Delhi District Court
Tinku Singh vs State on 22 September, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-005944-2022
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 44/2022
TINKU SINGH,
S/o. Shri. Jai Singh,
R/o. Village Nathory, PS Nakur,
District Saharanpur,
Uttar Pradesh. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI). ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 05.04.2022
Date of institution : 06.04.2022
Date when judgment was reserved : 02.08.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 22.09.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code') against the judgment dated 30.09.2021 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment') passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-05/Ld. MM-05, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM'), in case bearing; 'State v. Tinku Singh, CIS No. 288621/2016', arising out of FIR No. 100/2013, PS. Nabi Karim, under Sections 279/304A/337 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and Sections 134(a)/187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'MV Act'), convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 MV Act, and the consequent order of sentence dated 08.03.2022 (hereinafter CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 1 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:00:30 +0530 referred to as 'impugned order'), passed by the Ld. Trial Court, awarding the appellant; simple imprisonment for a period of 01 (one) year along with compensation to a tune of Rs. 2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lakhs and Fifty Thousand only) for the offence under Section 304A IPC; simple imprisonment for a period of 03 (three) months for the offence under Section 337 IPC; and simple imprisonment for a period of 01 (one) month along with fine of Rs.
500/- (Rupees Five Hundred only) for the offence under Section 134(a) read with Section 187 of MV Act, sentences to run concurrently. Further, the appellant was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 9,000/- (Rupees Nine Thousand only), as compensation for State expenses. (hereinafter impugned judgment and impugned order are collectively referred to as the 'impugned judgment and order').
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution against the appellant is that on 10.05.2013, on receipt of PCR Call pertaining to an accident vide DD No 13A, the concerned police official reached at Lady Harding Medical College Hospital/LHMC Hospital, where the victim (deceased) Ajay Bhushan ( hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was found admitted vide MLC No. 39510 and the victim/complainant, namely Vidya Sinha (hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant') was found admitted vide MLC No. 39511. At that point in time, the deceased was declared unfit for statement, however, the complainant was under
treatment. Ergo, the statement of the complainant could not be recorded. However, upon her statement being recorded, the complainant inter alia proclaimed that on 10.05.2013 at around 09:15 a.m., she was taking her brother/deceased for some interview at some NGO near Lakshmi Nagar (दिनांक 10-5-13 को समय CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 2 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:00:36 +0530 करीब 9:15 ए०एम० बजे मैं अपने भाई अजय भूषण को मदर डेरी, लक्ष्मी नगर के पास किसी एन०जी०ओ० में को-ओरडीनेटर की पोस्ट के लिए इन्टरव्यू दिलवाने ले जा रही थी). As per the complainant, while waiting at DBG Road Dispensary bus stand, bus with route no. 309 proceeding towards Kalyanpuri reached there, which was heavily occupied (डी०बी०जी० रोड डिसपेन्सरी बस स्टे ण्ड पर खडी थी। तभी वहां डी०टी०सी० की रूट नॅ 0 309 की बस जो कल्याणपुरी की ओर जा रही थी आयी जिसमें ज्यादा भीड थी।). It was further proclaimed by the complainant that she and her brother, somehow managed to enter inside the said bus and while the driver closed the rear gate, left hand of the deceased got caught in the said gate, however, the said bus proceeded ahead (हम दोनों भाई बहन किसी तरह बस में पीछे वाले गेट से चढे जो ड्राइवर द्वारा बस का पिछे वाला गेट बन्द करने पर मेरे भाई अजय भूषण का बांया हाथ गेट में फं स गया तथा बस चल पडी।). As per the complainant, as the other passengers of the bus, raised an alarm, the driver thereof opened the rear gate, leading to the deceased falling from the bus and sustaining injury on his head (इस बस में मौजूदा अन्य सवारियों द्वारा शोर मचाने पर ड्राइवर ने चलती बस का पिछे वाला गेट खोल दिया जिससे मेरा भाई अजय चलती बस से नीचे गिर गया तथा उसके सिर में चोट आयी). Markedly, the complaint further chronicles that the complainant jumped from the moving vehicle to save the deceased, however, she fell on the road on her side, sustained injury and got semi-conscious (जो अपने भाई को बचाने के लिए मैं भी चलती बस से कू द पडी तथा सडक पर पीठ के बल तिरछा गिरी जिससे मेरी पीछ पर व दायें पैर पर चोट आयी तथा मैं सेमी कनसीयस हो गयी।). Upon regaining consciousness, as per the complainant, she found herself in the said Hospital. Consequently, on the basis of the complaint of the complainant, the instant FIR came to be registered, and investigation ensued.
2.1. Notably, during the course of ensuing investigation, site plan was got prepared at the instance of the complainant.CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 3 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:00:39 +0530 Correspondingly, it was determined that the deceased, left for heavenly abode, whereupon, his body was got preserved in the mortuary (उसी दौराने एस०आई० साहब को मजरूब अजय भूषण की दौराने इलाज सी०आर० नॅ0 21678 पर एक्सपायर होने की इतला मिली जिस पर एस०आई० साहब ने मुकदमा हजा में सेक्शन 304ए आई पी सी ऐड की मृतक अजय भूषण की डेड बॉडी को मोरचरी में शिफट कराया।). At the same time, postmortem examination of the deceased was got conducted, wherein the cause of deceased's death was opined as, "...Cause of death is cranio- cerebral damage consequent upon blunt force trauma to head. All injuries are antemortem in nature caused by blunt force trauma, are 3-4 days old and are possible in a road traffic accident..." . Concomitantly, under the MLC of the complainant, nature of her injury was opined as 'simple'. Further, owing to the ensuing investigation, time sheet of the vehicles plying on the said route at the relevant point in time was obtained by the concerned IO and the identity of the vehicle and that of its driver, at the relevant point in time was determined as DL-1PC-9516 (hereinafter referred to as the 'offending vehicle') and Tinku Singh, the appellant herein, respectively. The concerned IO also got mechanical inspection of the offending vehicle was got conducted and eventually, on conclusion of investigation and on the basis of the material collected, the concerned police official, filed the chargesheet before the Ld. Trial Court.
2.2. Markedly, upon such chargesheet being filed, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 17.04.2014, took cognizance of offence under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 of MV Act. Thereafter, on compliance of the provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C. and upon arguments on the aspect of notice having been addressed by/on behalf of the State CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 4 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:00:43 +0530 and the appellant, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 16.12.2014, directed framing of notice, in terms of the provisions under Section 251 Cr.P.C., against the appellant for the offences under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 of MV Act, inter alia under the following observations;
"...Submissions on charge heard.
No ground is made out for discharging the accused.
Accordingly, charge framed U/s. 279/304A/337 IPC and 134(a) MV Act r/w Section 187 MV Act against the accused. He had pleaded not guilty and has claimed trial.
Put up for PE on ..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Apposite here to further reproduce the relevant extracts of charges/notice dated 16.12.2014, under Section 251 Cr.P.C. against the appellant, as under;
"...I, ***, Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, do hereby serve notice upon you accused Tinku Singh, S/o Sh. Jai Singh, R/o Village Nathori, PS Nakur, District Saharanpur, U.P. as under:
It is alleged against you that on 10.05.2013 at about 09.15 a.m. at Dispensary Bus Stand, DBG Road, Delhi within the jurisdiction of PS Nabi Karim, you were driving DTC bus of route no. 309 bearing no. DL-1PC-9516 in such a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and public safety and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 279 IPC and within my cognizance.
Secondly, on the aforesaid date, time and place while driving the said vehicle in aforesaid manner, you suddenly opened the backside gate of the bus without viewing the same in the rear mirror as a result of which Ajay Bhushan (now deceased) fell down and suffered injuries to which he succumbed and in this way caused his death and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 304 A IPC and within my cognizance.
Thirdly, on the aforesaid date, time and place while driving the said vehicle in aforesaid manner, you suddenly opened the backside gate of the bus CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 5 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:00:48 +0530 without viewing the same in the rear mirror as a result of which Ajay Bhushan (now deceased) fell down and with a view to save him complainant also jumped and suffered injuries amounting to simple hurt and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 337 IPC and within my cognizance.
Fourthly, on the aforesaid date, time and place after committing the aforesaid offences you instead of helping the injured persons by stopping the bus you fled away with the same and you 134 (a) MV Act r/w thereby committed an offence punishable U/s Section 187 MV Act and within my cognizance.
I hereby direct to be tried by this court for the aforesaid offences..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Significantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 17 (seventeen) witnesses/prosecution witnesses, i.e., PW-1/Ms. Vidhya Sinha; PW-2/Ram Sharan (TI DTC); PW-3/ Sh. Vinay Kumar; PW-4/Ram Dhani; PW-5/Mahesh Chand; PW-6/Sh. Balwan Singh; PW-7/Rohtash Singh; PW-8/Sh. Arvinder Singh; PW-9/Sh. Kiranpal Singh; PW-10/Manpreet Singh Kapoor; PW-11/Om Prakash; PW-12/HC Ramkesh; PW-13/SI Ravi Shankar; PW-14/ASI (Retd.) Bhagwan; PW-15/ASI Khushpal Singh; PW-16/HC Shamsher; and PW-17/HC Sumer Singh. Appositely, during the course of proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court, the appellant admitted the factum of the registration of instant FIR, MLC No. 39510/13 and MLC No. 39511/13 both dated 10.05.2013 of the deceased/Ajay Bhushan and the complainant/Vidya Sinha, respectively. Correspondingly, the appellant further admitted the X-ray report and the fact as to the X-ray of Vidya was done in LHMC Hospital; postmortem report of Ajay Bhushan, bearing no. 446/13; death summary report of Ajay Bhushan and the other treatment record of the deceased Ajay Bhushan, in terms of the provisions under CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 6 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:00:52 +0530 Section 294 Cr.P.C. Consequently, Ld. Trial Court, dispensed with/dropped the corresponding witnesses/prosecution witnesses. Subsequently, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, recording of statement of the appellant under Sections 313/281 Cr.P.C. on 07.12.2019, as well as on conclusion of arguments on behalf of the appellant as well as by State, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and order, holding the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 of MV Act, sentenced him in the manner, as noted hereinabove.
3. Ld. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment and order are against all cannons of law and facts of the case, as well as in gross contravention of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended by the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not appreciate the facts of the present case as well as failed to consider that the prosecution was unable to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant, while passing the said judgment/order. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court even failed to appreciate that in the instant case, there are numerous gaping holes in the case put forth by the prosecution and that the prosecution's story does not inspire any confidence, nor appeals to the senses of a prudent man. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, a perusal of the testimonies of the various prosecution witnesses/witnesses, who were examined before the Ld. Trial Court would clearly demonstrate that there are glaring, CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 7 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:00:56 +0530 and material contradictions and the Ld. Trial Court has committed grave error by not considering the same, leading to gross miscarriage of justice to the appellant. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further fervently asserted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not considering that PW-14 admitted that he had not filed the GPS record of the offending vehicle as the offending vehicle was shown in that document to be much ahead of the spot of alleged accident on 14.05.2013 and the investigation of the case was marked to the present IO only on 17.05.2013. Correspondingly, it was asserted by the Ld. Counsel that the IO deliberately opted not to file the TIP proceeding records in the instant case as the same would have clearly demonstrated that the complainant had failed to identify the appellant as the perpetrator of alleged offence. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that even the complainant made material improvement as to the time of alleged incident, specified under her initial statement before the police officials and subsequent deposition before the Court, belying the case put forth against the appellant. Even otherwise, it was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that none of the prosecution witnesses, supported the case of the prosecution, nor identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the alleged offence. Concomitantly, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that neither was the offending vehicle apprehended on the spot nor any of the witnesses, identified the offending vehicle to be involved in the alleged incident.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further strenuously argued that though the prosecution had heavily placed reliance on the GPS record of the offending vehicle, however, the IO deliberately opted not to produce certificate under Section 65B of CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 8 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:00:59 +0530 the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act') along with the said record, as mandated under law. Correspondingly, it was submitted that even the IO has made material/significant improvement in his deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, which fact has failed to be considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching a finding of appellant's guilt. Ld. Counsel further argued that in the instant case, even otherwise, the ingredients of none of the offences/charges levelled against the appellant have been made out from the material placed on record.
In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently argued that the Ld. Trial Court convicted the appellant, without appreciating that the prosecution failed to prove that the offending vehicle was being driven by the appellant in a rash and negligent manner. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, as per the settled law, in order to attribute criminal liability under 279/304A/337 IPC, rashness or negligence on the part of an accused is required to be unambiguously proved, which the prosecution has failed to do in the present case. As per the Ld. Counsel, the conviction of the appellant is premised on insufficient evidence, besides, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court did not adequately evaluate the evidence presented by the respondent/State, leading to a premature and unjust conclusion of appellant's guilt. It was further argued that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Ergo, as per the Ld. Counsel, the conviction and consequent order of sentence, passed against the appellant are unsustainable in law, non-est and liable to be set aside. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the depositions/testimonies of various prosecution witnesses are grossly insufficient to attribute rashness and/or negligence on the appellant, as has been erroneously done by the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 9 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:01:02 +0530 Counsel further argued that, even otherwise, there is not a single statement/deposition of any of the witnesses, ascribing rashness and/or negligence on the appellant.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that under the aforestated circumstances, it was not within the domain/jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court to presume rashness/negligence in the instant case, that too on the basis of deficit/insufficient evidence. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel submitted that not only did the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the truth of circumstances and passed its judgment/decision in haste, rather, did not properly appreciate/examine the facts of the present case, wrongly holding the appellant guilty of the aforementioned offences. Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the order of sentence was also passed by the Ld. Trial Court, whimsically, while failing to appreciate that the appellant was of young age at the relevant point in time, as well as responsible for the look after and take care of his family members. Ld. Counsel further vehemently argued that the punishment/penalty must not be retributive in nature, rather, humanizing, considering that sentencing an accused/convict with severe sentence would subject his family members to grave depravity. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, substantial time has lapsed since the incident in question and in case relaxation/leniency is not afforded to the appellant, serious/severe repercussions may ensue to the appellant and his family members' physical and mental well-being. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant inter alia prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and the impugned judgment and order be set aside. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Ajit Savant Majagavi v. State of Karnataka, CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 10 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:06 +0530 (1997) 7 SCC 110; Bhagiratth v. State of MP, AIR 1976 SC 975;
Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana, 2017 (8) SCC 570; Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma v. State of Uttarakhand, 2010 (10) SCC 439; Kali Ram v. State of HP, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Khekh Ram v. State of HP, 2018 (1) SCC 202; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. MGR Enterprises & Ors., 2019 (262) DLT 304; Sh. Kanwal Kishore Nagpal & Ors. v. Sh. Brahm Dev Sharma, 2023 (1) RCR (Rent) 598; and Kishore Gurung v. State of Sikkim, 2023 Legal Eagle 24.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents. Ld. Addl. PP for the State further submitted that the testimonies of the complainant and other witnesses have not only been consistent, rather, unblemished as well as lucidly point towards the only inference of guilt of the appellant. In this regard, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State that it is settled law that conviction of an accused can be based even on the testimony of a sole witness if it inspires confidence, which in the instant case is sufficiently established from the unwavering testimony of the complainant. As per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the facts and circumstances put forth as well as the evidence placed on record, unerringly point out towards the guilt of the appellant and that no fault can be attributed to the finding of the Ld. Trial Court, which is based on proper appreciation of facts as well as law. Further, as per the Ld. Addl. PP for the State, there was no omission of fault on the part of the complainant and deceased in the instant case and even CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 11 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:09 +0530 otherwise, it was submitted, the concept of contributory negligence has no role under criminal law. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset, as grossly malicious and devoid of merits.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record and written submissions/written arguments placed on record have been thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite at this stage to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court1 in Atley v. State of U.P., (1955) 2 SCC 45, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the 'scope and ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction, against an appeal against acquittal or an appeal against conviction, inter alia noted as under;
"9. ... It is also well settled that the Court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207: AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 SCC 898: AIR 1953 SC 122]. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court 1 Reference further made to; Padam Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 1 SCC 621.
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was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions...."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narendra Bhat v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 785, iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"3. This Court has in a series of judgments held that a court exercising appellate power must not only consider questions of law but also questions of fact and in doing so it must subject the evidence to a critical scrutiny. The judgment of the High Court must show that the Court really applied its mind to the facts of the case as particularly when the offence alleged is of a serious nature and may attract a heavy punishment."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the forenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against conviction extends to re-appreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is not only required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law2 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even an accused. Needless to reemphasize that an appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that such a presumption is neither strengthened by acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in 2 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.
CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 13 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:16 +0530 the trial court. 9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid
principles, however, before proceeding further with the appreciation of the merits of the case(s) at hand, as well as rival contentions of/on behalf of the parties, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"279. Rash driving or riding on a public way- Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** *** 304-A. Causing death by negligence-Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others-Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Relevantly, from a perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is observed that the essential ingredients3 to constitute an offence punishable under Section 279 IPC inter alia are that there must be, "rash and negligent driving or riding on a public way and the act must be so as to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person." Concurrently, similar 3 Vinod Kumar v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4347.
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elements of rashness and negligence are envisaged under the provisions of Section 304A IPC. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ras Bihari Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC Online Del 12290 , wherein the Hon'ble High Court, while explicating the ingredients of the provisions/offence(s) under Sections 279/304A IPC inter alia observed as under;
"9. To constitute an offence under Section 279 IPC, it must be shown that the person was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. Criminal negligence or criminal rashness is an important element of the offence under Section 279 IPC.
*** *** ***
11. In a road accident case, to convict a person for the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC, the prosecution is required to bring on record the basic requirement of the said Section i.e. "Rash or Negligent Act" with following conditions:
1) There must be death of the person in question;
2) that the accused must have caused such death; and
3) that such act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it did not amount to culpable homicide.
*** *** ***
13. Section 304A which deals with unintentional death caused by doing any rash or negligent act of the offender. The applicability of this Section is limited to rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. To bring an offence within the ambit of Section 304A, the prosecution is required to bring on record that the act was done by an accused and the death was caused due to rash and negligent act."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Correspondingly, to constitute an offence under Section 337 IPC, the prosecution is required to satisfy that the injury had been caused to any person by the accused's commission of any rash or negligent act and that such injuries are simple in nature. Quite evidently, in order to sustain conviction under the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 15 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:01:23 +0530 provisions under Section 279 or Section 304A or Section 337 IPC, the prosecution is inter alia required to prove that the driver of the offending vehicle/the accused was driving the same in a rash or negligent manner and further by doing such an act, rashly or negligent, the offender endangered human life or caused death of any person, or in the said process caused hurt to a victim, respectively. Demonstrably, rashness and/or negligence is/are one of the key ingredients as well as common 4 elements to constitute the offences under the said provisions.
12. Quite understandably, unless the aforesaid 'basic ingredients' are proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, no criminal liability can be attributed to the accused. As a corollary, there must be proof that the rash or negligent act of accused was the proximate cause of the incident in question and, in particular for the offence under Sections 304A/337 IPC, there must be proof that demise/death or simple hurt, respectively, resulted to the victim, owing to such an act of an accused. Apposite at this stage to further make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Hussain v. State of A.P., (1972) 3 SCC 18, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the contours of the words, 'rash(ness)' and 'negligent(ce)', noted as under;
"7. It is against this background we have to see whether the appellant was either rash or negligent. Rashness consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the 4 Adwait Surendra Aatre v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 473.
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signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22
17:01:26
+0530
circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. This definition of criminal rashness and criminal negligence given by Straight, J. in Empress v. Idu Beg [(1881) 3 All 776] has been adopted by this Court in Bhalchandra Waman Pethe v. State of Maharashtra [Cri A No 62 of 1965, decided on 20-11- 1967: 1968 SCD 198]..."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in H.W. Smith v. King-Emperor, 1925 SCC Online Cal 128, in a similar context, observed on an earlier occasion, as under;
"... Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted..."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Ergo, it is quite intelligible5 that negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations, which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In contrast, a rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. In fact, it is a settled law6, "Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species." Further, rashness consists7 in overhasty act, with the criminality lying in running the risk of doing such an act with 5 Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284.
6Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269.
7Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P., (2000) 7 SCC 72.
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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+0530
recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Needless to reiterate, to bring home the conviction of an accused, in particular, of the appellant in the instant case, it is imperative for prosecution to establish said mens rea beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant/accused.
15. Apposite at this stage for this Court to reproduce the relevant provisions under the MV Act, germane for the present adjudication, as under;
"134. Duty of driver in case of accident and injury to a person-When any person is injured or any property of a third party is damaged, as a result of an accident in which a motor vehicle is involved, the driver of the vehicle or other person in charge of the vehicle shall-
(a) unless it is not practicable to do so on account of mob fury or any other reason beyond his control, take all reasonable steps to secure medical attention for the injured person, by conveying him to the nearest medical practitioner or hospital, and it shall be the duty of every registered medical practitioner or the doctor on duty in the hospital immediately to attend to the injured person and render medical aid or treatment without waiting for any procedural formalities, unless the injured person or his guardian, in case he is a minor, desires otherwise;...
*** *** ***
187. Punishment for offences relating to accident-
Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 132 or of Section 133 or Section 134 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine of five thousand rupees, or with both or, if having been previously convicted of an offence under this section, he is again convicted of an offence under this section, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine of ten thousand rupees, or with both...."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Quite evidently, it is seen from above that Section 187 of the MV Act inter alia penalized the non-compliance of the provisions under Section 134 of the said enactment. In turn, the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 18 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:34 +0530 provision under Section 134(a) MV Act obligates the driver of the vehicle or any other person, in charge of such vehicle, where any person is injured or any property of a third party is damaged as a result of an accident in which a motor vehicle is involved to, "...take all reasonable steps to secure medical attention for the injured person, by conveying him to the nearest medical practitioner or hospital...". However, the exception to such obligation is envisaged under the said provision itself, i.e., in the cases where it is not practicable to do so on account of mob fury or any other reason beyond the control of such driver/person in charge of such offending vehicle. Clearly, the onus to prove such embargo/exception would vest on an accused under such case.
17. Therefore, being wary of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed with the appreciation of the material placed on record, in order to determine whether the prosecution has been able to prove its case/charges against the accused/appellant, beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case. In particular, to determine whether the finding of appellant's guilt can be reached beyond a pale of doubt in the facts and circumstances brought forth, as has been determined by the Ld. Trial Court. At the outset, this Court deems it pertinent to refer to the deposition of the complainant/Ms. Vidhya Sinha /PW-1, who deposed about the incident in question and the role of the appellant herein. Relevantly, as per PW-1/the complainant, on 10.05.2013 at around 09:15 a.m., she was present at DBG Dispensary Bus Stand along with her brother, deceased Ajay Bhushan. As per PW-1, they were proceeded for Mother Dairy, Laxmi Nagar for deceased's interview for a post of coordinator. It was further proclaimed by PW-1 that one DTC Bus of route no. 309, en-route Kalyanpuri CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 19 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:01:38 +0530 reached at the bus stand and they/PW-1 and her brother tried to board the said bus from its front gate. At this, as per PW-1, the appellant/driver, who was correctly identified by PW-1 before the Ld. Trial Court, directed them to board the bus from its rear gate. Consequently, it was avowed by PW-1 that they went to the rear gate of bus, whereupon she/PW-1 boarded the bus first, followed by the deceased, right behind her. PW-1 further proclaimed that as her brother boarded the bus, his hand got stuck in the gate of the bus and at this, she/PW-1 shouted and asked the appellant to stop the bus as well as open the gate of the bus. As per PW-1, public also raised such alarm, however, the appellant opened the gate, without stopping the bus. Due to this, PW-1 avowed that her brother fell out of the bus, and she also fell out of the bus, while saving him/the deceased. As per PW-1, she got unconscious and regained her consciousness only at LHMC Hospital. Upon waking, as per PW-1, she found out that the police officials were present there and her brother/deceased was on stretcher. Correspondingly, PW-1 asserted that she had not given her statement to the police officials on the said day as she was not feeling well and that her statement (Ex. PW1/A) was only recorded on 14.05.2013, besides, she got prepared the site plan (Ex. PW1/B). PW-1 also testified that her brother succumbed to his injuries on 14.05.2013 and she identified his body at RML Hospital as well as MAMC vide identification Ex. PW1/C and Ex. PW1/D, after which the deceased's body was handed over to her vide handing over memo (Ex. PW1/E). Further, as per PW-1, on 29.10.2013, she was called at the MACT Cell, Rajender Nagar, where she identified the appellant, who was arrested at her pointing out vide arrest memo (Ex. PW1/F). Relevantly, during the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 20 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:41 +0530 course of evidence, PW-1 was shown photographs ( Ex. PW1 (Colly.)) of the offending vehicle, i.e., of DTC bus bearing registration no. DL-1PC-9516, whereupon PW-1 asserted that the said bus may be the offending vehicle, however, the appellant asserted during the course of evidence of PW-1 that he was not disputing the of case property.
18. Markedly, upon being cross-examined by/on behalf of the appellant, PW-1/complainant, asserted as under;
"XXXXXX Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. Today, I have read my statement, recorded earlier. It is correct that no one else fell down from the bus except me and my brother. I do not know what happened after I fell down from the bus and got unconscious. I do not know who took me to hospital. None of my relative came to the hospital. I got injuries in my hand in my back. I was bandaged and was discharged in the evening but I remained in the hospital as my brother was not yet discharged. My brother remained in the hospital till his death. After the accident I saw the accused for the first time in MACT Cell. I have not seen the driver/accused in between. When I reached MACT Cell police officers showed me two persons and I identified the accused from among them. It is wrong to suggest that accused was not driving the said bus on the date of accident. I do not know the registration number of the bus as I boarded the bus only after seeing its route number. It is wrong to suggest that I and my brother were not travelling in the said bus bearing registration no. DL1PC9516. It is wrong to suggest that I identified the accused at the instance of police officials. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Germane for the purposes of the present discourse to make a reference to the testimony of PW-3/Vinay Kumar, who, though, did not completely support the case of the prosecution, however, proclaimed that on 10.05.2013, he was working as a conductor at Millenium Depot-1 and was on duty in DTC bearing registration no. DL-1PC-9516 of route no. 309. Correspondingly, CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 21 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:44 +0530 PW-3 affirmed that the said bus was driven by the appellant and that he/PW-3 was present in the said bus from 04:30 a.m. till 01:10 p.m., though, as per PW-3, no accident had happened with the offending vehicle. Correspondingly, reference is made to the deposition of PW-4/Ram Dhani, who proclaimed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 10.05.2013, he had parked his vehicle bearing DL-1LN-5505, adjacent to Punjab and Sind Bank, DBG Road branch, Paharganj, Delhi. Further, as per PW-4, he was present at the said spot and at around 09.00 a.m., one DTC bus of green color and route no. 309, low floor was proceeding from Anand Parbat to Kalyan Puri. As per PW-4, when the said bus had halted/was standing at dispensary, Paharganj some of the passengers were boarding or de-boarding the said bus and that he/PW-4 saw that a passenger who was trying to board the said bus, fell down from its rear gate. However, PW-4 expressed inability to depose as to how the accident had taken place. Relevantly, since both, PW-3 and PW-4 had not supported the case of the prosecution, they were declared hostile by Ld. Addl. PP for the State and extensively cross-examined by/on behalf of the State, however, to no avail. Needless to mention that PW-3 was not cross examined by/on behalf of the appellant and PW-4 upon being cross examined, affirmed that he had not seen the accident. Pertinent to note that even PW-5/Mahesh Chand, did not support the case of the prosecution and nothing was forthcoming even under cross examination of PW-5, by/at the behest of State. Concomitantly, PW-7/Rohtash Singh, produced the timesheets, dated 10.05.2013 of the buses, which were departed from depot and returned at Depot after completion of their route, however, failed to identify his signatures on the said time sheets or to depose as to who had CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 22 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:01:48 +0530 handed over the said sheets to the police officials/IO. Consequently, even PW-7 was declared hostile and cross- examined by Ld. Addl. PP for the State.
20. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to make reference to the deposition of PW-6/Balwan Singh, who inter alia deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that at the time of the incident, he was working as driver in DTC on contract basis and that his badge no. of DTC was 2188. Further, as per PW-6, on 10.05.2013, he was working in DTC and posted at Millennium Depot, driving bus no. DL-1PC-8285, route no. 309, from Anand Parbat to Kalyan Puri. As per PW-6, the said bus was green color, low floor. It was further testified by PW-6 that on 10.05.2013, at around 09:00 a.m., he started on his said bus from Anand Parbat till Kalyan Puri and at about 09:20 a.m., when they stopped the bus at Hari Har Mandir, Kamla Market, one passenger boarded his bus and informed him/PW-6 that sometime earlier, one male passenger and one lady passenger got injured, while boarding the DTC, green color, low floor bus route no. 309, of Millennium Depot. Further, as per PW-6, when the passenger was boarding the said bus, the hand of male passenger got stuck in the door and upon the passengers raising noise, the bus driver opened the door of the said bus, while the same/said bus was on move. Consequently, as per PW-6, he was informed that the said person, whose hand was stuck in the door of the bus fell down and the lady behind him also jumped from the bus. As per PW-6, he was informed by the said passenger that the male passenger received several injuries, while the lady passenger received less injuries. It was further proclaimed by PW-6 that the said passenger, who boarded his bus, also gave his phone number to him/PW-6 and asked him in case the said bus CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 23 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:01:51 +0530 driver was found, his/passenger's number should be shared with him. It was further testified by PW-6 that the crowd, which had gathered at the spot, were asking the said lady to get the case registered against the driver. Correspondingly, as per PW-6, he waited for 3-4 days for any news of the accident, however, he/PW-6 did not get any news regarding any accident. PW-6 further deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that he did not remember the phone number of the said passenger/informer, however, he/PW-6 had informed the IO that the said person/passenger had informed him/PW-6 that the aforementioned bus had gone prior to his/PW-6's bus. Notably, despite such assertion by PW-6, the appellant opted not to cross examine the said witness.
21. Apropos the present discourse, this Court deems it pertinent to make reference to the deposition of PW-10/Manpreet Singh Kapoor, who deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 03.02.2014, he was posted as DGM, IT, DIMTS, Ltd, 5 th Floor, Block First, IT Park, Shastri Park, Delhi. Further, as per PW-10, his company provided GPS facility to the DTC and at the request of the concerned police officials, the actual position of DTC Bus no. DL-1PC-9516/offending vehicle for 10.05.2013 from 08:59:45 hrs. to 09:04:20 hrs., was provided to the police, after downloading from the online system, as Ex. PW10/A. It was further proclaimed by PW-10 that the actual position of the said bus at the particular moment was shown in GPS system. Pertinently, during the course of his cross-examination by/on behalf of the appellant, PW-10 declared, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. It is correct that I did not issue certificate u/s. 65B Indian Evidence Act in respect of the data of GPS.
CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 24 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.09.22 17:01:55 +0530
One employee of my company was having control over the server in the office, but I do not remember the name of that employee. The data was generated by my colleague, but I do not remember his name. I do not remember whether IO had requested in writing to furnish the data of GPS or not. It is correct that I did not generate the data Ex. PW10/A. It is correct that the hard disc in respect of the generated data was not asked by IO and the same was not handed over to him. At this stage, Ld. Defence Counsel shown two sheets of GPS Data to the witness, witness stated that I do not know who has generated the said sheets. The said sheets are Marked DX (Colly.). It is wrong to suggest that the Data Ex. PW10/A are false and forged document. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Markedly, PW-13/SI Ravi Shanker deposed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 10.05.2013, he was posted at PS Nabi Karim as SI and on that day, he received an information regarding an accident vide DD No. 13A. Further, as per PW-13, on receipt of the said DD, he/PW-13 reached at LHMC Hospital, where one Ajay Bhushan Sinha and Vidya Sinha were found admitted vide MLC Nos. 39510 and 39511. As per PW-13, the injured Ajay Bhushan Sinha was not fit for statement and injured Vidya Sinha was unable to narrate the whole incident. Ergo, as per PW-13, DD 13A was kept pending. Correspondingly, PW-13 avowed that on 14.03.2015, he along with Ct. Samsher went to LHMC Hospital, where he came to know that both the injured were shifted to RML Hospital. Thereafter, as per PW-13, he along with Ct. Shamsher went to RML Hospital, where he/PW-13 recorded the statement of injured Vidya Sinha and prepared rukka. Thereafter, as per PW-13, rukka was handed over to Ct. Shamsher, who got the FIR registered and he/PW-13 took the complainant to the place of incident, where site plan was prepared. Subsequently, Cr. Samsher CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 25 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:01:59 +0530 is deposed to have arrived at the spot and handed over the original rukka and two copy of FIR to him/PW-13. PW-13 further asserted that during the ensuing proceedings, intimation of demise of Ajay Bhushan was received vide DD No. 35A , whereupon, postmortem proceedings were got conducted on 15.05.2013 vide postmortem report No. 446/13 and the dead body was handed over to the relatives of the deceased. Pertinently, upon being cross-examined, PW-13 avowed, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I reached at the hospital at about 10.00 AM on the day of incident. The information regarding the incident was received in the PS at about 9.30 AM. The injured Ajay Bhushan was unfit for the statement while the injured Vidya Sinha was fit for statement but she could not get her statement recorded as she was in pain. Rukka was prepared on 14.05.13 at about 12.00 Noon. There was no eyewitness at the spot on 10.05.13. I visited at the spot on 10.05.13 and 14.05.13. I prepared the site plan on 14.05.13 at the instance of the complainant. The complainant was brought by me to the spot. The investigation was handed over by me on 17.05.13 to MACT Cell. During my investigation I had recorded the statement of the complainant. It is wrong to suggest that I had not done the fair investigation. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Strikingly, PW-16/HC Shamsher affirmed and deposed on the same lines as PW-13, inter alia confirming the factum of having the FIR registered in the instant case. Apposite to further refer to the deposition of PW-14/ASI (Retd.) Shri. Bhagwan, who proclaimed under his testimony that on 17.05.2013, he was posted as ASI as PS Nabi Karim, when the investigation of the present case was marked to him. As per PW-14, he came to know that the offending vehicle was of green colour and belonging to Millennium Depot. Consequently, CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 26 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:02:02 +0530 he/PW-14 received the time sheet of all the buses of route no. 309 and matched the time of accident with GPS of offending vehicle. Thereafter, on 13.09.2013, as per PW-14, he recorded the statement of the conductor of the offending vehicle, namely, Vinay Kumar and on 24.10.2013, he/PW-14 served a notice under Section 133 of MV Act to the Manager, Millennium Depot. Thereafter, as per PW-14, on 29.10.2013, the Manager of the Millennium Depot produced the driver of the offending vehicle/the appellant along with the offending vehicle. Meanwhile, the complainant is proclaimed to have reached the police station and correctly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the offence. PW-14 further avowed that he seized the offending vehicle vide memo Ex. PW14/A; documents of the offending vehicle vide memo Ex. PW11/A; as well as the Driving License and badge of the appellant vide memo Ex. PW14/B. It was further avowed by PW-14 that the offending vehicle was got mechanically inspected, as well as the appellant arrested vide memo Ex. PW1/F and personally searched vide memo Ex. PW14/C. Accused, as per PW-14, was released on bail on same date and he/PW-14 recorded the statement of witness, prepared the charge sheet and filed the same in court. Relevantly, during the course of his cross-examination, PW-14, proclaimed as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I received the investigation of this case on 17.05.13. Earlier IO of this case was SI Ravi Shanker. Investigation of this case was transferred to me after the death of victim. The victim had died on 17.05.13. Postmortem was done through the earlier IO SI Ravi Shanker. I arrested the accused on 29.10.13. Notice u/s. 133 M.V. Act was served upon the Depot Manager of DTC, Millennium Park on 24.10.13. No reply to the notice u/s. 133 M.V. Act was received by me. I got to know about the offending vehicle through CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 27 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 GPS, but I do not remember the date when I came to know about the offending vehicle through GPS. I had mentioned the registration number of the offending vehicle in the notice u/s. 133 M.V. Act. I had filed the complete record of the GPS of offending vehicle. It is correct that I had not filed the documents which are lying on record which is Mark DX (two pages). It is wrong to suggest that I had deliberately not filed the documents Mark DX. I had started the investigation of this case on 17.05.13 but I do not remember the date when I concluded the investigation. The witnesses were examined on different dates and those dates are mentioned on the statements. I had mentioned in the case diary as to when I started the investigation and I had mentioned in the case diary as to the witnesses examined. It is wrong to suggest that I had tried to change the time of the incident just to frame the accused in present case. It is wrong to suggest that for that reason only I had withhold the documents Mark DX. It is correct that I had also called driver Balwan for the TIP proceedings. It is wrong to suggest that the complainant refused to identify the accused Tinku Singh in the police station. Since, the vehicles of accused and another driver Balwan were going simultaneously and thus it was required to call driver Balwan also for TIP. I had not filed the GPS data of the vehicle of driver Balwan. (Vol. The vehicle of accused was going ahead to the vehicle of driver Balwan.) I was apprised by the driver Balwan that his vehicle was at the back side of the vehicle of accused Tinku. It is wrong to suggest that I deliberately withholded the GPS Data of driver Balwan just to save him. It is wrong to suggest that I had not conducted the fair investigation of the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Noticeably, for a comprehensive evaluation of the material placed on record, this Court deems it pertinent to further make reference to the testimony of PW-17/HC Sumer Singh, who proclaimed before the Ld. Trial Court that on 29.10.2013, he was posted at MACT Cell, Central District, Delhi and that day, he joined the investigation of the present case along with IO/ASI Shri Bhagwan. On that day, as per PW-17, conductor of Millennium Depot, DTC, namely, Om Prakash reached at MACT Cell, CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 28 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:09 +0530 Rajinder Nagar along with the reply of notice under Section 133 MV Act and also produced the offending vehicle, i.e., DTC bus bearing no. DL-1PC-9516. As per PW-17, said conductor also produced the RC, permit, insurance certificate, etc. before the IO and the driver of the offending vehicle, i.e., Tinku Singh/the appellant also reached there, who was arrested, post interrogation. Needless to mention, PW-17 reiterated regarding the personal search, seizure and other proceedings, as deposed by PW-14 in his deposition. Significantly, in his cross-examination, PW-17 deposed/affirmed, as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for accused. I do not know as to when the notice u/s. 133 M.V. Act was given by the IO to the concerned person. I do not know the reason about the delay in conducting the investigation as the same is conducted by the IO. In my presence no public witness were examined by the IO. I do not know as to whether IO has interrogated any other driver of the DTC bus of the same route. It is wrong to suggest that one another driver namely Balwan Singh was also called for interrogation. It is wrong to suggest that the alleged offending vehicle is not involved in the present incident. It is wrong to suggest that accused had not caused any accident as alleged in the present case. It is wrong to suggest that accused has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is wrong to suggest that am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Conspicuously, in light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this Court would now proceed with the evaluation of the material placed on record, being wary of the arguments addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and the State. Quite evidently, from the foregoing, it is perspicuously deduced that the fulcrum of the case of the prosecution against the appellant is premised on the testimony of the complainant/Ms. Vidhya Sinha/PW-1, who, as aforenoted, inter alia, deposed that on CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 29 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:13 +0530 10.05.2013 at around 09:15 a.m., she was present at DBG Dispensary Bus Stand along with her brother, deceased Ajay Bhushan. Correspondingly, PW-1 asserted that one DTC Bus of route no. 309, en-route for Kalyanpuri reached at the bus stand and they/PW-1 and her brother tried to board the said bus from its front gate. At this, as per PW-1, the appellant/driver, who was correctly identified by PW-1 before the Ld. Trial Court, directed them to board the bus from its rear gate. Consequently, it was avowed by PW-1 that they went to the rear gate of bus, whereupon she/PW-1 boarded the bus first, followed by the deceased, behind her. PW-1 further proclaimed that as her brother boarded the bus, his hand got stuck in the gate of the bus and at this, she/PW-1 shouted and asked the appellant to stop the bus as well as open the gate of the bus. Further, as per PW-1, public also raised such alarm, however, the appellant opened the gate, without stopping the bus. Due to this, PW-1 avowed that her brother fell out of the bus, and she also fell out of the bus, while saving him/the deceased. As per PW-1, she got unconscious and regained her consciousness only at LHMC Hospital. Upon waking, as per PW-1, she found out that the police officials were present there and her brother/deceased was on stretcher, who eventually succumbed to his injuries.
Correspondingly, PW-1 asserted that on 29.10.2013, she was called at the MACT Cell, Rajender Nagar, where she identified the appellant, who was arrested at her pointing out.
26. In respect of the foregoing, it is noted that the Ld. Trial Court, while reaching the finding of guilt of the appellant, primarily relied on the depositions of Ms. Vidhya Sinha/PW-1, in so far as it is asserted to support the case of the prosecution regarding the incident as well as the identity of appellant as the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 30 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:19 +0530 perpetrator of the offence. Correspondingly, from a conscientious perusal of the impugned judgment, it is noted that the Ld. Trial Court also placed heavy reliance on the depositions of PW-7/Sh. Rohtash Singh in so far as it relates to the production of the time sheets for the vehicles plying on the route of the date of alleged incident; and PW-10/Sh. Manpreet Singh in as much as it relates to the production of the GPS coordinates of the offending vehicle; as well as failure on the part of the appellant to cross examine PW-6/Balwan Singh, being the other driver who was plying on the same route on the said date, to reach a finding that the appellant was the actual perpetrator of offence. However, in this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that while reaching the said conclusion, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that though, the complainant/Ms. Vidhya Sinha/PW-1, identified the appellant as the perpetrator of offence in her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, however, at no point in time, prior to such identification, was any TIP proceedings of the appellant, conducted/got conducted by the concerned IO before the concerned court in the instant case. In fact, while, complainant/Ms. Vidhya Sinha/PW-1 asserted in her testimony that she first identified the appellant in MACT Cell, Rajender Nagar, on 29.10.2013, when she was called by the said police official, however, it is not even forthcoming in the deposition of PW-1 that she was ever asked to participate in the formal TIP proceedings of the appellant/accused, especially, when it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant and the victims/deceased and the complainant were acquainted or familiar with each other, at any point in time, prior to the alleged date of occurrence. Obviously, under such circumstances, such identification of the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 31 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:02:23 +0530 appellant as the perpetrator of offence by the complainant, bereft of proper/formal TIP proceedings, in the considered opinion of this Court, is not beyond a pale of doubt. In fact, in this regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that it is trite law that mere identification of an accused in the police station or the Court for the first time, bereft of proper Test Identification parade/TIP proceedings, especially when the victim and the accused are strangers8, cannot be considered free from doubt. Reference in this regard, is made to the decision in Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online SC 310, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in an akin situation, noted as under;
"8. Anil Kumar (PW-8), who is the Investigating Officer (IO), has also admitted that PW-1 identified the accused persons by seeing them at the police station. He has further admitted that no identification parade was conducted. As such, it can be seen that the identification of the appellant herein by PW-1 is quite doubtful as no identification parade has been conducted. PW-1 clearly states that he has identified the accused persons since the police had shown him those two people.
9. In the absence of proper identification parade being conducted, the identification for the first time in the Court cannot be said to be free from doubt. We find that the other circumstance that the Courts relied for resting the order of conviction is with regard to the recovery of an iron rod. An iron rod is an article which could be found anywhere. It is not the case of the prosecution that any stolen article was recovered from the appellant herein..."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkhansingh v. State of M.P., (2003) 5 SCC 746 , while explicating the significance of TIP proceedings and dock identification, for the first time by a victim/complainant/witness, remarked as under;
8Liyakat Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 SCC Online HP 2125.
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"7. It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. Apart from the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons, are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration...
*** *** ***
10. It is no doubt true that much evidentiary value cannot be attached to the identification of the accused in court where identifying witness is a total stranger who had just a fleeting glimpse of the person identified or who had no particular reason to remember the person concerned, if the identification is made for the first time in court..."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Concomitantly, it is pertinent to reiterate that the Ld. Trial Court also relied on the testimonies of PW-7/Sh. Rohtash Singh and PW-10/Sh. Manpreet Singh, read in conjunction with CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 33 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:30 +0530 the part of deposition of PW-3/Sh. Vinay Kumar, to reach a conclusion that the accident occasioned due to offending vehicle and that the appellant was driving the said vehicle at the relevant point in time. However, while reaching the said conclusion, Ld. Trial Court read the factum of appellant's not cross-examining PW-6/Sh. Balwan by the appellant against the appellant, without considering that notwithstanding such omission on the part of the appellant, the prosecution, in the considered opinion of this Court, has not been able to prove its case/charges, beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant herein. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note that considering that it is the prosecution's own case that the appellant and PW-6/Sh. Balwan were plying on the same route on the date of alleged incident, though with a certain degree of gap/time gap. Ergo, under such circumstances, it was incumbent on the prosecution to produce the GPS records of both the vehicles on record of the Ld. Trial Court. However, the same was not done. Consequently, under such circumstances, notwithstanding such proximity of time, in which the said vehicles are stated to be commuting on the same route on the date of alleged incident, Ld. Trial Court, in the considered opinion of this Court, erroneously discarded the variation in the time of commission of alleged incident, i.e., around 09:15 a.m. on 10.05.2013, as deposed by PW-1 in her testimony and that of the presence of the offending vehicle at the said spot around 09:04 a.m. on the said date, as per the said vehicle's GPS records, terming the same as minor variations and unneeded exactitude of time in the deposition of victim. Apposite in this regard to reproduce the relevant extracts from the impugned judgment, as under;
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"...20. PW10 Manpreet Singh provided the GPS Data for the Vehicle in question for the time period 8.59.45-9.04.20 AM for the day of the accident. The time period shows the vehicle to be very much around the place where the accident took place. The Ld. Counsel for the accused put two more documents on record whilst cross examining the witness as showing the location of the bus for some time after 09.04.20.
But even that location is not of a place so far removed from the place of the incident in question that one can assume that the vehicle could never have been at the place at around 9.15 for the accident to have occurred. Exactitudes in human memory is not what is required. The complainant had stated a time period of around 9.15 AM. That does not have to be counted on a scale of precision by nanoseconds. Some minutes plus and minus can legitimately be presumed to be added or subtracted. The same need not be tested on some scale of golden accuracy. Looking from that angle, as per the GPS record the location of the offending vehicle does indeed appears to be belonging to the place of the incident in question and the nexus is established quite clearly. The witness was asked a few questions as to who had produced the said GPS data/certificate u/s 65B, to which the witness pleaded ignorance. But nowhere was any formal objection taken to the exhibiting of the said documents, by virtue of which they stand insufficiently challenged and hence can be read into evidence. The GPS data produced by the witness is of great importance as the same pinned down the driver accused and the vehicle in question. The same has not been shown to be unreliable or inaccurate. Considering the same, the driver accused having driven the offending vehicle at the time of the accident does indeed looks prima facie established. There's no denying it after the GPS Data establishes the proximity..."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Quite evidently, it is reiterated from a conscientious perusal of the above that the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment, afforded a certain degree of leeway in the time of presence of the appellant at the alleged spot of incident, as noted from the GPS records of the offending vehicle vis-à-vis time of occurrence, as deposed under the testimony of PW-1. However, as aforenoted, while reaching such conclusion, no observation as to CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 35 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:02:38 +0530 presence of PW-6 in the proximate time to the offending vehicle was made therein/under the impugned judgment. In fact, it is quite unequivocal from a scrupulous analysis of the deposition of PW-14/ASI (Retd.) Shri. Bhagwan that no endeavor was made by the IO to obtain the GPS records of PW-6's vehicle, so as to rule out a possibility of the commission of incident by the said vehicle, especially when the complainant had not spelled out the exact registration number of the offending vehicle and had merely stated route on which the said vehicle was plying i.e. route no. 309. Needless in this regard to reiterate that PW-14, affirmed during the course of his cross examination that he had, "...not filed the GPS data of the vehicle of driver Balwan. (Vol. The vehicle of accused was going ahead to the vehicle of driver Balwan.) I was apprised by the driver Balwan that his vehicle was at the back side of the vehicle of accused Tinku...". Quite despondently, the reasons for not obtaining such records of PW-6's vehicles has been explicated by PW-14 to be PW-6's mere assertion that his vehicle was at the back side of vehicle of the appellant. In this regard, this Court deems it further pertinent to note that, though, undoubtedly, PW-6 was not cross examined by the appellant, however, despite the same, it is not forthcoming from the record of the Ld. Trial Court that the prosecution, in fact, made any endeavor to retrieve the GPS record of PW-6's vehicle or even to trace out the passenger, who is asserted to have witnessed the incident, informed PW-6 of the same, as well as shared his particulars with PW-6 for further correspondence. Needless to mention that has such person/passenger adduced as witness in the instant case, same might have lend credence to the version of PW-6, even bereft of production of such GPS records. In fact, during the course of his CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 36 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:41 +0530 testimony, PW-6 conveniently asserted that he did not remember, "...the said phone number now. I informed the IO that the said person had stated to me that the above mentioned bus had gone on the said route prior to my bus...". Quite evidently, such omission cannot be ruled out/whittled away from the deposition of PW-3/Sh. Vinay Kumar as PW-3 merely deposed that the offending vehicle was being driven by the appellant and that he/PW-3 was present in the said bus from 04:30 a.m. till 01:10 p.m. However, nowhere under his deposition PW-3 asserted that the appellant was, in fact, present at the exact spot of incident at the time of alleged commission. On the contrary, PW-3 avowed that no accident had happened with the offending vehicle.
30. Needless at this stage to mention that, in the considered opinion of this Court, the foregoing circumstances/lacunae/omissions are quite detrimental to the case of the prosecution, despite the fact that this Court is in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that once the appellant failed to object to the exhibition of GPS records without production of certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act, during the course of recording of evidence of PW-10, he was precluded from doing so at the later/belated stage. In fact, in this regard, Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sonu v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whilst confronted with an akin conundrum, explicated the law in the following terms;
"32. It is nobody's case that CDRs which are a form of electronic record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The objection is that they were marked before the trial court without a certificate as required by Section 65B(4). It is clear from the judgments referred to supra that an objection relating to the mode or method of proof has to be raised at the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 37 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:45 +0530 time of marking of the document as an exhibit and not later. The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the Court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear from the above judgments that objections regarding admissibility of documents which are per se inadmissible can be taken even at the appellate stage. Admissibility of a document which is inherently inadmissible is an issue which can be taken up at the appellate stage because it is a fundamental issue. The mode or method of proof is procedural and objections, if not taken at the trial, cannot be permitted at the appellate stage. If the objections to the mode of proof are permitted to be taken at the appellate stage by a party, the other side does not have an opportunity of rectifying the deficiencies. The learned Senior Counsel for the State referred to statements under Section 161 CrPC, 1973 as an example of documents falling under the said category of inherently inadmissible evidence. CDRs do not fall in the said category of documents. We are satisfied that an objection that CDRs are unreliable due to violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 65B(4) cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage as the objection relates to the mode or method of proof."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Unmistakably, this Court reiterates that in the absence of formal TIP proceedings of the appellant and privation of concurrence between time of alleged commission of incident, as deposed by PW-1 and the time, demonstrable from the GPS records of the offending vehicle, it was incumbent on the part of the prosecution to place on record, GPS records of PW-6's vehicle to rule out a possibility of commission of accident by the said vehicle, being the only other vehicle of route no. 309, commuting on the same path. However, as aforenoted, prosecution miserably, failed to discharge its said burden. Clearly, under such circumstances, it cannot be determined, beyond a pale of doubt that the accident in question, in fact, occasioned due to the CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 38 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:02:48 +0530 offending vehicle, whilst the same was being driven by the appellant.
32. Notwithstanding the foregoing, presuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution has, in fact, been able to pin down the appellant as the perpetrator of offence in the instant case, even then, in the considered opinion of this Court, the evidence brought on record is grossly wanting to attribute the requisite mens rea on the appellant. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note here that, though, complainant/Ms. Vidhya Sinha/PW-1 asserted under her deposition that when the hand of the deceased was stuck in the vehicle, she and other passengers of the bus raised an alarm and the driver of the vehicle opened the door in the vehicle, leading to the fall of the deceased. However, despite such assertion, it is nowhere forthcoming in the deposition of PW-1 as to the speed with which the bus was moving at that point in time, leading to the fall of the deceased and the victim, as alleged. Correspondingly, the concerned IO did not even bother to produce other passengers of the said bus as witnesses, to corroborate the version of complainant, especially when PW-4/Ram Dhani proclaimed that he saw that a passenger, who was trying to board the bus on 10.05.2013, fell down from the bus, at the time of such boarding/deboarding. Ergo, the circumstances, this Court reiterates that a reasonable doubt exists as to the proof/attribution of requisite mens rea on the part of the appellant. In this regard this Court deems it pertinent to note that it is conscious of the settled law9 that rashness/negligence cannot be presumed in a particular case. On the contrary, the superior courts have persistently avowed that such an onus, to prove existence of 9 State of H.P. v. Baishakhi Ram, 2019 SCC OnLine HP 911.
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such mens rea, i.e., rashness and/or negligence on the part of an accused, rests heavily upon the prosecution to attribute/bring home criminal charges against an accused. Needless to mention that the onus in this regard vests primarily on the prosecution to prove the necessary culpability on an accused, 'beyond reasonable doubt' and it is only upon the prosecution establishing a foundation of its case, can an accused be expected to rebut the same by 'preponderance of probability' or by proving general defence. It is equally settled law 10, "...it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused...". It is further apposite to note here that the superior courts have also assiduously cautioned regarding drawing of any presumption of rashness or negligence merely for the reason of occurrence of a fatal accident11 or even for the reason of demise of an innocent person in road accident. In fact, not only is any such presumption, not envisaged under law, rather, the same cannot absolve the prosecution of proving the basic ingredients of the offences under Sections 279/304A IPC. Appositely, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in this regard in Narender v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC Online Del 4729 , noted as under;
"21. In the instant case, on the mere fact that an innocent died in a road accident, the presumption of rashness and negligence against the petitioner cannot be drawn. Reference may be taken in this connection of the observation made by another Bench of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Jagbir Singh reported 10 State of Punjab v. Kewal Krishan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 746; and Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193.11
State v. Hari Singh, 1968 SCC OnLine Raj 1: AIR 1969 Raj 86.
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as 2019 SCC Online Del 8401, where it was held that:
--
"20. ...It is necessary to avoid being influenced by the prejudice arising out of the loss of a life which is a dominant factor in cases of accident."' (Emphasis supplied)
33. Manifestly, from the exposition of law and facts outlined hereinabove, it is reiterated that in order to establish charges/offence under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 MV Act, the identity of the appellant as the alleged perpetrator of offence as well as the commission of a rash and negligent act as well as omission of duty, envisaged under Section 134(a) of the MV Act on the part of the appellant had to be proved by the prosecution that too, 'beyond reasonable doubt'. However, in conspectus of the foregoing scrutiny, it is reasonably deduced that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond pale of doubt in the instant case. Needless to reiterate that the law is trite that burden of proof has to be discharged 'beyond reasonable of doubt' in a criminal trial and that it is equally settled law 12 that if two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused and the other adversely against it, the view favoring the accused must be accepted.
34. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing explication/ discussion, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. Consequently, the judgment dated 30.09.2021 and the consequent order of sentence dated 08.03.2022, passed by Ld. MM-05, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing; ' State v. Tinku Singh, CIS No. 288621/2016', arising out of FIR No. 100/2013, PS. Nabi Karim, under Sections 279/304A/337 IPC and Sections 134(a)/187 of MV Act, convicting and sentencing the 12 Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 41 of 42 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.09.22 17:02:57 +0530 appellant, respectively, in the manner as hereinunder noted, are hereby set aside. The appellant is hereby admitted to bail on him furnishing of a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) along with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of this Court, as required under section 437A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS' for short). Further, as requested, the bail bond(s) be furnished by the appellant, within a period of one week from the date of this judgment.
35. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order.
36. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance. Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.09.22 17:03:02 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal) on 22.09.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CA. No. 44/2022 Tinku Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 42 of 42