Karnataka High Court
Course 5 Intelligence Private Limited vs The Principal Commissioner Of Central ... on 1 December, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114
WP No. 13639 of 2021
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 13639 OF 2021 (T-RES)
BETWEEN:
COURSE 5 INTELLIGENCE PRIVATE LIMITED
(FORMERLY BLUEOCEAN MARKET INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED) 2A,
GROUND FLOOR, EMBASSY TECH VILLAGE,
EAST TOWER, OUTER RING ROAD,
DEVERABEESANAHALLI,
KARIYAMMANA AGRAHARA, BENGALURU
KARNATAKA - 560 103,
A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1956 AND
REPRESENTED BY ITS DULY AUTHORISED
SIGNATORY CHANDRAKANTH RAO
(FINANCE CONTROLLER)
...PETITIONER
Digitally signed
by (BY SRI. RAJESH CHANDER KUMAR ROHRA, SR.COUNSEL
SHARADAVANI
B FOR MS.YOVINI RAJESH ROHRA, ADVOCATE)
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka AND:
THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX
GST EAST COMMISSIONERATE,
BENGALURU TRAFFIC AND TRANSIT
MANAGEMENT CENTRE, BMTC BUS STAND,
HAL AIRPORT ROAD, DOMMALURU,
BENGALURU - 560 071
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. JEEVAN J.NEERALIGI, ADVOCATE)
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114
WP No. 13639 of 2021
HC-KAR
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE SHOW
CAUSE NOTICE NO.13/2021-22 DATED 22.04.2021 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A IS WHOLLY ARBITRARY, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE, IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND EVEN OTHERWISE IN ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioner seeks the following reliefs:
i) Issue a writ of certiorari, or any other such writ order or direction, as it may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, quashing the show-cause notice No.13/2021- 22 dated 22.04.2021 in GEXCOM/ ADJN/ ST/ COM/ 283/2021-ADJN within DIN 20210457YT000000 2E9D (Annexure-A), is wholly arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, in excess of jurisdiction and even otherwise, in abuse of jurisdiction and violative of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India;
ii) To pass such other orders, directions and writs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, and in the interests of justice, including the costs of this writ petition.-3-
NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR
2. Heard Shrii.Rajesh Chander Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri.Jeevan J.Neeralgi, learned counsel apeparing for the respondent and perused the material on record.
3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned show-
cause notice at Annexure-A dated 22.04.2021 in order to point out that the necessary ingredients of Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 has not been complied with and conspicuously absent/missing from the impugned show-
cause notice. In this context, it is pointed out that without any basis, the respondent seek to justify invocation of the extended period of limitation and in the absence of any supporting material in this regard, the impugned show-
cause notice is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction or authority of law and contrary to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act and the same deserves to be quashed.
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4. He would place reliance upon various judgments including the judgment of the Apex Court in ITW SIGNODE INDIA LIMITED Vs. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE - 2003 (158) E.L.T. 403 (S.C.) and STEMCYTE INDIA THERAPEUTICS PRIVATE LIMITED -
(2025) 32 CENTAX 226 (S.C.) as well as judgment of this Court in the case of M/S NCS PEARSON INC. MINNESOTA BASED CORPORATION, USA Vs. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS in Writ Petition No.7635 of 2024 (T-Res) disposed of on 16.07.2025 under identical circumstances in relation to Section 74 of the CGST Act by pointing out that the language employed in Section 74 of the CGST Act is akin and similar to the language employed in Section 73(1) of the Finance Act and consequently, the impugned show-
cause notice deserves to be quashed.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submit that there is no merit in the petition. He would reiterate the various contentions urged in the statement of objections and submit that the petitioner did not file -5- NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR returns and did not declare taxable value and there was short payment of service tax. He submitted that due to the petitioner's conduct, the investigation was dragged on and as such, the respondent was left with no option but to complete the investigation and issue the show-cause notice, which does not warrant interference by this Court in the present petition.
6. By way of reply, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submit that the petitioner has been co-operating with the investigation and had issued a communication dated 05.09.2019 along with all relevant documents and as such, the delay in issuance of show-cause notice is not attributable to the petitioner and the same was reiterated in the e-mail at Annexure-'O' dated 20.04.2021 and the respondent not being diligent is not entitled to the benefit of the extended period of limitation and present petition deserves to be allowed.
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7. The learned counsel for the respondents would reiterate the various contentions urged in the statement of objections, in particular, paragraph Nos.4, 5 and 6.
8. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be necessary to extract the impugned show-cause notice, at paragraph No.8, where the respondent purport to invoke the extended period of limitation by justifying the same as hereunder:
"8. Justification for invoking extended period:
Whereas, from the records, it appears that the Service Provider has provided the taxable services and collected service consideration but have not paid/short paid the Service Tax and also failed to file/declare in the prescribed statutory returns. When the law requires a Service Provider to assess tax himself with full disclosure and file returns and the assessee fails to do so, the intension to evade tax is evident on record. It appears that they have suppressed facts from the knowledge of the Department with the intention to evade payment of Service Tax on the services provided by them. Therefore, it appears that the Service Tax amounting to Rs.7,55,29,015/- (ST: Rs.7,29,24,566/- and SBC: Rs.26,04,449/-) for the period from April, 2015 to March, 2016, is liable to be demanded and recovered from them in terms of proviso to Section 73(1) of the Act, since the omission and commission by the Service Provider appears to be covered under -7- NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR clause (c), (d) and (e) of proviso to Section 73(1) of the Act. As the Service Provider had failed to pay/short paid the Service Tax in time they are also liable to pay interest, at applicable rates, in terms of Section 75 of the Finance Act 1994. It further appears that the Service Provider by the above act of omission and commission has wilfully suppressed the correct taxable value from the department with intent to evade payment of Service Tax. But for the information provided by the CBDT, the fact of non- payment of Service Tax would not have come to light. Hence, it appears that they have rendered themselves liable for penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. Further, it also appears that they are liable for penalty under Section 77(1)(b), 77(1)(c), 77(1)(d) of the Act for their failure to keep, maintain or retain books of account and other documents/information and submit the same to the Department when called by an officer in accordance with the provisions of Act/Rules framed thereunder".
9. A perusal of the purported justifications of the respondent for invoking the extended period will clearly indicate that the necessary ingredients, which permit the respondents to invoke the extended period of limitation were conspicuously absent and missing in the impugned show-cause notice. Under identical circumstances, in ITW SIGNODE INDIA LIMITED's case supra, the Apex Court held as under:
-8-NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR "61. Such an extended period of limitation can be invoked only on a positive act of fraud etc. on the part of assessee is found. Such a positive act must be in contradistinction to mere inaction like non- taking of licence etc. It has to be pleaded and established. [See Padmini Products (supra), P&B Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra)] Even in Easland Combines(supra) this Court held:
"It is settled law that for invoking the extended period of limitation duty should not have been paid, short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded because of either fraud, collusion, willful misstatement, suppression of fact or contravention of any provision or rules. This Court has held that these ingredients postulate a positive act and, therefore, mere failure to pay duty and/or take out a licence which is not due to any fraud, collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of fact or contravention of any provision is not sufficient to attract the extended period of limitation."
62. The question of limitation involves a question of jurisdiction. The findings of fact on the question of jurisdiction would be a jurisdictional fact. Such a jurisdictional question is to be determined having regard to both fact and law involved therein. The Tribunal, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in not determining the said question, particularly, when in the absence of any finding of fact that such short-levy of excise duty related to any positive act on the part of the appellant by way of fraud, collusion, wilful mis- statement or suppression of facts, the extended period of limitation could not have been invoked and in that view of the matter no show cause notice in terms of Rule 10 could have been issued".
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10. So also, in STEMCYTE INDIA THERAPEUTICS PRIVATE LIMITED's, case supra, the Apex Court held as under:
"9.4. Therefore, in the absence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with an intent to evade payment of service tax, the invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 is wholly unwarranted. Mere non-payment of service tax, by itself, does not justify the invocation of the extended limitation period. Accordingly, the show cause notice issued by the department is clearly time-barred. On this ground alone, the impugned order deserves to be set aside".
11. The aforesaid two judgments of the Apex Court were referred to by this Court in M/S.NCS PEARSON INC.
MINNESOTA BASED CORPORATION, USA Vs. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS while dealing with show-cause notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act. and this Court held as under:
"21. In the instant case, a perusal of the material on record will indicate that the 2nd respondent has decided the jurisdictional facts in relation to the alleged wilful suppression by the petitioner erroneously/incorrectly by attempting to vest itself with the jurisdiction under Section 74 of the CGST Act and saddle a GST liability upon the
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR petitioner for the period under dispute, which is impermissible in law and consequently, the very issuance of the impugned SCN dated 12.02.2024 under Section 74 of the CGST Act is illegal and violative of Article 265 of the Constitution inasmuch as the impugned SCN seeks to realize monies from the petitioner under the guise of tax without the authority of the law and the impugned SCN deserves to be quashed.
22. The impugned SCN also fails to consider and appreciate that the issue of classification of Type-III Tests had not attained finality on account of W.P.No.3555/2021 preferred by the petitioner against the order of the AAAR pending adjudication before the Division Bench of this Court, in which there is an interim order in favour of the petitioner as stated supra; despite the sub-judice nature of the issue of classification and taxability of Type-III Tests pending before this Court, and interim orders having been granted in favour of the petitioner, the 2nd respondent has issued the impugned SCN relating to Type-III Tests, even though this very issue/question relating to classification and taxability of such supply of service was pending consideration of this Court and the impugned SCN deserves to be quashed on this score also.
23. A perusal of the impugned SCN will indicate that Section 74 of the CGST Act cannot be invoked in cases involving the mere omission to pay tax or the mere omission to give correct information, without there being any intention to evade tax; the allegations of wilful suppression of appropriate GST not being paid and the failure of the petitioner to mention the value of services correctly in the GSTR-5A returns and failing to apply the correct GST rate, ignores the fact that the very mens rea element of consciously or deliberately suppressing information/details for the purpose of evading the payment of tax which forms the sine qua non of Section 74 of the CGST Act, is
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR not satisfied in the instant case; the jurisdictional fact for invoking the stringent provisions of Section 74 of the CGST Act, that is of wilful suppression with a view to evade payment of tax are neither satisfied nor fulfilled in the impugned SCN, which deserves to be quashed on this ground also.
24. In the case of Cosmic Dye Chemical vs. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay - (1995) 6 SCC 117, the Apex Court held that the word 'wilful', which precedes suppression, requires the existence of an intent to evade duty as hereunder:
6. Now so far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that the requisite intent, i.e., intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word 'wilful' preceding the words "misstatement or suppression of facts" which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words "contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or rules" are again qualified by the immediately following words "with intent to evade payment of duty". It is, therefore, not correct to say that there can be a suppression or misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet constitutes a permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11-A. Misstatement or suppression of fact must be wilful.
25. In the case of Eastland Combines vs. CCE
- (2003) 3 SCC 410, the Apex Court held that wilful suppression postulates a positive act and that a mere failure to pay duty which is not due to any suppression of facts is not sufficient to attract the extended period of limitation and that the mere default or failure of the assessee to pay duty, without the existence of any intent to wilfully suppress information/details in itself would attract the extended period of limitation as hereunder:
31. It is settled law that for invoking the extended period of limitation duty should not have
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR been paid, shortlevied or short-paid or erroneously refunded because of either fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts or contravention of any provision or rules. This Court has held that these ingredients postulate a positive act and, therefore, mere failure to pay duty and/or take out a licence which is not due to any fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of fact or contravention of any provision is not sufficient to attract the extended period of limitation.
26. Similarly, in the case of Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise Meerut
- (2005) 7 SCC 749, the Apex Court held that a mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression as hereunder:
26. In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1988) 3 SCC 403 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 381 :
(1988) 35 ELT 605] this Court held that when the classification list continued to have been approved regularly by the Department, it could not be said that the manufacturer was guilty of "suppression of facts". As noted herein earlier, we have also concluded that the classification lists supplied by the appellant were duly approved from time to time regularly by the Excise Authorities and only in the year 1995, the Department found that there was "suppression of facts" in the matter of post-forming manufacturing process of the products in question.
Furthermore, in view of our discussion made herein earlier, that the Department has had the opportunities to inspect the products of the appellant from time to time and, in fact, had inspected the products of the appellant. Classification lists supplied by the appellant were duly approved and in view of the admitted fact that the flow- chart of manufacturing process submitted to the Superintendent of Central Excise on 17-5- 1990 clearly mentioned the fact of post-forming process on the rubber, the finding on "suppression of facts" of CEGAT cannot be approved by us. This Court in the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE [1995 Supp (3) SCC 462] while dealing with
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR the meaning of the expression "suppression of facts" in the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act held that the term must be construed strictly, it does not mean any omission and the act must be deliberate and wilful to evade payment of duty. The Court further held: (SCC pp. 463-64, para 4) "In taxation, it ['suppression of facts'] can have only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to escape payment of duty. Where facts are known to both the parties the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, does not render it suppression."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Relying on the aforesaid observations of this Court in the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE [1995 Supp (3) SCC 462] we find that "suppression of facts" can have only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to evade payment of duty. When facts were known to both the parties, the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, would not render it suppression. It is settled law that mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression. There must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to find wilful suppression. Therefore, in view of our findings made hereinabove that there was no deliberate intention on the part of the appellant not to disclose the correct information or to evade payment of duty, it was not open to the Central Excise Officer to proceed to recover duties in the manner indicated in the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that where facts were known to both the parties, as in the instant case, it was not open to CEGAT to come to a conclusion that the appellant was guilty of "suppression of facts". In Densons Pultretaknik v. CCE [(2003) 11 SCC 390] this Court held that mere classification under a different sub-heading by the manufacturer cannot be said to be wilful misstatement or "suppression of facts". This view
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR was also reiterated by this Court in CCE v. L.M.P. Precision Engg. Co. Ltd. [(2004) 9 SCC 703]
27. So also, in Continental Foundation Joint Venture vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh -(2007) 216 ELT 177 (SC), it was held by the Apex Court that mere omission to give correct information is not suppression of facts, unless it was deliberate to stop the payment of duty and that when the facts are known to both the parties, omission by one party to do what he might have done would not render it to be suppression as hereunder: -
12. The expression "suppression" has been used in the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act accompanied by very strong words as "fraud" or "collusion" and, therefore, has to be construed strictly. Mere omission to give correct information is not suppression of facts unless it was deliberate to stop (sic evade) the payment of duty.
Suppression means failure to disclose full information with the intent to evade payment of duty. When the facts are known to both the parties, omission by one party to do what he might have done would not render it suppression. When the Revenue invokes the extended period of limitation under Section 11-A the burden is cast upon it to prove suppression of fact. An incorrect statement cannot be equated with a wilful misstatement. The latter implies making of an incorrect statement with the knowledge that the statement was not correct.
28. As stated earlier, though the respondents allege in the impugned SCN that the petitioner failed to mention the value of services correctly in the GSTR - 5A returns and apply the correct GST rate on the consideration received, the mere omission to mention the value of services correctly in the returns and/or apply the correct GST rate would not be tantamount to wilful suppression, in light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, particularly when the respondents-
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR Revenue had in their knowledge the complete gamut of transactions of supply of Type-III tests by the petitioner, thereby leading to the sole conclusion that an intention to evade payment of tax could in no manner be imputed or attributable to the petitioner and the impugned SCN deserves to be quashed.
29. In the case of Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs vs. Reliance Industries Ltd., - 2023 SCC OnLine SC 767, the Apex Court held as under:-
14. In Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE [Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Co. v. CCE, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 462] , this Court, while dealing with a similar fact circumstance wherein the extended period of limitation under the abovementioned proviso had been invoked, held that since the expression "suppression of facts" is used in the company of terms such as fraud, collusion and wilful misstatement, it cannot therefore refer to an act of mere omission, and must be interpreted as referring to a deliberate act of non-disclosure aimed at evading duty, that is to say, an element of intentional action must be present.
15. Similarly, in CCE v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments [CCE v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments, (1989) 2 SCC 127 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 245] , this Court, while dealing with a similar situation of invocation of extended period of limitation under Section 11-A of the Act, this Court held as under :
(SCC p. 131, para 9) "9. ... In order to make the demand for duty sustainable beyond a period of six months and up to a period of 5 years in view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act, it has to be established that the duty of excise has not been levied or paid or short-levied or shortpaid, or erroneously refunded by reasons of either fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, with intent to evade
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR payment of duty. Something positive other than mere inaction or failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any liability, before (sic beyond) the period of six months. Whether in a particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression or contravention of any provision of any Act, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the facts referred to hereinbefore do not warrant any inference of fraud. The assessee declared the goods on the basis of their belief of the interpretation of the provisions of the law that the exempted goods were not required to be included and these did not include the value of the exempted goods which they manufactured at the relevant time. The Tribunal found that the explanation was plausible, and also noted that the Department had full knowledge of the facts about manufacture of all the goods manufactured by the respondent when the declaration was filed by the respondent. The respondent did not include the value of the products other than those falling under Tariff Item 14E manufactured by the respondent and this was in the knowledge, according to the Tribunal, of the authorities. These findings of the Tribunal have not been challenged before us or before the Tribunal itself as being based on no evidence."
23. We also find no merits in the other argument urged by the learned counsel for the Revenue that the Tribunal's order in IFGL Refractories [IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. CCE, 2000 SCC OnLine CEGAT 1771 : (2001) 134 ELT 230] could not have constituted a valid basis for the belief entertained by the assessee in view of the fact that the relevant valuation provisions had undergone amendments in the year 2000. The argument of the Revenue's counsel was that in view of the amendments to Section 4 and Rule 6 of the Valuation Rules the ratio of the Tribunal's
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR decision in IFGL case [IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. CCE, 2000 SCC OnLine CEGAT 1771 : (2001) 134 ELT 230] was no longer relevant for the period under consideration in these appeals. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention for two independent reasons. Firstly, this contention too has not been urged in the civil appeal filed by the Revenue and has been urged only during the course of the hearing before this Court. On this count alone the contention deserves to be ignored. Secondly, we also find this contention to be diametrically opposite to what the Revenue itself has been contending on merits right from the show-cause notice till the appeal filed before this Court.
24. On merits, the Revenue's case throughout had been that the issue of valuation is covered against the assessee by the judgment of this Court in IFGL Refractories [CCE v. IFGL Refractories Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 713] . Even in the order of CESTAT under challenge the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the principle of valuation laid down by this Court in IFGL Refractories [CCE v. IFGL Refractories Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 713] holds good and remains valid even under the amended valuation provisions for the period post July 2000. We therefore find it strange that for the purposes of justifying its case on limitation, the Revenue wishes to take a position exactly contrary to what it has taken in the show-cause notice on merits. We cannot allow the Revenue to blow hot and cold in the same breath by relying upon IFGL case [CCE v. IFGL Refractories Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 713] on merits while at the same time arguing that the same had no relevance for the purposes of examining the plea for a bona fide belief.
25. We are in full agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that during the period in dispute it was holding a bona fide belief that it was correctly discharging its duty liability. The mere fact that the belief was ultimately found to be wrong by the judgment of this Court does not render such belief of the assessee a mala fide belief particularly when
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NC: 2025:KHC:50114 WP No. 13639 of 2021 HC-KAR such a belief was emanating from the view taken by a Division Bench of the Tribunal. We note that the issue of valuation involved in this particular matter is indeed one where two plausible views could co-exist. In such cases of disputes of interpretation of legal provisions, it would be totally unjustified to invoke the extended period of limitation by considering the assessee's view to be lacking bona fides. In any scheme of self- assessment it becomes the responsibility of the assessee to determine his liability of duty correctly. This determination is required to be made on the basis of his own judgment and in a bona fide manner.
30. In the instant case, as stated supra, in the light of pendency of W.P.No.3555/2021 preferred by the petitioner before this Court assailing the order of the AAAR, the very issue/question relating to classification of Type-III tests supplied by the petitioner as OIDAR services, remains in a significant state of flux inasmuch as at the very initial stage of the litigation, the AAR vide its order dated 22.05.2020 held that Type-III tests were outside the purview of OIDAR services which was reversed by the AAAR, thereby indicating that the very classification of Type-3 tests as OIDAR services was uncertain and in a constantly fluid state and thus an interpretative issue which has not attained finality and the classification and taxability of Type-III Tests continues to be in a state of flux, even as of the present day; it follows there from that when there is a scope for doubt concerning the interpretation of legal provisions and the entire facts have been placed before the Revenue Authorities, the assessee cannot be attributed with any suppression or misstatement of facts with intent to evade duty and hence, cannot be saddled with demand by invoking the extended period of limitation and impugned SCN deserves to be quashed.
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12. As stated supra, the impugned show-cause notice, which is cryptic, laconic, non-speaking and unreasoned has been issued without fulfilling, satisfying or complying with the necessary ingredients contemplated under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 and in the absence of the same, the respondents clearly are not entitled to invoke the extended period of limitation as contemplated under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, as a result of which, the impugned show-cause notice is clearly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction or authority of law and the respondents are not entitled to assume jurisdiction by invoking Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, which is the jurisdictional fact and the same being completely absent in the present case, the impugned show-cause notice is vitiated warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.
13. In view of the above discussion, the following:
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WP No. 13639 of 2021
HC-KAR
ORDER
i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
ii) The impugned show-cause notice
No.13/2021- 22 dated 22.04.2021 in
GEXCOM/ ADJN/ ST/ COM/283/2021-ADJN
within DIN 20210 457YT00 0000 2E9D
(Annexure-A) and all further proceedings
pursuant thereto are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE DH List No.: 2 Sl No.: 29