Himachal Pradesh High Court
2025:Hhc:16058 vs Union Of India on 26 May, 2025
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
2025:HHC:16058 2025:HHC:16058 ...2...
These petitions, for involvement of similar issue to be decided on the basis of similar facts and common law, as applicable, are being decided together by this common judgment.
2. Petitioners have approached this Court for directing the respondent-University to grant them work-charge status, on completion of eight years, from the date of their initial appointment, 2025:HHC:16058 ...3...
i.e. 1.1.2002 alongwith consequential benefits alongwith all annual increments and pensionary benefits.
3. Respondent-University (hereinafter referred to as University) had filed reply, which is almost similar in all the petitions, except post of the petitioner and the Department/Organization. Para-2 of the reply (Preliminary Submissions) filed in CWPOA No.6170 of 2020 is as under:
"2. That the applicant was not engaged as Chowkidar on daily paid basis in the University but the applicant was simply engaged as ordinary daily paid labourer to work in the University field in the Department of Tea Husbandry and Technology, College of Agriculture of the respondent University in the year 1993. The highest decision making body, i.e. Board of Management of the respondent University on the recommendation of the Finance Committee had decided to bring only the skilled/Class-III Daily Paid Labourer on work charged category as per Govt. policy notified vide letter No.Per.(AP)C-13(2)-2/97 Vol.IV dated 08.07.1999. The decision of the Board of Management as above was notiied vide Notification No.Bud.1-221/HPKV/2000/-33695-737 dated 03.05.2000 (Annexure R-I). It is submitted that since the applicant was neither skilled worker nor holding Class-III position on daily paid basis in the respondent University, her claim for conferring work charged status w.e.f. 01.01.2002 is not maintainable being not covered in the decision notified vide notification dated 03.05.2000. It is further submitted that presently there is no work charged establishment with the respondent University. The applicant worked for 240 days and more in each calendar year since 1994 onwards and thus completed 8 year continuous service with 240 days on 31.12.2001 but, no policy for conferring work charged status was issued by the H.P. Govt. thereafter. The policies of H.P. Govt. notified vide letters dated 09.06.2006, 18.06.2007, 09.09.2008 for regularization of daily wages/contingent paid 2025:HHC:16058 ...4...
worker who had completed 8 years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year (expect where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.03.2004, 31.03.2006, 31.03.2008 respectively and further adopted in the respondent University vide notification No.4-8/95-CSKHPKV (GA) Vol.III/-39789-906 dated 14.06.2007, No.QSD.Bud.1-3/ CSKHPKV/07/46417-528 dated 19.06.2008 and No.QSD.4-
8/95-CSKHPKV (GA) Vol.III/-36000-36117 dated 27.05.2009 respectively (Annexure R-II Colly) also did not contain any provision for conferring work charged status to the daily paid workers. No daily paid worker of the Department of Tea Husbandry and Technology where the applicant was working on daily paid basis was ever conferred work charged status by the respondent University because these daily paid workers were engaged as ordinary daily paid to work in the fields as labourers and not with the specialization. Hence the claim of the applicant is not maintainable as per decision of the Board of Management of the respondent University and instructions of H.P. Govt."
4. Undisputedly, petitioners were appointed on daily wage basis as daily wagers in January 1993 and their services have been regularized w.e.f. 15.6.2007/6.7.2008.
5. Petitioners are claiming benefit of work-charged status after 8 years of service in terms of the policy of the State Government in the year 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2006.
6. In response to the petitions, respondent-University has taken the stand that regularization of petitioners has been done from due date in accordance with policy framed for regularization of daily wage labourers by the State Government and after completing all codal formalities.
2025:HHC:16058 ...5...
7. The extension of benefit of work-charge status, on completion of 8 years, has been opposed on the ground that University does not have work-charge establishment.
8. It has been claimed by the University that petitioners were regularized, in accordance with the policy of the State Government in pursuant to the approval received from the State Government.
9. Applicability of the policy of regularization, formulated and adopted by the State, to the University has not been disputed, rather stands admitted. It is also apt to notice that being a functionary of the State, the University is also expected to avoid arbitrariness in its actions. Therefore, pronouncements of the Courts related to the issue in present matters are also applicable to the University.
10. Though it has been stated in the reply that very nature of the employment of the daily wage employees is temporary in nature and they are appointed for execution of specific work and their services automatically come to an end on completion of the work, however, the said plea is not relevant in the present matter because admittedly petitioners, who were engaged in the year 1993, were continuously engaged till their regularization on 15.6.2007/6.7.2008 and, therefore, the work which was available for more than 14 years, cannot be said to be work available temporarily, leading to automatic disengagement of the petitioners.
2025:HHC:16058 ...6...
11. Plea has also been taken on behalf of the University that in view of judgment in Jaswant Singh and others vs. Union of India and others, (1979) 4 SCC 440, petitioners are not entitled for the claim to confer work charge status upon them on completion of requisite number of years as the University was and is not having any work charge establishment. Reliance has also been placed on State of Maharashtra vs. Purshotam and others, (1996) 9 SCC 266; and State of Rajasthan vs. Kunji Raman, (1997) 2 SCC 517.
12. Term "work-charge", in Jaswant Singh's and Kunji Raman's cases is in different context, whereas this term, in Himachal Pradesh, is used in different context. A person, working on daily-waged basis, before his regularization, is granted work-charged status on completion of specified number of years as daily-wager and effect thereof is that thereafter non-completion of 240 days in a calendar year would not result into his ouster from the service or debar him from getting the benefit of length of service for that particular year.
Normally, work-charged status is conferred upon a daily-wager, on accrual of his right for regularization, on completion of prescribed period of service, but non regularization is for want of regular vacancy in the department or for any other just and valid reason. Therefore, it is a period interregnum daily-wage service and regularization, which is altogether different form the temporary establishment of work-
2025:HHC:16058 ...7...
charge, as discussed in the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the State and, for practice in Himachal Pradesh, work-charged status is not conferred upon the person employed in a project but upon such daily-wage workers, who are to be continued after particular length of service for availability of work but without regularization for want of creation of post by Government for his regularization/ regular appointment. Therefore, work is always available in such cases and the charge of a daily-wager is created thereon to avoid his disengagement for reasons upon which a daily-
wager can be dispensed with from service.
13. In the given facts and circumstances of present case, judgment relied upon by the University pronounced in Jaswant Singh's case, Purshotam's case and in Kunji Raman's case (supra), are neither relevant nor applicable.
14. On conferment of work-charged status, sword of disengagement, hanging on the neck of workmen, is removed on completion of specified period of daily-waged service, as thereafter instead of daily-wage, the employee would get regular pay-scale and would be entitled to other consequential benefits for which a daily-
waged employee is not entitled.
15. For the purpose of adjudication of present case, Policy formulated by the respondents-State and approved by the Supreme 2025:HHC:16058 ...8...
Court of India in Mool Raj Upadhyaya v. State of H.P. & others, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 316 further explained in Gauri Dutt & others v.
State of H.P., Latest HLJ 2008 (HP) 366, and Regularization Policy framed and circulated by the respondents-State in the year 2000, shall be relevant.
16. Policy approved by the Supreme Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case reads as under:
"4. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the said scheme by substituting paragraphs 1 to 4 of the same by the following paragraphs:
"(1) Daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled, who have completed 10 years or more of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year on 31-12-1993, shall be appointed as work-charged employees with effect from 1-1-1994 and shall be put in the time-scale of pay applicable to the corresponding lowest grade in the government;
(2) daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled, who have not completed 10 years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year on 31-12-1993, shall be appointed as work-charged employees with effect from the date they complete the said period of 10 years of service and on such appointment they shall be put in the time-scale of pay applicable to the lowest grade in the government;
(3) daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled who have not completed 10 years of service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year on 31-12-1993, shall be paid daily wages at the rates prescribed by the government of Himachal Pradesh from time to time for daily-
wage employees falling in Class III and Class IV till they are 2025:HHC:16058 ...9...
appointed as work-charged employees in accordance with paragraph 2;
(4) daily-wage/muster-roll workers shall be regularised in a phased manner on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability including physical fitness. On regularisation they shall be put in the minimum of the time-scale payable to the corresponding lowest grade applicable to the government and would be entitled to all other benefits available to regular government servants of the corresponding grade."
17. Right of regularization/work-charge status of a Daily-Wage Worker, where the worker/employee has rendered service, on daily-
wage basis, on different posts in lower and higher grades, has been explained in Gauri Dutt's case, as under:
"18. The last question raises some interesting points. There have been instances where some employee has worked as beldar for some time and thereafter he has been engaged in a higher scale as mate or supervisor etc. The Tribunal in most of these cases has directed that the employee should be granted work charge status in the higher post on completion of 10 years of service after combining the service rendered in the lower scale and the higher scale. The State is aggrieved by these directions. According to the learned Advocate General the State has offered work charge status to these employees on completion of 10 years of combined service in the lower of the two scales and the State cannot be directed to grant work charge status in the higher scale. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the employees that since the employees are already working in the higher scale, it would not be fair and equitable to grant them work charge status in the lower scale.
19. We have considered the arguments from all angles. We are of the view that the employee cannot be given the benefit of combining service rendered in both the scales and be granted work charge status in the higher scale. We do, however, feel that at times it may be inequitable to grant the employee work charge status in the lower scale without giving him an option in this regard. We are giving two examples to illustrate two extreme positions. In example (i) we will deal an employee (A) who joined service on 1.1.1990. He works in 2025:HHC:16058 ...10...
the lower scale of beldar from 1.1.1991 to 31.12.1999. He is thereafter posted as Supervisor in the higher scale. Should he be granted work charge status as beldar or as Supervisor w.e.f. 1.1.2001? The other example is converse. Supposing employee (B) has worked as beldar w.e.f. 1.1.1991 to 31.12.1991 and from 1.1.1992 he has worked as Supervisor. From which date should we grant him work charge status and in what scale? It is obvious that in the first case the employee would not mind being granted work charge status even in the lower scale after 10 years w.e.f. 1.1.2000 since grant of work charge status would mean that he would get regular scale of pay. But should the employee be granted work charge status in the higher scale? We cannot agree with this preposition.
20. After considering all the pros and cons and keeping in view the fact that various anomalous situations may arise we are of the considered view that when an employee completes 10 years of continuous service combined in two scales, an option should be given to the employee to either accept work charge status in the lower scale or he may continue to work on daily rated basis in the higher scale and claim work charge status in the higher scale on completion of 10 years of continuous service in the said scale. In the examples given above, employee (A) may prefer to accept work charge status w.e.f. 1.1.2001 even in the lower scale of beldar because otherwise he may have to wait for 9 years before he is granted work charge status. On the other hand, employee (B) in the second example may prefer to delay the grant of work charge status by one year so that he can get work charge status in the higher scale. We feel that in each case the choice should be left to the employee. However, if the employee on being given a chance to exercise his option does not convey his option within 30 days, he shall be granted work charge status in the lower scale by combining the service rendered in both the scales. This answers the fourth question."
18. Relevant operative portion of orders dated 3.4.2000 and 6.5.2000, issued by Government of Himachal Pradesh, notifying and circulating terms for regularization of daily-wage workers in the year 2000, on completion of eight years continuous service, are as under:
2025:HHC:16058 ...11...
Order dated 3.4.2000:
"...................
In partial modification of this Department letter of even number dated 8th July, 1999 on the above subject, I am directed to say that the Government has now decided that the Daily Waged/Contingent Paid workers in all Departments including Public Works and Irrigation and Public Health Department (other than work- charged categories)/Boards/Corporations/Universities, etc. who have completed 8 years of continuous service (with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year) as on 31-03-2000 will be eligible for regularization. It has further been decided that completion of required years of service makes such daily wager/contingent paid worker eligible for consideration to be regularized and regularization in all cases will be from prospective effect i.e. from the date the order of regularization is issued after completion of codal formalities.
2. In view of the above decision and in order to avoid any litigation and also any hardship to daily wagers departments shall do the regularization based on seniority and they will ensure that senior persons are regularized first rather than regularizing junior persons first.
3. Other terms and conditions like fulfillment of essential qualification as prescribed in R&P Rules, etc. etc. as laid down in this department letter dated 8th July, 1999, as referred to above, shall continue to be operative.
4. These instructions may kindly be brought to the notice of all concerned for strict compliance.
5. These instructions have been issued with the prior approval of the Finance Department obtained vide their Dy. No.852 dated 23-03- 2000."
Order dated 6.5.2000:
".................
2. During the process of regularization of daily wagers, various issues and problems relating to these workers concerning their regularization have been brought to the notice of the Government. The Government in order to avoid such confusion or 2025:HHC:16058 ...12...
problems has decided to streamline the existing procedure/ instructions in order to bring uniformity of procedure in various departments of the Government. It has, therefore, been decided that henceforth:
(i) Daily Waged/Contingent Paid Workers who have completed required years of continuous service (with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year except where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) which as per latest instructions issued vide this Department letter of even number dated 3-4-2000 is 8 years as on 31-03-2000 shall be eligible for regularization. However, in Departments/ Corporations/Boards, where the system of the work charge categories also exists, eligible daily wagers will be considered first for bringing them on the work charge category instead of regularization. Such eligible daily waged workers/contingent paid workers will be considered for regularization against vacant posts or by creation of fresh posts and in both these events prior approval of Finance Department will be required as per their letter No.Fin-1-C(7)-1/99 dated 24.12.1999. The terms and conditions for such regularization shall be governed as per Annexure -'A'."
19. A Division Bench of this High Court in CWP No.2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar v. State of H.P. & others, decided on 28.7.2010, has held that till the new scheme, if introduced, comes into being, the old scheme shall be in force, and employees, till introduction of new scheme, shall be entitled for benefits of previous scheme. In other words, on introduction of new scheme, employees shall be entitled for benefits of new scheme, particularly when applicability of subsequent scheme is more beneficial to the employees than the old scheme. The employees, who are governed by old scheme, but are also governed under new scheme devolving 2025:HHC:16058 ...13...
benefits better than earlier scheme, are definitely entitled for benefits of the latest scheme.
20. With respect to ground taken by the respondents-Department that Department is not having work-charged establishment and, thus, benefit of period of service as a work-charged employee cannot be extended to the petitioners, it is apt to record that in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case an affidavit was filed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, formulating a Scheme for granting work-charged status to all daily-waged employees, serving in the State of Himachal Pradesh, in all Departments, irrespective of the fact that Department is/was having work-charged establishment or not.
21. In Gauri Dutt's case, it has been held that the scheme formulated in Mool Raj Upadhaya's case is applicable to daily-
waged employees working in any department of the State of Himachal Pradesh and the employees, who are not governed by the directions given in Mool Raj Upadhaya's case, shall be governed by a Scheme framed by the State in this regard and it has also been observed that granting of work-charged status would mean that an employee would get regular scale of pay.
22. Upholding the order passed by the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment 2025:HHC:16058 ...14...
dated 10.5.2018, in CWP No.3111 of 2016, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ashwani Kumar, has pronounced that work-
charged establishment is not a pre-requisite for conferment of work-
charged status nor conversion of work-charged employee into regular employee would make such establishment non-existent.
23. Civil Appeal No.5753 of 2019, titled as State of H.P. vs. Ashwani Kumar, preferred by the State in Ashwani Kumar's case has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 22.07.2019. Similarly, SLP (C) No. 8830-8869 of 2011 preferred by the State in Rakesh Kumar's case also stands dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15.01.2015.
24. In response to plea that work-charged establishment does not exist in the respondent-University, learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred pronouncements of this High Court in cases CWPOA No. 5748 of 2019, titled Man Singh Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and others; CWPOA No. 52 of 2019, titled Beli Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another; CWPOA No. 5566 of 2019, titled as Reema Devi Vs. State of H.P. and others;
and CWPOA No. 5660 of 2019, titled Ghanshyam Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others; LPA No.151 of 2021, titled State of HP Vs. Beli Ram, decided on 09.08.2023; CWPOA No.5554 of 2019, titled Daulat Ram vs. State of HP and others; CWPOA 2025:HHC:16058 ...15...
No.6468 of 2020, titled Uggam Ram vs. State of HP and others decided on 09.11.2023; and CWPOA No.6151 of 2020, titled Rashid Mohammed vs. State of HP and others decided on 13.06.2024; wherein similar plea of respondent-State did not find favour of the Court.
25. According to pronouncement in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case, clarified in Gauri Dutt's case, work charge status was to be conferred irrespective of existence of work charge establishment. The said fact has not been considered in Rakesh Kumar's case. In fact, in Rakesh Kumar's case, this issue was not adjudicated but without considering Mool Raj's case and without assigning any reason, a passing observation was made. Whereas this issue has been adjudicated and decided in subsequent judgment in Ashwani Kumar's case. Therefore, observations made on this issue in Rakesh Kumar's case are not binding especially when Civil Appeal in Ashwani Kumar's case has been dismissed by Supreme Court.
Therefore, abolition or non-existence of work-charge establishment in the respondent-Department has no effect on the rights of petitioner for conferment of work-charged status after completion of 8 years in terms of Policy of the Government as well as verdict of Rakesh Kumar's case.
2025:HHC:16058 ...16...
26. For conferment of work-charged status, work-charged establishment in the Department is not prerequisite. The same has also been affirmed by the Principal Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 9.8.2023 passed in LPA No. 151 of 2021, titled State of H.P. & another Vs. Beli Ram.
27. The aforesaid principle has also been affirmed in CWPOA No.6710 of 2020, titled as Ram Singh & others vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 08.09.2023; CWPOA No.6614 of 2020, titled as Ram Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 23.11.2023;
CWPOA No.6217 of 2020, titled as Pawan Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others; and CWPOA No.7497 of 2020, titled as Pritam Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 29.07.2024.
28. Regarding regularization of the petitioners from prospective dates of passing of order after issuance of fresh Policy of the Government and withholding regularization/ grant of work-charged status to the petitioners for want of time gap between two Policies, it would be appropriate to refer pronouncement of this Court in CWP No. 2415 of 2012, titled as Mathu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation and others, decided on 31.7.2014.
29. Judgment of Single Bench passed in Mathu Ram's case has been affirmed by a Division Bench in LPA No. 44 of 2015, titled as 2025:HHC:16058 ...17...
Municipal Corporation, Shimla & others vs. Mathu Ram, decided on 13.10.2015.
30. Conclusion of verdict of Mathu Ram's and Rakesh Kumar's cases, with respect to gap between issuance/ formulation of two policies, is that previous policy/scheme shall remain in force till issuance/ formulation/introduction of subsequent policy/scheme, but cut of date for completion of requisite number of years shall be redundant in subsequent years and benefit of policy/scheme shall be extended to employees immediately on completion of continuous service for requisite number of years with minimum prescribed number of working days in each calendar year. In case regularization is not possible for want of availability of vacancy, the work-charge status has to be conferred upon daily wage employee on completion of requisite number of years prescribed in the Policy/Scheme.
31. Despite having bestowed status of custodian of rights of its citizens, State or its functionaries invariably are adopting exploitative method in the field of public employment to avoid its liabilities, depriving the persons employed from their just claims and benefits by making initial appointments on temporary basis, i.e. contract, adhoc, tenure, daily-wage etc., in order to shirk from its responsibility and delay the conferment of work-charge status or extension of benefits 2025:HHC:16058 ...18...
of regularization Policy of the State by not notifying Policies in this regard in future. Present case is also an example of such practice.
32. So far as regularization of petitioners is concerned, that may depend upon the availability of post, but for conferring work charge status, existence of post or existence of work charge establishment is not necessary and, therefore, plea on this count to deny conferment of work charge status upon the petitioners, on completion of 8 years, is also not tenable.
33. Learned counsel for the University has submitted that for delay and laches, appellant-petitioner is not entitled for any actual monetary relief in present matter with further submission that actual monetary benefits extended to others are also liable to be recovered as has been directed and permitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment/order dated 6.2.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1595 of 2025, arising out of SLP(C) No. 23016 of 2023, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Surajmani and another.
34. Learned counsel for the University has finally admitted that a Co-ordinate Division Bench has dismissed LPA No.85 of 2025, titled Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishvavidyalaya Palampur, through its Registrar v.
Surjeet Kumar, by referring Judgment in Surajmani's case and 2025:HHC:16058 ...19...
judgment dated 12.1.2023, passed in CWP No.1396 of 2019, titled Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishvavidyalaya v. Sarwan Kumar, which was decided alongwith LPA No.165 of 2021, titled State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surajmani and connected matters, with the submission that SLP preferred in Sarwan's case has also been decided alongwith Surajmani's case (Civil Appeal No.1595 of 2025) by the Supreme Court.
35. Surajmani's case has been decided by the Supreme Court alongwith connected matters including Civil Appeal No. 1956 of 2025 (SLP (C) 3679 of 2025), titled as State of H.P. Vs. Lal Singh, vide order dated 6.2.2025, which reads as under:-
"1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The short point that arises for out consideration in these appeals is "whether a daily wager is liable to be conferred 'work charged status' after completion of eight years of service" or, in other words, "whether the benefit of 'work charged status' could be given to a work-charged employee after completion of eight years of service".
4. This Court in Mool Raj Upadhayaya Vs. State of H.P. reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316 held as under:-
"2. A Scheme for Betterment (Appointment) Regularisation of Muster-Roll/Daily-Wagers in Himachal Pradesh has been prepared by the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the same has been placed on record along with the supplementary affidavit of Shri K.J.B.V. Subramanyam dated 7-12-1992 in WP (C) No. 249 of 1988.
2025:HHC:16058 ...20...
xxxx xxxx xxx
4.Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the said scheme by substituting paragraphs 1 to 4 of the same by the following paragraphs :
"(1) Daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled, who have completed 10 years or more of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a calepdar year on 31-12-1993, shall be appointed as work-charged employees with effect from 1-1-1994 and shall be put in the time-scale of pay applicable to the corresponding lowest grade in the Government;
(2) daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled, who have not completed 10 years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year on 31-12-1993, shall be appointed as work-charged employees with effect from the date they complete the said period of 10 years of service and on such appointment they shall be put in the time- scale of pay applicable to the lowest grade in the Government;
(3) daily-wage/muster-roll workers, whether skilled or unskilled who have not completed 10 years of service with a minimum of 240 days in a calendar year on 31-
12-1993, shall be paid daily wages at the rates prescribed by the Government of Himachal Pradesh from time to time for daily-wage employees falling in Class III and Class IV till they are appointed as work- charged employees in accordance with paragraph 2;
(4) daily-wage/muster-roll workers shall be regularised in a phased manner on the basis of seniority-cum- suitability including physical fitness. On regularisation they shall be put in the minimum of the time-scale payable to the corresponding lowest grade applicable to the Government and would be entitled to all other benefits available to regular government servants of the corresponding grade."
2025:HHC:16058 ...21...
5. The workers who had been regularised in service in the Public Health Department under various schemes announced by the State Government from time to time but had not been granted the status of "work-charged" had approached the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 2735 of 2010 titled as Rakesh Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. which came to be disposed of on 28.07.2010 by opining as under:
"6. The simple question is whether the delay defeats justice? In analyzing the above issue, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioners are only class-IV workers (Beldars). The schemes announced by the Government clearly provided that the department concerned should consider the workmen concerned for bringing them on the workcharged category. So, there is an obligation cast on the department to consider the cases of the daily waged workmen for conferment of the work-charged status, being on a work-charged establishment, on completion of the required number of years in terms of the policy. At the best, the petitioners can only be denied the interest on the eligible benefits and not the benefits as such, which accrued on them as per the policy and under which policy, the department was bound to confer the status, subject to the workmen satisfying the required conditions.
7. In the above circumstances, these Writ Petitions are disposed of directing the respondents to consider the case(s) of the petitioners herein for conferment of workcharged status, subject to their eligibility in terms of the policy dated 3.4.2000 and as explained in 6.5.2000 policy, as extracted above. Needful in this regard shall be done within a period of three months from the date of production of the copy of this judgment by the respective petitioners. Needless to say that the question of conferment of workcharged status does not arise in case the establishment ceases to be a work charged establishment and hence, the conferment of the status will not arise after the abolition of the work-charged status of the establishment."
6. The aforesaid order came to be affirmed by this Court in Special leave Petition (Civil) No. 33570 of 2010 and all connected matters were disposed of on 15.01.2015. Later, certain workers who had 2025:HHC:16058 ...22...
been engaged on daily wage basis in Public Works Department of Himachal Pradesh, after having completed eight years of continuous service prayed for conferment of work-charged status by filing O.A. No. 412 of 2016 before the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal. Their prayer was allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 30.06.2016. Upon challenging the same by the State in Civil Writ Petition No. 3111 of 2016 titled as State of H.P. and Ors. Vs. Sh. Ashwani Kumar the High Court, relying upon its judgment in Civil Writ Petition No. 4489 of 2009 titled as Ravi Kumar Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., decided on 14.12.2009, maintained the order of the Tribunal. The order of the High Court in Ashwani Kumar (Supra) has also been affirmed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 5753 of 2019 titled as State of H.P. and Ors. Vs. Ashwani Kumar by order dated 22.07.2019, wherein this Court observed as under :
"3. We are not disturbing the finding of the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court, with respect to the conferral of the status of the work charge from 01.01.2003. However, as regularization has been made only in the year 2006, obviously, notional benefit could have to be granted as the petition was initially filed in the year 2013.
4. Thus, we make the modification that the respondent would be entitled only for notional benefits of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Accordingly, with the aforesaid modification in the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court, the appeal is disposed of."
7. In this factual scenario, when we consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, it would not detain us for too long to brush aside the contention of the learned senior counsel and learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Himachal Pradesh. Inasmuch as the issue involved in these appeals has been laid to rest by this Court in the case of Mool Raj Upadhyaya (Supra). That apart, this Court, while examining a similar plea in Ashwani Kumar's (Supra) case in Civil Appeal No. 5753 of 2019 disposed of on 22.07.2019, has specifically addressed this issue by arriving at a conclusion that the order of the Tribunal directing conferment of 'work charge 2025:HHC:16058 ...23...
status' on completion of eight (08) years of service, did not suffer from any infirmity and it was reiterated order of the Tribunal was just and proper.
8. However, in order to allay the apprehension of the State as expressed thereunder and to safeguard the interest of the State which otherwise would have burdened the exchequer with extra benefits being conferred on the employees who had not been regularly appointed, this Court has, as a succor to the State, restricted the claim or, in other words, modified the order of the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court by arriving at a conclusion that the petitioners/appellants therein would be entitled to the notional benefits of the order passed by the Tribunal and accordingly disposed of the said appeal.
9. It would not be out of context to refer at this juncture itself that the State, in its wisdom, having felt that the subsequent schemes having been formulated and implemented, would alter the situation and, therefore, order dated 12.04.1994 passed in Mool Raj Upadhyaya's (Supra) case has to be modified, had approached this Court by filing an Interlocutory Application being IA No. 3 in the year 2005 in the aforesaid Mool Raj Upadhyaya's case, i.e., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 787 of 1987. A perusal of the said application and the averments made thereunder would clearly indicate that the very same contentions urged, pleas advanced and arguments put forth today before us were the ones which were urged/raised in the said application. Though Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned senior counsel appearing for the State would fairly submit that the said application was withdrawn on the ground of subsequent schemes having been formulated and implemented by the State of Himachal Pradesh, but we are unable to accept the said proposition howsoever attractive it may be, for the simple reason that the said application was dismissed simpliciter as withdrawn. Yet another factor which sways our mind to reject the contention raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the State would be the fact that the State having accepted the judgment of Ashwani Kumar (Supra), has implemented the same and it is in this background, the High Court in the impugned order has observed that the State cannot adopt pick and choose policy.
2025:HHC:16058 ...24...
10. For the cumulative reasons aforestated, we are of the considered view that the dicta laid down by this Court vide order dated 22.07.2019 in Ashwani Kumar's (Supra) case which is based on the judgment of Mool Raj Upadhyaya (Supra) holds the field and would also be applicable to the Respondents herein who had approached the Tribunal or the High Court seeking similar relief. As such, the Respondents shall be entitled for grant of 'work-charged' status from the date of completion of 8 years of service. However, we hold that the relief in the present appeals will be limited to notional benefits as explained in paragraph 3 and 4 of Ashwani Kumar's (Supra) case in Civil Appeal No(s). 5753 of 2019 and the present appeals stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
11. We also make it explicitly clear that the State in its endeavour of implementing the orders of the Tribunal, High Court or this Court, if having paid the amounts in excess, would be at liberty to take such steps as it deems fit without insisting for one time recovery.
12. It is further underscored that this judgment would necessarily be a judgment in rem and the State shall hence forth not take recourse to employing personnel as daily wagers but shall make appointments only in accordance with law, as enumerated in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi [(2006) 4 SCC 1].
13. Pending applications, if any, shall also be disposed of."
36. In Surajmani's case, monetary benefits, as recorded in Para-
10 of order dated 6.2.2025, have been restricted in appeals being decided together by the order dated 6.2.2025, in terms of judgment passed in Civil Appeal No(s). 5753 of 2019, titled as State of H.P. and others Vs. Ashwani Kumar, wherein following order was passed with respect to monetary benefits:-
"3. We are not disturbing the finding of the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court, with respect to the conferral of the 2025:HHC:16058 ...25...
status of the work charge from 01.01.2003. However, as regularization has been made only in the year 2006, obviously, notional benefit could have to be granted as the petition was initially filed in the year 2013.
4. Thus, we make the modification that the respondent would be entitled only for notional benefits of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Accordingly, with the aforesaid modification in the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court, the appeal is disposed of."
37. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in response to plea of University regarding actual and notional monetary benefits, has referred following paragraphs of judgment dated 8.4.2025, passed in LPA No.182 of 2024, titled as Ramiya v. State of H.P. & others:
"11. To rebut the plea of respondents-Department regarding dis- entitlement for actual monetary benefits on account of delay and laches, learned counsel for appellant-petitioner, has placed reliance upon order dated 15.1.2025, passed by the Supreme Court in SLP No.8830- 8869 of 2011, preferred by the State against judgment dated 28.7.2010 passed by a Division Bench of this High Court, in CWPOA No. 2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P., with submission that order dated 6.2.2025, being relied upon by the learned Advocate General, has been passed by Smaller Bench (2-Judge), whereas order dated 15.1.2025 has been passed by Larger Bench (3-Judge) and considering doctrine of precedence, it is not permissible to the respondents-State as well as this Court to ignore the judgment affirmed by a Larger Bench.
12. Relevant Para-6 of judgment of High Court in Rakesh Kumar's case (CWP No.2735 of 2010) is as under:
"6. The simple question is whether the delay defeats justice? In analyzing the above issue, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioners are only class-IV workers (Beldars). The schemes announced by the Government clearly provided that 2025:HHC:16058 ...26...
the department concerned should consider the workmen concerned for bringing them on the work-charged category. So, there is an obligation cast on the department to consider the cases of the daily waged workmen for conferment of the work-charged status, being on a work-charged establishment, on completion of the required number of years in terms of the policy. At the best, the petitioners can only be denied the interest on the eligible benefits and not the benefits as such, which accrued on them as per the policy and under which policy, the department was bound to confer the status, subject to the workmen satisfying the required conditions."
13. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has upheld the aforesaid judgment dated 28.7.2010 passed in Rakesh Kumar's case, vide order dated 15.1.2015 in SLP Nos. 8830-8869 of 2011 alongwith connected matters, by dismissing the Special Leave Petitions on merits after going through the record, in following terms:-
"Delay condoned.
On hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and there is no reason to interfere in these special leave petitions."
Accordingly, the special leave petitions stand dismissed."
14. It has been submitted that judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case has been upheld by larger Bench of the Supreme Court, whereas order in Surajmani's case has been passed by smaller Bench of Supreme Court and, thus, order passed in Surajmani's case cannot be made basis for rejecting the claim of petitioner by ignoring judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case, because in present case also, like Rakesh Kumar, it was duty of State to confer work- charge status upon petitioner from due date with all monetary benefits and unlike some other petitioners in Surajmani's and Ashwani Kumar's cases, appellant-petitioner was struggling for his right in terms of Policy of the State since beginning without any 2025:HHC:16058 ...27...
delay or laches on his part, rather delay was and is on the part of the State, caused by rejecting the legal and just claim of appellant- petitioner, acting contrary to the Policy.
15. It would also be relevant to refer observations made by a Division Bench of this High Court in CWPOA No.2343 of 2020, titled as Vikram Singh vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, and other connected matters, decided on 09.11.2023, which reads as under:-
"23. In so far as the plea of limitation/delay and laches is concerned, the same is also liable to be rejected. As has already been stated supra, the plea of petitioners is based on discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Thimmappa and others vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and another, 2001 (2) SCC 259, wherein, it has been categorically laid down that if there is an infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India then petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
... ... ...
25. For delayed regularization, petitioners cannot be blamed as the same was to be done by the respondent-Corporation. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of a Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No.2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of HP and others alongwith connected matters decided on 28.07.2010."
16. It has also been submitted that Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5806 of 2024, titled Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Others vs. Vikram Singh & others, laying challenge to the aforesaid decision, dated 9.11.2023, in Vikram Singh's case (supra), was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 15.03.2024.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in present case, plea of the respondents for denying monetary benefits on account of delay and laches is also not legally 2025:HHC:16058 ...28...
sustainable, in view of judgment of Supreme Court, passed in State of UP Vs. Arvind Kumar Shrivastva, 2015 (1) SCC Page 347 followed in 2021 Vol. 13 SCC Page 225. Relevant extract wherein is being reproduced hereinbelow:-
"22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fencesitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said 2025:HHC:16058 ...29...
judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." (Emphasis supplied)
18. Affirming the judgment in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Shrivastva, (2015) 1 SCC 347, a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court of India in Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and others vs. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225, has observed as under:-
"13. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava. ..."
19. It has been submitted that present case is covered by Paras 22.1 and 22.3 of Arvind Kumar Shrivastva's case supra as the appellant has been knocking at the doors of Court for justice since 2010. Therefore, claim of the petitioner does not suffer either from delay and laches or acquiescence.
... ... ... ...
27. It is apparent from aforesaid that it was and is duty of the respondents-State to confer Work Charge status upon the appellant-petitioner, and for lapse on the part of respondents, appellant-petitioner, who belongs to the lowest rank of hierarchy in the service cannot be made to suffer, and in numerous similar cases it has also been held that for dereliction of duty on the part of concerned officer/Department/State, petitioner cannot be made to suffer.
2025:HHC:16058 ...30...
28. For delayed extension of benefits, arising out of the Policy of the State, the petitioner cannot be deprived from consequential benefits from the due date, as implementation of Policy is the duty of the State through its Officers, being custodian of rights of citizens.
29. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in terms of judgment passed by this Court in CWP No. 2735 of 2010 titled Rakesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P., alongwith connected matters, a decision was taken by respondents- State at its own to grant benefit to all individuals, like the petitioner in CWP No.2735 of 2010, which was circulated vide letter dated 08.06.2015. Subsequently, the respondents implemented the decision in Rakesh Kumar's case and as a consequence thereof, benefit of work-charge status/regularization was granted from due date on completion of daily-wage service for requisite years, in most of cases 8 years.
30. A perusal of decision in Rakesh Kumar's case stated supra reflects that the same is a decision, which touches upon a policy matter, scheme of regularization. Rakesh Kumar's case is a judgment in rem with intention to give benefits to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. The same casts an obligation upon the authorities to themselves extend the benefits thereof to all similarly situated persons.
31. For considering alternative contention of learned counsel for appellant-petitioner, that at the most payment of actual monetary benefits may be restricted for the period three years prior to filing first petition CWP No.5702 of 2010, we have also taken note of following judgments of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been held that right of petitioner is to be considered with reference to first date of initiation of proceedings and payment of the actual monetary benefits can be restricted for three years prior to filing of petition.
31-A. Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409, has held as under:
2025:HHC:16058 ...31...
"... ... ...It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding... ... ..."
31-B. Supreme Court in Rajeshwar and others vs. Jot Ram and another, (1976) 1 SCC 194: AIR 1976 SC 49, referring Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409; and Bhajan Lal vs. State of Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 34; has held as under:-
"6. The philosophy of the approach which commends itself to us is that a litigant who seeks justice in a perfect legal system gets it when he asks for it. But because human institutions of legal justice function slowly, and in quest of perfection, appeals and reviews at higher levels are provided for, the end product comes considerably late. But these higher Courts pronounce upon the rights of parties as the facts stood when the first Court was first approached. The delay of years flows from the infirmity of the judicial institution and this protraction of the Court machinery shall prejudice no one. Actus curiae neminem gravabit. Precedential support invoked by the appellant's counsel also lets him down provided we scan the fact situation in each of those cases and the legal propositions therein laid down.
7. The realism of our processual justice bends our jurisprudence to mould, negate or regulate reliefs in the light of exceptional developments having a material and equitable import, occurring during the pendency of the litigation so that the Court may not stultify itself by granting what has become meaningless or does not, by a myopic view, miss decisive alterations in fact-situations or legal positions and drive parties to fresh litigation whereas relief can be given right here. The broad principle, so stated, strikes a chord of sympathy in a court of good conscience. But a seeming virtue may prove a treacherous vice unless judicial perspicacity, founded on well-grounded- rules, studies the plan of the statute, its provisions regarding subsequent changes and the possible damage to the social programme of the measure if later events are allowed to unsettle speedy accomplishment of a re-
2025:HHC:16058 ...32...
structuring of the land system which is the soul of this which enactment. No processual equity can be permitted to sabotage a cherished reform, nor individual hardship thwart social justice. This wider perspective explains the rulings cited on both sides and the law of subsequent events on pending actions.
8. In P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (AIR 1976 SC 1409) this Court dealt with the adjectival activism relating to post institution circumstances Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that 'it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding'.
This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he Is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right because, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The Court's procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystallized in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 34."
31-C. In State of U.P. and others vs. Harish Chandra and others, (1996) 9 SCC 309, Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"... ... ...Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition... ... ..."
31-D. In Union of India and others Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648, the Supreme Court has held as under:
2025:HHC:16058 ...33...
"7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition."
31-E. In Jaswant Singh Vs. Punjab Poultry Field Staff Association and others, (2002) 1 SCC 261; and Ex-Sepoy (Washerman) Ram Khilawan Vs. Union of India and others, (2019) 8 SCC 581, the monetary benefits have been restricted by the Supreme Court for three years prior to filing of the suit.
... ... ... ...
33. Pendency of lis cannot be a ground to put an employee to a disadvantage or prejudicial position by denying monetary benefits. No employee should suffer due to pendency of a lis or act of a Court as in this case.
2025:HHC:16058 ...34...
34. In given facts and circumstances of a case, monetary benefits may be denied or restricted to three years prior initiation of proceedings, either with interest or without interest. This issue has to be dealt with in each case on the basis of given facts and circumstances. But equals are to be treated in similar manner. It is also apt to record that this Court, wherever facts and circumstances warrant, including in Surajmani's case and other connected matters, has either restricted the monetary benefits to three years from the date of initiation of proceedings or has denied the same. Further, normally interest is imposed only for delayed execution.
35. In the background of the mandate in the case of Mool Raj Upadhayaya, which was reiterated in the case of Rakesh Kumar and re-affirmed in the case of Ashwani Kumar with modification with respect to consequential benefits restricting actual benefits but was implemented by granting monetary benefits for three years prior to filing of the writ petition by petitioner and this mandate has been recently affirmed in the case of Surajmani by directing the State Authorities to extend similar benefits of work-charge status without discrimination, petitioner is entitled for work-charge status from due date.
... ... ... ...
38. In the facts and attending circumstances of present case, in terms of judgment reported in 1996 (5) SCC 54, titled as Shangrila Food Products Limited and another vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, in order to do complete and substantial justice inter se the parties while exercising writ jurisdiction, the benefit of Rakesh Kumar's case, stated supra, needs to be extended to the petitioner for the reasons stated herein below:-
"11. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends 2025:HHC:16058 ...35...
of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief....... ..."
... ... ... ...
40. Even otherwise, when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, other identical situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit, and not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
41. Present case is squarely covered by Paras-22.1 and 22.3 of the judgment in Arvind Kumar Shrivastva's case, because judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons whether they approached the Court or not. It is also apt to record that it is disputed that respondents-State had itself decided to extend benefits of judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case to all similarly situated persons and the decision was circulated vide communication dated 8.6.2015. In such a situation, obligation is cast upon the authorities to extend the benefit to all similarly situated persons. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances, appellant-petitioner would not be treated fence-sitter, and delay and laches or acquiescence would not be a valid ground to dismiss his claim for actual monetary benefits.
41. For considering plea of precedence of verdict of Rakesh Kumar's case, affirmed by larger Bench of Supreme Court, over direction/order passed by smaller Bench of Supreme Court on the same issue, following pronouncements of Supreme Court, being referred hereinafter, would be relevant.
42-A. In Central Board of Dowoodi Bohra Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2005) 2 SCC 673, the Supreme Court, after taking into consideration numerous judgments passed by the Supreme Court earlier, has summed up the legal position as under:-
2025:HHC:16058 ...36...
"12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the lawlaid down by the Constitution Benches in the above said decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-
equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co- equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question 2025:HHC:16058 ...37...
dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh & Ors. [(1989) 2 SCC 754] and Hansoli Devi & Ors.[(2002) 7 SCC 273]"
42-B. In K.P. Manu Vs. Chairman, Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate, (2015) 4 SCC 1, it has been observed by the Supreme Court, as under:-
"48. When a binding precedent is not taken note of and the judgment is rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of the binding authority, the concept of per incuria comes into play. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that:
"42. ....... 'Per incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong."
At a subsequent stage of the said authority, it has been held that: (A.R. Antulay case, SCC p. 654, para 47) "47.....It is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per incuriam the court can ignore it."
49. In Union of India and Others v. R.P. Singh, (2014) 7 SCC 340, the Court observed thus:
"19. "In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 2010, while dealing with the issue of "per incuriam", a two-Judge Bench, after referring to the dictum in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd, 1944 K.B. 718. and certain passages from Halsbury's Laws of England and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, 2025:HHC:16058 ...38...
had ruled thus: (Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre case, SCC p 743, para 138) '138. The analysis of English and Indian Law clearly leads to the irresistible conclusion that not only the judgment of a larger strength is binding on a judgment of smaller strength but the judgment of a coequal strength is also binding on a Bench of Judges of coequal strength. In the instant case, judgments mentioned in paras 124 and 125 are by two or three Judges of this Court. These judgments have clearly ignored a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sibbia case, (1980) 2 SCC 565 1980 which has comprehensively dealt with all the facets of anticipatory bail enumerated under S. 438 CrPC. Consequently, the judgments mentioned in paras 124 and 125 of this judgment are per incuriam.'"
42-C. Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. Through its Director Shri Pradeep Kumar Agrawal Vs. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi through its Principal Secretary (Finance) and ohters, AIR 2022 SC 4868, has held as under:-
"19. The view of Bhat, J. was expressly concurred by Rao. J. (Para 196) and Gupta, J. (Para 227). There was no dissent to the view. In view of Article 145 (5) of the Constitution of India concurrence of a majority of the judges at the hearing will be considered as a judgment or opinion of the Court. It is settled that the majority decision of a Bench of larger strength would prevail over the decision of a Bench of lesser strength, irrespective of the number of Judges constituting the majority.
... ... ...
27. The conclusion (1) is that a decision delivered by a Bench of largest strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. It is the strength of 2025:HHC:16058 ...39...
the Bench and not number of Judges who have taken a particular view which is said to be relevant. However, conclusion (2) makes it absolutely clear that a Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. Quorum means the bench strength which was hearing the matter.
28. Thus, it has been rightly concluded that the numerical strength of the Judges taking a particular view is not relevant, but the Bench strength is determinative of the binding nature of the judgment."
42-D. The Supreme Court, considering observations in judgment in Dr. Shah Faesal and others Vs. Union of India and Another, (2020) 4 SCC 1, in Total Environment Building Systems Private Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and others, (2022) 16 SCC 219, has held as under:-
"27. In Shah Faesal and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr., (2020) 4 SCC 1, the Constitution Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the principle of stare decisis and the law of precedents/re-consideration/review of earlier decision. After considering the decision of this Court in the case of Chandra Prakash and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2002) 4 SCC 234 para 22, it is observed and held by this Court that doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest and the society organises itself based on the present legal order. By observing and holding so, it is observed in paragraphs 17 to 19 as under:-
"17. This Court's jurisprudence has shown that usually the courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development. The numbers themselves speak of restraint and the value this Court attaches to the doctrine of precedent. This Court regards the use of precedent 2025:HHC:16058 ...40...
as indispensable bedrock upon which this Court renders justice. The use of such precedents, to some extent, creates certainty upon which individuals can rely and conduct their affairs. It also creates a basis for the development of the rule of law. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, John Roberts observed during his Senate confirmation hearing, 'It is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and even- handedness'.
18. Doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, Judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law, therefore they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law.
19. When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest and the society organises itself based on the present legal order. When substantial judicial time and resources are spent on references, the same should not be made in a casual or cavalier manner. It is only when a proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment of the same Bench, or it is shown that the proposition laid down has become unworkable or contrary to a well-established principle, that a reference will be made to a larger Bench. In this context, a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [(2002) 4 SCC 234], after considering series of earlier rulings reiterated that : (SCC p.245, para 22) '22. ... The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court.' "
(emphasis in original) 2025:HHC:16058 ...41...
28. It is observed and held in the aforesaid decision that even the rule of overruling the judgments should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon a mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired Statute, or is contrary to a decision of another court which the court is bound to follow; not, upon a mere suggestion, that some or all of the members of the court might later arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was res integra. It is further observed that otherwise there would be great danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of law. It is further observed and held that the decisions rendered by a coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength and a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench unless it is shown to be per incuriam.
29. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on consistency, certainty and uniformity also deserve consideration, which are as under.
30. This Court in State of H.P. Vs. A.P. Jaswal, (2001) 1 SCC 748 has observed as under:-
"24. Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy........."
The aforesaid observations are equally, if not more meaningful and relevant to tax matters.
2025:HHC:16058 ...42...
31. This Court, in the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754, on the question of the merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, had observed that this enables an organic development of law, besides assuring the individuals as to the consequences of transactions forming part of his daily affairs, and, therefore, there is a need for clear and consistent enunciation of legal principles in the decision of a court.
32. In K. Ajit Babu and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 473, this Court again emphasized on the aspect of consistency, certainty and uniformity in the field of judicial decisions as it sets a pattern upon which future conduct may be based. One of the basic principles of the administration of justice is that identical/similar cases should be decided alike. This is the foundation of the doctrine of precedent, which has considerable benefits and advantages. Emphasis on the law of precedent, which promotes certainty and consistency, was also noticed in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija and Ors. Vs. Collector Thane, Maharashtra and Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 396, by emphasizing that it is the duty of the courts to make the law more predictable. Law must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour, otherwise, the lawyers or, for that matter, laymen would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise or conduct themselves. The general public should not be in a dilemma to obey or not to obey such law.
33. In Medley Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Daman, (2011) 2 SCC 6014, the question before this Court was whether, "physicians' samples" are excisable goods considering that they are prohibited from being sold under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Observing that since this Court has consistently held that the medical supplies supplied to the doctors are liable to excise duty, the issue involved in this case was no longer res integra. Relying on the 2025:HHC:16058 ...43...
Constitutional Bench decision in Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362, it was held:
"43. It is settled law that this Court should follow an earlier decision that has withstood the changes in time, irrespective of the rationale of the view taken. It was held by a Constitution Bench in Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362:
'40. It is also true to say that for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of longstanding should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.' "
34. In Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and others, (2001) 1 SCC 91 this Court refused to indulge on the question of delegated legislation in taxing statute since the authority of the legislature in introducing the statute in question, i.e., Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 could not be doubted and in any event, was a settled proposition of law for more than a decade.
35. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court rejected the plea to reconsider the decision in State of 2025:HHC:16058 ...44...
Madhya Pradesh v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 642 in the following words:-
"35. In the wake of the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that taking recourse to the doctrine as above would be an imperative necessity, so as to avoid uncertainty and confusion, since the basic feature of law is its certainty and in the event of any departure therefrom the society would be in utter confusion and the resultant effect of which would be legal anarchy and judicial indiscipline-a situation which always ought to be avoided. The Central Legislature introduced the legislation (MMRD Act) in the year 1957 and several hundreds and thousands of cases have already been dealt with on the basis thereof and the effect of a declaration of a contra law would be totally disastrous affecting the very basics of the revenue jurisprudence. It is true that the doctrine has no statutory sanction but it is a rule of convenience, expediency, prudence and above all the public policy. It is to be observed in its observance rather than in its breach to serve the people and subserve the ends of justice." "
42-E. In Cr. Appeal No. 305 of 2014, decided on 2.11.2016 by Division Bench of this High Court, after considering the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it was concluded that decision rendered by three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court shall have precedence over the judgments rendered by two-Judge Bench of the same Court.
42-F. In FAO No. 4086 of 2013, titled as Mandeep Kaur & others Vs. Gayyur Alam and others also, it has been observed that decision of smaller Bench cannot override pronouncement of Larger Bench.
43. In Rakesh Kumar's case, judgment of Division Bench of this Court has been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been held that in the cases of present nature delay will not defeat the claim of the petitioner for financial benefits. At the most, appellant-petitioner may be denied interest 2025:HHC:16058 ...45...
on the arrears, but where it is duty of the State to implement the Policy, the appellant is definitely entitled for financial benefits from the due date.
44. Judgment in Arvind Shrivastva case has also been affirmed by Larger Bench (3-Judge) of the Supreme Court.
45. The direction passed in Ashwani Kumar's and Surajmani's cases, with respect to granting monetary benefits on notional basis only, have been passed by Smaller Benches of the Supreme Court which is in conflict with earlier order passed by Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar's case. It appears that this aspect was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court either inadvertently in hurry to obtain orders or deliberately in order to re- agitate the settled issue regarding the entitlement of monetary benefits of Class-IV employees/Beldars, who are entitled for the benefits of Policy. It is apparent that State is agitating the same issue again and again in the Courts including the Supreme Court by selecting weaker opponent having no capability and competency to fight with the mighty State in the Supreme Court and is in habit of becoming instrumental to obtain contradictory orders/directions from the Court by concealing the material judgments/orders passed earlier by the Bench of same strength or even judgment passed by the Larger Bench(es).
46. In view of settled law, this Court, without commenting upon merits of pronouncements of the Supreme Court, is bound to follow the earlier order passed by larger Bench of the Supreme Court upholding the Rakesh Kumar's judgment, wherein persons, like appellant, belonging to lowest cadre of the Government service in hierarchy, have been held entitled for monetary benefits from the due date but without interest on arrears, because they were deprived of the benefits of the scheme/policy of the Government on account of laxity, inaction, omission or commission on the part of the State or its Officer/officials by not conferring work charge status upon daily waged beldars from due date. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that order passed in Surajmani's case and/or Ashwani Kumar's case, to the extent of denial of actual monetary benefits from due date, shall have no impact on the directions passed in Rakesh Kumar's case and thus appellant 2025:HHC:16058 ...46...
is entitled for the monetary benefits from the due date from which he has been held entitled for conferment of work charge status.
47. The material on record reveals that the matter with respect to the entitlement of monetary benefits from due date of conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous service stands adjudicated by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra) and the said judgment stands affirmed by three- Judge Bench of Supreme Court. Based on this judgment, which is judgment in rem, the State Authorities have extended the benefit of judgment in large number of cases, probably in thousands, in various departments, including the respondent department. Once the benefit of this judgment has been extended to similar persons then it does not behove the State Authorities to compel its employees to come to the Courts, for seeking similar benefits. Denial or defeating similar benefits by taking the plea of delay and latches certainly amounts to treating "equal as unequal", which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in view of the mandate of law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.C.Sharma versus Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721.
48. It is also settled that though law of Limitation is not applicable, however principle of delay and laches is attracted for adjudication of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and a petitioner may be ousted or deprived from monetary benefits or interest on delayed payment for delay and laches in appropriate case. In present case, for otherwise strong merit in the case, in order to prevent exploitation of victims for omission and commission on the part of mighty State, taking into consideration the circumstances of the petition and incapability of petitioner to approach the Court, invariably delay and laches may be ignored for adjudication of issue raised in the appeal and Writ Petition on merits. Therefore, we are of the considered view that appellant- petitioner, in present appeal, is not liable to be deprived monetary benefits from due date, on the ground of delay and laches. But he shall not be entitled for interest on delayed payment.
49. Similar benefits have been extended by the State to thousands of similarly situated employees. Thus, petitioner cannot be discriminated on the ground of delay and laches, particularly when it was duty of respondents to extend such benefits to the 2025:HHC:16058 ...47...
petitioner. State should act as a 'model employer' and should extend benefits of its Policies to all eligible persons, in consonance with pronouncements of the Court(s) which have attained finality, without any discrimination particularly when identical objections have already been overruled by the Courts and such pronouncements have attained finality. Thus claim of the petitioner cannot be refuted only on the ground of delay and laches and for joining on regularization without protest.
50. It is also apt to record that facts of the present case are also different from the cases of Surajmani and/or Ashwani Kumar as well as other cases wherein actual monetary benefits either have been denied or restricted to three years prior to filing of petition(s), because in present case appellant, who was daily-wage Beldar, was initially ousted from the job. He agitated the matter before Labour Court. Thereafter, he was re-engaged and regularized in the year 2010. For non-extending the benefits of Policy of the State, which was applicable to employees, including appellant- petitioner, and was to be implemented by the State, he approached the Court in the year 2010 by filing CWP No. 5702 of 2010 and since 1998 he is agitating for getting justice. His claim for extending benefits of work charge status upon him from 1.1.2006 is not a stale or delayed claim. Therefore, observations made in Ashwani Kumar's case and orders passed in Surajmani's case limiting the financial benefits notionally are not applicable to the appellant.
51. In absence of grant of monetary benefits in cases of conferment of work charge status upon beldars, in some cases, after struggling for years together in the Cours, persons may not be able to get anything because confinement of work charge status prior to regularisation is meaningful only if such person is held entitled for monetary benefits from the due date or at least three years prior to filing of the petition depending upon facts and circumstances of each case, because in absence of monetary benefits order of conferment of work-charge status, in most of the cases, will be a fruitless paper decree.
52. Despite having bestowed status of custodian of rights of its citizens, State or its functionaries invariably are adopting exploitative method in the field of public employment to avoid its 2025:HHC:16058 ...48...
liabilities, depriving the persons employed of their just claims and benefits by making initial appointments on temporary basis, i.e. contract, adhoc, tenure, daily-wage etc., and, therefore, by delaying or denying conferment of work-charge status or extension of other benefits, including that of Regularization Policy of the State, by not notifying Policies in this regard in time, in order to shirk from its responsibility. Present case is also an example of such practice.
53. Present situation is a result of poor assistance to the Court or deliberate concealment of material relevant facts from the Court by the State as if private parties to lis may or may not have knowledge of all relevant orders but the State was party in all cases decided earlier.
54. Denial or delaying the benefits despite having been extended to similar incumbents, defeats the objective of a Welfare State. It is apt to note that the State Government notified Himachal Pradesh State Litigation Policy on 07.03.2011, with the object that claimants and litigants should act consistently and an endeavour should be made to avoid unnecessary litigation. Once the matter in issue with respect to the conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous daily wage service and regularization thereafter subject to availability of posts stands settled by this Court, which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then the action of the State Authorities in filing appeals so as to delay and deny the benefits as given to others and raising objections on claims filed by claimants being dehors the Litigation Policy has been deprecated by this Court in CWP No. 1314 of 2016, titled as Nigma Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others also.
55. In above referred Nigma Devi's case, this High Court had directed the State to pay compensation of 20,00,000/- to the petitioner therein and had ordered that the said amount shall be recovered from the erring Officers/officials on pro-rata basis.
56. The Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).3398/2024, titled as State of Rajasthan and ors. V. Gopal Bijhawat, decided on 16.2.2024, had imposed costs of 10,00,000/- on the State for having harassed a poor litigant for 2025:HHC:16058 ...49...
having engaged him in protracted litigation denying him fruits of his litigation.
57. In Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).30326 of 2023, titled as The Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Vithal Rao, decided on 6.9.2023, the Supreme Court had imposed costs of 5,00,000/- and had categorically observed that just because Officers of the State do not have to pay for litigation from their pocket does not mean that they can harass individuals by forcing them into uncalled for litigation.
38. In given facts and circumstances, aforesaid referred paras of Ramiya's case are relevant and applicable. In present cases also, like Ramiya's case, this Court, instead of commenting upon merits of two judgments of Supreme Court with variance, has no other option except to follow earlier judgment/order of Larger Bench.
39. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that there is merit in the claim of the petitioners and plea of the respondent-University to oppose the same, is liable to be rejected.
37. Accordingly, respondent-University is directed to confer the work-charge status upon the petitioners from completion of eight years of daily wage service from initial date of appointment and issue appropriate orders for the said purpose by conferring the status upon the petitioners from 01.01.2002 with all consequential benefits.
However, the actual monetary benefits are ordered to be extended to the petitioners for three years prior to filing of the present petitions, and prior to that the monetary benefits shall be on notional basis.
2025:HHC:16058 ...50...
Appropriate order, conferring work-charge status and extending consequential benefits be issued on or before 30.6.2025.
Consequential monetary benefits be disbursed to them within eight weeks thereafter.
40. The petitioners shall not be entitled for interest on arrears in case benefits are extended in aforesaid time, failing which the petitioners shall be entitled for interest @6% per annum.
All the petition(s) are allowed and disposed of in aforesaid terms.