Delhi District Court
Sagar Khaneja vs Neeru Rastogi on 10 December, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
& RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL (CENTRAL)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
RCT No. 109/2025
CNR No. DLCT01-015140-2025
In the matter of:-
SAGAR KHANEJA
S/O LATE SH. RAKESH KUMAR KHANEJA
R/O A-18, CHANDER NAGAR,
GHAZIABAD, U.P.201011
....APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. SMT. NEERU RASTOGI
W/O SHRI ROOP KISHORE RASTOGI
C/O MC#1682, PVT. NO.10-A, FIRST FLOOR,
J.H. BUILDING, JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH
PLACE, CHANDNI CHOWK, DELHI-110006
2. SMT. MEENU KHANEJA
W/O LATE SH. RAKESH KUMAR KHANEJA,
R/O A-18, CHANDER NAGAR,
GHAZIABAD, U.P.201011
3. MS. MAHIMA KHANEJA
D/O LATE SH. RAKESH KUMAR KHANEJA,
R/O A-18, CHANDER NAGAR,
GHAZIABAD, U.P.201011
4. ANIL KUMAR
S/O LATE SH. GOBIND RAM
MUNICIPAL NO.1715, PVT. SHOP NO.2,
GROUND FLOOR, MANGAL BUILDING NO.2,
JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH PLACE,
Digitally signed
by VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
BANSAL
KUMAR Date:
RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 1 of 18 BANSAL 2025.12.10
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+0530
CHANDNI CHOWK, DELHI 110006
5. PRAVEEN KUMAR
S/O LATE SH. GOBIND RAM,
MUNICIPAL NO.1715, PVT. SHOP NO.2,
GROUND FLOOR, MANGAL BUILDING NO.2,
JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH PLACE, CHANDNI
CHOWK, DELHI 110006
6. SMT. ANITA RANI
D/O LATE SH. GOBIND RAM,
MUNICIPAL NO.1715, PVT. SHOP NO.2,
GROUND FLOOR, MANGAL BUILDING NO.2,
JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH PLACE,
CHANDNI CHOWK, DELHI 110006
7. SMT. SUNITA RANI ALIAS SMT. SUNITA KHANNA
D/O LATE SH. GOBIND RAM
THROUGH HER LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
A. SH. DEEPAK KHANNA
B. SH. LAKSHAY KHANNA
C. SH. SAHIL KHANNA
MUNICIPAL NO.1715, PVT. SHOP NO.2,
GROUND FLOOR, MANGAL BUILDING NO.2,
JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH PLACE, CHANDNI
CHOWK, DELHI 110006
8. SMT. REKHA SARAN
D/O LATE SH. GOBIND RAM
MUNICIPAL NO.1715, PVT. SHOP NO.2,
GROUND FLOOR, MANGAL BUILDING NO.2,
JOGDHIAN COLONY, BHAGIRATH PLACE,
CHANDNI CHOWK, DELHI 110006
(Note: respondent no. 2 to 8 are proforma respondents)
....RESPONDENTS
Date of filing of appeal : 04.10.2025
Date of arguments : 31.10.2025
Date of Judgment : 10.12.2025
Digitally signed
by VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
BANSAL
KUMAR Date:
BANSAL
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JUDGMENT:
1. Present appeal has been preferred challenging order dated 03.09.2025 vide which application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC moved by Sagar Khaneja (hereinafter referred to as respondent no. 2/appellant) was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to the present appeal are that Smt. Neeru Rastogi (hereinafter referred to as petitioner/respondent) filed eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement against Smt. Meenu Khaneja and others with respect to one shop measuring 18'-5" x 5'-7" [Carpet area:
103'-0" Sq. Ft. Appx.] bearing pvt. Shop No. 2 on the ground floor of the property bearing Municipal no.1715, Mangal Building No.2, Jogdhian Colony, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk, Delhi- 110006 (hereinafter referred to as "tenanted premises) on the ground of bonafide requirement. The respondents were served. They filed the application for leave to defend. During pendency, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was moved by the respondent no. 2/appellant on the ground that petition is barred under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC as the petitioner / respondent got the right in the property only vide memorandum of family settlement dated 15.11.2018 and from the date of transfer of the property in her name period of 5 years has not passed as required under Section 14 (6) of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as "DRC Act"). Ld. ARC after hearing arguments dismissed the application.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date: BANSAL 2025.12.10 16:59:14 +0530 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 3 of 18
3. Aggrieved by the order, present appeal has been preferred.
Notice of appeal was sent to the respondent. Trial Court record was requisitioned.
4. I have heard Ld. counsel for the appellant, Ld. counsel for the respondent and perused the record.
5. Ld. counsel submitted that as per the eviction petition the property was owned and was let out by M/s Roop Kishore Rastogi (HUF). The HUF was dissolved vide oral family settlement dated 31.03.2018 reduced into writing vide memorandum of family settlement dated 15.11.2018. In accordance with this memorandum of family settlement, the tenanted premises fell in the share of the petitioner. Ld. counsel submitted that originally property was owned by father-in-law of the petitioner/respondent Sh. Harish Chand Rastogi. As the property was in the name of HUF, therefore, Sh. Harish Chand Rastogi was not having any right, title or interest in the property and hence any document executed by Sh. Harish Chand Rastogi to release the property by executing Release Deed dated 01.04.1978 as mentioned in the memorandum of Family Settlement in favour of Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi was without any authority. Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi again constituted an HUF comprising himself, brother and mother. The brother of Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi again released share in the property in favour of Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi and the mother which was again against the law. Ld. counsel submitted that petitioner / respondent herein being wife of Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi is not Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 4 of 18 2025.12.10 16:59:19 +0530 a coparcener and therefore was not having antecedent title in the property in dispute. According to the memorandum of family settlement dated 15.11.2018 she received this property. It amounts to transfer in her name of the property in which she was not having any right and thus hit by Section 14(6) of DRC Act as she got right in the property only on 15.11.2018 and as per law if a person gets property by transfer, he cannot file eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement for a period of five years. Here petition has been filed in 2020 itself i.e. before the expiry of period of five years.
6. Ld. counsel in support of his arguments has relied upon judgment cited as Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur and Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2014 decided on 31.07.2020, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under:-
"(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same."
7. Ld. counsel has also relied upon judgment cited as Amarjeet Kaur v. Jagrup Singh etc.: 2014:PHHC:087939, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, I find it difficult to accept Digitally signed by contention of the appellant that Smt. Kartar Kaur VIRENDER KUMAR VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 16:59:24 +0530 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 5 of 18 entered into a valid family settlement/arrangement with Amarjit Kaur alone. If Smt. Kartar Kaur was to resolve any dispute by way of a family settlement, such an arrangement without her three sons being a party thereto, cannot satisfy the essential requirements of a valid family settlement as laid down in Kale's case (supra). In this view of the matter, I do not find any error in the findings of the learned appellate Court in holding that there could be no occasion for Kartar Kaur to enter into a family settlement with Amarjit Kaur who otherwise had no pre-existing right in the property owned by Smt. Kartar Kaur. As Amarjit Kaur had no pre-existing right in the suit property and there could be no family settlement between Smt. Kartar Kaur and Amarjit Kaur, the family settlement propounded by Amarjit Kaur cannot be held to be valid even if Smt. Kartar Kaur was not happy with her sons."
8. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Rekha Oberoi v. Amit Oberoi, 2024:DHC: 4340, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"61. he estate of a Hindu Woman dying intestate, devolves upon her children and husband. In case a child predeceases her, the share of the predeceased child devolves upon the son or daughter of the predeceased child, to the exclusion of the spouse of the predeceased person.
62. While under the Class I to the Schedule under Hindu Succession Act, on demise of a Hindu Male, the wife and children of a predeceased son are recognised as heirs. However, when it comes to the rules of succession as expounded in Section 15 of the Act, 1956 in regard to a Female, the pre- deceased daughter or son are not treated at par with the surviving son and daughter, instead of the benefit going to the all his/her legal heirs of the pre- deceased daughter or son, it gets limited to the children alone to the exclusion of the spouse of the pre-deceased child. The result being that the children of such pre-deceased child alone take the benefit of the estate of their grandmother, who has died intestate."
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 16:59:29 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 6 of 18 +0530
9. Ld. counsel has also relied upon decision in V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai: AIR 1996 SC 432, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"13. In dealing with the present appeal, we propose to confine our decision to the narrow question which arises before us and that relates to the construction of s. 14(6). What s. 14(6) provides is that the purchaser should acquire the premises by transfer and that necessarily assumes that the title to the property which the purchaser acquires by transfer did not vest in him prior to such transfer. Having regard to the object intended to be achieved by this provision, we are not inclined to hold that a person who acquired property by partition can fall within the scope of its provision even though the property which he acquired by partition did in a sense belong to him before such transfer. Where a property belongs to an undivided Hindu family and on partition it falls to the share of one of the coparceners of the family, there is no doubt a change of the landlord of the said premises, but the said change is not of the same character as the change which is effected by transfer of premises to which s. 14(6) refers. In regard to cases falling under s. 14(6), a person who had no title to the premises and in that sense, was a stranger, becomes a landlord by virtue of the transfer. In regard to a partition, the position in entirely different. When the appellant was inducted into the premises, the premises belonged to the undivided Hindu family consisting of respondent No. 1, his father and his brother. After partition, instead of the undivided Hindu family, respondent No. 1 alone had become landlord of the premises. We are satisfied that it would be unreasonable to hold that allotment of one parcel of property belonging to an undivided Hindu family to an individual coparcener as a result of partition is an acquisition of the said property by transfer by the said coparcener within the meaning of s. 14 (6). In our opinion, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that s. 14 (6) did not create a bar against the institution of the application by respondent No. 1 for evicting the appellant."Digitally signed by VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 7 of 18 2025.12.10 16:59:33 +0530
10. Ld. counsel further relied upon decision in Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v.Gundappa Amabadas Bukate: AIR 1997 SC 998, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"30. We have our own doubts on this question. If a partition of the joint family property takes place by act of parties, it would not, as seen above, be treated as "Transfer" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. But if a suit for partition is filed and the partition is brought about through a decree of the Court, it would amount to a "Transfer" vide Section 2(d), which specifically excludes transfers by operation of law or under a decree or order of a Court. Section 5, which, in a way, defines transfer, is, therefore, over-ridden by Section 2(d) of the Act. This is rather anomalous and the anomaly will have to be cured one day, particularly as "transfer" has been interpreted differently by this Court is the context of different statutory provisions."
11. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Shub Karan Singh v. Sita Saran Budna: 2009 (12) Scale 259, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"4. 'Partition' is a re-distribution or ajusdtment of pre-existing rights, among co-owner /coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them, into different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severalty. A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. 'Separation of share' is a species of 'partition'. When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of share/s refers to a division where only one or only a few among several co-owners/coparceners get separated, and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by inetes and bounds. For example, where four brothers owning a Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 8 of 18 2025.12.10 16:59:38 +0530 property divide it among themselves by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother. In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the prayer is not only for declaration of plaintiff's share in the suit properties, but also division of his share by metes and bounds. This involves three issues: (i) whether the person seeking division has a share or interest in the suit property/properties; (ii) whether he is entitled to the relief of division and separate possession; and (iii) how and in what manner, the property/properties should be divided by metes and bounds?"
12. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram : 1969 (2) Supreme Court Cases 33, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born (See Mitakshara, Ch. 11-27). The incidents of co- parcenership under the Mitakshara law are : first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property any tune work out their rights by asking for partition thirdly that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co- ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a coparcener with his adoptive father Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 16:59:44 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 9 of 18 +0530 as regards the ancestral properties of the latter. In Sundarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri and Anr.
Mr. Justice Bhashyam Ayyangar stated the legal position thus :-
"The Mitakshara doctrine of joint family property is founded upon the existence of an undivided family, as a corporate body (Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant) and Mayne's 'Hindu Law and Usage', 6th edition, paragraph 270] and the possession of property by such corporate body. The first requisite therefore is the family unit; and the possession by it of property is the second requisite. For the present purpose, female members of the family may be left out of consideration and the conception of a Hindu family is a common male ancestor with his lineal descendants in the male line, and so long as that family is in its normal condition viz., the undivided state--its forms a corporate body. Such corporate body, with its heritage, is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by act of parties, save in so far that, by adoption, a stranger may be affiliated as a member of that corporate family"."
13. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Hardeo Rai v. Shakuntala Devi: (2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases 46, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"22. For the purpose of assigning one's interest in the property, it was not-necessary that partition by metes and bounds amongst the coparceners must take place. When an intention is expressed to partition the coparcenary property, the share of each of the coparceners becomes clear and ascertainable. Once the share of a coparcener is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenary property. The parties in such an event would not possess the property as "joint ternants" but as "tenants-in-common". The decision of this Court in SBI¹, therefore, is not applicable to the present case."Digitally signed by VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 16:59:48 +0530 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 10 of 18
14. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh: (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 419, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"11. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submission and we find substance in the submission of Mr. Rao. In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of ancestral property and a coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than the Joint Hindu family and before commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no definite share in the coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not static. We are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener."
15. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Sunil Kumar v. Ram Prakash: 1988) 2 Supreme Court Cases 77, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"18. The coparcenary consists of only those persons who have taken by birth an interest in the property of the holder and who can enforce a partition whenever they like. It is a narrower body than joint family. It commences with a common ancestor and includes a holder of joint property and only those males in his male line who are not removed from him by more than three degrees. The Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.10 16:59:53 +0530 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 11 of 18 reason why coparcenership is so limited is to be found in the tenet of the Hindu religion that only male descendants up to three degrees can offer spiritual ministration to an ancestor. Only males can be coparceners. See: Hindu Law by N. R. Raghavachariar, 8th edn., p. 202."
16. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Controller of Estate v. Alladi Kuppuswamy: (1977) 3 SCR 721, wherein it has been observed as under:-
"In State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram (dead) through Shri Gurbux Rai(2), this Court, while dealing with the incidents of Hindu C coparcenary, observed as follows:
"According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi- corporate capacity. The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law are: first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties is common; secondly, that no alienation of the property any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending. over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a coparcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the latter."
Thus analysing the ratio of a aforesaid case regarding-the incidents of a Hindu coparcenary it would appear that a Hindu coparcenary has six essential characteristics, namely, (1) that the lineal male descendants up to the third generation acquire an independent right of owner-ship by birth and not as representing their ancestors; (2) that the members of the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 16:59:58 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 12 of 18 +0530 coparcenary have the right to work out their rights by demanding partition; (3) that until partition, each member has got ownership extending over the entire property conjointly with the rest and so long as no partition takes place, it is difficult for any coperacener to predicate the share which he might receive; (4) that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the property is common; (5) that there. that there can be no alienation of the property without the concurrence of the other coparceners unless it be for legal necessity; and (6) that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death and merges in the coparcenary property. Applying these tests to the interesi of a Hindu widow who has been introduced into a coparcenary by virtue of the Act of 1937, we find that, excepting condition No. (1), all other conditions are fully satisfied in case of a Hindu widow succeeding to the interest of her husband in a Hindu coparcenary. In other words, after her husband's death the Hindu widow under the Act of 1937 has got the right to demand partition, she cannot predicate the exact share which she might receive until partition is made, her dominion extends to the entire property conjointly with the other members of the coparcenary, her possession and enjoyment is common, the property cannot be alienated without concurrence of all the members of the family, except for legal necessity, and like other coparceners she has a fluctuating interest in the property which may be increased or decreased by deaths or additions in the family. It is manifest that she cannot fulfill the first condition, because she enters the coparcenary long after she is born and after she is married to her husband and acquires his interest on his death. Thus, short of the first condition, she possesses all the necessary indicia of a coparcenary interest. The fact that before the Act of 1956, she had the e characteristic of a widow-estate in her interest in the property does not detract any the less from this position. It must follow as a logical corollary that though a Hindu - widow cannot be a coparcener, she has coparcenary interest and she is also a member of a coparcenary by virtue of the rights conferred on her under the Act of 1937."
17. Ld. counsel has further relied upon decision in Shreya Vidyarthi v. Ashok Vidyarthi: (2015) 16 Supreme Court Cases 46, wherein it has been observed as under:- Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 17:00:03 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 13 of 18 +0530 "22. While there can be no doubt that a Hindu widow is not a coparcener in the HUF of her husband and, therefore, cannot act as karta of the HUF after the death of her husband the two expressions i.e. karta and manager may be understood to be not synonymous and the expression "manager" may be understood as denoting a role distinct from that of the karta. Hypothetically, we may take the case of HUF where the male adult coparcener has died and there is no male coparcener surviving or as in the facts of the present case, where the sole male coparcener (respondent-plaintiff Ashok Vidyarthi) is a minor. In such a situation obviously the HUF does not come to an ens. The mother of the male coparcener can-act as the legal guardian of the minor and also look after his role as the karta in her capacity as his (minor's) legal guardian. Such a situation has been found, and in our opinion rightly, to be consistent with the law by the Calcutta High Court in Sushila Devi Rampuria v.ITO rendered in the context of the provisions of the Income Tax Act and while determining the liability of such an HUF to assessment under the Act.
Coincidently the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court was noticed in CIT v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills."
18. Ld. counsel further submitted that it is settled law that if a joint family property is partitioned it has to be seen as a transfer particularly when a person who was not having antecedent title in the property get right in the property but the Ld. ARC has not considered this fact and has dismissed the application. It is prayed that order of Ld. ARC be set aside and appeal be allowed.
19. Ld. counsel for petitioner / respondent submitted that firstly appellant has no right to challenge the ownership of the petitioner particularly when it is admitted that HUF was the landlord and the petitioner / respondent herein is the family members of Sh. Roop Kishore Rastogi. Ld. counsel further submitted that petitioner / respondent being the family member Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.10 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 14 of 18 17:00:09 +0530 even otherwise had right to file the petition. Even otherwise, the tenant i.e. applicant/ appellant herein has no right to challenge the family settlement. Ld. counsel further submitted that in the judgment cited as Ravinder Kaur Grewal (supra) which has been relied upon by the appellant himself, it has been held that by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:-
"16. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied the dictum in the relied upon decisions. The settled legal position is that when by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. as observed in Kale (supra)."
20. Ld. counsel further submitted that in this judgment itself Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring the judgment of Kale @ Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.: 3 (1976) 3 SCC 119 has observed as under:-
"9...... A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 15 of 18 2025.12.10 17:00:15 +0530 or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits......."
(emphasis supplied) In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: -
In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:
"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family: (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary: (4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10 RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 16 of 18 17:00:19 +0530 not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement.
Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same:
(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible.
which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."
(emphasis supplied)"
21. Ld. counsel submitted that from this decision, it is clear that even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claim or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedents title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Court will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same. Ld. counsel submitted that in view of the same as the petitioner / respondent gets the right in the family settlement and she was already having right in the property being the daughter-in-law, it cannot be said to be transfer of the property being hit by Section 14(6) of DRC Act. It is submitted that Ld. ARC has rightly rejected the application. There is no merit in the appeal and same be dismissed.
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.12.10
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17:00:24
+0530
22. After hearing arguments and going through the record, I found that the only issue is as to whether the right coming to the petitioner / respondent through memorandum of family settlement dated 15.11.2018 amounts to transfer of the property to bring it within the mischief of Section 14(6) of DRC Act. Both the counsels have relied upon judgment titled Ravinder Kaur Grewal (supra). In that judgment, itself it has been held that for family settlement or arrangement even if a person who was not having any antecedent title but gets a share, that has to be treated as family settlement to resolve the dispute and to protect the family from the litigation. In the present case, family settlement has been reached between the parties which was reduced to writing on 15.11.2018 and in view of the family settlement, one of the daughter-in-law i.e. petitioner / respondent herein got the right in the property in dispute. Under the circumstances, it has to be assumed as also held in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal (supra) that she had the antecedent titled in the property. In view of this law, as settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court, it does not amount to transfer and therefore, does not attract the bar under Section 14 (6) of DRC Act. In my opinion, Ld. ARC has rightly dismissed the application. There is no merit in the appeal, same is thereby dismissed.
23. Trial Court record be returned alongwith copy of the judgment.
24. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Digitally signedVIRENDER by VIRENDER Announced in the open Court KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL on 10th day of December, 2025 BANSAL Date: 2025.12.10 17:00:35 +0530 (Virender Kumar Bansal) Principal District & Sessions Judge Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi(ak) RCT-109/2025 Sagar Khaneja v. Neeru Rastogi & Anr. Page 18 of 18