Allahabad High Court
Moti Goel Son Of Lajjaram vs State Of Uttar Pradesh on 19 October, 2006
JUDGMENT Poonam Srivastav, J.
1. Heard Sri Dilip Kumar, learned Counsel for the applicants and Sri Mahendra Singh Special counsel for the State, Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, learned A.G.A. for the State. Common question of fact and law is involved in all the four applications, they are decided together by a common judgment. The leading case is criminal misc. application No. 15856 of 2005.
2. The instant applications have been filed with a prayer for quashing the charge sheet No. 9 of 2005 dated 3 10.2005 arising out of case crime No. 169 of 2005, charge sheet No. 157 of 2005 arising out of case crime No. 154 of 2005, charge sheet No. 10 of 2005 arising out of case crime No. 179 of 2005 and charge sheet No. 8 of 2005 arising out of case crime No. 152 of 2005, Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar.
3. During the course of arguments, an amendment application was filed along with supplementary affidavit in support thereof for addition of following prayer It is further prayed that the order dated 9 10,2005 passed by the Special Judge/Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, registering the case, after taking cognizance on the charge sheet, may be set aside and consequential relief to the applicants may kindly be grant.
4. Amendment application was allowed and the learned Counsel for the applicants was permitted to incorporate the amendment vide order dated 25.4.2006.
5. Factual submission on behalf of the applicant is that grandfather of Moti Lal Goyal, Raghunath Sahai was in actual physical possession of entire area of land alleged to belong to the State in the capacity of holder of Patta of Dawami Istakarari since before advent of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act After Act No. 1 of 1950. He became a Sirdar and thereafter acquired Bhoomdhari rights. It is submitted that the entries in the revenue record up till 1371 Fasli is continuous. When consolidation operation commenced sometime in the year 1971, name of Raghunath Sahai afroresaid was omitted due to certain clerical error and the land was shown to be entered as banzer. This irregularity continued as Sri Raghunath Sahai died. It was detected for the first time in the year 1995 by the applicant Lajja Ram son of Raghunath Sahai. On legal advice, a regular suit No. 71 of 1995 was instituted under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act impleading the State of UP. as well as Gaon Sabha as opposite parties. During the intervening period, the plots in dispute were acquired by Greater Noida. An impleadment application dated 12.9.1995 was moved and Greater Noida was also impleaded as one of the contesting respondents in the aforesaid suit under the order of the S.D.O. The suit was finally decreed on 1.6.1996 and the applicants were declared Bhoomidhar having transferable rights of Gala Nos. 519, 520 The District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar wrote a letter to the State of U.P. on 23.11.2002 for cancellation of the acquisition order dated 7.12.1995 relating to the plot Nos. 519, 520, 578 of village Haldauna as Lajja Ram was declared Bhoomidhar over the said plots. The recommendation was also made to rectify the mistake in the revenue record. The State of U.P. directed the District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar by means of the letter dated 12.9.2002 to make an inquiry, consequent thereon the S.D.O. Gautam Budh Nagar was required to submit a report in the matter relating to acquisition of Bhoomdhari plots of applicant Lajja Ram. It is further submitted by the counsel for the applicants that an ex parte inquiry was made and the report was submitted on 30.9.2002 with the recommendation to cancel the acquisition order in favour of Greater Noida. It was at this stage, the S.D.O. Rakesh Kumar Singh passed an order on 2.6.2005 exercising power under Sections 33/39 of the Land Revenue Act cancelling the entries in favour of Sri Raghunath Sahai in the relevant Khatauni. According to the contention of the counsel for the applicants, this was done without any notice to the applicants. The S.D.O. Rakesh Kumar Singh, vide order dated 2.6.2005 under Sections 33/39 of Land Revenue Act issued a direction to lodge First Information Report against the applicants The First Information Report was registered in pursuance to the aforesaid direction. Specific allegations were made against the applicant Moti Lal Goyal and his father and few others. The allegation in the F.I.R. is that that the accused manipulated the revenue entries and according to the material collected, the outgoing Pradhan namely Mahendra Singh and Jagdish did not execute any Patta in favour of Sri Raghunath Sahai, Lajja Ram, or Moti Lal Goyal. On the basis of aforesaid investigation, charge sheets have been submitted against the applicants under Sections 420, 466, 467, 468, 469, 472. 120B, I PC , Section 13(1)(d) & 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act before the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act.
6. Further submission on behalf of the applicants is that finding of revenue court under Section 229-B U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act was not challenged in any superior Court of law and, the S.D.O. had no jurisdiction whatsoever to nullify the effect and operation of the judgment passed in the suit, therefore, the order passed under Section 33/39 of Land Revenue Act is without jurisdiction. The First Information Report dated 4.6.2005 is annexed as annexure No. 5 to the affidavit filed in support of the application. As many as 20 accused are named in the First Information Report. The informant is Lekhpal Lakhan Singh, charge sheets have been submitted against Lajja Ram, Moti Lal Goyal and Charan Singh son of Hari Singh. When the charge sheets were submitted, learned Special Judge took cognizance in respect of the offences shown in the charge sheet. The order taking cognizance is also under challenge in this application.
7. The applicants have been taken into custody in pursuance to the First Information Report and are still behind the bar. Learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the prosecution, though has submitted the charge sheets against the applicants, who have been taken into custody in pursuance thereof but the investigation is still continuing till date and no charge sheet has been filed against any of the public servant so far. The applicants are admittedly not public servant but charge sheets have been tiled against them under Section 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The submission is that offence under Section 13 of the |Act specifically relates to a person for an illegal act done in the capacity of a public servant. The charge sheets submitted against the applicants under provisions of Act No. 49 of 1988 before the Special Court and the proceedings in pursuance to the said charge sheets are questioned in this application. It is also argued that the cognizance taken by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act is illegal and proceedings cannot be allowed to continue.
8. Next submission is that before initiating the proceedings for an offence under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, a previous sanction under Section 19 of the Act is mandatory. In absence of any such sanction on record whatsoever, proceedings are liable to be dropped forthwith.
9. Next submission is that the police submitted charge sheets hurriedly against the applicants without completing investigation only with a view to deprive the applicants of benefit of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. No public servant has been charge sheeted till date and "prosecution admits that the investigation is continuing. The applicants who are detained, cannot be allowed to continue in detention for an indefinite period till the prosecution chooses to charge sheet at least one of the public servant along with the applicants A number of decisions have been relied upon by Sri Dilip Kumar, Advocate, in support of his contention. It is also submitted that assuming that the revenue entries were maneuvered, then the remedy was to get the judicial order challenged or resort to other proceedings in the court of law but not to curb the liberty of the applicants.
10. Sri Mahendra Pratap, Special counsel, appearing for the State of U.P. and Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, A.G.A. for the prosecution filed counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit. They have emphatically disputed arguments advanced on behalf of the applicants, and also raised preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the instant applications on the ground that the applicants have failed to annex entire evidence collected during the investigation including oral as well as documentary evidence and it amounts to concealment of material fact from the court and, therefore, the applications filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are liable to be dismissed on the ground of concealment alone. It is argued next that bare reading of the First Information Report discloses commission of cognizable offence and the police has an unfettered right to investigate the matter and submit its conclusion after completion of the investigation under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the court is entitled to take appropriate action, therefore, cognizance taken by the Special Court cannot be said to be an abuse of process of law and any submission made to the contrary is liable to be ignored. It is also submitted that the Apex Court has repeatedly ruled that it is only at the time of framing of charge, an opportunity of hearing is provided to the accused and that too only a limited right of addressing the court at that stage. The court has to come to a conclusion on the basis of such evidence collected during the investigation. It is at this stage the court examines whether prima-facie evidence collected discloses commission of the offence and thereafter frame charge. In case the trial court comes to a different conclusion then he can discharge the accused. It is submitted on behalf of the State that since the police has filed charge sheets after completing the investigation, and arriving at a prima-facie conclusion, the trial cannot be throttled at this stage in exercise of inherent power. Prayer for quashing the charge sheets is emphatically opposed and learned A.G.A. has isserted that even though the applicants are not public servant but nonetheless they are abettors and can very well be prosecuted and convicted under Sections 12 and 14 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act does not provide for a sanction of an offence under Sections 12 and 14 of the Act and therefore, if no sanction has been granted by the competent authority, it does not vitiate the trial and the charge sheet cannot be quashed on this ground as well.
11. Next submission is, Section 20(2) of the Act. which raises presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. Since evidence collected is sufficient to convict the applicants for an offence under Section 12 and 14 of the Act, a presumption is raised against the applicants as well and they cannot get away by saying that they are not public servant and, therefore, charge sheets and the consequent proceedings are liable to be quashed
12. Annexure C.A. 1 to the counter affidavit dated 1.2.2006 are photocopies of some Parchas of the case diary, which has been placed by the State to demonstrate that during further investigation in case crime No. 169 of 2005, evidence was collected and statements of three persons namely. Ravi Kant, Teekam, and Mahavir have been recorded. On the basis of the said evidence, involvement of three government servants namely Ram Lakhan, Arun Kumar (S.D.M.), Rajveer have come to light, they have participated in manipulating the record, Efforts are being made to locate the posting of the aforesaid government servants. This fact is mentioned in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit. Another counter affidavit dated 29.10.2005 has been filed by Sri Mahendra Pratap, Special counsel bringing on record judgment and order of a Division Bench of this Court passed on 1.3.2005 in criminal misc. writ petition No. 152 of 2005 directing the State Government to entrust the case to C.B.I. for further investigation. The aforesaid writ petition was preferred by one Rajendra Tyagi for quashing the First Information Report, which was dismissed. I need not go into this aspect of the matter.
13. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and going through the record, I proceed to decide legal question vis-a-vis two prayers made in the instant applications. First one for quashing the charge sheet and second for quashing the order taking cognizance by the Special Judge as well as consequent proceedings before the court of the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act.
14. The word "public servant" is defined in Section 2(c). On a close examination of definition, a number of categories from (c) (i) to (xii) are the persons who are covered within the--definition of public servant. The definition clause specifically provides the different class of persons, who fall within the ambit of the Act as a 'Public Servant'. They are such persons, who choose to take upon themselves duties and responsibilities belonging to the position of public servant and is recognized as filling such a position. The terms of definition clause are absolutely clear and unambiguous. The expression 'public servant' shall have a particular meaning for the purpose of the Act. The present applicants cannot be said to be public servants since they do not fall under any of sub-clause of the definition clause. They have neither been appointed by the Government or any local authority nor institution whatsoever. I agree with the contention of the counsel for the applicants to this extent that the two applicants before me, Lajja Ram and Moti Lal Goyal do not fall within the category of "public servant". Section 13 of the Act specifically deals with criminal misconduct/offence committed by a public servant. In the circumstances, it is concluded that the applicants are not public servant within the meaning of the Act and the objection raised by the State cannot be accepted.
15. Section 19 of the Act provides that prior sanction is essential for the prosecution of a public servant. An embargo is imposed on the court by Section 19 of the Act that it shall take cognizance on an offence under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant only after previous sanction is obtained from the competent authority.
16. So far as the argument advanced on behalf of the applicants regarding requisite prior sanction for prosecution of public servant is concerned, it is true that when a public servant is prosecuted for an offence under Section 13 of the Act or any of the offence mentioned in Section 19 of the Act, prior sanction is necessary. However, 1 am of the view that the applicants are not public servant. The contention of the learned Counsel for the State that the allegation against them in the F.I.R. or charge sheet very well bring them within the category of abettors. The Act provides for prosecution and punishment for the offenders, who are proved to be "abettors" within the meaning of Sections 12 and 14 of the Act. No sanction is required for their prosecution and, therefore, in case sanction has not been obtained by the prosecution for prosecuting the applicants, I do not think, any illegality whatsoever has been committed. Therefore, no case for quashing the charge sheet for want of necessary sanction under Section 19 of the Act is made out. The argument of Sri Dilip Kumar, Advocate that charge sheet should be quashed for want of necessary sanction has no force and cannot be accepted.
17. No doubt, charge sheets have been submitted under Section 13(2) & 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, the court can always taken care of this aspect while framing the charge and this argument can very well be advanced at the stage of framing charge or claiming discharge. This Court cannot pre-empt and frame charge for a different offence other than mentioned in the charge sheet. The trial court is competent to differ with the opinion of the Investigating Officer and frame charge for offences for which the accused has not been charge sheeted. It is an exclusive domain of the trial Judge. The Investigating Officer is not the final authority and cannot be expected to go into legal intricacies at the time of filing of the charge sheet. Learned Special Judge can very well alter and frame charges under the appropriate provisions of Criminal Procedure Code after hearing counsels for the respective parties.
18. The Apex Court has ruled in a number of decisions the question regarding mandatory prerequisite of 'sanction' while dealing with the cases relating to prosecution of public servant. In the case of State of Karnataka through C.B.I. v. C. Nagaraja Swami decided along with case State of Karanataka through C.H.I. v. MX. Vijai 2005 page 953 A.C.C. page 781 (S.C.) and State of Goa v. Babu Thomas 2005 A.C.C. page 389 (S.C.) wherein it was ruled that want of sanction before prosecuting a public servant renders the judgment illegal and without jurisdiction. The argument advanced on behalf of the applicants is that the charge sheets submitted against the applicants is under Sections 13(2) & 13(1)(d) of the Act along with other offences of the I.P.C. therefore, the charge sheets are liable to be quashed for want of requisite sanction, is not acceptable. I am of the view that the applicants are not public servants within the meaning of the Act, therefore, there is no prerequisite of grant of sanction under Section 19 of the Act by a competent authority. This objection regarding grant of sanction is available to the applicants, only in the event the trial Judge frames charge for offences enumerated in Section 19 of the Act. However, it is open for the applicants to raise this objection at the stage of framing of charge or at the stage of claiming discharge. This Court can neither quash the charge sheet nor alter the charge at this stage in exercise of inherent powers and assume the role of the trial court. The Apex Court's decision relied upon by the counsel for the applicants is the law of the land and cannot be questioned but all those citations relate to the cases where public servants were prosecuted without a sanction contemplated by the Act. 1 have already held that the applicants are not public servants and, therefore, no sanction was required for their prosecution
19. Next argument advanced on behalf of the counsel for the applicants is that cognizance could not be taken by the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act as the applicants are not public servants and, therefore, assuming the Investigating Officer was of the opinion that the applicants are prima-facie guilty of commission of an offence, it is only under provision of Indian Penal Code and not under the provision of Anti Corruption Act. The cognizance taken by the Special Judge, therefore, is rendered illegal, It is also submitted in this respect that order taking cognizance is only two words order without application of mind and, therefore, subsequent proceedings on the basis of an order taking cognizance is also rendered illegal. The order is only mechanical and not alter recording a satisfaction by the court.
20. Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party has categorically submitted that the accused, who are not public servants can very well be prosecuted for an offence under Section 12 of the Act, which is quoted hereinbelow:
12. Punishment for abetment of offences defined in Section 7 or 11.-
Whoever abets any offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall he punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
21. Section 7 of the Act deals with offence committed by public servant accepting gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. Section 14 of the Act deals with habitual offender, who committed offence under Sections 8, 9 and 12 of the Act. On the basis of these provisions, learned Counsel appearing for the State has ' emphasized that even if the applicants are not public servants within the meaning of the Act, they are abettors and have continuously indulged in abetting the offence thereby committed an offence under Sections 12 and 14 of the Act. The applicants cannot escape the liability as abettors of the offence alleged. It is the applicants, who are beneficiary and the entries in their favour are clear pointer that illegal gratification was extended to the public servant to achieve the goal by making necessary interpolation, manipulation and fabrication in the revenue entries by a public servant, even though they have not been charge sheeted so far. The question raised on behalf of the applicants is that whether the Special Judge has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial against the present applicants despite the fact that they are not public servant, can be permitted or not? Section 4 of the Act is quoted hereinbelow:
4. Cases triable by Special Judge.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law for the time being in force, the offences specified in Sub-section (I) of Section 3 shall be tried by Special Judges only.
(2) Every offence specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or, as the case may be, by the Special Judge appointed for the case, or, where there are more Special Judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government.
(3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Section 3, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), a Special Judge shall, as far as practicable, hold the trial of an offence on day-to-day basis.
22. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act provides that any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in Clause (a) shall also be tried by the Special Judge. On perusal of two provisions, it is explicit that the conspirators or abettors of an offence punishable under Clause (a) of Section 3(1) of the Act can be tried by the Special Judge alone and none else. It is the question to be adjudged by the trial court as to whether the applicants have committed an offence under Sections 12 and 14 of the Act. I do not think that it is proper to give my opinion whether an offence under Sections 12 and 14 of the Act is made out or not before the trial Judge forms an opinion after going through the evidence collected during investigation. The court below shall examine the evidence and analyze the question whether the applicants have abetted commission of the offence by extending gratification for getting an illegal act done by the public servant. This aspect is yet to be examined by the court below and thereafter come to a conclusion whether the charge under the provisions of Prevention Act is made out or not and consequent jurisdiction of the Special Judge
23. Both the counsels, Sri Dilip Kumar, Advocate, as well as Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, A.G.A. has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court P. Nallammal v. State by Inspector of Police 1999 (39) A.C.C. 473. Submission of the Counsel appearing for the State on the basis of aforesaid decision is that any offence under Prevention of Corruption Act can be tried by the Special Judge even if there is no public servant, but if such non public servants have conspired or abetted the offence, the order taking cognizance by the Special Judge is not vitiated. Learned A.G.A. has placed reliance on paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:
Thus, Clause (h) of the sub-section encompasses, the offences committed in conspiracy with other or by abetment of "any of the offences" punishable under the P.C. Act. If such conspiracy or abetment of "any of the offences" punishable under the P.C. Act can be tried "only" by the Special Judge, it is inconceivable that the abettor or the conspirator can be delinked from the delinquent public servant for the purpose of trial of the offence. If a. non-public servant is also a member of the criminal conspiracy for a public servant to commit any offence under the P.C. Act, or if such non-public servant has abetted any of the offence which the public servant commits, such non-public servant is also liable to be tried along with public servant before the court of a Special Judge having jurisdiction in the matter.
24. Sri Dilip Kumar Advocate, has placed reliance on this very decision and emphasis is on paragraph No. 16, which is-quoted hereinbelow:
16. Therefore, the legislative intent is manifest that abettors of all the different offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the P.C. Act should also be dealt with along with the public servant in the same trial held by the Special Judge.
25. Learned Counsel for the applicants has argued on the basis of aforesaid decision that in the instant case, charge sheeted accused are two applicants, who are not public servant and also not a single public servant has been charge sheeted till date. The Apex Court has clearly held that abettors of the offence should be dealt along with public servant in the same trial by the Special Judge. In the instant case, accepting arguments of State counsel that the applicants have tried to misappropriate the land belonging to the State with the help of some public servant and thereby induced the public servant to commit the offence and are abettors. I agree that in case the court concludes that the applicants are prima facie found to be abettors then there is no illegality whatsoever in case the applicants are tried along with public servant.
26. In the case of N.P. Prabhu v. Union of India and Anr. 2003 Criminal Law Journal page 2261, where it has been held that offence under Section 7 or 11 abetted by an accused, who is a non public servant, can very well be tried by the Special Judge even if offence abetted is not committed by a public servant. In view of this decision, the court shall examine whether an offence under Section 7 or 11 of the Act was abetted by the present applicants and thereafter form an opinion regarding presence of all the ingredient of Sections 12 and 14(b) of the Act No. 49 of 1988. Taking into consideration the observation of the Apex Court, question arises whether the abettors can be tried in absence of public servants, who are alleged to have abetted. The court came to a conclusion that there is nothing to indicate that non-public servant alone cannot be tried for the offence punishable under Sections 12 and 14(b) of the Act and the Special Judge has jurisdiction to try the offence. However, before the court gives an opinion that offence under Section 12 of the Act is constituted, it is to ensure that the abettors attempted to give illegal gratification to the public servants to do or not to do an official act, in lieu thereof. It is also necessary to arrive at a conclusion that 'illegal gratification was extended for definite motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person with the Central Government or State Government or Parliament or legislature any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in Clause (C) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or others.
27. It is once again left open to the court concerned to examine this aspect at the appropriate moment. The scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is clear that the provisions of Section 227 Cr.P.C. was incorporated only with a view to save the accused from prolong harassment when the material gathered after investigation falls short of minimum legal requirement. In view of this, the submission of Sri Dilip Kumar, Advocate, that since names of public servants are not forthcoming till date by the Investigating Officer and the admission of the learned A.G.A. that such public servants, who are suspected to have committed substantive offence on account of abetment of the applicants are not traceable, the applicants cannot be permitted to continue and await conclusion of the Investigating Officer till eternity is not without substance. However, since the proceedings in the trial are continuing, the trial Judge is fully competent to decide all these questions.
28. Learned Counsel for the State has advanced argument on the question of presumption as envisaged in Section 20 of the Act. Sri Sudhir Mehrotra, Advocate, has submitted that Section 20(2) of the Act is specifically carved out in respect of presumption of an offence punishable under Sections 12 and 14(b) of the Act. Submission is that Section 20(1) deals with the public servant and Section 20(2) relates to non-public servant, and since offence of abetment against the present applicants is made out, a presumption will necessarily arise under the said provision. This argument has strenuously been disputed by Sri Dilip Kumar, Advocate. After hearing arguments of the counsels for the respective parties and on a close scrutiny of provisions of Section 20 of the Act, it is analogous to the corresponding Section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act. 1947. The presumption arises as soon as the prosecution establishes that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification or that valuable thing other than by way of legal remuneration but before such presumption could arise, the prosecution is required to establish by cogent evidence that the accused willfully took money or things offered to him knowingly. This acceptance has necessarily to be by a public servant and lure or extension of the benefit is to be given by such person, who need not be necessarily a public servant. In the circumstances, assertion of the learned Counsel for the State that a presumption against the applicants for getting an illegal act in order to offer the benefit, could be accepted only if it is brought on record that the public servant accepted such illegal gratification It is thus evident that a , presumption cannot be raised simplicitor under Section 20(2) of the Act. No doubt, presumption has to be accepted unless it is rebutted by some proof by the accused but once again since no public servant has been charged sheeted till now, presumption under Section 20(2) cannot be accepted simplicitor. Whatever document has been brought on record, it does not transpire that there was any payment of illegal gratification to a public servant for doing or not doing the act and. therefore. I come to a conclusion that presumption under Section 20(2) of the Act cannot be raised against the present applicants This argument advanced on behalf of the Slate is without any basis.
29. I have also considered the argument that the applicant Moti Lal Goyal is in custody since a very long time. In fact, Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. was enacted only to ensure that the Investigating Agency is not given an unfettered right to continue with indefinite investigation and in the garb of such investigation, the accused cannot be kept in continuous detention. It is also true that the applicants are in custody since more than one and half year and charge has not yet been framed but I am informed that the Investigating Agency is still continuing with the investigation I am of the view that interference by this Court at the investigation stage is not called for. However It is equally true that the Investigating Agency cannot be given latitude of protracted investigation. In the case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay A.I.R 1984 S.C., a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while interpreting scope of Article 21 of the Constitution came to a conclusion that every citizen has a right to speedy trial. This was also confirmed in another decision by the Apex court Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors. 2002 I S.C.C. page 149. The Apex Court held that every date may not be taken as causing prejudice to the accused but totality of the circumstances and general conspectus of the case have to be taken into consideration.
30. Supplementary affidavit has been filed by the learned A.G.A. bringing on record order sheet to show that in fact delay is being caused in absence of the accused, who were admitted in the hospital. Learned Sessions Judge while allowing the application for further investigation on 5.8.2006, passed an order that there is no need for the Investigating Officer to seek leave of the court for further investigation and in additional evidence collected against the accused Moti Lal Goyal can very well be placed on record even after filing of the charge sheet. Perusal of the order sheet dated 5.8.2006 shows that 17,8.2006 was fixed for charge. I am not aware about any order subsequent to this order. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I think it proper and direct the learned Sessions shall hear the accused on the question of discharge/charge expeditiously, preferably, within a period of two months from the date, a certified copy of this order is produced before him. I am not inclined to quash the charge sheet and order taking cognizance since the Investigating Officer collected evidence against them and filed charge sheet. The Apex Court as well as this Court has continuously disapproved quashing the proceedings in exercise of inherent powers unless and until continuation on the face of it amounts to an abuse of process of the Court. The inherent powers are limited to extreme exception and cannot be short-circuited by quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. unless it is brought to the notice of the Court that allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. I am conscious that this power has to be exercised sparingly. Therefore,. 1 am not inclined to quash the charge sheet or the order taking cognizance. I direct the learned Sessions Judge concerned to decide the question of discharge/charge as case may be within specific period of two months as the applicants are in continuous detention since a very long time. In view of what has been discussed above, the prayer made in these applications cannot be granted. The Special Judge shall proceed m the matter in the light of the observation in this judgment within the time frame prescribed.
31. With the aforesaid directions, the present applications are dismissed.