Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 132 (2.12 seconds)
Documents citing Delhi Development Authority vs Sukhbir Singh & Ors on 9 September, 2016

State vs Sukhbir Singh Etc.4 on 16 May, 2026

2026.05.18 16:21:05 +0530 (Manish Jain) ACJM:Shahdara:KKD:Delhi State Vs. Sukhbir Singh etc. FIR No.: 357/2007 PS: Anand Vihar he was posted at IC/PP PS ISBT Anand Vihar as Sub-Inspector. On that day, investigation of the present case was marked to him and he received the case file from the Duty Officer. He issued notice to the Bank Manager, Central Bank of India for documents. Thereafter, investigation of the present case was transferred to Inspector Ghanshyam and he handed over the case file to him as per directions of the SHO.
Delhi District Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Bimlendra Mohan Pratap Mishra And ... vs State Of U.P.Throu.Its ... on 14 February, 2017

The thrust of the arguments on behalf of the petitioners by Sri Sidharth Dhaon is that in view of the paragraphs 10 to 16 and paragraph - 27 of the decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and others (supra) particularly paragraph - 14 thereof, coupled with paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) it is clearly established that in the present case, there was no valid payment in terms of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ignoring the procedure of mode and manner of deposit as provided under Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act. Sri Dhaon urges that receiving of the cheques in this desperate situation after more than 30 years is not an act of volition but receiving something under compulsion as the litigation still continues to persist and the petitioners were pursuing their claim bona fidely as indicated above. It was the respondents who failed to make deposit after the Award was made in 1981 and they did not even choose to tender or offer the amount even at the stage of Reference. The amount was not even admittedly deposited before the Reference Court where the Reference came to be decided finally on 2.4.2010. It was after the petitioners had filed an execution case and had already preferred an appeal against the Reference Order that the cheques were sent to the petitioners. The aforesaid facts remain undisputed. Thus, there was no payment for 30 years after the Award. It is also urged that for the purpose of attracting the provisions of Section 24 (2), the leeway period that has to be construed if understood in it's correct perspective has to be counted backwards from 1.1.2014 which is the date of enforcement of the 2014 Act. The amount was tendered only three years prior to the said date by way of cheques. Thus, it is not in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court and is not a valid tender of money as explained by the judgments of the Apex Court while interpreting Section 31 (2) of the 1894 Act read with the proviso to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. The question in this case is therefore only in relation to the issue of the tendering of payment through cheques in the year 2011 and as to whether such tendering would amount to a valid deposit of compensation that may not attract the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
Allahabad High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - S Harkauli - Full Document

Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal And Ors. Etc. on 6 March, 2020

Thus, it is apparent from the decision of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by the landowners, that time limit is fixed for the executive authorities to take steps. In case they are prevented by the court's order, obviously, as per the interpretation of the provisions is that such period has to be excluded. In case such a provision would have been made, it would have been “ex abundanti cautela”. There was no necessity of making such a provision even if this proposition has been discussed during the formulation of legislation. However, the provision providing exclusion has been enacted. It casts an obligation upon the Authorities to take requisite steps within five years, that by itself excludes such period of interim order.
Supreme Court of India Cites 442 - Cited by 1731 - A Mishra - Full Document

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd vs Tarun Pal Singh on 15 November, 2017

14. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Sukhbir Singh (supra). The facts of the said case reflect that Notification under Section 4 was issued on 24.10.1961; Award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, New Delhi, on 12.12.1997; and possession was taken on 27.1.2000. It was not a case under Section 24(1)(b). It was clearly a case covered by provisions contained in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as Award had been passed 5 years before the commencement of the Act of 2013. In that context, 39 this Court has discussed the matter and observed as follows:
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 47 - Cited by 32 - Full Document

J Venkatesh Reddy vs The State Of Karnataka on 19 April, 2017

On the next point for consideration as to whether Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act is concerned, it is urged that the said Section is a deeming provision and would apply only where the acquisition is initiated under the 1894 LA Act and reliance is placed on Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh's case in this regard. However, it is to be kept in view that the Apex Court in the said case was not examining whether the acquisition had been made under different enactments, like in the instant case. But was dealing with the acquisition made under the 1894 Act.
Karnataka High Court Cites 127 - Cited by 1 - A Byrareddy - Full Document

Ashwani Arora vs Union Of India on 15 December, 2020

49. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion is that the LAC was required to send notice under Section 12(2) of L.A. Act, 1894 alongwith the award, which has admittedly not been sent to the petitioners. Further, nothing has been pointed out by the respondents to show that the LAC had received 80% of the compensation amount on 17.08.2006 i.e. date of acquisition of the properties in question and on 08.01.2008 i.e. date of issuance of notice under section 12(2) of L.A. Act, 1894. Rather, there is letter dated 29.05.2008 Ex. CW8/2, which shows that the LAC had asked Land & Building Department to remit the amount of compensation in respect of acquisition of land of Village Jhilmil Tahirpur and letter dated 06.07.2009 Ex. CW8/1 whereby compensation amount had been deposited with Ld. Predecessor of this Court. Therefore, in terms of ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in DDA vs. Sukhbir Singh (supra), no valid notice under section 12(2) of L.A. Act, 1894 was issued to the petitioners/claimants herein.
Delhi District Court Cites 48 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next