCC 633 - Union of India and others vs. C. Girija and others.
4. (2022) 12 SCC 579 - Ajay Kumar Shukla and others vs. Arvind Rai and others.
13. I have considered the submission put forth by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record as also the respective provisions in respect of the issue involved in the case at hand. Before reaching to a logical conclusion, it would be appropriate to take note of the law laid down by the Supreme Court on such issues.
In re Rabindranath Bose (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand case [(1969) 1 SCC 110] needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.10
33. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court in Jaisinghani case observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this case, we are asked to consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone.
34. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, says that there has been no undue delay. He says that the representations were being received by the Government all the time. But there is limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations. If the Government has turned down one representation, the making of another representation on similar lines would not enable the petitioners to explain the delay. Learned counsel for the petitioners says that the petitioners were under the impression that the Departmental Promotion Committee had held a meeting in 1948 and not on April 29, 1949, and the real true facts came to be known in 1961 when the Government mentioned these facts in their letter, dated December 28, 1961.
35. We are unable to accept this explanation. This fact has been mentioned in the minutes of the 11 meeting of the Committee which met in February 1952, and we are unable to believe that the petitioners did not come to know all these facts till 1961. But even assuming that the petitioners came to know all these facts only in December 1961 even then there has been inordinate delay in presenting the present petition. The fact that Jaisinghani case was pending before the High Court and later in this Court is also, no excuse for the delay in presenting the present petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
In re Shiba Shankar Mohapatra(supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:
18. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , wherein it has been observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further observed as under :
(Tilokchand case [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , SCC p. 115, para 7) 12 "7. ... The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court."
19. This Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar case [(1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] also placed reliance upon its earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] , wherein it has been observed as under : (Rabindranath Bose case [(1970) 1 SCC 84] , SCC p. 97, para 33) "33. ... It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years."
In re C. Girija (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"15. There is no dispute between the parties that in the Notification dated 14-10-1999 inviting applications for filling up of 05 posts under 30% LDCE quota, 04 vacancies were shown as unreserved and 01 as reserved for SC. The applicant submitted an application for participation in the selection but she could not be included against 04 unreserved vacancies, she being a general category candidate. There were certain complaints with regard to selection under 70% quota, with regard to which certain investigations were going on, which could be finalised in 2007. Applicant for the first time submitted representation to General Manager, Southern Railways on 25-9-2007 praying for inclusion of her name in the panel dated 9-1-2001. Copy of the representation filed by the applicant has been brought on the record, which indicate that applicant has in her representation relied on certain orders issued on 20-6- 2007 and 5-9-2007 with regard to revision of the panel under 70% selection quota. With regard to 30% quota to 13 be filled through LDCE, she stated that reserving 01 post for SC was totally against all norms. Representation was replied by Railways on 27-12-2007 stating that with regard to revision of the panel under 70% promotion quota, the applicant is not a party in any way. With regard to vacancy under 30% LDCE selection, it was indicated that the same was done as per the Rules prevalent at that time. OA No. 466 of 2009 was filed thereafter by the applicant, which has been decided by the Tribunal. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 560 days in filing the OA. The applicant has challenged the communication dated 27-12-2007 of the Railways which was given in reply to the representation of the applicant. The condonation of delay, thus, only meant that against the letter dated 27-12-2007, her OA was held to be within time. The Tribunal and High Court have not adverted to the delay, which accrued from the declaration of panel on 9-1-2001 and submitting her representation on 25-9-2007 i.e. after more than 06 years and 09 months.
16. This Court had occasion to consider the question of cause of action in reference to grievances pertaining to service matters. This Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining [C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 961] had occasion to consider the case where an employee was terminated and after decades, he filed a representation, which was decided. After decision of the representation, he filed an OA in the Tribunal, which was entertained and order was passed. In the above context, in para 9, following has been held : (SCC pp. 122-23) "9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any "decision" on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on 14 account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
17. This Court again in Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar [Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 :
(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1126] on belated representation laid down following, which is extracted below : (SCC p. 66, para 15) "15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-
barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches."
18. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari [State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 32] had occasion to consider question of 15 delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. In paras 19 and 23 following was laid down :
(SCC pp. 184-85)
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.
* * *
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam [State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 475] , this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus : (SCC p. 145, para 16) '16. ... filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.' "
19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In paras 26 and 28, following was laid down : (Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari case [State of 16 Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 32] , SCC pp. 185-86) "26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22] , wherein it has been laid down that : (SCC p. 154, para 2) '2. ... A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.' * * *
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court."
20. On the proposition as noticed above, it is clear that the claim of the applicant for inclusion of her name in the panel, which was issued on 9-1-2001 and for the 17 first time was raked up by her, by filing representation on 25-9-2007 i.e. after more than 06 and half years. The claim of inclusion in the panel had become stale by that time and filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action. Thus, mere fact that representation was replied by Railways on 27-12-2007, a stale claim shall not become a live claim. Both the Tribunal and the High Court did not advert to this important aspect of the matter. It is further to be noted from the material on record that after declaration of panel on 9-1-2001, there were further selection under 30% promotion by LDCE quota, in which the applicant participated. In selection held in 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With regard to her non-inclusion in panel in 2005 selection, she also filed OA No. 629 of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. After participating in subsequent selections under 30% quota and being declared unsuccessful, by mere filing representation on 27-9-2007 with regard to selection made in 2001, the delay and laches shall not be wiped out.
21. There is one more aspect of the matter, which need to be noted. The applicant was well aware that under 30% LDCE quota, out of 05 vacancies, 04 are unreserved and 01 is reserved, which was circulated by Notification dated 14-10-1999. She applied against the said bifurcated vacancies and was interviewed on 8-1- 2001, panel of which was declared on 9-1-2001 and promotion was made on the same day. She having participated in the selection for promotion under 30% LDCE quota and the bifurcation of the vacancies being part of the process of selection, it was not open for her to challenge the bifurcation of vacancies into general and reserved after taking a chance to get selected. In this context, reference is made to judgment of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar [Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 357 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 822] . This Court after referring to several earlier judgments have laid down following in paras 13 to 18 :
(SCC pp. 363-64) "13. The law on the subject has been crystallised in several decisions of this Court. In Chandra 18 Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla [Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla, (2002) 6 SCC 127 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 830] , this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar [Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar, (2007) 8 SCC 100 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 792] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 107, para 18) '18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same. (See Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil [Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil, (1991) 3 SCC 368 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1052] and Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission [Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 12 SCC 724 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 345] .)'
14. The same view was reiterated in Amlan Jyoti Borooah [Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam, (2009) 3 SCC 227 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 627] , wherein it was held to be well settled that the candidates who have taken part in a selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein are not entitled to question it upon being declared to be unsuccessful.
15. In Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar [Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 576 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 256] , the same principle was reiterated in the following observations : (SCC p. 584, para 16) 19 '16. We also agree with the High Court [Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar, 2008 SCC OnLine Pat 321 : (2009) 4 SLR 272] that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition.
Reference in this connection may be made to the judgments in Madan Lal v. State of J&K [Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 712] , Marripati Nagaraja v. State of A.P. [Marripati Nagaraja v. State of A.P., (2007) 11 SCC 522 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 68] , Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal [Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 4 SCC 171 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 1005] , Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam [Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam, (2009) 3 SCC 227 :
(2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 627] and K.A. Nagamani v.
Indian Airlines [K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines, (2009) 5 SCC 515 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 57] .'
16. In Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission [Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, (2011) 1 SCC 150 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 21] , candidates who had participated in the selection process were aware that they were required to possess certain specific qualifications in computer operations. The appellants had appeared in the selection process and after participating in the interview sought to challenge the selection process as 20 being without jurisdiction. This was held to be impermissible.
17. In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi [Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, (2013) 11 SCC 309 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 129] , candidates who were competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of Uttarakhand participated in a written examination held in pursuance of an advertisement. This Court held that if they had cleared the test, the respondents would not have raised any objection to the selection process or to the methodology adopted. Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the respondents were disentitled to seek relief under Article 226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that : (SCC p. 318, para 18) '18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome.'
18. In State (UT of Chandigarh) v. Jasmine Kaur [State (UT of Chandigarh) v. Jasmine Kaur, (2014) 10 SCC 521 : 6 SCEC 745] , it was held that a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting himself or herself to the selection process cannot turn around and complain that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of his or her non-selection. In Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey [Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, (2015) 11 SCC 493 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 274] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 500, para 17) '17. Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on one more point that the appellants had participated in the process of interview and not challenged it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost four months between the interview and 21 declaration of result. However, the appellants did not challenge it at that time. Thus, it appears that only when the appellants found themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the candidates should not have participated in the interview and challenged the procedure or they should have challenged immediately after the interviews were conducted.' This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan [Madras Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan, (2016) 1 SCC 454 : (2016) 1 SCC (L&S) 164 : 7 SCEC 462] ."
22. We, thus, due to the above both the reasons, are of the view that the Tribunal and the High Court ought not to have entertained the stale claim of the applicant."
And in re Ajay Kumar Shukla (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"30. Once it is established that the seniority list was prepared in contravention of the statutory provisions laid down in the 1991 Rules, the seniority list could be interfered with. The appointing authority would be bound by the statutory rules and any violation or disregard to the statutory rules would vitiate the seniority list. The same would be arbitrary, dehors the rules and in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The only exception to the above would be where there is unreasonable delay which is unexplained."
14. To establish that this petition has been filed within time, although learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly urged and tried to convince this Court contending that the claim raised by the petitioners with regard to 22 correction of gradation list arose when the respondents took cognizance of the matter and issued orders to correct the gradation list of the Police Department, but did not issue any order in respect of the gradation list pertaining to the petitioners, however, in view of the settled legal position on the issue, I am not convinced with the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners for the reason that if the said submission is accepted then it shall be considered that the petitioners were the silent spectators and expecting the orders in their favour, but when they did not get anything favourable then only they woke up and filed this petition. On such an issue, the Supreme Court has very specifically observed that the silent spectators cannot be allowed to raise their voice after a long lapse of time. The Supreme Court has observed that the question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. The Supreme Court has considered the effect of delay in challenging the seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion, which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. The Court has observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition, should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay.
15. Recently, this Court dealing with such an issue, relying upon various decisions rendered by this Court and also by the Supreme Court, dismissed 23 a petition seeking promotion vide order dated 07.02.2025 passed in WP No. 24030/2021- Jitendra Narayan Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others on the ground of delay and laches since the claim of the petitioners therein was raised after a long delay. The relevant paras of the said order are reproduced as hereunder :
"5. Shri Brian D'silva, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that as per the settled principle of law, the adverse ACRs, if not communicated, cannot be taken note of at the time of considering the case of promotion by the DPC. He has submitted that in the present case, admittedly adverse ACRs were not communicated to the petitioner and those were coming in way of his promotion and therefore, the proceeding of DPC granting promotion to respondent Nos.4 and 5 deserves to be set aside and review DPC be convened ignoring the ACRs of the petitioner for the years 2010 to 2014 and promotion of respondent Nos.4 and 5 be also set aside.
6. The main contesting respondents i.e. respondent Nos.2 and 3 have filed their reply.
7. Countering the aforesaid arguments of the counsel for the petitioner, Shri Pankaj Dubey, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3 has submitted that the petitioner suffers from delay and laches, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed on this very ground.
8. As per the respondents, though the petitioner was considered by the DPC but since he failed to qualify the required criteria, therefore, he was not promoted and was superseded in the year 2014 and 2015 and now in a petition of 2021, the petitioner's claim cannot be considered because it is hopelessly barred by time. The petition should have been filed immediately after the order of promotion of respondent Nos.4 and 5 and even the first representation according to them, has been filed in the year 2019 and therefore, the explanation given in the column of delay in the petition cannot be considered to be a sufficient cause. The petition therefore, deserves to be dismissed.24
9. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 have also filed their reply and submitted that their promotion has been made by the respondents after due consideration of their record and since they fulfilled the criteria, therefore, got promoted. Not only this, but the petitioner was also considered by the respondents but since he failed to achieve the cut-off marks, therefore, was not promoted and as such, after such a long time, their promotion cannot be set aside because the same was validly done following the rules. Ergo, the petition according to them, deserves to be dismissed.
10. Shri D'silva, during the course of arguments has placed reliance upon an order passed by this Court in the first round i.e. W.P. No.10156 of 2020 which got disposed of vide order dated 27.08.2020 directing the petitioner to make a fresh representation and respondents at the same time, were also directed to decide the same by a speaking and reasoned order and according to Shri D'silva, since the High Court has considered the petition and disposed of the same with a direction to file a fresh representation, therefore, at this stage, the delay cannot be taken note of and his petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. He has also contended that the petitioner's representation of 2019 was pending before the authority, not decided and when the Court has directed to file it afresh, a fresh representation was filed which was decided by the impugned order dated 28.01.2021 (Annexure-P/11), not rejecting the representation of the petitioner on the ground of delay, therefore, this petition challenging the said order of the authority not considering the representation in proper manner, the petition on the ground of delay cannot be dismissed.
11. However, I am not convinced with the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. Undisputably, the cause of action to challenge the promotion of respondent Nos.4 and 5 arose when they were junior to the petitioner and promoted after superseding the petitioner in the year 2014 and 2015 respectively. The petitioner first time has made a representation in the year 2019 and since that representation was not decided by the authority, therefore, he filed a petition i.e. W.P. No.10156 of 2020, which was disposed of directing the petitioner to make a fresh representation to the respondents but, merely because the Court has directed the petitioner to file a fresh 25 representation directing the authority to decide the same by a reasoned and speaking order, it does not mean that the delay in raising the cause by the petitioner can now be considered. The order passed by the High Court disposing of the said petition was in the following manner:-
"Under these circumstances, petitioner is directed to submit a fresh representation along with all the relevant documents before respondent No.1 within two weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. In turn, the said respondent shall decide the same in accordance with law by passing a reasoned and speaking order within a further period of three months' time."
12. The petition was not decided on merit as there was no consideration on merit of the claim and on the first hearing, without the reply of respondent Nos.2 and 3 and even without granting any opportunity to them, the said petition was disposed of, therefore, the stand taken by the petitioner that when High Court on earlier occasion entertained the petition and directed the petitioner to make a fresh representation, then at this stage, the delay cannot be taken note of, is not sustainable.
13. The second writ petition i.e. W.P. No.20704 of 2021 was also withdrawn by the petitioner and that was also at the first hearing not giving any notice to the respondents and this withdrawal was simplicitor with liberty to file afresh if cause of action still survives.
14. In my opinion, it can be assessed that the petitioner was very tactfully filing the petitions before this Court knowing fully well that the same could have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, therefore, on the first occasion, he got the petition disposed of and on the second occasion, withdrew the same and again filed a fresh petition, the present one. As such, it is clear that the question of delay in raising cause has not been considered by the Court in earlier rounds of litigation and therefore, if that objection is being raised by the respondents, it is the duty of the Court to consider it whether the petition suffers from delay and laches or not.
15. Although Shri D'silva has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in (2008) 8 26 SCC 725 (Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India & Others), (2009) 16 SCC 146 (Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar Vs. Union of India & Others) and also upon an order passed by this Court in W.P. No.30909 of 2023 (Mrs. Veena Jain Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others), but in all those cases, the question of delay has not been considered and the legal position is that the Court has considered the cases in which the DPC considered the ACRs which were not communicated but found adverse.
16. There is no dispute with regard to legal aspect as has been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner and the judgments cited by him dealing with the said legal aspect, but here in this case, the question is as to whether the petition filed by the petitioner raising his grievance suffers from delay and laches and explanation given by the petitioner is sufficient or not.
17. The counsel for the respondents have placed reliance upon a decision reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 (P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) in which the Supreme Court has dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of delay and laches holding as under:-
"The appellant failed to come to the Court on three opportunities when he could have. A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within 6 months or at the most a year of such promotion and the High Court can refuse to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach expeditiously for relief and put forward stale claim and try to unsettle settled matters."
18. They have also placed reliance upon an order dated 24.08.2023 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.23739 of 2022 (Anil Kumar Sharma Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others), in which, the High Court has observed as under:-
"4. By this petition the petitioner has claimed promotion to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector w.e.f. 1.10.2015 whereas this petition has been filed on 17.10.2022, i.e. after seven years. It is 27 submitted by counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner is making successive representations, therefore, there is no delay in filing this petition.
10. Thus, it is clear that successive representations do not give rise to a new cause of action. Furthermore, by this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 1.10.2015 by which certain persons including Rewaram Gaikwad were granted promotion. Much water has flown under the bridge. In clause 4 of the writ petition, the petitioner has merely stated that since cause of action leading to this petition is constant in nature, therefore, there is no delay. However, this Court is of the considered opinion that delayed challenge of supersession is a fatal cause. In the meanwhile, the petitioner has allowed lot of things to take place.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes had stated:28
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is 29 inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
19. Reliance has also been placed upon an order dated 17.10.2022 passed by the Gwalior Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.22660 of 2022 (Raspati Ojha and another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others), in which, the High Court has observed as under:-
".........Thus, it is held that in case of promotion, the delay and laches assumes importance. If a person was sitting over his/her right, thereby allowing the situation to change drastically, then he has to suffer for his own lethargy. A person may feel aggrieved that the similarly situated person has been granted promotion, but then, the person who was sleeping over his right, is responsible for burning his heart. Delay defeats equity. Further more, merely because a vigilant employee was agitating his cause and got the relief, then the judgment passed in the case of vigilant employee would not amount to giving rise to any cause of action in favor of those persons who were sleeping over their rights. Furthermore, repeated representations do not extend the period of limitation, and even if, the Court has directed for deciding the representation, still an old and stale case cannot be reopened, because a decision on the delayed representation would not give rise to any fresh cause of action."30
20. This Court also vide order dated 17.10.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.8045 of 2016 (C.B.M. Tiwari Vs. The Chairman, Coal India Ltd. And others) dealing with the importance of limitation in a case of promotion, has observed as under:-
"10. As already mentioned hereinabove, none of the juniors promoted by the respondents ignoring the petitioner has been impleaded as a party and even after giving opportunities to the learned counsel for the petitioner being in representative capacity to implead any of the junior who superseded the petitioner, he refused to do so. As such, now this Court has to see whether in a case of supersession when respondents are denying that no junior of the petitioner has been promoted and no relief can be granted without impleading any of the juniors superseded the petitioner, relief can be granted or not and petition can be maintained or not, because it suffers from non-joinder of the necessary party. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon a decision reported in Vijay Kumar Kaul (supra) in which the Supreme Court has considered the claim of promotion on the ground that juniors have been promoted. The Supreme Court has also taken note of the aspect of delay. The Supreme Court has also observed that in absence of any junior promoted ignoring the claim of the petitioner, the petition cannot be maintained and that suffers from non-joinder of the parties. The Supreme Court has observed as under:
"36. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. Neither before the Tribunal nor before the High Court, Parveen Kumar and others were arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over the factum that they are senior to the appellants and have been conferred the benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In their absence, if any direction is issued for fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise their interest. When they have not been impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult to grant.31
37. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision in Indu Shekhar Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 8 SCC 129 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1916 : AIR 2006 SC 2432] wherein it has been held thus : (SCC p. 151, para 56) "56. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the respondents. In their absence, the High Court could not have determined the question of inter se seniority."
38. In Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht [(2010) 12 SCC 204 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 208 : AIR 2010 SC 2613] this Court while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-impleadment of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed observed thus : (SCC pp. 207-08, paras 9-10) "9. ... in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1963 SC 786] , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and pro forma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called 'CPC') provides that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1153] , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [(1974) 2 SCC 706 : AIR 1974 SC 2105] and Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT 32 [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88] .)
10. In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167] and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [(2009) 1 SCC 768 :
(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 : AIR 2008 SC Supp 824] , it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are necessary parties."
39. From the aforesaid enunciation of law there cannot be any trace of doubt that an affected party has to be impleaded so that the doctrine of audi alteram partem is not put into any hazard."
11. The Supreme Court in the above case also considered the aspect of claiming relief of seniority and promotion at a belated stage and observed that the claim of promotion can be raised at an earliest opportunity or within a reasonable time. The belated approach is impermissible because in the meantime interest of third parties gets ripened and any interference after enormous delay creates anarchy. The Supreme Court has also observed that it becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice while entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time. Not only this but the Supreme Court has further observed that making continuous representations and consuming time to see the result of those representations is unwarranted and petition can be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Supreme Court observed with regard to delay as under:-
"22. As far as Appellant 4 is concerned, we really see no justifiable reason on his part to join the other appellants when he had 33 acceded to the first judgment passed in his favour to a limited extent by the Tribunal. This was an ambitious effort but it is to be borne in mind that all ambitions are neither praiseworthy nor have the sanction of law. Be that as it may, they approached the Tribunal sometime only in 2004. The only justification given for the delay was that they had been making representations and when the said benefit was declined by communication dated 31-7-2004, they moved the Tribunal. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants fairly stated that as the doctrine of parity gets attracted, they may only be conferred the benefit of seniority so that their promotions are not affected.
23. It is necessary to keep in mind that a claim for seniority is to be put forth within a reasonable period of time. In this context, we may refer to the decision of this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. [(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22 :
AIR 1974 SC 2271] wherein a two-Judge Bench has held thus : (SCC p. 154, para 2) "2. ... It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters."
24. In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 : AIR 2006 SC 1581] this Court had held thus that : (SCC p. 325, para 6) 34 "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably."
25. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [(2009) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 2009 SC 571] this Court has opined that : (SCC p. 174, para 26) "26. ... One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum."
26. From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is manifest that a litigant who invokes the jurisdiction of a court for claiming seniority, it is obligatory on his part to come to the court at the earliest or at least within a reasonable span of time. The belated approach is impermissible as in the meantime interest of third parties gets ripened and further interference after enormous delay is likely to usher in a state of anarchy.
3527. The acts done during the interregnum are to be kept in mind and should not be lightly brushed aside. It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time."
12. The Supreme Court in case of A.J. Fernandis (supra) has considered the aspect of delay in a matter of promotion and observed as under:-
"14. Even otherwise, it is to be noted that the appellant got promoted to the post of Ticket Collector on 28-5-1983. He was thereafter promoted as a Senior Ticket Collector on 25-9- 1986. The appellant was then promoted as a Train Ticket Examiner on 25-5-1987. The 3rd respondent chose to challenge the promotion of the appellant as a Ticket Collector only on 11- 12-1987, i.e., after a period of 4 years. On the ground of delay and laches also the application of the 3rd respondent should have been dismissed."
13. In case of Balram Prasad Shukla, the High Court has also considered the claim of promotion on the ground of delay and laches and observed as under:-
"7. It be seen that the petitioner was promoted on the post of Accountant on ad-hoc basis on 28-2-1980 but the promotion was subject to the approval of the DPC as it is clear on bare perusal of Annexure-I dated 28-2-1980. Thus, the confirmation of the petitioner to the post of Accountant would be only after the approval of the DPC. The DPC was convened in the year 1981 and the petitioner was not found fit as a result of which vide order dated 7-7-1981 the department passed impugned order Annexure-36
H reverting the petitioner to his original post of first grade clerk. It be seen that the promotion which took place on 7-7-1981 was never challenged by the petitioner for near about nine years and by this petition which was filed on 12-2-1990 the petitioner is seeking promotion w.e.f. 7-7-1981. In the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 : AIR 1974 SC 2271 the Apex Court upheld the decision of Madras High Court dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner on the ground of laches in regard to promotion which was sought after 14 years. In that case the Supreme Court held that if a person is aggrieved by an order of promotion, promoting a junior over his head he should approach the Court atleast within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in a later decision in the case of A.J. Fernandis v. Divisional Manager, South Central Railway, (2001) 1 SCC 240 in which the Apex Court held that the promotion of another employee cannot be changed after a period of four long years. Since the petitioner is challenging the order of promotion after near about nine years, the view of this Court is that on the basis of the decision of P.S. Sadasivaswamy and A.J. Fernandis (supra), the petitioner is not entitled for the relief."
21. In view of the above, it is clear that the petition suffers from delay and laches. Merely because a representation was made by the petitioner in the year 2019, though not decided by the authority on the ground of delay, does not mean that the Court at the time of entertaining the petition, cannot consider the question of delay.
22. Dealing with the similar situation, the Supreme Court in a case reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 (C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and mining and another) has observed as under:-
"9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to 37 his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any "decision" on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to "consider". If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex- employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
11. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of 38 the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of "acknowledgement of a jural relationship" to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
12. When a government servant abandons service to take up alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice."
23. Similarly, the High Court vide order dated 06.03.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.7106 of 2020 (Sanjay Dave Vs. Union of India and others) has considered the fact whether filing repeated representations can give a fresh cause of action and delay can be ignored or not and observed as under:-
"4. Before entering into the merits of the case, this Court would like to deal with the preliminary objections with regard to delay and latches. The crux of the matter is that the service of the petitioner was terminated in November, 2002 and the petitioner has approached this Court after 18 long years. It is well established principle of law that delay defeats equity."
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in 39 conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a 40 fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T.N. Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :
11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-andfast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the 41 Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :
6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his 42 conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council Vs. Sristidhar Biswar 43 reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as under :
11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal.
Such persons should not be given any benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced.
The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of positi on that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches."
The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
4418. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under :
16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
(See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p.277, paras 9-10) "9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay.
45This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making overnment had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik.).
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Amantaray reported in (1977) 3 SCC 396 has held as under :
6. It would thus appear that there is justification for the argument of the Solicitor-
General that even though a cause of action arose to the petitioner as far back as 1962, on the rejection of his representation on November 9, 1962, he allowed some eleven years to go by before filing the writ petition. There is no satisfactory explanation of the inordinate delay for, as has been held by this Court in Rabindra 46 Nath Bose v. Union of India the making of repeated representations, after the rejection of one representation, could not be held to be a satisfactory explanation of the delay. The fact therefore remains that the petitioner allowed some years to go by before making a petition for the redress of his grievances. In the meantime a number of other appointments were also made to the Indian Administrative Service by promotion from the State Civil Service, some of the officers received promotions to higher posts in that service and may even have retired. Those who continued to serve could justifiably think that as there was no challenge to their appointments within the period prescribed for a suit, they could look forward to further promotion and higher terminal benefits on retirement. The High Court therefore erred in rejecting the argument that the writ petition should be dismissed because of the inordinate and unexplained delay even though it was "strenuously" urged for its consideration on behalf of the Government of India.
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik reported in (1976) 3 SCC 579 has held as under :
14. It is unnecessary to deal at length with the State's contention that the writ petitions were filed in the High Court after a long delay and that the writ petitioners are guilty of laches. We have no doubt that Patnaik and Mishra brought to the court a grievance too stale to merit redress. Krishna Moorthy's appointment was gazetted on March 14, 1962 and it is incredible that his service-horoscope was not known to his possible competitors. On November 15, 1968 they were all confirmed as Assistant Engineers by a common gazette notification and that notification showed Krishna Moorthy's confirmation as of February 27, 1961 and that of the other two as of May 2, 1962. And yet till May 29, 1973 when the writ petitions were filed, the petitioners did nothing 47 except to file a representation to the Government on June 19, 1970 and a memorial to the Governor on April 16, 1973. The High Court made light of this long and inexplicable delay with a casual remark that the contention was "without any force". It overlooked that in June, 1974 it was setting aside an appointment dated March, 1962 of a person who had in the meanwhile risen to the rank of a Superintending Engineer. Those 12 long years were as if writ in water. We cannot but express our grave concern that an extraordinary jurisdiction should have been exercised in such an abject disregard of consequences and in favour of persons who were unmindful of their so-called rights for many long years.
The Supreme Court in the case of BSNL v.
Ghanshyam Dass reported in (2011) 4 SCC 374 has held as under :
26. On the other hand, where only the affected parties approach the court and relief is given to those parties, the fence-sitters who did not approach the court cannot claim that such relief should have been extended to them thereby upsetting or interfering with the rights which had accrued to others.
27. In Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, the appellants who were general candidates belatedly challenged the promotion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates on the basis of the decisions in Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab, Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan and R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab and this Court refused to grant the relief saying: (Jagdish Lal case, SCC pp. 562-63, para 18) "18. ... this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to reiterate all the catena of precedents in this behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had 48 the impetus from Virpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh ratios. But Virpal Chauhan and Sabharwal cases, kept at rest the promotion already made by that date, and declared them as valid; they were limited to the question of future promotions given by applying the rule of reservation to all the persons prior to the date of judgment in Sabharwal case which required to be examined in the light of the law laid in Sabharwal case. Thus earlier promotions cannot be reopened. Only those cases arising after that date would be examined in the light of the law laid down in Sabharwal case and Virpal Chauhan case and equally Ajit Singh case. If the candidate has already been further promoted to the higher echelons of service, his seniority is not open to be reviewed. In A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh case a Bench of two Judges to which two of us, K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ. were members, had reiterated the above view and it was also held that all the prior promotions are not open to judicial review. In Chander Pal v. State of Haryana a Bench of two Judges consisting of S.C. Agrawal and G.T. Nanavati, JJ. considered the effect of Virpal Chauhan, Ajit Singh, Sabharwal and A.B.S. Karamchari Sangh cases and held that the seniority of those respondents who had already retired or had been promoted to higher posts could not be disturbed. The seniority of the petitioner therein and the respondents who were holding the post in the same level or in the same cadre would be adjusted keeping in view the ratio in Virpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh; but promotion, if any, had been given to any of them during the pendency of this writ petition was directed not to be disturbed."
The Supreme Court in the case of Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of J&K reported in (2009) 15 SCC 321 has held as under:
22. If at this late juncture the petitioner is directed to be promoted to the post of Sub-
Inspector even above Abdul Rashid Rather, the 49 seniority of those who had been promoted in the meantime or have been directly recruited would be affected. The State would also have to pay the back wages to him which would be a drainage of public funds. Whereas an employee cannot be denied his promotion in terms of the rules, the same cannot be granted out of the way as a result whereof the rights of third parties are affected. The aspect of public interest as also the general administration must, therefore, be kept in mind while granting equitable relief.
23. We understand that there would be a heart burning insofar as the petitioner is concerned, but then he is to thank himself therefor. If those five persons, who were seniors to Hamiddulah Dar filed writ petitions immediately, the High Court might have directed cancellation of his illegal promotion. This Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt did not take into consideration all these aspects of the matter and the binding decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion was right in opining that it was not necessary for it to follow Maharaj Krishan Bhatt.
The Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 has held as under :
"2. ... A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it 50 expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters."
x x x
10. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari reported in (2013) 12 SCC 179 has held as under :
19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.
****
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed.
But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.
The Supreme Court in the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 has held as under :
"10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter 51 did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim."
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59 has held as under :
"15. When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.""
(emphasis supplied)
24. In view of aforesaid legal preposition as has been dealt with by the Supreme Court and also by this Court, the explanation given by the petitioner in the column of delay, cannot be considered to be a sufficient cause. Further, the Court is repeatedly saying that delay defeats equity and in a matter of promotion, it is clear that entertaining a petition would amount to unsettle the settled position.
25. Admittedly, the petitioner did not approach the Court in time and the promotion made in favour of respondent Nos.4 and 5 in the years 2014 and 2015 respectively, cannot be questioned in the year 2021, therefore, the petition apparently suffers from delay and laches.
5226. Ex consequentia, the petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed."
16. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, I am of the considered view that this petition also suffers from delay and laches because the appointment orders of the petitioners were issued containing a specific condition for determining inter-se seniority and on the said date the Rule on which the petitioners have relied upon was very much in force and the petitioners could have raised their claim immediately after their appointment but they were sitting silent and watching consequential actions on the basis of the said seniority therefore, now they are not allowed to interfere in the said settled position Resultantly, this petition is not maintainable as it suffers from delay and laches. It is dismissed accordingly.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE Raghvendra RAGHVENDRA SHARAN SHUKLA 2025.02.18 14:42:23 +05'30'