Karnataka High Court
Sri S Hareesh vs The State Of Karnataka on 27 April, 2018
Author: B.V.Nagarathna
Bench: B.V.Nagarathna
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
WRIT PETITION NOs.15967-15969/2017 c/w
21196/2017, 18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016
(LA-BDA) & 21193-21195/2017 (BDA)
W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017
BETWEEN:
1. SRI S. HAREESH
S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
73/52, 2ND FLOOR,
CHANDRA APARTMENT, 4TH CROSS,
BASAWESHWAR LAYOUT,
VIJAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
2. SRI M.S. SHANMUKHA
S/O. M.K. SHIVANNA,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
MUDDALINGANAHALLI VILLAGE,
THYAMGONDALU HOBLI,
NELAMANGALA TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT - 562 132.
3. SRI S. GURUPRASAD
S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
NO.24, 13TH CROSS,
GAYATHRI LAYOUT,
BASAVANAPURA ROAD,
K.R. PURAM,
BANGALORE - 560 036. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI: UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. MAYA
HOLLA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER).
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (LAND ACQUISITION)
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
5. THE ENGINEER MEMBER
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI: VIJAYA KUMAR A. PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1;
SRI G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2 TO R-5)
*****
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE
THAT THE ACQUISITION IN RESPECT OF THE PETITION SCHEDULE
PROPERTY VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DTD.15.07.1982
VIDE ANNEX-C AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DTD.16.08.1985
ISSUED BY R-1 VIDE ANNEX-D IS DEEMED TO HAVE LAPSED
UNDER SECTION 24(2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION
AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION
AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 AND ETC.,
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W.P.No.21196/2017
BETWEEN:
M/S. UNISHIRE HOUSING LLP,
(A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP FIRM)
NO.36, UNISHIRE SQUARE,
RAILWAY PARALLEL ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER
SRI G. NANDAKUMAR). ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI: LOHITASWA BANAKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S. BUILDINGS,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER).
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
(LAND ACQUISITION)
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
5. THE ENGINEER MEMBER,
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
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6. ALL COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT
WELFARE SOCIETY (ACDWS)
NO.826/A, 5TH MAIN ROAD,
VIJAYANAGARA,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.
(R-6 IMPLEADED V.C.O.
DATED 23/01/2018) ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI: VIJAYA KUMAR A. PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1;
SRI G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2 TO R-5; SRI
AJITH ANAND SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R-6)
*****
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT
THE ACQUISITION IN RESPECT OF THE PETITION SCHEDULE
PROPERTY VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 15.07.1982
AT ANNEX-C ISSUED BY R-1 AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED
16.08.1985 AT ANNEX-D ISSUED BY R-2 IS DEEMED TO HAVE
LAPSED UNDER SEC. 24(2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR
COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013; AND ETC.,
W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016
BETWEEN:
1. SRI C. SANDEEP BABU
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,
2. SRI C. CHETAN
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,
3. SRI C. MADHUSUDAN
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
S/O. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA,
4. SRI G. CHENNARAYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
S/O. LATE GUMMAIAH,
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ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO.21,
PANTHARAPALYA, MYSORE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 039. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI: LOHITASWA BANAKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
K.P. WEST EXTENSION,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
3. M/S. LAKSHMI MALLEABLES (P) LIMITED
(A COMPANY INCORPORATED
UNDER COMPANIES ACT, 1956)
HAVING ITS REGESTRED OFFICE AT
#144, NAYANDAHALLI MYSORE ROAD
BANGALORE - 560 039.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING
DIRECTOR MR. RAJATH
RAMACHANDRA MANJAPPA).
(R-3 IMPLEADED V.C.O
DATED 15/06/2016)
4. ALL COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT
WELFARE SOCIETY BY ITS SECRETARY
SRI S.R. HEGDE MAJOR NO.826/A,
5TH MAIN ROAD, VIJAYANAGARA,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
5. B. KUSUMAKAR SHETTY
S/O. MANJAYYA SHETTY
AGE: 61 YEARS,
R/O. NO.1764, 22ND CROSS,
GOVINDARAJ NAGARA,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
6. SMT. M.N. VIJAYALAKSHMI
W/O. M.N. PRASANNA,
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R/O. NO.3390/35, 5TH MAIN ROAD,
3RD CROSS VIJAYANAGARA,
2ND STATE, BANGALORE - 560 040.
7. MISS. NIVEDITHA RESHME
D/O. RAVINDRA RESHME,
AGE: 30 YEARS,
R/O. NO.5/2, POPULATION
CENTRE QUARTERS MALLESHWARAM,
BANGALORE - 560 003.
8. SMT. GEETHA SHETTY
W/O. SANTHOSH SHETTY,
AGE: 54 YEARS, R/O. NO.94,
5TH CROSS BAPUJI LAYOUT,
VIJAYANAGARA,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
9. SMT. VIJAYAMMA
W/O. T. PRABHAKARA,
AGE: 70 YEARS, R/O. NO.1780,
23RD CROSS KHB COLONY,
BANGALORE - 560 023.
10. SMT. DEEPA
W/O. SAMPATH KUMAR
AGE: 43 YEARS,
85, 3RD CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
CHOLURPALYA MAGADI ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 023.
11. SRI K.R. VIJAYAKUMAR
A/O. K. RAJASHEKARAIAH
AGE: 75 YEARS,
R/O NO.831- A, 4TH MAIN,
5TH CROSS, VIJAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
12. SMT. PRATHIMA PRASAD
D/O. SAMPANGIRAMAIAH,
AGE: 45 YEARS, R/O. NO.1123,
18/1A VANI VILAS ROAD, MYSORE.
13. SRI SHARATH KUMAR HEGDE
S/O. SEETHARAMA HEGDE,
AGE: 41 YEARS, R/O NO.6,
KRISHNA RESIDENCY,
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4TH CROSS, AMARJOTHINAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
14. DR. SUNIL SHETTY
S/O. RAJEEV SHETTY
AGE: 39 YEARS,
JANANI DENTAL CLINIC,
R/O. NO.70, 50 FEET ROAD,
CHANDRA LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
15. MISS. SARITHA HEGDE
D/O. S.R. HEGDE,
AGE: 45 YEARS, R/O. NO.312,
SALARPURIA CAMBRIDGE RESIDENCY,
SOMESHWARAPURA,
1ST CROSS, ULSOOR,
BANGALORE - 560 008.
(R-4 TO R-15 ARE IMPLEADED
V.C.O. DATED 05/07/2016) ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI: VIJAYA KUMAR A. PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1;
SRI G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2; SRI
B.VACHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-3; SRI AJITH ANAND SHETTY,
ADVOCATE FOR R-4 TO R-15)
*****
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT
THE ACQUISITION IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER SCHEDULE
PROPERTY VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DTD.15.07.1982
[ANNEX-C] AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DTD.16.08.1985 [ANNEX-D]
IS DEEMED TO HAVE LAPSED UNDER SECTION 24[2] OF THE
RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013
AND ETC.,
W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017
BETWEEN:
1. SRI M.S. SHANMUKHA
S/O. M.K. SHIVANNA,
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AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
MUDDALINGANAHALLI VILLAGE,
THYAMGONDALU HOBLI,
NELAMANGALA TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT - 562 132.
2. SRI S. HAREESH
S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
73/52, 2ND FLOOR,
CHANDRA APARTMENT, 4TH CROSS,
BASAWESHWAR LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
3. SRI S. GURUPRASAD
S/O. LATE N. SHANTHARAM,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
NO.24, 13TH CROSS,
GAYATHRI LAYOUT,
BASAVANAPURA ROAD, K.R.PURAM,
BANGALORE - 560 036. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI: UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. MAYA
HOLLA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
M.S. BUILDINGS,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD
KUMARA PARK WEST
BANGALORE - 560 020.
(REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER).
3. THE ENGINEER MEMBER
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
4. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
HOUSING PROJECT DIVISION-1
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
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T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
5. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
SPECIAL TASK FORCE
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BANGALORE - 560 020.
6. M/S. K. GOWDA AND COMPANY (H.R.K. GOWDA)
NO.3/1, 1ST FLOOR, (REPRESENTED
BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY),
JNANABHARATHI MAIN ROAD,
NAGARABHAVI,
BANGALORE - 560 072. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIJAYA KUMAR .A PATIL, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R-1; SRI
G.S. KANNUR, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R-2 TO R-5; SRI D.L.N.
RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. VIDYULATHA B.V., ADVOCATE
FOR R-6)
*****
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR
THE RECORDS IN THE MATTER OF CONSTRUCTION OF 3 BHK
HOUSING PROJECT SY.NO.103 OF NAGARBHAVI, YESHWANTHPUR,
BANGALRE NORTH TALUK, ON THE FILE OF R-4; AND QUASH AND
SET ASIDE WORK ORDER DATED 10.03.2017 AT ANNEX-P ISSUED
BY THE R-4 IN FAVOUR OF R-6 IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE
PETITION SCHEDULE PROPERTY AND GRANT ALL CONSEQUENTIAL
RELIEFS THERETO; AND ETC.,
THE ORDER IN THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN DICTATED
FROM 02/02/2018 ON VARIOUS DATES AND RESERVED ON
02/03/2018 AND IT BEING LISTED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT TODAY,
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
These writ petitions pertain to land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, totally measuring four acres thirty guntas (hereinafter referred to as "land in question"). Originally, the said land belonged to one Muniveerappa. Muniveerappa sold two acres in favour of G.Chennarayappa under a registered sale deed dated 09/10/1978. He is one of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016. The remaining land measuring two acres thirty guntas was retained by Muniveerappa and on his demise, his sons M.Muniramaiah and M.Gangadhar became the owners of said land.
2. The reason as to why these writ petitions have been clubbed together are on account of the similar grievances ventilated by the petitioners herein in respect of preliminary notification issued by the Bangalore Development Authority ("BDA" for short) under Section 17(1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 ("BDA Act" for short) dated 15/07/1982 and declaration and final notification issued under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act on 16/08/1985. Hence, these writ petitions have been clubbed
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together and they have been heard together and are disposed of by this common order.
3. The main prayer in all these writ petitions pertain to, seeking a declaration that the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "2013 Act" for the sake of convenience). In addition, in W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017, the petitioners have sought a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act. Alternatively, they have sought a declaration that endorsement dated 04/12/2014 withdrawing their "no objection" issued vide endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexures "M" and "B") respectively, by third respondent - Deputy Commissioner (Land Acquisition), BDA as arbitrary, illegal and non est and not binding on the petitioners in any manner and consequently to quash the same. Further a direction is sought to second and fifth respondents in the said writ petitions to act strictly in conformity with endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Further, in W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017, the petitioners who are the very same persons in
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W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017 have sought quashing of work order bearing No.BDA/EE/HPD-1/TEN/WO/T-19/2016-17 dated 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") to the said writ petitions issued by fourth respondent, in favour of sixth respondent in the said writ petitions insofar as it relates to the petition schedule land and they have further sought an order of restraint with regard to altering the nature of the schedule land. At this stage itself, it may be stated that these petitioners have purchased only 37.08 guntas of land in question, which is equivalent to 43,544.82 sq.ft.
4. As already noted, petitioners have sought their respective reliefs on the basis of Section 27 of the BDA Act and/or Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, as the case may be, having regard to the acquisition made by the BDA pursuant to the notifications issued under Sections 17(1) and 19(1) of the BDA Act dated 15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 respectively.
5. The pleadings in respect of each of these cases could be succinctly stated as under:
(i) W.P.Nos.15967-15969 of 2017: (a) Petitioners herein are stated to be purchasers of
43,544.82 sq.ft. of the land in question from Muniramaiah and
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Gangadhar, sons of Muniveerappa, the original owner of the land in question. They have averred that subsequent to the preliminary and final notifications issued by the BDA, an award was passed on 16/05/2002 and the same was approved on 20/05/2002 in respect of the entire extent of land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village. Copies of the preliminary notification and the final notification are at Annexures "C" and "D" respectively. According to the petitioners a cyclostyled mahazar was drawn in respect of the entire extent of the land in Sy.No.103 and possession is said to have been taken on 16/08/2002. That the said mahazar does not bear the names and addresses of the witnesses and further the boundaries of the land in question have not been mentioned therein. It is stated that such a mahazar is not proof of taking possession. It is further averred that the names of the owners have continued in RTC pertaining to the land in question and hence, the mahazar cannot be accepted or believed. It is further stated that in the year 2012, BDA took actual possession of only 20 guntas out of 2.30 acres from the land owners, having regard to the Exchange Deeds executed pursuant to resolution of BDA bearing No.102/2006, dated 04/07/2006. This was a case wherein
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owners of the land in question handed over possession of the said 20 guntas of land to BDA for the purpose of the same being utilized for ring road and BDA gave free of cost alternative land equivalent to 75% of the land so utilized.
(b) It is further averred that in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by owners of the land namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar they sought for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in Sy.No.103 to an extent of 2 acres 30 guntas had lapsed as per Section 27 of the BDA Act, on the ground that the Scheme has not been substantially implemented, but the same came to be dismissed by this Court by order dated 03/08/2006 (Annexure "Q"). At this stage itself, it may be noted that there was no appeal filed against order dated 03/08/2006. It is averred by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that in the said writ petition, BDA had contended that out of the total extent of 1,210 acres of land notified, BDA had utilized an extent of 608 acres 30 guntas of land for formation of Nagarabhavi layout. Therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that the Scheme had been substantially implemented and on that ground the petition filed by
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Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, owners of the land was dismissed. However, in some other writ appeal i.e., W.A.No.1053/2007, BDA had filed a tabular statement indicating total extent of lands utilized under various Schemes initiated by it in respect of lands acquired by the BDA. That as per Annexure "L" to the writ petitions at Sl.No.15, in respect of Nagarbhavi Layout, the total extent of land utilized is 608 acres 30 guntas. It is submitted that this is contrary to what was contended by BDA in W.P.No.19532/2005, which was filed by Muniramaiah and Gangadhar. It is contended that BDA has misled this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 and that fraud was played upon this Court in obtaining a order of dismissal.
According to the petitioners, BDA entered into exchange of 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 with site bearing No.2BM-741 in Sy.No.37/1 of Banaswadi village free of cost. That the said 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 was handed over by the owners namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar to BDA for the purpose of formation of the ring road connecting Magadi Road to Mysore Road. Petitioners have further
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submitted that the total extent of land covered under the seven sale deeds under which they have purchased the land is 75% of 20 guntas of land utilized for the road. It is further averred that as 20 guntas of land was surrendered by the vendors of the petitioners to BDA, 75% of 20 guntas of land was allotted to their vendors in Banaswadi area as per Resolution No.102/2006 of the BDA dated 04/07/2006. This fact is adverted to by the petitioners to contend that possession of land in Sy.No.103 remained with petitioners' vendors and that they voluntarily handed over possession of only 20 guntas of land to the BDA.
(c) Petitioners have next averred that one of their vendors namely, Gangadhar had filed W.P.No.214/2014 before this Court, seeking a declaration that the acquisition in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. nearly one Acre of land in Sy.No.103 had lapsed and the said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 27/01/2014 at Annexure "H". Thereafter, BDA issued an endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to the effect that it had accepted the judgment passed in W.P.No.214/2014 and that in Sy.No.103, 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land (roughly 1 Acre was deleted from acquisition) and a copy of the said endorsement is at
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Annexure "B" to the writ petitions. According to the petitioners, prior to the issuance of the said endorsement, there were discussions held and notings on the file of the BDA to the effect that the land should be deleted from acquisition. The said documents are produced at Annexures "X" and "W" in the second additional statement of objections.
(d) Thereafter, petitioners sold several of their properties and from out of the sale proceeds as well as compensation received by them from their land being acquired by National Highway Authority of India, they purchased 37.08 guntas of land, which is equivalent to 48,837.50 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 (on the premise that the said extent of land had been deleted from acquisition) for a valuable consideration of Rs.8.57 crores. Petitioners have averred that they purchased the said property based on the endorsement issued by the BDA to one of their vendors and that the principles of estoppel and promissory estoppel apply in the instant case as BDA could not have withdrawn the said endorsement on 04/12/2014 as per Annexure "M" of W.P.No.214/2014. It is averred that the endorsement at Annexure "B" dated 11/06/2014 was issued after a lapse of
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nearly six months after disposal of the writ petition and subsequently, after a further lapse of six months i.e., nearly one year from the date of disposal of W.P.No.214/2014, impugned endorsement dated 04/12/2014 at Annexure "M" of W.P.No.214/2014 withdrawing the earlier endorsement at Annexure "B" has been issued, which is highly improper on the part of the BDA. That on the very same day, when the earlier endorsement was withdrawn by the BDA i.e., on 04/12/2014, BDA filed W.A.No.3124/2014 before the Division Bench of this Court challenging order dated 27/01/2014 passed by this Court in W.P.No.214/2014.
(e) According to the petitioners, in the aforesaid writ appeal, BDA suppressed the fact that it had issued endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to Gangadhar, one of the vendors of the petitioners. This, according to the petitioners, is another instance of fraud played on this Court. That the withdrawal of said endorsement as per Annexure "M" dated 04/12/2014 is nearly three months after the lands had been purchased by the petitioners, which was on 10/09/2014. According to the petitioners, the said endorsement is wholly illegal. It is further stated that W.A.No.3124/2014, along with other writ appeals, was
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allowed by judgment of the Division Bench of this Court on 16/07/2015 (Annexure "G"). That the petitioners herein were not parties to the said proceedings. They preferred S.L.P.Nos.19774-776/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, they withdrew the special leave petitions to avail other remedies in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court permitted withdrawal of special leave petitions reserving liberty to the petitioners to move the Supreme Court once again, if so required. Thereafter, petitioners filed review petition in R.P.No.59/2016 before this Court seeking review of the order passed by the Division Bench in W.P.No.3124/2014. On 10/03/2017, Division Bench dismissed the review petition and observed that petitioners not being parties to the writ appeal, judgment passed in the writ appeals did not bind them. A copy of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in review petition are at Annexures "J" and "K" respectively, in the writ petitions.
(f) According to the petitioners, on 10/04/2017, some officers of the BDA went near the property purchased by the petitioners and sought to dispossess them. Under the circumstances, petitioners filed these petitions seeking a
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declaration that the acquisition has lapsed in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 and alternatively, to declare that the endorsement dated 04/12/2014 is illegal and to direct BDA to act in conformity with the earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014.
(g) Respondent - BDA has filed its statement of objections contending that the petitioners are not the owners of the property bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavai village, measuring 37.08 guntas or 43,544.82 sq.ft. That vendors of the petitioners had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of a person named Byadagi and the said person had formed revenue sites and sold them to certain individuals. Copies of the said sale deeds are produced as Annexures "R- 1(a)" to "R-1(m)". That in the year 1980-81 itself there were fifteen other sites which were sold by the GPA holder and copy of the Encumbrance Certificate evidencing sale of the said sites is at Annexure "R-2". The vendors of the petitioners have admitted execution of the GPA and the power of attorney holder alienating the sites, which is evident from Annexure "R-3", which is a copy of the representation made to the BDA. That the purchasers of the sites from the GPA holder, represented to the BDA seeking allotment of the
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very sites in their favour by accepting developmental charges, as per Annexure "R-4". Therefore, an extent of two acres out of Sy.No.103 was not within the ownership and possession of the vendors of the petitioners when they sold it to the petitioners herein. It is further stated that the petitioners are not bona fide purchasers of the property as the petitioners entered into sale agreements through GPA holder of the vendors of the petitioners namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar. That Muniramaiah had filed W.P.No.46953/2013 and the said petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court against which, BDA filed W.A.No.1024/2014, which writ appeal was also allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside on 16/07/2015. It is further stated that the petitioners herein have not made any payment to the owners of the property and that the entire sale consideration of Rs.7.57 Crores has been paid to the confirming parties, who claim to be the GPA holders of the vendors of the petitioners, who entered into an agreement with the vendors of the petitioners on 03/09/2013. That as on the said date, acquisition proceedings had been completed and this Court had already declared so in the year 2006 in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by
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the petitioners therein, and the said writ petition had been dismissed. Therefore, petitioners' vendors had no right, title or interest over the petition schedule property, so as to alienate the same in favour of the petitioners.
(h) That on 03/09/2013, the vendors of the petitioners represented by their power of attorney executed an agreement in favour of one J.T.Satish Chandra and others represented by their GPA holder, which is a nullity in the eye of law as the land in question had not remained with the owners, so as to enter into any such agreement. That Muniveerappa and the other land owner, Chennarayappa, had executed power of attorney in favour of K.K.Byadagi, in respect of Sy.No.103, who had formed eighty sites and sold them to different individuals.
(i) It is averred that the vendors of the petitioners namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, had separately filed writ petitions, which were allowed by this Court. Thereafter, BDA had preferred writ appeals against the said orders, which were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court. Subsequently, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the special leave petitions filed by petitioners' vendors had been
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dismissed and those petitions filed by the petitioners herein were withdrawn. It is contended by BDA that these petitioners cannot seek any relief at the hands of this Court by once again preferring these writ petitions.
(j) It is also averred in the statement of objections filed by the BDA that infact, pursuant to preliminary notification dated 15/07/1982 and final notification dated 16/08/1985 issued in respect of the land in question, Muniveerappa - father of the vendors of the petitioners had infact, filed W.P.No.17707/1986 assailing the acquisition notification which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 08/03/1991. Thereafter, W.P.No.13042/1986 filed by Chennarayappa the other land owner, was also dismissed on 23/08/1987. There were several other writ petitions and suits which were filed by various persons in respect of the land in question which have not been successful and details of the same are given at Paragraph No.19 of the statement of objections filed by the BDA.
(k) It is further averred that since the notified khatedar and others did not file claim petitions before the Land Acquisition Officer, the compensation determined was
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deposited before the Civil Court as per Annexure "R-7" and possession of the land in question was taken after drawing up of a mahazar as per Annexure "R-8".
(l) It is also highlighted in the statement of objections that petitioners' vendors had filed W.P.No.19532/2005, which was dismissed by order dated 03/08/2006, which order has attained finality as no appeal was filed against the said order. It is also stated that according to the vendors of the petitioners, certain portion of Sy.No.103 has been regularized for the purpose of formation of ring road. In the circumstances, BDA contended that petitioners are not entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act as well as Section 27 of the BDA Act.
(m) BDA has further averred that paper publication was issued by it inviting tenders for the construction of three Bedroom-Hall-Kitchen (3 BHK) housing project as per Annexure "R-12". Thereafter, one more tender notification was issued on 11/07/2016 for the very same purpose as per Annexure "R-13". That the BDA has issued work order dated 10/03/2017 in favour of one K.Gowda & Company. That this
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Court has passed an interim order of status quo in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 filed by the very same petitioners by arraying K.Gowda & Company as sixth respondent and the said writ petition is also not maintainable. In the circumstances, BDA has sought for dismissal of these writ petitions.
(ii) W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017:
(a) Petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 have also filed these petitions assailing the work order issued by the BDA dated 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") in favour of sixth respondent and to restrain second to sixth respondents or any person claiming under them or through them from entering the petition schedule land (37.08 guntas/43,544.82 sq.ft) and altering its nature in any manner. It is not necessary to once again narrate the facts leading up to filing of these petitions as the very same petitioners have adverted to the facts narrated above to seek the relief of quashing of work order dated 10/03/2017.
(b) Statement of objections has been filed by the BDA as well as sixth respondent to these petitions. BDA has reiterated its averments and contentions as per its statement
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of objections filed in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017, which is adverted to above. However, it is further contended that petitioners herein have never been in possession of the land in question. That they have also filed W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017 before this court wherein, they have sought an order of restraint against respondent - BDA and the contractor from interfering with the possession of their property. At that stage, in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, this Court issued an order of status quo, which order still continues to be in operation. In the circumstances, BDA has sought for dismissal of these writ petitions.
(c) The sixth respondent in its statement of objections, at the outset, has contended that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the work order issued by the BDA in its favour and that the writ petition is not maintainable under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. That on 05/01/2016, BDA invited tender for construction of 3 BHK apartments in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi and that notification was published in Times of India and other daily news papers as per Annexure "R-1" on 14/07/2016 as per Annexure "R-2". Earlier correspondence was made on 06/05/2016 by the Assistant Executing Engineer, BDA along with the sketch
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produced at Annexures "R-3" and "R-4" with the statement of objections. The sixth respondent participated in the tender process and they being the lowest bidder has been awarded the contract. That sixth respondent has submitted a Bank guarantee of Rs.2,37,85,000/- to respondent - BDA, which is valid up to 07/03/2019 only. On 10/03/2017, work order was issued in favour of sixth respondent for a tender amount of Rs.47,57,00,000/- on accepting the bid made by sixth respondent, which is time-bound project and the work had to commence on 10/03/2017 and to be completed on 09/09/2018. Annexures "R-5" and "R-6" is a copy of the bank guarantee dated 08/03/2017 and letter dated 09/03/2017 has been addressed to the Executive Engineer, Housing Project Division-I of the BDA. Copy of the work order on the tender dated 10/03/2017 is produced at Annexure "R-7".
(d) According to sixth respondent, it commenced the construction activity as per the work order on 03/04/2017 and it continued the work as per photographs at Annexures "R-8(a) to (r)". When the matter stood thus, petitioners herein filed W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 referred to above on 12/04/2017 virtually challenging the acquisition proceedings
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of the years 1982-85 and thereafter, these writ petitions have been filed. That in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017, by interim order dated 30/04/2017, respondents were directed not to dispossess the petitioners if they were not already dispossessed. It is stated that sixth respondent herein was not a party to those writ petitions. Thereafter, some time during the summer vacation, these writ petitions were filed arraying sixth respondent as a party and interim order of status-quo has been operating against sixth respondent in which, it has filed an application seeking vacating of the interim order. BDA has also filed an application seeking vacating of the interim order passed by this Court in both the aforesaid batches of writ petitions. Reiterating the facts which have been stated by the BDA in their statement of objections, sixth respondent has also sought for dismissal of these writ petitions.
(iii) W.P.No.21196 of 2017:
(a) Petitioner herein is stated to be limited liability partnership dealing in housing projects, purchaser of land measuring 33.34 guntas or 36,308.68 sq.ft. out of 2.30 acres in Survey No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village, vide sale deed dated 10/09/2014 registered as document No.3105/2014-15
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in the Office of the senior Sub-Registrar, Sreeramapuram, Bengaluru. It has sought a declaration that Preliminary Notification dated 15/07/1982 (Annexure "C") and Final Notification dated 16/08/1985 (Annexure "D") are deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. A similar declaration is also sought under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Petitioner has sought an order restraining second to fifth respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. The details of the schedule property are appended to the memorandum of writ petition. The extent is 33.342 guntas or 36,308.68 sq.ft. Making similar averments and taking up similar contentions as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 in so far as the acquisition proceedings are concerned, petitioners herein have averred that their vendors are the land owners, who had also filed writ petitions before this court and they have also relied upon the endorsement issued by the BDA to one of the vendors of the petitioner on 11/06/2014, who had filed W.P.No.214/2014, during the course of arguments.
(b) Petitioners have also referred to writ petitions filed by their vendors and the father of their vendors and have narrated about the orders passed in those writ petitions
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as well as the writ appeals before this Court. In fact, petitioners herein had preferred S.L.P.Nos.19774- 19776/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court assailing judgment dated 16/07/2015 passed in W.A.No.1024/2014 and connected writ appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On 20/11/2015, petitioners herein sought permission to withdraw their special leave petitions with liberty to move the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again, if so required. After withdrawal of the special leave petitions, the petitioners have filed this writ petition seeking the aforesaid prayers. In the interregnum, petitioner herein had preferred R.P.No.197/2016 before this court which was dismissed by order dated 10/03/2017 after observing that the petitioner herein was not a party to the writ appeal proceeding and therefore, the judgment passed in the writ appeals was not binding on it. Copy of the said order is at Annexure "Q", while copy of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of the petitioners herein is at Annexure "N". It is averred that the petitioner purchased their extent of land from their vendors on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 issued by the BDA. However, it is relevant to note at this stage itself that the petitioners have neither
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sought any specific relief on the basis of the said endorsement nor on the withdrawal of the said endorsement subsequently by the BDA on 04/12/2014. It is clarified at this stage itself that the endorsement issued by the BDA to one of the vendors of the petitioners herein, namely, Gangadhar is not in respect of the portion of the land sold to the petitioners herein but, it is in respect of the portion of survey number sold to the petitioner in W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017. Therefore, whether they could rely upon endorsement dated 11/06/2014 issued by the BDA would be considered.
(c) The second respondent - BDA has filed statement of objections contending that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed in as much as the petitioner herein cannot claim to be the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village to an extent of 32.32 guntas. That the sale deed on the basis of which the petitioners are claiming right, does not have any validity in the eye of Law. That the father of vendors of the petitioner had in fact sold an extent of land in the year 1980 itself to different individuals.
(d) That the petitioner has not disclosed the earlier litigation filed by its vendors on the basis of Section 27 of
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BDA Act. That the prayer sought for by the petitioner under Section 27 of the BDA Act and Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, cannot be granted for various reasons. That the acquisition process was initiated over three decades ago and has been completed; that BDA has allotted sites to different beneficiaries, who are in possession of their respective extent. That the vendors of the petitioner have not been successful in any of the proceedings with regard to Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village. That even otherwise physical possession of the land in question has been taken over by the State and handed over to the Engineering Division of the BDA, which has in turn allotted various extents to several persons, who are in possession of the same. That the petitioner cannot claim to be in physical possession of 32.342 guntas of land pursuant to determination of the compensation and the award amount has been deposited before the Civil Court. Therefore, petitioners cannot invoke Section 24(2) of 2013 Act so as to seek any declaration in their favour as a subsequent purchaser.
(e) BDA has further averred that in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village, in respect of land over which this
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petitioner has made a claim was the subject matter of earlier transactions when the father of the vendors of the petitioner in fact, had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Byadgi. That the latter formed revenue sites and sold the same to different individuals by registered sale deeds, that 15 sites were sold in the year 1980-81 itself by the said General Power of Attorney Holder; that the vendors of petitioner herein having lost their right, title and interest even prior to the acquisition process being initiated, could not have, subsequent to the completion of the acquisition proceedings, alienated 33.342 guntas in favour of petitioner herein; that BDA having taken possession of land, has allotted it to the third parties and they are in possession of their respective sites.
(f) Further, W.P.No.46953/2013 filed by one of the vendors of the petitioner was allowed and same was challenged by the BDA in W.A.No.1024/2014 and the said appeal was allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside; that the petitioner challenged the said order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and withdrew the special leave petition with liberty to approach the other forums. They have not succeeded even in the review petition filed by
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them. That pursuant to the liberty reserved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the present writ petition is one more attempt by the second petitioner to frustrate the acquisition proceedings. In the circumstances, the BDA has sought for dismissal of the writ petition by adverting to as many as twenty seven cases that have been filed in respect of Sy.No.103 in the statement of objections.
(g) It is further contended by BDA that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act does not apply to the acquisition initiated under provisions of BDA Act and assuming that the said provision is applicable, BDA has contended that conditions of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act do not exist in the present case. Therefore, BDA has sought for dismissal of writ petition.
(h) The sixth respondent, being a society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act 1960, has been impleaded by order dated 23/01/2018.
(iv) W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016:
(a) This writ petition is filed in respect of remaining two acres of land (after excluding a portion of land acquired for formation of Ring Road by second respondent - BDA) situated at Sy.No.103, Nagarabhavi Village. The petitioners herein have averred that fourth petitioner - G.Chennarayappa had
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purchased the said two acres of land in Sy.No.103 from its previous owner -Muniveerappa i.e., father of Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, (vendors of the petitioner in connected W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017) under a registered sale deed dated 09/10/1979 registered in the Office of the Sub- Registrar, Bengaluru North Taluk.
(b) It is averred that pursuant to the purchase of the land in question on 09/10/1979, the revenue records were mutated in the name of fourth petitioner vide M.R.No.13/78- 79 and that fourth petitioner remained in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. That fourth petitioner executed a Gift Deed dated 20/06/2006 in favour of his three sons, namely, first to third petitioners gifting the land in question in favour of his sons. The said gift deed was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North Taluk dated 20/06/2006. Thereafter the revenue entries were mutated in the names of first to third petitioners vide M.R.No.1/2006-07 dated 06/10/2006. That preliminary notification bearing No. dated 15/07/1982 was issued for a vast extent of land measuring about 1210 acres and 35 guntas situated in Nagarabhavi and Malagala Villages under Section 17 of the BDA Act. The State Government
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issued final notification bearing No.HUD 249 MNX 85, dated 16/08/1985 under Section 19 of the BDA Act, for the purpose of a housing Scheme. Thereafter fourth petitioner filed O.S.No.5824/1989 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore seeking the relief of permanent injunction against BDA. There was an order of temporary injunction granted on 31/10/1989 which remained in force till the dismissal of the suit for non prosecution on 09/01/1996.
(c) According to the petitioners subsequent to the Final Notification dated 16/08/1985 no further steps were taken by the first respondent i.e., the State under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LA Act, 1894' for short) and though first respondent claims that an Award in L.A.C.No.51/85-86 has been passed on 16/05/2002, which is after an inordinate delay of seventeen years, petitioners have averred that they are in actual and physical possession of their land as even as on date possession of the land has not been taken by second respondent. That although mahazar has been relied upon by second respondent, which is dated 30/04/2003, there has been no notification issued under Section 16(2) of the LA Act, 1894 (Karnataka Amendment).
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(d) It is further averred that fourth petitioner had filed W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed by learned Single Judge dated 20/03/2009. Being aggrieved by that order, BDA preferred W.A.No.1490/2009 and the same was allowed by the Division Bench by its Judgment dated 16/07/2015. The petitioners herein preferred S.L.P.Nos.31353-31354/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which were dismissed on 27/11/2015. The aforesaid proceedings related to relief under Section 27 of the BDA Act, 1976 but present writ petition is based on a different cause of action which is under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. Petitioners have contended that physical possession of the land has not been taken by the state nor compensation has been paid by the State. Hence, there is deemed lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. It is further stated that second respondent has issued Work Order dated 16/03/2016 for allegedly providing asphalting and construction of RCC structure, drain and culvert on the schedule land. The same is contrary to the pleadings and submission made by the BDA dated 16/07/2015 in W.A.No.1490/2009. On the aforesaid pleadings, petitioners
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have sought for a declaration that the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
(e) Statement of objections has been filed by the BDA seeking dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of suppression of material facts as well as on the ground of delay and laches and on account of non-joinder of necessary parties. It is contended that there have been repeated litigations in respect of Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village and that the present litigation is one such although petitioners have admitted in the earlier rounds of litigation that BDA has taken possession of the land and layout has been formed. According to BDA, further, petitioners have claimed sites under Incentive Scheme on the ground that they have handed over their extent of land voluntarily to the State Government. They have admitted that compensation amount has been deposited in the City Civil Court in respect of their extent of land. In the circumstances, BDA has contended that, any declaration under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, without reference to the earlier litigation in respect of the land in question would only nullify the acquisition of the land in question.
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(f) BDA has further averred that the petitioners have also suppressed the fact that GPA was executed in favour of one Byadagi and the latter had formed revenue sites and sold the same to different individuals. Therefore, petitioners cannot claim to be the owners in possession to an extent of two acres of land involved in this writ petition. It is also averred that the gift deed on which reliance is placed by the first to third petitioners has no validity in the eye of law as the same has come into existence after the land has vested with the BDA after possession of the same has been taken by the State Government.
(g) BDA has further averred that subsequent to the preliminary and final notifications issued for the acquisition of the extent of land, Muniveerappa had filed W.P.No.17707/1986 challenging the acquisition proceedings which was dismissed by this Court on 08/03/1991; that Muniveerappa is the vendor of fourth petitioner. In fact fourth petitioner had also filed W.P.No.13042/1986 which was dismissed on 23/11/1987. One Smt.Prema had filed O.S.No.5549/1989 against the BDA claiming to be purchaser from the fourth petitioner. The said suit was dismissed. BDA has adverted to as many as twentyfour proceedings in
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respect of the land in question and has contended that on account of several legal proceedings process of acquisition have been stalled and that the petitioners have once again filed the present writ petition only for the same purpose.
(h) It is also averred that subsequent to the determination of compensation by passing of an award, the same has been deposited before the Civil Court, after notice under Section 12(2) of LA Act, 1894 was issued to the petitioners. Thereafter, possession of the land in question was taken by drawing up of mahazar and the same was thereafter handed over to the Engineering Section of BDA and the land has stood vested in the BDA free from all encumbrances. It is also submitted that BDA has allotted sites to the allottees and the allottees have filed impleading applications which have been allowed and they have been impleaded as respondents in this writ petition. It is stated that the impleading applicants are in possession of the respective extents of land and they have been allotted their extent by the BDA. That the petitioners are not entitled to any declaration regarding lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as the said provision does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act.
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(i) It is also contended that petitioners herein had filed an application Misc.W.No.619/2009 in W.P.No.13028/2007 seeking allotment of alternative land to an extent 40,000 sq.ft. in their favour. The same would clearly indicate that petitioners have lost possession of the acquired land and sought for alternative land. Hence, BDA sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
(j) The third respondent has filed its statement of objections contending that the writ petition is not maintainable as it is misconceived and it is liable to be dismissed. Contentions have been raised with regard to non applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, to acquisitions initiated under the provisions of BDA Act. The third respondent has also contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts on account of non disclosure of earlier transactions of fourth respondent with regard to petition schedule land. That petitioners have also not disclosed various litigations that have been initiated in respect of the land, which has been acquired; that petitioners have also not disclosed that the fourth petitioner had sold the land to various third parties way back in the year 1980-81. According to the third
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respondent the aforesaid facts have not been disclosed in the present writ petition. It is also contended that the State has taken possession of the land and handed over to the Engineering Department of the BDA after passing of the award, as per mahazar dated 16/08/2002. That in fact, portion of the Ring Road have been formed in the said survey number, which is a clear indication of the fact that petitioners are no longer in possession of their extent of land and their contention that they continued to be in possession is untenable and contrary to the records. Further, subsequent to the passing of the award, compensation amount has been deposited in the Civil Court on 30/05/2007 as per Annexure "R5". Hence, the conditions laid under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act do not apply to the case of the petitioners and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. According to respondent - BDA, the contention regarding applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is barred by principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata on facts, assuming that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is applicable.
(k) It is also contended that these petitioners have also filed several rounds of litigations and despite being
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unsuccessful even before the Supreme Court have ventured to file present writ petition.
(l) That though fourth petitioner had filed W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, the same was set aside by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1522/2009 and connected matters. Thereafter the said judgment in the writ appeal has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.Nos.31353-354/2015.
(m) Just as the third respondent, fourth to fifteenth respondents, who claim to be the allottees from the society filed an application for impleadment and upon the same being allowed by this Court, they have filed statement of objections to the writ petition. Fourth to fifteenth respondents have contended that filing of present writ petition is an abuse of process of law and the same ought to be rejected as the petitioners cannot seek relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. That fourth respondent is a Society registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, and fifth to fifteenth respondents are its members. That fourth respondent - Society owned a portion of Sy.No.48,
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Nagarabhavi, I Stage, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bangalore, measuring 3 acres which was acquired by the BDA to form 18 plots and same has been allotted to third parties. The State Government by Order No.NEE/96/2004 dated 11/08/2004 directed BDA to allot alternative land of an equal extent for the Society. BDA executed a Deed of Conveyance dated 05/05/2006, conveying title over land measuring 2,007 sq.mtrs. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village 1st Stage in favour of the Society. According to them, fifth to fifteenth respondents are allottees from the Society, who are owners in possession of their respective plots therein.
(n) Fourth respondent has stated that in fact W.A.No.4970/2014 was filed by these respondents which succeeded before the Division Bench, in as much as they had also assailed very same order passed by the Single Judge dated 13/12/2013 and the said order was set aside in W.A.No.1024/2014 filed by BDA. That in fact these petitioners had earlier filed W.P.No.13042/1986, but the said writ petition was rejected on 23/11/1987. Reference has also been made to the other two litigations filed by Muniveerappa and his two sons, namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar which have been unsuccessful. These respondents have
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sought for dismissal of the writ petitions as they are bona fide allottees from the BDA and that their allotment cannot be disturbed at the instance of the petitioners who claim to be erstwhile land owners. Hence, fourth to fifteenth respondents have sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.
6. The contentions of the respective parties are elucidated as under:-
(i) W.P.Nos.15967-969 of 2017:
(a) Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla, appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 as well as W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017, has raised a threefold contention: the first contention is with regard to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to the said provision to submit that, in the instant case, despite the award having been made, compensation amount not having been paid and physical possession of the land in question not having been taken by the State, the conditions stipulated under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act would squarely apply and therefore, petitioners are entitled to relief under that provision inasmuch as this Court may declare that the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed
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and if at all the appropriate Government chooses, it could initiate fresh acquisition proceedings. Therefore, according to him, such a declaration may be made having regard to the stipulations contained in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another [(2017) 6 SCC 751], (Manav Dharam Trust). He further placed reliance on another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Raman Grover & others [(2016)14 SCC 101] (Delhi Development Authority) to contend that in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that where possession had not been taken, though the award had been passed, Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, would squarely apply and relief was granted in the said decision. It was contended by him that the aforesaid declaration has been made in a case where acquisition has been made under the provisions of Delhi Development Act, and not under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 and therefore, the said dictum may be applied in the instant case to grant relief to the petitioners. He further submitted that in
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Manav Dharam Trust, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that a subsequent purchaser is also entitled to seek a declaration under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act and therefore, there is no impediment for the petitioners herein who are subsequent purchasers to seek such a declaration.
(b) On facts, in support of the aforesaid submission, learned senior counsel contended that the acquisition notifications are of the years 1982 and 1985 respectively that the award is said to have been made in the year 2002 and the mahazar relied upon by the respondents in support of possession being taken by them would not in any way support the case of the respondents. It was contended that a cyclostyled mahazar has been drawn stating that possession of entire extent of land in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi was taken in the year 2002. That in the said mahazar, a copy of which is produced as Annexure "F" to the writ petition, neither the boundaries of the land are mentioned nor other details are stated in the said mahazar. Therefore, mahazar cannot be relied upon or accepted to prove that possession has been taken from petitioners' vendors. He further submitted that in the record of rights and in the RTCs, the names of the owners of schedule land i.e., petitioners'
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vendors continue to be reflected and therefore, the mahazar cannot be believed at all. Learned senior counsel further drew my attention to the fact that in the year 2012, BDA took possession of 20 guntas of schedule land under an exchange deed. That the said extent of 20 guntas of land was surrendered by petitioners' vendors free of cost pursuant to a resolution of BDA bearing No.102/2006, dated 04/07/2006. That the said extent of land was surrendered to BDA for the purpose of utilizing the same for formation of ring road in the land in question and in view of the same, alternative land equivalent to 75% of the land cost was allotted to petitioners' vendors in part of Sy.No.37/1 near Old Madras Road, in Banaswadi Layout. Learned senior counsel, therefore, submitted that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act may be applied in the instant case and relief be granted to the petitioners under the said provision.
(c) He next contended that under Section 27 of the BDA Act, petitioners are entitled to a declaration that Nagarabhavi Scheme not having been implemented substantially within a period of five years, it must be declared that the Scheme had lapsed and Section 36 of the BDA Act has become inoperative. He contended that in the instant
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case, the acquisition notifications being of the years 1982 and 1985 insofar as the land in question is concerned, there has been no implementation of the Scheme by the respondent/BDA. Therefore, a declaration under Section 27 of the BDA Act be granted.
(d) Learned senior counsel next elaborated his submissions on endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B"), issued by the third respondent/BDA and the withdrawal of the said endorsement by another endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") which is assailed. Drawing my attention to endorsement dated 11/06/2014, learned senior counsel contended that by the said endorsement, the BDA had categorically informed one of the vendors of the petitioners namely, Gangadhar that pursuant to the disposal of W.P.No.214/2014 by learned Single Judge of this Court to the effect that there has been lapse of acquisition with regard to land in question, BDA had given up formation of layout or implementation of the Scheme in respect of the land in question. That BDA also stated in the endorsement dated 11/06/2014 that, having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act, the Scheme had not been implemented to an extent of 43,544.82 sq.ft. and hence, the acquisition with regard to the
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said extent had lapsed. He further submitted that the endorsement categorically stated that in view of the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.214/2014, the acquisition process in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village, had been concluded and that the said extent of land was no longer part of the acquisition process. In view of the aforesaid three categorical statements made by the BDA in its endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to one of the vendors of the petitioners, and the petitioners having been informed about the same and on being satisfied that the aforesaid extent of land was no longer part of the acquisition process, went ahead with the purchase of the said extent of land. But the BDA, by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"), has withdrawn the earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014, which is impermissible in law.
(e) Learned senior counsel contended that the petitioners have assailed the withdrawal of the said endorsement dated 04/12/2014 on the principles of promissory estoppel. In this regard, learned senior counsel submitted that even though endorsement dated 11/06/2014 has not been issued to the petitioners, but only to one of the
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vendors of the petitioners, the same is equally applicable to the petitioners as the said endorsement was relied upon by the vendors of the petitioners so as to enable the petitioners to purchase the aforesaid extent of land. He contended that even though the endorsement has not been issued directly to the petitioners, nevertheless, they have acted on the endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Subsequent to the purchase of the aforesaid extent of land on 10/09/2014, BDA withdrew the earlier endorsement 11/06/2014 by issuance of another endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"), which is assailed in these writ petitions. Learned senior counsel placed reliance on several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to adumberate on the concept of promissory estoppel and as to how the said doctrine squarely applies in the instant case. He submitted that having regard to the applicability of the said doctrine in the instant case, this Court may quash the subsequent endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") and thereby declare that BDA is bound by its earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B"). The decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel shall be adverted to later.
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(ii) W.P.Nos.21193-21195 of 2017:
(a) Insofar as W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 are concerned, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Work Order issued by the BDA to the sixth respondent therein on 10/03/2017 (Annexure "P") is illegal and liable to be quashed insofar as it relates to the extent of land involved in these petitions and second to sixth respondents or any other person claiming through them be restrained from entering petitioners' land or altering the nature of the same. Learned senior counsel submitted that when once this Court grants the reliefs sought for by the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, then consequentially W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 would have to be allowed as the work order dated 10/03/2017 would have to be quashed.
(b) Per contra, learned counsel for respondent/BDA, Sri Kannur, submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs sought for by them. He contended that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act. The said Section applies only when an acquisition is initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. He drew my attention to two decisions of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust and Sukbhir Singh to contend that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically enunciated the conditions/stipulations under which the declaration under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act could be granted. The first and foremost condition is that initiation of acquisition must be under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, but in the instant case, acquisition proceedings are initiated under the provisions of BDA Act and therefore, the primary stipulation under Section 24(2) not having been complied with in the instant case, this Court may not consider the case under the said provision. He also, relied upon a judgment of this Court dated on 14/12/2017, in the case of M/s.Evershine Monuments vs. The State of Karnataka [ILR 2018 Kar. 731], to draw my attention to the fact that this Court has already taken a view in the matter and has held that Section 24(2) does not apply to acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act and by applying the said decision to the instant case, the contention raised by the petitioners under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act may be repelled.
(c) Learned counsel for the BDA next contended that the declaration sought for by the petitioners under Section
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27 of the BDA Act cannot also be granted in the instant case in view of the earlier orders passed by this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the very land in question, wherein similar contentions have been rejected. He contended that similar reliefs were sought for by petitioners' vendors before this Court. That W.P.No.19532/2005 was filed by the vendors of the petitioners, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar and the same was dismissed by order dated 03/08/2006. The said order has attained finality as there has been no challenge made to the same. But thereafter, both Muniramaiah and Gangadhar once again filed writ petitions separately in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 seeking the relief of declaration that the acquisition had lapsed on account of non-implementation of the Scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act. Though the said writ petitions were allowed, the Division Bench of this Court has set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge dated 09/10/2013 and 27/07/2014. That the common judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1024/2014 filed against the order passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.A.No.3124/2014 passed against W.P.No.214/2014 has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the special
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leave petitions filed by the vendors of the petitioners have been dismissed, therefore, petitioners cannot invoke Section 27 of the BDA Act in these writ petitions, is the submission.
(d) Learned counsel for BDA further submitted that endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was issued to petitioners' vendors having regard to the situation as it obtained on the said date. That in fact, the issuance of the said endorsement was not authorized. As subsequently, BDA took a decision to assail the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.214/2014 dated 27/01/2014. That in fact, even on 11/06/2014, when the said endorsement was issued, W.A.No.1024/2014 had already been filed and was pending before the Division Bench. The said writ appeal was filed against Muniramaiah, one of the vendors against order passed in W.P.No.46913/2013, and subsequently, BDA having taken a decision to assail order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014 decided to withdraw endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Learned counsel for the BDA submitted that the withdrawal of the aforesaid endorsement on 04/12/2014 by issuance of another endorsement was just and proper. That the principles of promissory estoppel would not apply in the instant case.
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Learned counsel contended that if endorsement dated 11/06/2014 had been issued erroneously, then BDA was justified in withdrawing such an endorsement. He further submitted that it could also be construed that as the situation as it existed on 11/06/2014, has been mentioned in the endorsement, with regard to the land in question and that petitioners did not acquire any right based on the endorsement. That BDA cannot be estopped from withdrawing endorsement dated 11/06/2014. That the principle of promissory estoppel relied upon by the petitioners' senior counsel does not apply to the instant case. Learned counsel for BDA pointed that this Court may bear in mind the fact that BDA, has succeeded in the writ appeals filed by it as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That the attempt made by the petitioners herein by filing these petitions is only to seek annulment of the dictum of the Division Bench of this Court as well as the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petitions, which is impermissible.
(e) Learned counsel further elaborated that on 04/12/2014, W.A.No.3124/2014 was filed by the BDA
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assailing order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014 against Gangadhar, one of the vendors of the petitioners and therefore, on that date, BDA was justified in withdrawing the earlier endorsement issued on 11/06/2014 to him. Learned counsel for the BDA further pointed out that the vendors of the petitioners have been unsuccessful before this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which was disposed of on 03/08/2006. Thereafter, they entered into agreement of sale with certain third parties on 03/09/2013, a copy of which is produced as Annexure "R-5". It is, subsequent to the said agreement, petitioners' vendors filed two independent writ petitions in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014, once again invoking Section 27 of the BDA Act and although the aforesaid writ petitions were not maintainable, petitioners' vendors succeeded in those writ petitions and on the basis of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in those writ petitions, petitioners conveyed the aforesaid extent of land to the petitioners. That agreement holders, with whom petitioners' vendors had earlier entered into an agreement to sell dated 03/09/2013, were consenting parties. He submitted that the attempt made by petitioners' vendors to file writ petitions in the years
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2013 and 2014 was in order to seek an order at the hands of this Court as they had entered into an agreement and they had intended to alienate the aforesaid land in question, whereas they had no right to do so as the acquisition proceedings had already concluded long ago and they were also unsuccessful in the earlier writ petition filed by them in the year 2005. That the main reason for filing writ petitions once again was to some how legalise the alienation sought to be made by them.
(f) Learned counsel for the BDA also submitted that there was a delay of about 272 days in filing the writ appeals. The delay was condoned. Neither of the vendors of the petitioners brought to the notice of the Division Bench that they had created third party interest in respect of the land in question, although they were caveators in both the writ appeals. The Division Bench was unaware of the fact that petitioners' vendors had alienated the land in question to the petitioners and neither were the petitioners impleaded in the said writ appeals by their vendors. That the vendors of the petitioners alienated the aforesaid extent of land between the date of the order of learned Single Judge of this Court passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 and the
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judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in writ appeals arising from the aforesaid orders.
(g) Further learned counsel for the BDA submitted that petitioners ought to have made enquiries before purchasing the land in question by ascertaining whether it was a subject matter of acquisition process as part of Nagarbhavi Scheme as, by then, it was implemented and as to whether there were any cases filed or pending in respect of the said extent of land. Petitioners not having made the relevant enquiries, cannot now pretend to be innocent purchasers before this Court and seek relief at the hands of this Court on that premise. He contended that the petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs on the basis of doctrine of promissory estoppel as the petitioners are not bona fide purchasers and they are not innocent persons who have acted on the basis of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014. That in fact, the said endorsement has been issued only to one of the vendors of the petitioners viz., Gangadhar and not to the other vendor of the petitioners, his brother namely, Muniramaiah.
(h) Further, contention of learned counsel for BDA is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable in
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the instant case. It is contended that the said doctrine applies only when policy matters of the State are involved and a representation is held out by the State. That petitioners could not have purchased the land in question on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the BDA has rightly withdrawn the said endorsement by issuance of another endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and the said endorsements would now pale into insignificance on account of the Judgments of the Division Bench of this Court in the writ appeals filed by the BDA, which have been sustained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as against petitioners' vendors as well as petitioners. He submitted that these petitioners who are the purchasers of the aforesaid extent of land also filed special leave petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and realizing that they would be unsuccessful before the Hon'ble Apex Court sought withdrawal of their special leave petitions with liberty to seek appropriate remedy before an appropriate forum. That the filing of these writ petitions is not the appropriate remedy at all. He further submitted that, in fact, these petitioners had earlier filed review petitions before the Division Bench of this Court, which had allowed
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the appeals filed by the BDA. That the said review petitions were dismissed, although it was observed that the judgment of the Division Bench was not applicable to the petitioners herein as they were not parties to the writ appeals. Learned counsel for the BDA also submitted that petitioners cannot rely upon the doctrine of legitimate expectation or the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
(i) In fact, even before making the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the BDA prefaced his submissions by contending that the vendors of the petitioners had, as far back as in the year 1980-81 had alienated the land in question in the form of revenue sites through a power of attorney holder, K.K.Byadgi and in fact, there have been a number of proceedings instituted by the purchasers of the said sites both before this Court as well as before the Civil Court. That the intentions of the vendors of the petitioners are not bona fide and neither are the petitioners bona fide purchasers. He submitted that having regard to the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the facts that emerge in the instant case, the writ petitions may be dismissed as the petitioners are not entitled to any relief.
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(j) Learned senior counsel appearing for sixth respondent in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 contended that the petitioners have no right to assail work order dated 10/03/2017, which has been issued by respondent - BDA in favour of sixth respondent. That in fact, petitioners herein in the first instance filed W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 seeking certain reliefs. In those writ petitions, no challenge has been made to the work order dated 10/03/2017 issued by the BDA in favour of sixth respondent. Subsequently, present petitions were filed in May 2017 arraying sixth respondent as party to the writ petition and there is an interim order of status quo regarding dispossession operating against sixth respondent. He submitted that filing of two separate writ petitions by the petitioners is an abuse of the process of this Court. Further, the writ petitions are hit by the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata That the writ petitions are hit by the principles of issue estoppel and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply in the present case.
(k) Elaborating on each of the aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for sixth respondent
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contended that petitioners have no locus standi to invoke either Section 24(2) of 2013 Act or Section 27 of the BDA Act. He submitted that this Court has already opined that, Section 24 of the 2013 Act would not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, as held in case of M/s.Evershine Monuments and therefore, on that ground petitioners' contention regarding Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act may be rejected.
(l) As far as Section 27 of the BDA Act is concerned, learned senior counsel contended that the said contention would no longer be available to the petitioner to urge in view of the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata being applicable to the present case. He contended that petitioners' vendors had earlier filed writ petitions jointly as well as independently. That in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by both the vendors of the petitioners, they were unsuccessful and that the said order has attained finality. The reason as to why the said writ petition had been dismissed was on account of the finding given by the learned Single Judge of this Court to the effect that the Scheme in respect of Nagarabhavi had been implemented substantially and therefore, Section 27 of the BDA Act was not applicable.
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Challenge made to the acquisition notifications was also repelled. When the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 03/08/2006 in W.P.No.19532/2005 had attained finality, vendors of the petitioner could not have once again filed separate writ petitions in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 respectively. Although, learned Single Judge of this Court allowed both the writ petitions, the Division Bench of this Court set aside the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in those writ petitions and held in favour of the BDA and repelled the contentions raised by the petitioners' vendors on the principle of res judicata. That the petitioners herein did not seek impleadment in the said writ appeals by stating that they had purchased the extent of land in question. He further submitted that the petitioners herein as well as their vendors have been unsuccessful before the Hon'ble Supreme Court inasmuch as there has been no interference in the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the writ appeals filed by the BDA as against orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforementioned writ petitions. In fact, petitioners herein withdrew their special leave petitions filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and sought liberty to seek appropriate
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remedy, which is not by filing present writ petitions before this Court. He further contended that review petitions filed by the petitioners herein were also dismissed and there has been no interference with the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court. Learned senior counsel appearing for sixth respondent submitted that by applying principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners herein seeking relief under Section 27 of the BDA Act may be dismissed.
(m) Learned counsel further submitted that even if it is to be assumed for the sake of arguments that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would be applicable to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, petitioners have not been successful in establishing that compensation has not been paid to their vendors or that possession has not been taken from their vendors. He submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act as the said section is not applicable to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act and having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court on the aforesaid aspects, which have been affirmed by the Apex Court, the same cannot be sought to be reopened or reagitated and
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hence, salutary doctrine of res judicata and constructive res judicata may be applied in the instant case and the writ petitions be dismissed.
(n) He further submitted that if W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017 do not succeed and the said writ petitions are dismissed, then the petitioners have no locus standi to question the action or steps taken by the BDA vis-à-vis the land in question insofar as the issuance of the work order to sixth respondent for the purpose of construction of apartments in the land in question.
(o) On the validity of the endorsement dated 04/12/2014, which is assailed by the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is concerned, learned counsel for sixth respondent submitted that doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply only when three essential postulates exist. First, there should be an unequivocal expression of a promise. The second is, action being taken or benefit being denied to the promissee on the basis of the promise made by the promissor. Thirdly, the promisor must have the power/competence to make such a promise. That in the instant case, the officer of the BDA had no authority to issue
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endorsement dated 11/06/2014 as by then, the BDA had already preferred W.A.No.1024/2014 assailing order dated 09/10/2013 passed in W.P.No.46953/2013. There was no reason for the BDA to issue such an endorsement at all having regard to the events that transpired prior to and subsequent to the issuance of the aforesaid endorsement.
(p) Learned senior counsel for sixth respondent further contended that even if for the sake of argument it is to be assumed that endorsement dated 11/06/2014 would be the basis for the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, he submitted that on a reading of the said endorsement, it does not appear that any promise was made at all to petitioners' vendors. That the endorsement only reiterated the position as it obtained on that date. That on the basis of the said endorsement, petitioners' vendors did not alter their position to their detriment. That the petitioners herein could not have placed reliance on the endorsement issued to one of the vendors of the petitioners, so as to alter their position. That if the petitioners herein were investing huge sums of money for the purchase of the aforesaid extent of land, they ought to have been prudent and diligent in ascertaining the status of the land from the point of view of
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acquisition being made by BDA. Merely because petitioners purchased the aforesaid extent of land in September 2014 between issuance of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 and withdrawal of the same on 04/12/2014, no right flowed in favour of the petitioners. That petitioners are not innocent parties who could contend that they have been victimized at the hands of either their vendors or respondent - BDA. Further, petitioners cannot appear to be innocent victims before this Court so as to seek relief on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 being withdrawn on 04/12/2014. Learned senior counsel contended that petitioners' vendors had no authority to alienate any bit of the land notified by the BDA and petitioners cannot claim to be victims to the attempts made by petitioners' vendors seeking to alienate land to them. That petitioners also cannot claim to have derived any benefit from endorsement dated 11/06/2014 in the face of completion of acquisition proceedings initiated by respondent - BDA.
(q) Relying on certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the aspect of doctrine of promissory estoppel not being applicable to the present case, learned senior counsel appering for sixth respondent sought dismissal
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of W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 as against sixth respondent and also that the interim order of status quo to be vacated.
(r) Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla, while replying to the arguments of learned senior counsel for respondents, submitted that respondents are not right in contending that the Scheme had not lapsed insofar as the land in question is concerned. He submitted that learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 dismissed the writ petitions filed by the petitioners' vendors on the basis of the statement filed by the respondent - BDA to the effect that BDA had implemented the Scheme substantially, but that is not the correct position. He drew my attention to Annexure "L", to contend that in W.A.No.1053/2007 BDA had filed a statement to the effect that only an extent of 608.30 acres out of 1210.35 acres had been utilized for the formation of Nagarbhavi layout (Annexure "L" to W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017). He further submitted that having regard to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the review petitions filed by the petitioners, the judgment of the Division Bench in the writ appeals filed by the BDA is not applicable or binding on the petitioners. That the petitioners have every right to seek relief by filing these
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writ petitions as they are subsequent purchasers and their right as subsequent purchasers have been recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust.
(s) Learned senior counsel for petitioners further submitted that petitioners having purchased the aforesaid extent of land, have the protection of Article 300-A of the Constitution and BDA cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate vis-à-vis issuance and withdrawal of the endorsement and that BDA is bound by endorsement issued on 11/06/2014 on the basis of which, petitioners have purchased their extent of land in question. He further reiterated that mahazar relied upon by the respondents to contend that physical possession of the land in question has been taken was not drawn in accordance with law and no reliance could be placed on the said document. That as a result there has been no vesting of the aforesaid extent of land in the State. Therefore, BDA does not have any right, title and interest in respect of the said land. That the only extent of land that has been surrendered by petitioners' vendors is 20 guntas for the formation of ring road in respect of which an exchange deed has been executed. Apart from the said extent, possession of the land in question continues
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with the petitioners herein, who have purchased the same from their vendors, the erstwhile land owners. He contended that principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata do not apply as actions of the respondent - BDA are fraudulent in as much as having misled this Court so as to seek dismissal of W.P.No.19532/2005 thereafter are seeking to legalize their actions. That the principles of doctrine of promissory estoppel would squarely apply in the present case, as the petitioners have spent nearly rupees nine crores for purchasing the aforesaid extent of land and therefore, the writ petitions may be allowed.
(iii) W.P.No.21196 of 2017:
(a) Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset submitted that the petitioner has adopted the arguments of learned senior counsel who has appeared in W.P.Nos.15967-
15969/2017 with regard to the relief claimed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act as well as Section 27 of the BDA Act.
(b) He submitted that the petitioner herein has purchased land measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 in Nagarbhavi Village under sale deed dated 10/09/2014 (Annexure "A"). That the said conveyance has been made by
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both the brothers, namely Muniramaiah and Gangadhar and one of the agreement holders is a confirming party. That the petitioner is engaged in the business of real estate and more particularly, in the construction of apartments and development of properties in and around Bengaluru. Learned counsel for petitioner, relied upon orders passed by this Court in favour of the vendors of the petitioner who are the very same vendors who sold certain extent of land in favour of petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017. He further submitted that petitioner's vendors did not disclose to the petitioner about the pendency of the writ appeals when they conveyed the land to the petitioner on 10/09/2014. Petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner was not a party in the writ appeals preferred by the BDA and being aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in those writ appeals dated 16/07/2015, petitioner preferred S.L.P.Nos.19774-776/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said special leave petitions were withdrawn with liberty to approach any other forum as may be available in law. He further submitted that the petitioners herein preferred R.P.No.197/2016 before this Court and the Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 10/03/2017,
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dismissed the review petition by observing that the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in writ appeal and therefore, the judgment passed in writ appeal was not binding on him. Thereafter, these writ petitions have been filed on a fresh ground.
(c) Learned counsel also submitted that though the issuance of an endorsement is not a subject matter of controversy in this writ petition, the order that may be made in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 may be made applicable to this writ petition also, on the withdrawal of the endorsement issued by the BDA after the same having been issued by the BDA to one of the vendors of the petitioner.
(d) In response, learned counsel for BDA, reiterated his submissions made with regard to W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017 and contended that the petitioner herein is not entitled to any relief just as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 are not entitled. That in the instant case also, Section 24(2) cannot be invoked by the petitioner, as the land in question in this writ petition has also been taken possession of by the respondent/BDA and in fact, 10,137 sq.mtrs. has been allotted to sixth
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respondent/House Building Society by way of bulk allotment on 10/05/2006 and subsequently, a sale deed has been executed by the BDA in favour of sixth respondent/society. Therefore, petitioner herein could not have purchased the land in question in this writ petition on 10/09/2014. In the circumstances, learned counsel for the BDA sought dismissal of this writ petition.
(e) Learned counsel for sixth respondent Sri Ajit Shetty submitted that sixth respondent is a Society registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1960. That the Society owned a portion of Sy.No.48 in Nagarabhavi village which was comprised in 18 plots which was acquired by the BDA and allotted to third parties. Under the circumstances, the State Government decided to allot alternative land to the Society and Government order dated 11/08/2004 was issued to that effect, pursuant to which, on 05/05/2006, the BDA executed Deed of Conveyance in favour of the sixth respondent Society agreeing to allot 10137 sq.mtrs. in favour of the Society. Relying on the order passed by this Court in the writ petition filed by petitioner's vendors and also the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, learned counsel contended that the possession of the land
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in question in this writ petition having been taken by the first respondent - State Government and having handed over the same to BDA, the latter has in turn conveyed possession to the sixth respondent - Society, pursuant to Government Order dated 11/08/2004 by execution conveyance deed on 05/05/2006. In the circumstance, petitioner cannot contend that they are in physical possession of the land in question. In fact, the sixth respondent has carried out certain development works on the said land and completed building a compound wall around the land. Therefore, learned counsel for sixth respondent sought for dismissal of the writ petition.
(iv) W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016:
(a) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in this writ petition also, petitioners have sought for a declaration that there is deemed lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. That the fourth petitioner herein is the father of first to third petitioners herein. That fourth petitioner had purchased land to an extent of 2 acres in Sy.No.103 from Muniveerappa, father of Muniramaiah and Gangadhar. In fact, petitioners herein had preferred W.P.No.13028/07 before this Court. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 20/03/2009. Against the said
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order, BDA preferred W.A.No.1490/2009 and one of the allottees of BDA M/s.Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd., had preferred W.A.No.1522/2009. The said writ appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 16/07/2015. However, it is noted that special leave petition filed by the petitioners herein before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed on 27/11/2015. Nevertheless, learned counsel for petitioners submitted that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act gives a new right to the petitioners and therefore, they are empowered to seek declaration under the said provision by filing this writ petition.
(b) Learned counsel for the petitioner herein contended that he adopts the arguments of learned senior counsel in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 in so far as the reliefs sought for under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is concerned and that the writ petition may be allowed.
(c) Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent - BDA while reiterating the submissions made in other writ petitions, brought to my notice the fact that Site Nos.169, 170, 171, 189, 190, and 198 measuring an extent of two acres of land in question in this writ petition have
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been allotted to third respondent, M/s.Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd. That having regard to the dismissal of the special leave petitions filed by the petitioners herein, they are not entitled to seek any relief under Section 24(2) of the Act, as dismissal of the special leave petitions would clearly indicate that the petitioners are not in possession of the said extent of land (2 acres). That W.P.No.13028/2007 filed by the petitioners earlier was allowed by this Court, but the said order was reversed in W.A.No.1490/2009 by judgment of the Division Bench dated 16/07/2015 which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petition filed by the petitioners herein. In the circumstances, the writ petitions may be dismissed. Further, the orders passed in W.P.Nos.13042/1986, W.P.No.17707/1986 and W.A. No.2361/1990 have a bearing on these writ petitions.
(d) It is contended that in the instant case, physical possession of the land in question has been taken by the State and handed over to BDA. He submitted that preliminary notification was issued on 15/07/1982 and final notification was issued on 16/08/1985 and the award in respect of entire survey number was passed on 20/05/2002. Thereafter, on 16/08/2002, physical possession of the land
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was taken by the State and the same was handed over to the Engineering Section of BDA for the purpose of development on 30/04/2003.
(e) Learned counsel for third respondent Sri Vachan, placed reliance on Annexure "G" to contend that physical possession of the land had been taken and the said question cannot be re-opened once again in this writ petition, having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court in the earlier writ petitions pertaining to Sy.No.103 which includes two acres of land which is the subject matter of this writ petition.
(f) Learned counsel further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court (Dharwad Bench) in the case of Anil and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Another [2017 (3) KCCR 2698 (DB)], while considering a case acquisition initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka High ways Act has categorically held that the provision of 2013 Act, more particularly Section 24 thereof, would not apply to any acquisition initiated under the said Act. Therefore, by way of analogy, the Court may hold in this case also that Section 24(2) of the Act, is not available to the petitioners to seek such reliefs in this writ petition, as has
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been held by this Court in the case of M/s.Evershine Monuments.
(g) Learned counsel for third respondent further submitted that in W.P.No.13028/07 filed by the petitioners herein, initially there was an ex parte order of status quo to be maintained for a period of four weeks. The third respondent herein sought for impleadment in the writ petition and filed application for vacating of the said order. But the interim order of status quo was modified and this Court held that third respondent herein (fourth respondent in this writ petition), who was in possession of plot Nos.169, 170, 171, 189, 190, 191 and 198 and had put up construction on the said sites, the construction and development would be subject to the result of the said writ petition. Thereafter, petitioners in that writ petition, sought for quashing of possession certificates issued by respondent
- BDA in favour of third respondent. Although the said writ petition was allowed thereafter, the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the said writ petition was set aside in W.A.No.1490/2009 on 16/07/2015. He contended that when there is a clear finding of fact that the third respondent is in possession aforesaid sites, at this point of time, the
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petitioners cannot assail the said finding of fact in this writ petition. He therefore, submitted that the petitioners herein had preferred special leave petition against the judgment dated 16/07/2015 passed in W.P.No.1490/2009. But the said special leave petitions have been dismissed. Learned counsel for the third respondent, submitted that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same may be dismissed.
(h) Learned counsel for fourth to fifteenth respondents submitted that fourth respondent is a society registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and fifth to fifteenth respondents are the members and allottees of the society, that the fourth respondent - Society has allotted plots to its members who are fifth to fifteenth respondents. The same have been allotted by the BDA to the fourth respondent - Society by way of bulk allotment. That the bulk allotment was made by BDA in favour of fourth respondent - Society. That a portion of the land in question (measuring two acres) has been utilized by BDA for formation of road for the layout which is being utilized as ingress and egress to their respective sites by fifth to fifteenth respondents. In the circumstance, learned counsel for fourth to fifteenth respondents submitted that
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there is no merit in this writ petition and the same may be dismissed.
(i) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State in all these writ petitions has, at the outset, contended that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act. In this regard, he placed reliance on the recent decision of this Court in the case of M/s.Evershine Monuments. He submitted that in the instant case, acquisition having been initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, the said section cannot be invoked by the petitioners to seek a declaration that there is deemed lapse of acquisition. He further contended that Section 27 of the BDA Act also, cannot be invoked by the petitioners in all these writ petitions. He submitted that such a declaration was sought for by petitioners' vendors in W.P.No.19532/2005 and the said writ petition was dismissed by holding that the Scheme had been substantially implemented and that the said order is binding on the petitioners, who are none other than the purchasers from the land owners themselves. That as in the case of W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016, petitioners herein and their vendors have been repeatedly approaching this Court, which is an instance of abuse of
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the process of law and also this Court. He contended that the purchasers, who are the petitioners in these cases are not bona fide purchasers and therefore, they cannot be granted any relief in these writ petitions.
(j) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate further submitted that by issuance of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, no promise was held out to the petitioners and relying on the endorsement, petitioners could not have purchased the land in question. He further contended that if this Court is to grant any relief to the petitioners, it would be indirectly reviewing the judgment of the Division Bench, which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by dismissing the special leave petitions, which is impermissible. That the petitioners herein have either withdrawn the special leave petitions or their special leave petitions were dismissed, so as to seek other remedies but not to seek a remedy under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act or under Section 27 of the BDA Act. He further submitted that having regard to the award passed on 16/05/2002, physical possession of the land in question was taken on 03/04/2003 by the State and handed over to the Engineering Section of the BDA. That the land stood vested with the State Government in 2002 itself and on
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the same being handed over to the BDA, the latter has taken steps for allotting certain portions of the lands in question to certain allottees. That petitioners cannot submit that there is deemed lapse of acquisition of the land in question when Nagarbhavi Scheme has been implemented. He submitted that there may be no developmental activity in the land in question although certain portions of the same has been allotted to various persons. But it is on account of petitioners' vendors repeatedly approaching either this Court or the Civil Court wherein, interim orders have been made leading to a status quo position with regard to developmental activities on the land in question. He submitted that the State or respondent - BDA cannot be blamed for the same. That the petitioners cannot contend at this point of time that compensation has not been paid nor physical possession of the land has been taken by the respondent - State. Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate contended that there is no merit in the writ petitions and therefore, writ petitions may be dismissed.
(k) That in the writ appeals filed by the BDA, before the Division Bench, the vendors of the petitioners, who have purchased the land in question, did not disclose the fact that they had purchased the land. It is only thereafter, that
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vendors brought to the notice of the Division Bench that they had alienated the land in question from the petitioners herein. That petitioners' vendors have not come forward to assail endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and hence, they are bound by subsequent endorsement. Therefore, petitioners cannot seek to assail the same by filing writ petitions before this Court. That the effect of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 cannot be construed to imply that the acquired land would revert to the land owners so as to enable them to deal with the same as owners. That there is no reversion of the land in favour of the land owners on the basis of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, but it continues to vest with BDA or its allottees. Therefore, the alienation made by petitioners vendors in favour of the petitioners is null and void and inoperative.
(l) Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate further contended that even if for a moment it is held that Nagarbhavi Scheme has lapsed, the acquisition of land cannot lapse. For this proposition, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate relied on Paragraph No.38 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. BDA [(2011) 3 SCC 139) (Offshore Holdings).
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(m) He further contended that the writ petition would have to be dismissed by applying the principles of res judicata in view of the orders/judgments passed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(n) By way of reply, learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 submitted that although BDA has formed ring road which is portion of the land in question (2 acres) nevertheless in so far as the rest of the land is concerned, possession of the same has not been taken by BDA and it continues to remain with the petitioner and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to seek relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
(o) By way of reply, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.21196/2017 submitted that no sites have been formed and the petitioner continues to be in possession of the extent of land measuring 33.34 guntas. Points for consideration:-
7. Having heard learned senior counsel and counsel for the petitioners, learned senior counsel and counsel for respondents and learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for
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the State, the following points would arise for my consideration:-
1) Whether petitioners are entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act? In other words, whether Section 24 applies to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act as held in the case of Chikkathayamma or whether the dictum of this Court in case of M/s.Evershine Monuments would apply?
2) Keeping aside Point No.1 and assuming that the said Section applies to even acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act, whether petitioners are entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?
3) Whether petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed as envisaged under Section 27 of the BDA Act?
4) Whether the withdrawal of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") (impugned in this writ petition) by the BDA is just and proper?
If not, whether the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.15967-15969/2017 are entitled to relief on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B")?
5) Whether the principles/doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply in the instant case and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 would succeed on the basis of the said doctrine?
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6) Whether petitioners in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 are entitled to any relief in those writ petitions?
7) Whether these writ petitions are hit by the principles of res judicata?
8) What order?
The aforesaid points shall be considered in seriatim.
8. Before that the undisputed facts may be taken note of.
(a) The Land in question, totally measures four acres thirty guntas is situated at Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village, Bangalore North Taluk. Originally, the said land belonged to Muniveerappa. He sold two acres of land in favour of G.Chennarayappa who is petitioner No.4 in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 under a registered sale deed dated 09/07/1978. Remaining two acres thirty guntas of land was retained by Muniveerappa and on his demise, it was succeeded to, by his sons, M.Muniramaiah and Gangadhar. Muniramaiah and Gangadhar have sold an extent of 37.08 guntas or 43,544.82 sq.ft. in favour of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017. Further, they have sold 33.34 guntas or
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36,307.68 sq.ft. in favour of the petitioners in W.P.No.21196/2017. The subject matter of W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 is two acres, purchased by G. Channarayappa excluding a portion, in which ring road has been formed.
(b) In respect of entire extent of 4 acres 30 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 preliminary and final notifications dated 15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 were issued along with other lands under Secions 17 and 19 of BDA Act for the purpose of acquiring the same for formation of Nagarbhavi Layout. That both Muniveerappa and Chennarayappa had preferred writ petitions before this Court assailing the acquisition of their respective lands, but they were unsuccessful in those writ petitions. That the alienation made by Muniveerappa's sons Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, in favour of petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 under a registered sale deed dated 10/09/2014 was long after the acquisition notifications had been issued. Similarly, the petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017 has purchased specific extent of land in the said survey number under registered sale deed dated 10/09/2014.
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(c) It is not in dispute that the BDA issued two endorsements dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") and 4/12/2014 (Annexure "M") respectively and the latter has been assailed in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017. It is also not in dispute that the BDA has issued work order dated 10/03/2017 to sixth respondent in W.P.Nos.21193- 21195/2017. Assailing the said work order, the said writ petitions have been filed.
(d) It is also an undisputed fact that in the land in question there have been several litigations before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru and this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which shall be discussed later. Re. Point No.1:
"(1) Whether petitioners are entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act? In other words, whether Section 24 applies to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act as held in the case of Chikkathayamma or whether the dictum of this Court in case of M/s.Evershine Monuments would apply?"
9. Petitioners have sought a declaration that the acquisition of Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village, is deemed to have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act.
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10. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla appearing for petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, contended that although this Court has rendered the judgment in M/s.Evershine Munoments by following the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of Section 24 to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act and it has held that Section 24 is not applicable, nevertheless, the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust could be considered, wherein the provisions of Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 ("DDA Act" for short) was considered. Learned counsel for petitioners in other connected writ petitions, Sri Lohitaswa Banakar, relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of K.M.Chikkathayamma and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in ILR 2016 KAR 1603, (Chikkathayamma), in support of his submissions on Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. On the other hand, learned Additional Government Advocate drew my attention to a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court (Dharwad Bench) to submit that in the case of acquisition of land under the State Highways Act, the Division Bench has held that Section 24 of 2013 Act is not applicable.
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11. In my view, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust in relation to DDA Act cannot be applied to the present case, which is a case of acquisition under the provisions of the BDA Act in view of several dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the said Act and the clear distinction made between LA Act, 1894 and BDA Act, which shall be discussed later. Further, DDA Act was enacted by the Parliament for the Union Territory of Delhi as it then was, whereas, BDA Act has been enacted by Karnataka Legislature for Metropolitan City of Bengaluru. In light of the above discussion, Point No.1 is accordingly considered.
12. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is extracted for immediate reference as under:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
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(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
The title or preamble to Section 24 reads as "Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894" shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. It is explicit, restricted in its scope and not expansive in nature. It is only where the acquisition process has been initiated under LA Act, 1894
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that the acquisition would lapse, on the existence of conditions as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 24. Same is the case with regard to Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24.
13. The said Section has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh and others [(2016) 16 SCC 258] (Sukbhir Singh). In said case the acquisition was under
the provisions of LA Act, 1894 and not under any other Central or State enactment. Further, it has been held as under:
"11. Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause and covers situations where either no award has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, or where an award has been made under Section 11, land acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed.
12. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows:
(a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping sub-section (1) out of harm's way;
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(b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;
(c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act;
(d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;
(e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again."
(underlining by me)
14. Further, in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another [(2017) 6 SCC 751], (Manav Dharam Trust) referring to Sukhbir Singh, it has been observed as under:
"24. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the 1894 Act was under Section 11-A where what would lapse is the ... "entire proceedings for the acquisition of land"
whereas under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in
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passing of an award under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or compensation was not paid within five years prior to 1-1-2014. In other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and taking of possession within the five year period prior to 1-1- 2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in DDA v. Sukbhir Singh: (SCC p.283, para 26) "26. ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression "deemed to have lapsed" because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have been ended."
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an impediment for the transfer. Once the
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acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments cease to exist."
(underlining by me)
15. The aforesaid observations have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question whether subsequent purchasers/assignees/ power of attorney holders etc. have locus standi to file a petition seeking declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under sub- section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which, even according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the only issue arising in that case. But, nevertheless, the aforesaid observations have been made in the context of land acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894.
16. Further, in the case of Aligarh Development Authority vs. Meghsingh (AIR 2016 SC 2912), which is also a case arising under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, at paragraph 6 and 7, it has been held as under;
"6. Section 24 of the 2013 Act envisages mainly two situations; i) where the land acquisition proceedings had already been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force. (ii) where the Award has been passed but neither the owner has been dispossessed nor has he been paid the compensation. Under the first, where the award had not been passed, the acquisition
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proceedings could continue; but the compensation will have to be determined under the Scheme of 2013 Act. Under the second category, there is a statutory lapse of the proceedings. There is also an incidental third situation, where award under the 1894 Act had already been passed prior to coming into force of the 2013 Act, but payment is yet to be made and possession is yet to be taken. In that case, the further proceedings after the award could continue under the old Act of 1894; but if either payment or possession has not taken effect in five years prior to the 2013 Act, then proceedings will lapse.
7. In the case before us, since admittedly the award has not been passed, there arises no question of lapse. The land acquisition proceedings would continue but with the rider that the award will have to be passed and compensation determined under the provisions of 2013 Act."
17. Thus, by following the observations and interpretation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it becomes clear that Section 24 of the 2013 Act, [whether it is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)] applies only when acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, on that short ground alone, it could be held that Section 24 of the 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the BDA Act. In this regard, it would be relevant to cite another
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decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnail Kaur vs. State of Punjab [(2015) 3 SCC 206], wherein sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act was applied to a case arising under the provisions of Punjab Regional Town Planning And Development Act, 1995 and declared that the acquisition had lapsed as the conditions under that provision was satisfied, but without touching upon the controversy as it emanates in the present case and having regard to the subsequent judgments referred to above, the said judgment would not be applicable to the instant cases.
18. But having regard to further submissions made by learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the petitioners that, any acquisition made under the provisions of the BDA Act, is akin to an acquisition made under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, it is necessary to delve further on the question despite the use of the expression "in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" in both sub- section(1) as well as sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. In this regard, it will be useful to compare the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, with the provisions of the BDA Act.
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19. The LA Act, 1894, though a pre-constitution legislation and since repealed, could be traced to Entry-42, List-III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, whereas the BDA Act has been enacted by the State Legislature on the strength of Entry-5, List-II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The said entries are extracted for immediate reference as under:
"Seventh Schedule, List III-Concurrent List, Entry 42 - Acquisition and requisitioning of property."
"Seventh Schedule, List II- State List, Entry-5 - Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self- government or village administration."
Thus, both the Acts have been enacted under two different Entries of two distinct Lists of the Seventh Schedule. Moreover, the object and purpose of the two Acts are distinct.
20. The object and purpose of the LA Act, 1894, is for acquisition of the land for public purposes and for companies. The expression public purpose is defined in Section 3(f) of the said Act. It is an inclusive definition and
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not an exhaustive one. Section 3(f) is substituted by the Karnataka Amendment with effect from 24.08.1961. On the other hand, the object of the BDA Act, which has substituted City Improvement Trust Board Act, is to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority for the development of the city of Bangalore, now Bengaluru, and areas adjacent thereto and matters connected therewith. Whereas, the provisions of LA Act, 1894, is to acquire land for public purposes, determination of compensation and matters connected therewith and is a general enactment, the object and purpose of the BDA Act is for planned development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area and acquisition of land under Sections 17 and 19 of the BDA Act by issuance of Preliminary and Final Notifications is incidental which is for the purpose of development Schemes, as enunciated in Chapter III of the BDA Act, for Bangalore Metropolitan Area. For that purpose, the BDA has authority to acquire land by agreement with the land owners as per Section 35 of the said Act or the State Government could transfer land to the BDA belonging to it or to Corporation or a local authority as per Section 37 or, BDA could directly acquire land from land owners under Chapters III and IV of the said BDA Act.
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21. The object and purpose of the BDA Act has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others [(2010) 7 SCC 129] (Bondu Ramaswamy), which was a case concerning challenge to acquisition made by BDA for the purpose of formation of Arkavathi Layout, at Paragraph No.47, by holding that, the purpose and object of the BDA is to act as a development authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble of the BDA Act describes it as "an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith". The development contemplated by the BDA Act is "carrying out of building, engineering or other operations in or over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment" (vide Section 2(j) of BDA Act). Therefore, the purpose of BDA Act is to make lay outs, construct buildings or carry out other operations in regard to land."
22. By contrast, the Scheme of the LA Act, 1894, which is since repealed by 2013 Act was an expropriatory
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legislation to provide for acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies. Section 4 of the said Act dealt with publication of Preliminary Notification while Section 5-A provided for hearing objections with regard to the proposed acquisitions. Section 6 dealt with the issuance of a declaration and Final Notification that the land was required for a public purpose. The said declaration was conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be. After making such a declaration, the appropriate government could acquire the land in accordance with the Act. In fact, Part II of the LA Act, 1894, dealt with acquisition which contemplated procedure for the passing of an award; notifying persons interested and taking possession of the land. Part II of the said Act, dealt with the provisions dealing with enhancement of compensation by the reference Court by the land owner seeking a reference for a higher compensation. Part IV dealt with apportionment of compensation, while Part V of the said Act concerned with payment. Acquisition of land for companies was dealt with in Part VII of the said Act and a special procedure was prescribed. Part VIII pertained to miscellaneous provisions. Thus, the whole object and Scheme
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of LA Act, 1894, was to acquire land for a public purpose or for the benefit of companies, whereas the object and Scheme of the BDA Act is to have planned development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area and in that regard acquisition of land under the BDA Act read with the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 is only incidental to and not the primary object of BDA Act.
23. More specifically, the controversy as to, whether, Sections 6 and 11-A of the LA Act, 1894, were applicable to provisions of the BDA Act or not were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Munithimmaiah vs. State of Karnataka and others [(2002) 4 SCC 326] (Munithimmaiah); Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. Bangaore Development Authority [(2011) 3 SCC 139) (Offshore Holdings), and Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others [(2010) 7 SCC 129) (Bondu Ramaswarmy), the latter two cases have been referred to above.
a) In Munithimmaiah, while referring to the decisions of this Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd., vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1997 Kar. 1419], in the context of whether Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894, was applicable to
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Section 19 of the BDA Act (both dealing with declaration and final notification), Hon'ble Supreme Court has at Paragraph No.15, categorically observed as under:
"15. So far as the BDA Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate and ensure a planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under, and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and not a law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Enactment of 1894, as amended from time to time. If at all, the BDA Act, so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities are concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the special purposes of the BDA and the same was not also considered to be part of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It could not also be legitimately stated, on a reading of Section 36 of the BDA Act that the Karnataka legislature intended thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or amendments, which might be made by altogether a different legislature, be it the Parliament, to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition
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under the BDA Act vis-à-vis the Central Act has been analysed elaborately by the Division Bench, as noticed supra, in our view, very rightly too, considered to constitute a special and self-contained code of its own and the BDA Act and Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each other, or pari materia legislations. That apart, the BDA Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the BDA Act. When the BDA Act, expressly provides by specifically enacting the circumstances under which and the period of time on the expiry of which alone the proceedings initiated thereunder shall lapse due to any default, the different circumstances and period of limitation envisaged under the Central Act, 1894, as amended by the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of BDA Act without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provisions in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature. A Scheme formulated, sanctioned and set for implementation under the BDA Act, cannot be
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stultified or rendered ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act, particularly of the nature of Sections 6 and 11-A, which cannot also on its own force have any application to actions taken under the BDA Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11- A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to proceedings under the BDA Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant has no merit whatsoever and do not commend for our acceptance."
(underlining by me)
b) The object and purpose of the BDA Act has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy and others vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others [(2010) 7 SCC 129] (Bondu Ramaswamy), which was a case concerning challenge to acquisition made by BDA for the purpose of formation of Arkavathi Layout, at Paragraph No.47, by holding that, the purpose and object of the BDA is to act as a development authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble of the BDA Act describes it as "an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters
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connected therewith". The development contemplated by the BDA Act is "carrying out of building, engineering or other operations in or over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment" (vide Section 2(j) of BDA Act). Therefore, the purpose of BDA Act is to make lay outs, construct buildings or carry out other operations in regard to land."
Further, on comparing the provisions of LA Act, 1894, with BDA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"79. This question arises from the contention raised by one of the appellants that the provisions of section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the LA Act", for short) will apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act and consequently if the final declaration under section 19(1) is not issued within one year from the date of publication of the notification under sections 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act, such final declaration will be invalid. The appellants' submissions are as under: the notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of the Act was issued and gazetted on 3-2- 2003 and the declaration under Section 19(1) was issued and published on 23-2-2004. Section 36 of the Act provides that the acquisition of land under the BDA Act within or outside the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, shall be regulated by the provisions of the LA Act, so far as they are applicable. Section 6 of LA Act requires that no declaration shall be made, in respect of any
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land covered by a notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of such notification under section 4 of LA Act. As the provisions of LA Act have been made applicable to acquisitions under the BDA Act, it is necessary that the declaration under Section 19(1) of BDA Act (which is equivalent to the final declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act) should also be made before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification under Sections 17(1) and (3) of BDA Act (which is equivalent to Section 4(1) of LA Act).
80. The BDA Act contains provisions relating to acquisition of properties, up to the stage of publication of final declaration. The BDA Act does not contain the subsequent provisions relating to completion of the acquisition, that is, issue of notices, enquiry and award, vesting of land, payment of compensation, principles relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36 of the BDA Act does not make the LA Act applicable in its entirety, but states that the acquisition under BDA Act, shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of LA Act. Therefore it follows that where there are already provisions in the BDA Act regulating certain aspects or stages of acquisition or the proceedings relating thereto, the corresponding provisions of LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. Only those provisions of LA Act, relating to the stages of acquisition, for which there is no provision in the BDA Act, are applied to the acquisitions under BDA Act.
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81. The BDA Act contains specific provisions relating to preliminary notification and final declaration. In fact the procedure up to final declaration under the BDA Act is different from the procedure under the LA Act relating to acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for acquisition under Sections 15 to 19 of the BDA Act and the limited application of the LA Act in terms of Section 36 of the BDA Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. If Section 6 of LA Act is not made applicable, the question of amendment to Section 6 of the LA Act providing a time-limit for issue of final declaration, will also not apply."
(underlining by me)
c) While considering the question as to whether Section 11-A of the LA Act, 1894, applies to acquisitions made under the BDA Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings Private Limited, has emphatically held that Section 11-A does not apply to acquisitions made under the BDA Act, by observing as follows:
"33. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, which provide for time-frame for compliance and the consequences of default thereof, are not applicable to acquisition under the BDA Act. They are Sections 6 and 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. As per Section 11-A, if the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6,
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the acquisition proceedings will lapse. Similarly, where declaration under Section 6 of this Act is not issued within three years from the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act [such notification being issued after the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement of Central Act 68 of 1984] or within one year where Section 4 notification was published subsequent to the passing of Central Act 68 of 1984, no such declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued in any of these cases.
34. A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority while dealing with the contention that notification issued in terms of Section 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act appears to be equivalent to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and the declaration under Section 19(1) of the BDA Act appears to be equivalent to the final declaration under Section 6 of the Land acquisition Act, held that all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act will not apply to the acquisition under the BDA Act and only those provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, relating to stages of acquisition, for which there is no corresponding provision in the BDA Act, are applicable to an acquisition under the BDA Act. The provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act would not be attracted to the BDA Act as the Act itself provides for such mechanism.
35. Be that as it may, it is clear that the BDA Act is a self-contained code which provides for all the
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situations that may arise in planned development of an area including acquisition of land for that purpose. The Scheme of the Act does not admit any necessity for reading the provisions of Sections 6 and 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, as part and parcel of the BDA Act for attainment of its object. The primary object of the State Act is to carry out planned development and acquisition is a mere incident of such planned development. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, where the land is to be acquired for a specific public purpose and acquisition is the sum and substance of that Act, all matters in relation to the acquisition of land will be regulated by the provisions of that Act. The State Act has provided its own Scheme and provisions for acquisition of land.
36. The co-relation between the two enactments is a very limited one. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be attracted only in so far as they are applicable to the State law. Where there are specific provisions under the State Act the provisions of Central Act will not be attracted. Furthermore, reading the provisions of default and consequences thereof, as stated under the Central Act into the State Act, is bound to frustrate the very Scheme formulated under the State Act. Only because some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are attracted, it does not necessarily contemplate that all the provisions of the Central Act would per se be applicable to the provisions of the State Act irrespective of the Scheme and object contained therein. The Authority under the BDA Act is vested with complete powers to prepare and execute the
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development plans of which acquisition may or may not be a part. The provisions of the State Act can be implemented completely and effectively on their own and reading the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the State Act, which may result in frustrating its object, is not called for. We would be dealing with various facets which would support this view shortly.
37. The provisions of Section 27 of the BDA Act mandate the Authority to execute the Scheme, substantially, within five years from the date of publication of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19. If the Authority fails to do so, then the Scheme shall lapse and provisions of Section 36 of the BDA Act will become inoperative. The provisions of Section 27 have a direct nexus with the provisions of Section 36 which provide that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, so far as they are applicable to the State Act, shall govern the cases of acquisition otherwise than by agreement. Acquisition stands on a completely distinct footing from the Scheme formulated which is the subject-matter of execution under the provisions of the BDA Act.
38. On a conjunctive reading of the provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of the State Act, it is clear that where a Scheme lapses, the acquisition may not. This, of course, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where, upon completion of the acquisition proceedings, the land has vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition would not lapse or terminate as a result of lapsing of the Scheme
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under Section 27 of the BDA Act. An argument to the contrary cannot be accepted for the reason that on vesting, the land stands transferred and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances and such status of the property is incapable of being altered by fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act. Both these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which property, once and absolutely, vested in the State can be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State. However, this may not be true in cases where acquisition proceedings are still pending and land has not been vested in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act.
39. What is meant by the language of Section 27 of the BDA Act, i.e. "provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative", is that if the acquisition proceedings are pending and where the Scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act, i.e. with reference to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act shall become inoperative. Once the land which, upon its acquisition, has vested in the State and thereafter vested in the Authority in terms of Section 36(3); such vesting is incapable of being disturbed except in the case where the Government issues a notification for re-vesting the land in itself, or a Corporation, or a local Authority in cases where the land is not required by the Authority under the provisions of Section 37(3) of the BDA Act.
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40. This being the Scheme of the acquisition within the framework of the State Act, read with the relevant provisions of the Central Act, it will not be permissible to bring the concept of "lapsing of acquisition" as stated in the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter IV of the BDA Act.
44. One of the apparent and unavoidable consequences of reading the provisions of Section 11- A of the Central Act into the State Act would be that it is bound to adversely affect the "development Scheme" under the State Act and may even frustrate the same. It is a self-defeating argument that the Government can always issue fresh declaration and the acquisition in all cases should lapse in terms of Section 11-A of the Central Act."
(underlining by me)
d) Further, in the case of Girnar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra and others [(2011) 3 SCC 1], (Girnar Traders), the Hon'ble Supreme Court on comparing the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, (MRTP Act) which is an Act similar to BDA Act with the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, has observed as under:
"130. While referring to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the State Legislature has not adopted, specifically or otherwise, the period mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the contrary, different time-frames have been postulated under different provisions of the MRTP Act.
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If those limitations of time are not adhered to by the authorities concerned, the consequences have also been provided therefor. From the stage of initiation of steps for preparation of draft plans to the finalization of the Scheme, it takes considerable time. Furthermore, its implementation at the ground level, takes still much more time. If this entire planned development which is a massive project is permitted to lapse on the application of Section 11-A of the Central Act, it will have the effect of rendering every project of planned development frustrated. It can hardly be an argument that the Government can always issue fresh declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and take further proceedings. Recommencement of acquisition proceedings at different levels of the hierarchy of the State and Planning Authority itself takes considerable time and, thus, it will be difficult to achieve the target of planned development.
131. This clearly demonstrates that all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act introduced by later amendments would not, per se, become applicable and be deemed to be part and parcel of the MRTP Act. The intent of the legislature to make the State Act a self-contained Code with definite reference to required provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is clear."
xxx xxx xxx
134. However, if the provisions of section 11-A of the Central Act were permitted to punctuate a Scheme of the State Act and the award is not made
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within two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Central Act, the acquisition proceedings will lapse which will frustrate the rights of the State as well as the Scheme contemplated under Section 126 as well as Section 127 of the State Act and that would not be permissible in law. This being legislation by incorporation, the general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand excluded.
xxx xxx xxx
137. The Court cannot lose sight of one very important fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating to planned development and acquisition is an incidental aspect thereof. Planned development is quite different from merely "achieving a public purpose" for which the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Development plan, Regional Plan and town planning Scheme are major events in the development of a State. They are controlled and guided by different financial, architectural and public interest for the development including macro and micro planning of the entire State.
138. The provisions relating to planned development of the State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different time-frames are required for initiation, finalization and complete execution of such development plans. The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
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with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire Scheme and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section 11-A of the Central Act, every development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end to the entire development process.
xxx xxx xxx
140. Thus, in our view, reading of Section 11- A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act will render the substantive provisions of the State Act ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the object of the Act materially."
(underlining by me)
d) Recently, in Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore and another vs. Anasuya Bai (D) by LRs. and others (AIR 2017 SC 904) (Anasuya Bai), the question under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, as to, whether relief under Section 24 of the 2013 Act could be granted to landowners when acquisition was made under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, (KIAD Act). After referring to the judgment of this Court which was appealed against before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in light of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, Hon'ble
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Supreme Court noted the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the following words:
"24. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment, however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the New LA Act in the following manner:
"13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIADB Act. But there is no provisions under the KIADB Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under LA Act, whether the new act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years u/S 11. If the award is passed under LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11-A contemplates if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2011) 3 SCC 408: (AIR 2011 SC 1113) has held that Section 11-A of the Act is no
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application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the New Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and non- passing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from non-payment of compensation to the land owners.
14. The New Act does not say whether the Act is applicable to the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act 1894. What Section 24 says that if the award is not passed u/S.11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid within 5 years or more prior to new act, if the physical possession of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. In the instant case, it is not case of the respondent that award is not required to be passed under the provisions of LA Act. When the award is required to be passed under LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of New Act cannot be made applicable on account of non payment of compensation within a period of five years.
25. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, matter is
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not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 24 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the Old LA Act is not rightly understood."
24. Next, it is necessary to discuss Smt. K.M. Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603], which is a recent judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court and which is the sheet-anchor of learned counsel for the petitioners herein.
a) The points for determination in the aforesaid case are culled out for immediate reference as under:
"a) Whether the petitions in WP 38868-70 and WP Nos.38871-74/2015 are maintainable in view of the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KUDA Act having been quashed and the same being the subject matter of an appeal before a Division bench of this Court.
b) Whether the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or the LA Act, 2013, should be applied to acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KUDA Act and the BDA Act, if the proceedings are not completed as on the date of coming into force of the LA Act, 2013.
c) What order should follow in each of these petitions."
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Learned Single Judge has culled out the ingredients of the said sub-section which is extracted later.
b) It is necessary to delineate on this case in detail as heavy reliance has been placed on the said decision by learned counsel for the petitioners. The primary contention canvassed in the aforesaid case was, as to, whether 2013 Act would be applicable to acquisitions initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (KUDA Act) and BDA Act. If the answer to the same was in the affirmative, then the acquisition proceeding in the aforesaid case which concerned BDA Act also was deemed to have lapsed.
c) In that case, the contention of learned senior counsel and learned Counsel for the petitioners was, where a statute is cited by a reference (the cited statute) (LA Act, 1894) into an another statute (the referring statute) (BDA Act/KUDA Act) any repeal or amendment of the cited statute is automatically carried over or reflected in the referring statute. This was in contrast, to a case of legislation by incorporation wherein the repeal or amendment of the incorporated statute does not automatically affect the incorporating statute. It was further contended in the said
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case that in Offshore Holdings Private Limited, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, Section 36 of the BDA Act (a provision in pari materia with Section 36 of KUDA Act) to be a case of legislation by incorporation. But, the repeal of LA Act, 1894 and substitution of 2013 Act created an exception and when the exception applied, the effect would be one of legislation by reference. It was contended that, if LA Act, 1894, was to be applied to acquisitions made under the KUDA Act post 01/01/2014, the quantum of compensation to the land owners in relation to acquisitions under the KUDA Act would be lesser than the compensation vis-à-vis acquisition made under 2013 Act, even though the purpose of the acquisition is same (urban or town planning and allotment of house sites). Similarly, the additional benefits in relation to rehabilitation and resettlement of affected families would also not be available to the land owners even though the purpose of the acquisition remains the same. It was emphasized in that case that the provisions of 2013 Act are more beneficial to the land owners and affected families in land acquisition proceedings. The discriminatory effect as regards compensation and other benefits would occur because there is a complete change in the legislative approach in relation to
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land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement under 2013 Act which is more beneficial to the land owners. It was further contended in the said case that the land owners would thus be entitled to different rates of compensation and other resettlement and rehabilitation benefits, depending upon which Act the acquisition is made, whether under the BDA Act or KUDA Act or the central land acquisition enactments resulting in a discriminatory effect being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
d) Per contra, the State through learned Advocate General submitted in the said case that the intention of Section 24 in 2013 Act is different and distinct in that the said section has specific reference to acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894. That the object and purpose of Section 24 is not only to save acquisition initiated under LA Act, 1894, but also to declare lapse of acquisition under sub- section (2) of Section 24 and to also give the benefit of the 2013 Act under certain circumstances. It was further contended that Section 27 of KUDA Act as well as BDA Act provide for lapse of Scheme of development and consequent inoperation of Section 36 of the Act. That BDA Act being a complete code by itself, lapse of acquisition has to be
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considered under that Act only. It was further contended that Section 24 is more in the nature of a transitory provision and an exception and operates as a link between LA Act, 1894 and 2013 Act.
e) While considering point No.2 extracted above, learned Single Judge in the said case held with regard to interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as under:-
"Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013 provides for lapse of acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, on the satisfaction of certain conditions, which are as follows:
a. The award of compensation should have been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the LA Act, 2013. In that, it should have been passed prior to 01.01.2009;
AND b. Physical possession of the land has not been taken;
OR
c. Compensation has not been paid.
The Apex Court has interpreted the requirement of possession being taken under Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, to mean that actual physical possession has to be taken and mere symbolic possession would not suffice."
(emphasis by me)
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Although learned Single Judge has noticed that sub- section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies to acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, nevertheless has also held that the "answer to the second point for consideration is that it is the LA Act, 2013 that shall be applied to acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act and KUDA Act, that have remained without being completed in all respects as on 1/1/2014, and proceedings that have been initiated thereafter".
f) Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Section 24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as KUDA Act. Learned Single Judge however noted that sub-section (2) of Section 24 is a substantive provision of law which saves acquisition as well as affords the prospect of land sought to be acquired reverting to the land owner under certain conditions.
The said decision was rendered on 10/03/2016. It is stated at the Bar that the said decision has been appealed against by the BDA and a Division Bench of this Court has stayed the order passed in the said case.
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25. The order in the case of Chikkathayamma's case has been considered in M/s.Evershine Monuments and it has been held as under:
"37. In my humble opinion, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case as well as similar judgments in other cases, in the context of KUDA, 1987 and BDA Act have been rendered without making an analysis of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, with regard to its applicability to acquisitions initiated under those Acts as opposed to acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894. Further, judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard have not been considered and followed and without bearing in mind the distinction in the object and Scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, as well as the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard. Learned Single Judge by his order has granted relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. While a reference has been made to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy, Munithimmaiah, and Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd., the said reference is not in depth, as a detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgments, which have been rendered on a detailed comparison of LA Act, 1894 with BDA Act, would have thrown light on the object and scope of Section 24 of 2013 Act.
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38. Reliance placed on the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions referred to above in detail would clearly indicate that the object and Scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, being distinct and meant for different purposes, it cannot be construed that acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, is an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case does not take into consideration the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh and the subsequent decision in the case of Manav Dharam Trust, which are directly on the issue of applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act to only acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894.
39. With respect, the judgment in the case of Chikkathayamma and other judgments which are similar in nature cannot be considered to be binding precedent as they are contrary to the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above as well as the provision of Section 24 of the 2013 Act and hence cannot be applied to the present cases which deal with acquisition under BDA Act. There are also additional reasons for holding so.
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40. Revisiting the words of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, what is significant to note is the fact that the said Section expressly refers to land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894. The said Section does not incorporate the words "or proceedings initiated under any other enactment".
Therefore, the expression "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894"
are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. In this regard, the rules of interpretation of a statute would become relevant and reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some
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absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in light of their own views as to policy" unless it is shown to adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case.
41. In this context, Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India reported in AIR 2002 SC 1351 could be relied upon wherein, Cross on "Statutory Interpretation" (Third Edition, 1995) has been relied upon as follows:-
"Thus, an 'ordinary meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used."
42. The aforesaid principles being squarely applicable to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the same must be interpreted having regard to the
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intention of the Parliament. In this regard, one cannot lose sight of the fact that 2013 Act repeals only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central or State enactment dealing with acquisition. Therefore, what are sought to be saved under Section 24 of the 2013 Act, are those acquisitions initiated only under LA Act, 1894 and not any acquisition initiated under any other Central or State enactment. Therefore, the words "acquisition proceedings initiated under any other enactment"
cannot be added or supplemented by the Court after the expression "in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" under both sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Further, the short title of Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as "Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases." This is another indication that Section 24 applies only to those acquisition "initiated" under the provisions of LA Act, 1894.
43. Further, Section 24 creates a new right in favour of land owners in as much as they are entitled to relief under certain circumstances as stipulated in Section 24 of the Act. One such relief is under sub- section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned therein exist. One overbearing condition is that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply.
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44. The reasons as to why Parliament has incorporated Section 24 in the 2013 Act are evident and not far to see. The said section creates a new right in favour of land owners whose lands have been acquired under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, which has been repealed and substituted by 2013 Act. The 2013 Act is not a substitution for other Central enactments pertaining to acquisition of land or for that matter any other State enactment. Therefore, Section 24 uses the expression that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. But while creating a new right in favour of land owners under Section 24, Parliament at the same time has intended two further aspects: first, saving acquisition under LA Act, 1894 and second, not encroaching upon other Central or State enactments. As far as State enactments dealing with acquisitions are concerned, Parliament intentionally has not touched upon any State enactment. The reason being that several State enactments have been made drawing sustenance from Entry 5, List II or State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, whereas LA Act, 1894 as well as 2013 Act could be traced to Entry 42 List III (Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Moreover, as has been explained above, the object and scope of the BDA Act made under Entry 5 List II (State List) are distinct from LA Act, 1894 substituted by 2013 Act.
45. Further, the State enactments have their own provisions concerning lapse of acquisition such as Section 27 of BDA Act or KUDA Act and Section 24 of 2013 Act cannot trammel upon those provisions of the State Acts such as BDA Act or KUDA Act. The State
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enactments may have referred to certain provisions of LA Act, 1894, particularly with regard to determination of compensation and such other matters.
Reference to LA Act, 1894 in the State enactments for certain purposes does not imply that the acquisition is initiated under LA Act, 1894. What is of prime importance for Section 24 of 2013 Act to apply is that acquisition proceedings must have been initiated under LA Act, 1894 and not any other law. Losing sight of this aspect would create confusion in the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act. If the said provision is to apply to acquisitions initiated under a State enactment, such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, then Section 27 of the said Acts which also deal with lapse of acquisition under certain circumstances will be rendered nugatory, otiose or redundant on prevailing of circumstances mentioned in Section 24 of the 2013 Act. In this regard, it is also observed that when State Acts such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, have specific provisions in the form of Section 27 concerning lapse of acquisition, Section 24 of the Parliamentary enactment i.e., 2013 Act, cannot be applied, when acquisitions are under State enactments. This is because, the State or Central Laws concerning acquisition are enacted under different entries and in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and therefore, they operate in different fields. This is so, although, the State enactments may refer to the provisions of LA Act, 1894 for certain purposes.
xxx
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47. Thus, 2013 Act has not only repealed the LA Act, 1894, but has substituted the said Act. The 2013 Act is a totally distinct enactment and a complete code by itself. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, initiation of acquisition under State enactments such as BDA Act is not the same as initiation of acquisition under LA Act, 1894.
48. Further, it is noted that 2013 Act has, by virtue of Section 114 thereof, repealed LA Act, 1894. Section 114 reads as under:
"114. Repeal and Saving: (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."
Therefore, what is saved under Section 114 of 2013 Act are only those acts and actions initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, which ought to be saved having regard to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under:
"6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
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made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a saving clause as per sub- section 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under LA Act, 1894. Sub-section (1), lays down the
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conditions when the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, would be amenable to the provisions of 2013 Act or, continued under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, on certain conditions or circumstances prevailing. Under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the Parliament has, by a deeming provision, intended that if certain conditions are satisfied, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed.
XXX
50. Therefore, for a declaration of lapse of acquisition, the pre-conditions or conditions precedent mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act must apply. Most importantly the said conditions must prevail in an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, and not with regard to acquisition initiated under any other enactment be it Central or State enactment. Therefore, before land owners could seek relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which is a right created in their favour, the basic postulate that must be borne in mind is to ascertain, in the first instance, as to under which law, acquisition has been initiated; whether under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or any other law. If it is under any other law, then in my view Section 24 would not be applicable to such acquisitions. The dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited clearly enunciate that an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act being distinct from an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act,
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1894, it cannot be held that acquisition process initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, would also encompass acquisition proceedings initiated under any other law such as, the BDA Act. As already noted, the two enactments being distinct having a different object and scope and acquisition of lands being only incidental to the main object and scope under the BDA Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the two Acts cannot be considered on par, so as to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act is "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894."
51. As already observed, Section 24 of the 2013 Act creates a new right in the land owners. For the exercise of said right, certain conditions have to exist, the most significant of them being, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of land owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the BDA Act or KUDA Act. In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
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"105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.
(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days
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which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament."
The enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 105 consists of the following thirteen Parliamentary enactments, namely:
"THE FOURTH SCHEDULE [See section 105] LIST OF ENACTMENTS REGULATING LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958).
2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962).
3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (14 of 1948).
4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886).
5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 (18 of 1885).
6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (33 of 1978).
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7. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956).
8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962).
9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 1952).
10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (60 of 1948).
11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (20 of 1957).
12. The Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003).
13. The Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)."
52. Therefore, Parliament itself has listed the Central enactments to which 2013 Act does not apply. This is because Parliament was conscious of the fact that LA Act, 1894 was substituted by the 2013 Act, which is distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments.
53. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming
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provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise.
54. In the result, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as the acquisitions in these cases were initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act and not under the LA Act, 1894. It is further held, with respect, that Chikkathayamma's and other similar decisions, having regard to the dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited, are not applicable as binding precedent in the present case. Further, most of the decisions referred to above have granted relief on the basis of factual determination as per sub-section 2 of Section 24 and without considering the question of law which arises in these cases. Further, in some cases, the petitioners have themselves not pressed sub- section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Even then, relief has been granted on a determination made on facts and by holding that there has been abandonment of acquisition/lapse of acquisition.
55. Hence, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed, as the petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as the said section does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act."
26. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Raman Grover and
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Others [(2016) 14 SCC 101] does not apply, as the same turns on its own facts and in that case, possession had not been taken by Delhi Development Authority though the award had been passed as far back as in 1996. Hence, Section 24(2) of 2013 Act was applied and it was held that acquisition proceedings was deemed to have lapsed in respect of 1,100 sq.yrds. of land involved in that case. Further, as pointed out by learned Addl. Government Advocate, a Division Bench of this Court (Dharwad Bench) in the case of Anil and others vs. State of Karnataka and others [W.A.Nos.100221-225/2017 and connected matters, disposed off on 19/04/2017] has held that the provisions of Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act would not be applicable to Karnataka Highways Act, 1964, which is a State enactment, which squarely applies to this case.
27. In view of the aforesaid dictum, which is squarely applicable to the present case, the petitioners herein are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act as the said Section does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, but in applies only to acquisitions initiated under the provisions of LA Act 1894.
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28. But these matters do not end here. Learned senior counsel and other counsel for the respective petitioners have also made submissions on the premise that Section 24 of 2013 Act applies and therefore, writ petitions would now be considered separately and independently of the answer given to Point No.1. Therefore, assuming that Section 24 applies to acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act also, whether petitioners are entitled to relief under that provision, is considered on the basis of the emerging facts in each of the writ petitions as Point No.2.
Re. Point No.2:
"(2) Keeping aside Point No.1 and assuming that the said Section applies to even acquisitions initiated under the BDA Act, whether petitioners are entitled to any relief under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?"
29. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act begins with a non-obstante clause and it states that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section has not been made five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and physical possession of the land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, then the proceedings shall
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be deemed to have lapsed. The relief sought for by the petitioners herein is on the premise that the compensation has not been paid and further, physical possession of the land in question has not been taken and therefore, the acquisition proceedings is deemed to have lapsed.
30. Admittedly, the award was passed in respect of the land in question on 16/05/2002. Annexure "E" is a copy of the award produced by the petitioners in W.P.No.15967- 15969/2017. It was approved on 20/05/2002. The award reads as under:
________________________ "AWARD UNDER SECTION - 11 OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT.
________________________ GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER BANGALORE DISTRICT
1. Land Acquisition Case No.51/85-86
2. Name of the Project - Nagarabhavi Layout I Stage
3. Preliminary Notification No.A6/PR/S.L.A.O./S/201/ 82-83 Dated : 15.7.82 published in pages 55 to 65 part-III (3) Karnataka Gazette Dtd: 12.8.1982
4. Authority for the acquisition Declaration No.HUD 249
- MNX-85/Dt.16.8.1985 Dtd: published at pages 467 to 474
5. Name of the Taluk - North Village Nagarabhavi
6. The Structures, extent and other description of the land with particulars of trees, buildings and standing crops thereon.
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_____________________________________________ Name of the Remai- Amount Area required Khatedar/ Sy.No. Class Total Kharab ning ___________ Anubhavdar. extent Land Extent Extent Amount A-G A-G A-G Rs. Ps. A-G Rs. Ps.
Muniveerappa 103 Dry 4-30 0-30 4-00 4.64 4-30 4.64 Bin Pusalaiah G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah
7. Name of the interested persons and the nature of their respective interests.
Muniveerappa bin Pussalaiah, G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah.
8. Schedule of notices served statements filed by interested persons and documents etc., referred to. Notices under section 9 and 10 of the L.A. Act have been issued and served on the notified khatedars as per the provisions of the L.A. Act on 13.12.1985.
9. Amount of the compensation claimed and the apportionment applied for :-
No one has claimed compensation. All are requesting for De-notification and Re-conveyance of the land.
10. A W A R D :-
The land in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi village measuring 4A-30G including 00-30 gts., Un-reserved kharab land was notified for acquisition under Preliminary Notification No.A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 Dtd.15.7.1982 for layout called Nagarabhavi. I stage and the same is published in the Karnataka Gazette Dtd.12.8.82, in pages 55 to 65, part-III under section 17(1) and (3) of the BDA Act, 1976.
Final notification was approved by the Government vide No.HUD-249-MNX-85 Dtd.16.8.1985
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and published in the Karnataka Gazette Dtd.7.11.1985 under section 19(1) of the BDA act.
The true area of the land is 4A-30 Gts., which includes 0-30 Gts., of Un-reserved kharab land. The land is bounded as follows :-
East : Gangondanahalli Gadi North - Sy.No.48 West : Sy.No.48 South-Sy.No.59 and 102.
CLAIMS : The notified khatedars are Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah. Notices under section 9, 10, 11 & 14 of L.A. Act have been served as per the provisions of the L.A. Act. But, no one has given any claim statement, except one petition dtd.25-9-86 by Sri.G.Chennarayappa, the notified khatedar requesting for de-notification of the land to an extent of 2A-00 gts., for his share. In the remaining extent, one Sri.Byadgi, the GPA holder of Sri.Muniveerappa has formed Revenue sites and sold to different individuals prior to the Preliminary Notification dated 12-8-82.
Further, the khatedars have filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka in W.P.13042/86, 17707/86 and W.A.2361/90 challenging the notification. But the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka have dismissed these petitions on 8.3.1991 and 18.7.91 respectively.
VALUATION :
In determining the valuation to be fixed, the most important factor to be considered is the market value of the land as on the date of Preliminary notification under section 17(1) & (3) of the BDA Act 1976. The Preliminary notification was published on 26.8.82. One of the method as per the provisions of the L.A. Act is adopted in fixing the compensation is on the basis of price within a reasonable time from the date of
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notification in a bonafide transaction in the same village or in the adjoining villages. Considering lands having similar advantages of land under acquisition for this purpose I have verified all the transactions that have taken place in the two villages during the year 1982 - 1985. As seen from the sale statistics that is made available by the Sub-Registrar Office, Bangalore North Taluk, there are more transactions in respect of small fragments, Naturally, these fragments would have been sold for a fancy price, the land under acquisition measures 4-30 Gts., Therefore, the land under acquisition cannot be compared with fragments in respect of which the transactions are available.
Village Period Extent Value paid
------------------------------------------------------------
Nagarabhavi 29.01.82 02-10 46,000.00
" 28.05.82 40' x 40' 17,462.30
" 29.05.82 30' x 50' 10,912-30
" 31.05.82 60' x 40' 10,827.90
" 04.06.82 80x45x40
________
2 22,322.90
" 08.06.82 66+84 70+60 44,343.50
_____x _____
2 2
" 11.10.82 4 acres 33,000.00
" 27.12.82 60' x 40' 17,280.00
Malagala 10.11.83 2 acres 46,000-00
------------------------------------------------------------
However as seen from these transactions there are few transitions in respect of bigger extent also, these transactions having taken place in the year 1982 itself. The Preliminary Notification in respect of this land under acquisition was published in the year 1982 under section 17 of the BDA Act. Therefore the transaction
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which are available for bigger extents could be definitely considered in arriving at the market value of the land under acquisition. As seen from the sale statistics, the maximum amount that was paid in any single transaction is Rs.23,000/- per acre. However as verified from the Court decrees for the lands acquired in the near by areas of the land under acquisition, the learned Civil Judge Bangalore has fixed the compensation amount at the rate of Rs.65,000/- per acre for the lands in Gangondanahally village and Rs.73,000/- per acre for the lands in Devatigereramanahally village, Kempapura Agrahara Village in pursuance of the reference made under section 18 of the L.A. Act for the lands in Chandra Layout. This compensation amount was confirmed by the Hon'ble Court of Karnataka in MFA.284/83. This compensation amount was awarded by the learned Civil Judge, on the judgement of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka for certain lands acquired in which market value of the lands was fixed at Rs.50,000/- per acre during 1971.
Here the points to be considered are whether the land under acquisition could be directly compared with the land which have been acquired for Chandra Layout. The distance factor shall also be considered which govern the potential of the lands.
The lands which have been acquired for Chandra Layout are definitely having more advantages as the village D.R.Hally, K.P.Agrahara, are just touching the Bangalore Mysore Highway and the road which connects Vijayanagar extension with Bangalore Mysore Highway extension with Bangalore Mysore highway respectively. Whereas the land under acquisition along with the other lands in Nagarabhavi and Malagala village are located in
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such a way wherein the communication/transportation was not fully developed at the time of Notification. The land under acquisition along with other lands of Malagala and Nagarabhavi are located at a distance of 3 to 4 kms. away from the Chandra Layout.
Considering these factors - I am satisfied that an amount of Rs35,000/- per acre for dry and Rs.10,000/- per acre for kharab land is just and reasonable and that would reflect the true market value of the land under acquisition as on the date of Preliminary Notification.
INSPECTION :
My Predecessor has inspected the land along with the Revenue Inspector and Revenue Surveyor on 21-1- 92 and verified the mahazar and sketch drawn by the Executive Staff, that the land is vacant except four existing sheds, and I have also inspected the land 29.4.2002 and verified the mahazar dated 19.1.92, the mahazar drawn earlier found to be correct. I do not allow the compensation for these structures as the constructions have un-authorisedly come up after the publication of the Preliminary Notification in the Official Gazette dated 12.8.82.
Sri. G.Chennarayappa and Sri. Muniveerappa :
Rs. Ps.
1. Value of 4-00 acres of dry land at 1,40,000-00
Rs.35,000/- per acre.
2. Value of 30 gts., of un-reserved 7,500-00
kharab land for Rs.10,000/-
3. S.A. at 30% 44,250-00
4. Addl. value at 12% on item 2,03,623-00
No.1 & 2 from the date of P.N. to
the date of Award i.e., 12.8.82 to
10.5.2002 total 7203 days, Less stay
period by the High Court of Karnataka
and Civil Court in W.P.No.17707/86,
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13046/86 and O.S.No.5824/89 and
5825/89 i.e., 1.10.86 to 25.2.95
total 3004 days (7203 days (-)
3004 days) = 4199 days)
__________
TOTAL : 3,95,373-00
========
(Rupees Three Lakhs Ninety Five Thousand Three Hundred And Seventy Three Only) TITLE AND APPORTIONMENT :-
The land to be acquired is 4A-30 gts., which includes 0-30 gts, of/unreserved kharab land. The notified khatedars are Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah and G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah as per the Gazette Notification. Notices under section 9, 10, 11 and 14 of L.A. Act have been issued and served as per the provision of the L.A. Act.
In response to statutory notices and also paper publication in the daily news paper like Deccan Herald and Prajavani Dtd., 1.8.87 and 3.8.87. Some of the Revenue site holder have filed the petitions to this office and requested for regularisation/Re-con-veyance as they have purchased (Revenue) Sites formed by Sri. Muniveerappa, and some of them have obtained Interim/Injunction Orders from the City Civil Court, B'lore in O.S.5825/89, O.S.5549/89 and O.S.5824/89 restraining the BDA as from demolishing the structures, and these suits also been dismissed. The writ petitions i.e., 13046/86, 17707/86, W.A.2361/90 have been dismissed by the High Court of Karnataka.
As per the extracts of Index of lands and Records of Rights the khata stands in the name of Sri. Muniveerappa S/o. Pusalaiah, and G.Chennarayappa S/o. Late Gummaiah. As verified from the pahani the name of Sri. Muniveerappa and G.Chennarayappa
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appear in the column No.9. As extent of 2A-00 of land stands in favour of Sri. Chennarayappa s/o. Late Gummaiah, 0-30 gts., of land is unreserved kharab and the remaining 2A-00 was held by Muniveerappa S/o.Pusalaiah. The khatedar have not produced necessary documents regarding their holdings.
In the circumstances I hereby order that the award amount of Rs.3,95,373-00 be paid to the notified khatedars/Anubhavadars, subject to the production of title deeds and other necessary document as noted hereunder according to their respective shares.
1. Up-to-date Encumbrance Certificate
2. Up-to-date of R.T.C.
3. Index of land and Records of Rights.
4. A certificate from the Tahsildar B'lore North Taluk under section 48(A) of K.L.R. Act.
5. Original Sale Deed.
6. Exemption certificate from the Special D.C. for U.L.C.R.
7. No due certificate from the Tahsildar.
8. Indemnity Bond and Affidavit.
Muniveerappa bin Pusalaiah, G.Chennarayappa S/o.Late Gummaiah I further order that the land shall vests with the BDA free from all encumbrances and the BDA is exempted form the payment of conversion fine. The land revenue will abate from the date of taking possession of the land.
Typed to my dictation and the typed script corrected by me.
Bangalore.
Dated : 16.5.2002. (H.R.JAGADEESH) Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore Development Authority Bangalore.
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No.BDA/DC(LA)/AWARD/85/2002-03 dated 20/05/2002 ORDER Award for Rs.03,95,373-00 (RUPEES THREE LAKH NINTY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THREE ONLY) in respect of the land measuring 04 acres 30 gts. in Survey No.103 OF NAGARABHAVI VILLAGE, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk is APPROVED.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, Bangalore is to verify and make sure that there are no stay orders from any Court and parallel acquisition before taking possession of the land. Further the Special Land Acquisition Officer should take all necessary steps to see that compensation be paid to real owner of the land.
Deputy Commissioner (LA) BDA., Bangalore.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer."
(underlining by me) A reading of the same would indicate that the notified khatedars were shown as Muniveerappa and G.Chennarayappa in respect of 2 acres 30 guntas and 2 acres respectively (totally 4 acres 30 guntas). It is noted in the award that notices under Sections 9, 10, 11 and 14 of LA Act, 1894 had been served on the notified khatedars, but no claim statement had been submitted, except G.Chennarayappa had requested for denotification of land in respect of his 2 acres. In the remaining extent, Byadgi, the GPA holder of
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Muniveerappa had formed revenue sites and sold to different individuals prior to preliminary notification dated 12/08/1982. That the khatedars had filed W.P.Nos.13042/1986, 17707/86 and W.A.No.2361/1990 challenging the notification, but this Court on 08/03/1991 and 18/07/1991 had dismissed those petitions. The award further notes that some of the revenue site holders had filed petitions to the BDA seeking regularization/ reconveyance of revenue sites purchased by them and that some of them had obtained interim injunction/orders issued by the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, in several suits and the suits had also been dismissed. In the circumstances, compensation was determined at Rs.3,95,373/- to be paid to the khatedars/anubhavadars namely, Muniveerappa and G.Chennarayappa, subject to the production of title deeds etc. After approval of the award, an order was made by the Deputy Commissioner (LA), BDA, Bangalore, dated 20/5/2002 to take possession of the land and to take steps for payment of compensation to the real owner of the land. As Muniveerappa and Chennarayappa did not appear before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, steps were taken to deposit the amount before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru. Thereafter, as per mahazar (Annexure "F"),
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possession of 4 acres 30 guntas of land was taken on 30/04/2003 by the Revenue Inspector and subsequently, possession was handed over to the Engineering Section of BDA.
31. Learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla has controverted the said mahazar at Annexure "F" to contend that it is a mahazar, which was not drawn in accordance with law, the names and addresses of the persons in whose presence the mahazar was drawn were not noted next to their signatures and therefore, physical possession of the land has not been taken in accordance with law and neither has compensation had been paid to the notified khatedars. Thus, petitioners are entitled to relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act.
32. Before considering the aforesaid aspects, it is necessary to refer to the orders passed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(a) The father of the vendors of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and connected writ petitions, W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 namely, Muniveerappa, had filed W.P.No.17707/1986 before this Court. In the said writ petition, Preliminary Notification and Final Notification dated
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15/07/1982 and 16/08/1985 respectively were assailed. The said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 7-08/03/1991, which is reported as Muniveerappa vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1991 KAR 3362]. The Division Bench by following the dictum in Venkataramaiah vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1987 KAR 2995] dismissed the writ petition as in the aforesaid case, this Court had upheld the acquisition notifications by negativing the very contentions raised. Following the said decision, Muniveerappa's petition was also dismissed. The Division Bench while dismissing the writ petition opined that unless review of a decision is sought for, as it is always open to the person affected by a decision to seek review of that decision or it is set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would not be just and proper to go into that aspect of the matter once again. That the findings recorded on a question of fact cannot be gone into in a subsequent proceeding pertaining to the same matter even at the instance of a different party unless that party seeks review of that finding by way of another writ petition making the parties to the earlier writ petition in which such a finding is recorded, as parties to the subsequent writ petition. Otherwise such a
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course would lead to incongruous results. It will result in shaking the confidence of the public in the judicial proceedings. This order of the Division Bench was not assailed by any of the parties therein before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it has attained finality.
(b) After fifteen years, petitioners' vendors namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar together preferred W.P.No.19532/2005 before this Court seeking a declaration under Section 27 of BDA Act to the effect that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed in respect of land bearing Sy.No.103 to an extent of 2 acres 30 guntas. In that writ petition it was recorded in paragraph Nos.5 and 6 as under:
"5. It is brought to the notice of this Court by the Advocate appearing on behalf of the BDA that totally 1210 acres land is acquired for formation of "Nagarabhavi Layout" and the BDA has already utilized more than 1200 acres of land for formation of layout. The said fact is also clear from the Order passed by this Court in W.P.No.27671/2000 (vide paragraphs-17 and 18). Thus it is clear from the aforesaid fact that the Scheme is substantially implemented by the BDA and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Scheme is lapsed cannot be accepted.
6. The statement of objections filed by the BDA, on facts, further makes it clear that the petitioner and
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his father were the instrumental in delaying the proceedings relating to taking possession of the property. The land bearing Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi village totally measures 4 acres 30 guntas including 0.30 guntas Kharab land and the said land is owned by two persons namey, Muniveerappa S/o Pulasaiah (father of petitioner) and G.Channararasappa S/o Gummaiah. The Channarasappa prayed for de- notification of his portion of land i.e. 2 acres of land by filing his statement of objection in the acquisition proceedings. After considering his statement of objections, final notification was issued. Said Channarasappa filed writ petition No.13042/1985 questioning the acquisition notification and obtained interim order, which came to be dismissed on 23/11/1987. The father of petitioner, namely, Muniveerappa also filed W.P.17707/1986 challenging the acquisition notification relating to 4 acres 30 guntas and obtained interim order, which ultimately came to be dismissed on 08/03/1991. Thereafter, father of petitioner filed civil suit in O.S.No.5825/1989 which came to be dismissed on 25/02/1995. Likewise, several persons who have purchased the sites from the petitioner also filed writ petitions and original suits in W.P.Nos.21563/1989, 22906-910/1999, O.S.Nos.5753/1989, 5549/1989, 5824/1089, 5825/1989, 3226/1996, 1570/1997. All these cases are dismissed on various dates. After dismissal of the aforesaid matters, the possession of the land is taken by the BDA. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above, the dictum laid down by this Court in
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D.Narayanappa's case cited supra is not applicable to the case on hand."
(underlining by me) His Lordship Mohan Shantanagoudar J., then as a Hon'ble Judge of this Court, found that the Nagarbhavi Scheme was substantially implemented by the BDA and as the process relating to taking possession of some portion of land was obstructed because of interim orders granted by various Courts including this Court, BDA could be blamed for the same. In the circumstances, the writ petition was dismissed. Admittedly there was no appeal filed against the aforesaid order dated 03/08/2006, which has attained finality.
(c) Despite the aforesaid order, seven years later, W.P.No.46953/2013 was filed by only Muniramaiah, one of the vendors of the petitioners before this Court. As already noted, in the interregnum after order dated 03/08/2006 and the filing of the aforesaid writ petition, the vendors of the petitioners had entered into an agreement to sell dated 03/09/2013 with certain persons, who were agreement holders and confirming parties to the sale deed executed by the vendors of the petitioners in favour of the petitioners herein on 10/09/2014.
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(d) In the aforesaid writ petition, filed by Muniramaiah, the prayer sought was that the acquisition had lapsed on account of non implementation of Nagarbhavi Scheme and therefore, the Scheme had become inoperative in so far as the land measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft., in Sy.No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village. By order dated 13/12/2013, writ petition was allowed and it was declared by the learned Single Judge that the Scheme insofar as the aforesaid extent of petitioner's land was concerned had lapsed having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act.
(e) Thereafter, the other vendor namely, Gangadhar filed W.P.No.214/2014 before this Court seeking a similar relief. By order dated 27/01/2014, this Court, by applying the reasoning given in W.P.No.46953/2013, allowed the said writ petition also holding that the said Scheme had lapsed insofar as 43,544.82 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 was concerned.
(f) At this stage itself, it may be reiterated that subsequent to the said writ petition being allowed, BDA issued "no objection" in the form of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 on the request made by Gangadhar, a copy of which is at Annexure "B". However, on the day when the said endorsement was issued, W.A.No.1024/2014 had
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already been filed by the BDA against Muniramaiah, which was pending before the Division Bench of this Court. It is noted that the said writ appeal was filed on 15/04/2014. Thereafter, BDA by another endorsement dated 04/12/2014, withdrew endorsement dated 11/06/2014 and on the very same day preferred W.A.No.3124/2014 against Gangadhar, assailing order dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014. The Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 24/02/2015 condoned the delay in filing the aforesaid appeals.
(g) At this stage itself, it may be noted that the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and connected matters were not parties to the writ appeals. The writ appeals filed by the BDA were allowed by judgment dated 16/07/2015. The relevant portion of the said judgment in W.A.No.1024/2014 and W.A.No.3124/2014 read as under: "W.A.No.1024/2014
"13. This appeal is filed by the BDA assailing order dated December 13, 2013 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013.
14. By that order, Hon'ble Single Judge has held that insofar as the land belonging to respondent
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No.2 herein was concerned, the Scheme has lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act.
15. Learned counsel for the BDA has submitted that the impugned judgment would have to be set aside in view of the fact that respondent No.2 (M.Muniramaiah) herein had earlier filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 along with his brother M. Gangadhar and by order dated August 3, 2006 that writ petition was dismissed.
16. In that writ petition, also, the very same declaration to the effect that the acquisition had lapsed was sought and the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court had dismissed that writ petition, which order has attained finality.
17. The writ petition filed by the second respondent herein, in our view, has to be dismissed for the simple reason that the second respondent had filed a second writ petition on the same cause of action, which was not maintainable. The writ petition filed by the second respondent was hit by the principles of res judicata. Therefore, the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated December 13, 2013 passed in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013 is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
W.A.No.3124/2014:
18. This writ appeal is filed by the BDA assailing order dated January 27, 2014 passed in Writ Petition No.214 of 2014. By that order, Hon'ble Single Judge has followed order passed in Writ Petition No.46953 of 2013 disposed of on December
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13, 2013 and allowed the writ petition by holding that the Scheme insofar as the land of respondent No.2 herein is concerned had lapsed under Section 27 of the BDA Act.
19. Learned counsel for the BDA has brought to our notice that respondent No.2 herein along with his brother Muniramaiah M., had filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 before this court and by order dated August 3, 2006, the Hon'ble Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. That order has attained finality. He, therefore, contended that the second respondent could not have filed one more writ petition seeking the very same relief, which he had sought in Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005 along with his brother.
20. We are of the opinion that the Hon'ble Single Judge ought not to have entertained the said writ petition inasmuch as those petitioners earlier filed Writ Petition No.19532 of 2005, and upon a contested hearing, the said writ petition, on the selfsame issue, was dismissed on August 3, 2006.
21. We are of the opinion that the filing of second writ petition was an abuse of the process of the Court to stall the Scheme. Therefore, both the orders as aforesaid are set aside.
22. In view of the order passed in Writ Appeal No.1024/2014, we dismiss Writ Petition No.214 of 14 and set aside the order passed therein by allowing this appeal."
(underlining by me)
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(h) Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid appeals, the petitioners herein filed special leave petitions i.e., S.L.P.Nos.19849- 19850/2015 and their vendors preferred S.L.P.Nos.31100- 31101/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The special leave petitions filed by petitioners' vendors were dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that there was no legal and valid ground for interference, but the special leave petitions filed by the petitioners herein were withdrawn with liberty to approach other forums as may be available in law. Petitioners were also granted liberty to move the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again, if so required.
(i) Thereafter, petitioners herein preferred Review Petition No.59/2016 before the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment passed in W.A.No.3124/2014 which arose from W.P.No.214/2014. The Division Bench by order dated 10/3/2017, dismissed the review petition by observing that when the review petitioners were not parties to the writ appeals, the judgment passed in those writ appeals was not binding on them. There has been no challenge to the said order. Thereafter these writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioners.
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(j) From order dated 03/08/2006 in W.P.No.19532/2005, it is noted that petitioners vendors' father
- Muniveerappa had also filed O.S.No.5825/1989 before the City Civil Court, which was dismissed on 25/02/1995, which judgment has attained finality. Likewise, several persons who purchased sites from the petitioners' vendors' father had also filed writ petitions and original suits. W.P.Nos.21563/1989, 22906-910/1999, O.S.Nos.5753/1989, 5549/1989, 5824/1089, 5825/1989, 3226/1996 and 1570/1997 were dismissed on various dates.
(k) Similar is the case in the case of petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 as is evident from the narration above.
(l) Further, petitioner No.4 in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 had also filed W.P.13028/2007 before this Court. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 20/03/2009. Against the said order, BDA preferred W.A.No.1430/2009 and connected matters and one of the allottees of the BDA, M/s.Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd. (respondent No.3 in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948- 18950/2016) had also preferred W.P.No.1522/2009. The said writ appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of this Court
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by setting aside order dated 20/03/2009, passed in W.P.No.13028/2007, vide judgment dated 16/07/2015 and special leave petition filed by petitioner No.4 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dismissed on 07/11/2015.
33. Before answering the said contention, it would be useful to infer on the orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court in various cases filed by Muniveerappa and his two sons Muniramaiah and Gangadhar as well as Chennarayappa. On a reading of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.19532/2005, filed by Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, vendors of the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017, it becomes crystal clear about the dismissal of the writ petitions and the suits referred to therein and that the award was passed and possession of the land was taken by the BDA. In fact, a categorical finding has been given by this Court that possession of the entire land in question (4 acres 30 guntas) had been taken by the BDA after dismissal of the suits and writ petitions on passing of the award. This finding has attained finality inasmuch as there has been no appeal filed against the order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005. Hence, it is impermissible for the petitioners to contend that physical possession of the land
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has not been taken or that compensation has not been paid. Also, no contention to the effect that the mahazar is a concocted or got up document can be urged at this point of time, as this Court has categorically held in W.P.No.19532/2005 that possession of the land has been taken by the BDA, which finding has attained finality. Therefore, all contentions with regard to the veracity of the mahazar at Annexure "F" cannot be considered at this point of time.
34. Further, the surrender of 20 guntas of land by petitioners' vendors for the formation of ring road was during the pendency of W.P.No.19532/2005, by way of exchange for 75% of 20 guntas in Banaswadi and has no nexus to merits of the case.
35. In W.P.No.13028/2007, the petitioners, who in fact, sought for allotment of alternative land by way of sites as per their representation dated 28/08/2008, also challenged allotment of seven sites bearing Nos.169, 170, 189, 190, 191 and 198 formed in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village, in favour of the fourth respondent therein (M/s. Lakshmi Malleables Pvt. Ltd.) and to declare the allotment and issuance of possession certificate in respect of the above
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seven sites and also the seven sale deeds dated 07/11/2007 in favour of the said entity as null and void. Therefore, the petitioners, in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 and connected writ petitions, have themselves admitted that the aforesaid sites were allotted to the fourth respondent therein (third respondent herein), which could have been allotted only after taking possession from the petitioners and handing over the same to BDA. Further, petitioners also sought for allotment of sites under BDA (Incentive Scheme for Voluntary Surrender of Land) Rules, 1989, which has been enforced from 01/04/1989, which is another indication of the fact that possession has been taken from the petitioners as these Rules apply when possession is surrendered voluntarily.
36. In view of the dismissal of the successive writ petitions filed by the notified khatadars and their children and the finding given on possession of the entire extent of 4 acres 30 guntas being taken over by the BDA having attained finality, at this length of time, petitioners are estopped from reopening the said question so as to contend that physical possession of the total extent of land has not been taken over
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and therefore, they are entitled to relief under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act.
37. Similarly, on the question of payment of compensation, a reading of the said order would indicate that the notified khatedars, namely Muniveerappa and Chennarayappa did not make any claim seeking compensation despite service of notices on them. They did not appear before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, they have not sought for payment of compensation by producing the relevant documents before the BDA. In the circumstances, on approval of the award dated 16/05/2002, on 20/05/2002, an order was made by the Deputy Commissioner (LA), BDA, Bengaluru, which is in continuation of the award that an amount of Rs.2,75,269/- be deposited before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the notified khatedars have not paid the compensation to them as they did not even participate in the proceedings for determination of the award by not filing a claim statement, nor appeared before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA. In the circumstances, the BDA had no other option, but to deposit the compensation amount before the reference Court i.e., the
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City Civil Court, Bengaluru. Hence, it cannot be held that compensation has not been paid to the notified khatedars in respect of the land in question.
38. Hence, assuming that Section 24(2) is applicable even in the case of acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, petitioners herein are not entitled to any relief under the said provision as the conditions/stipulations stated in Section 24(2) do not apply or exist, in the instant cases. Point No.2 is accordingly answered against the petitioners and in favour of the respondents. Re. Point No.3:
"3) Whether petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed as envisaged under Section 27 of the BDA Act?"
39. Before answering this point, it would be useful to extract Section 27 of the BDA Act, which reads as under:
"27. Authority to execute the Scheme within five years: Where within a period of five years from the date of the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of section 19, the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially, the Scheme shall lapse and the provisions of section 36 shall become inoperative."
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40. In the instant case, the preliminary notification is dated 15/07/1982, and declaration and final notification is dated 16/08/1985. Learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that the acquisition of land in question i.e., land bearing Sy.No.103, measuring 4 acres 30 guntas, has lapsed on account of there being no substantial execution of the Scheme. The said contention is controverted by learned counsel for BDA by contending that Nagarbhavi Layout is a full fledged layout and that it cannot be said that there is no substantial execution of the Scheme. On the other hand, the Scheme is nearing completion. In fact, in W.P.No.19532/2005 filed by Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, it has been observed that 1,200 acres of land was acquired for formation of Nagarbhavi Layout and that 608 acres of land had been utilized for the said purpose. Placing reliance on order passed in W.P.No.27671/2000 (paragraph Nos.17 and
18), this Court held that the Scheme has been substantially implemented by the BDA and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Scheme had lapsed cannot be accepted and hence, dismissed the said writ petition.
41. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 sought to contend
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that the said submission by the BDA in the said writ petition was wholly incorrect as in another proceeding (W.A.1053/2007) before this Court, it was stated by the BDA that out of 1,210 acres acquired in Nagarbhavi Village, 85 acres 36 guntas had been deleted from the notifications and that layout has been formed in 608 acres 30 guntas. In fact, even as per Annexure "L" appended to W.P.No.15967- 1569/2017, it is evident that 1,210 acres 35 guntas was notified under the preliminary notification, but in the final notification 1,124 acres were notified, 85 acres 36 guntas were deleted from preliminary and final notification and there was denotification even after the final notification. Possession of 680 acres 07 guntas was taken and handed over to the engineering section of the BDA and layout has been formed in 608 acres 30 guntas. Thus, having regard to the extent of land notified in the final notification being 1,124 acres 23 guntas and the layout being formed in 608 acres 30 guntas, it is held that there is substantial implementation of the Scheme. In fact, that is what has been held by this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which order has attained finality as there has been no challenge to the same. Therefore, the controversy ought to end.
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42. However, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 has placed reliance on orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014, wherein learned Single Judge of this Court while allowing the writ petitions declared that Nagarbhavi Scheme insofar as petitioners' land is concerned had lapsed and under Section 27 of the BDA Act relief was granted. That although the Division Bench of this Court set aside those orders and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the judgment of this Court, nevertheless, in review petitions filed before this Court while dismissing the same, it is observed by the Division Bench that the judgment passed in the writ appeals is not binding on the petitioners herein as they were not parties in the writ appeals and hence, this Court ought to consider the question of lapse of acquisition under Section 27 of the Act afresh. Of course, the aforesaid contentions are rebutted by the learned counsel for the respondents in the writ petitions.
43. There are two aspects of the matter: the first, is with regard to the observation of this Court in the review petition to the effect that as petitioners herein were not parties to the writ appeals the judgment in the writ appeals is
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not binding on them. The second aspect is whether, indeed, there has been lapse of acquisition under Section 27 of the Act vis-à-vis the land in question i.e., Sy.No.103, Nagabhavi Village, totally measuring 4 acres 30 guntas. The answer to the aforesaid aspects is readily found in the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005. In that case, the petitioners therein i.e., the vendors of the petitioners herein had sought a similar declaration under Section 27 of the BDA Act. The said writ petition was dismissed and the order passed in the said writ petition has attained finality. Therefore, despite the observation made by the Division Bench of this Court in the review petitions to the effect that the judgment passed in the writ appeals are not binding on the petitioners herein, nevertheless, the dismissal of W.P.No.19532/2005 is a binding precedent on not only to the parties to the said writ petition, namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, but all those who are claiming right, title and interest under the petitioners therein who are none other than petitioners herein, who have purchased their extents from them. Hence, the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in review petitions, do not assist the petitioners herein in any manner as they are bound by the
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decision of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which has attained finality. This is despite the Division Bench's observations that in the judgment passed in the writ appeals, dated 16/07/2015 are not binding on the review petitioners as they were not parties to the writ appeals. But petitioners' vendors were parties to the writ appeals and the said judgment of the Division Bench is binding on them. Their challenge to the said judgment was also turned down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the observation of the Division Bench in judgment dated 16/07/2015 to the effect that the writ petitions filed separately in the years 2013 and 2014 by petitioners' vendors were not maintainable binds the vendors of the petitioners herein. To reiterate this is, because they had already suffered an order at the hands of this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005, which was not appealed against and therefore, had attained finality. Therefore, their subsequent writ petitions once again seeking a declaration on the basis of Section 27 of the BDA Act was not maintainable. Thus, the order in W.P.No.19532/2005 was also applicable to petitioners herein as they are subsequent purchasers, who are claiming title under their vendors against whom order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is operating till date and now
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is applicable to the petitioners herein. In fact, petitioners' vendors' writ petitions filed separately in the years 2013 and 2014 were dismissed as not maintainable as having been hit by the principles of res judicata would clearly imply that the order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is binding and operating on petitioners' vendors. When petitioners herein are claiming right, title and interest under their vendors, against whom the order passed in W.P.No.19532/2005 is operating till date, the same would as a natural corollary operate on the petitioners herein. Therefore, if petitioners herein seek to wriggle out of the judgment of the Division Bench, which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, they are, nevertheless, bound by the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.19532/2005 as the same is binding on petitioners' vendors, who had filed the said writ petition unsuccessfully and under whom petitioners herein claim right, title and interest as their alienees.
44. The same reasoning applies to the petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017, which is a company, which has purchased a portion of the land in 2 acres 30 guntas of Sy.No.103 from the very same vendors.
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45. As far as the petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 are concerned, petitioner No.4 had filed W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed. But in the writ appeal filed by the BDA against the said order, the Division Bench of this Court had set aside the order passed in the writ petition by the common judgment dated 16/07/2015. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions filed against the judgment of the Division Bench and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948-18950/2016 did not seek liberty to file any review petition, but instead have filed this fresh writ petition invoking Section 24(2) of the Act by contending that this writ petition is based on a different cause of action. In the circumstances, petitioners in this writ petition cannot be permitted to raise any argument on the basis of Section 27 of the BDA Act.
46. It is reiterated that the award having been made on 20/05/2002, the same has been deposited before Civil Court. Possession of the land in question was taken on 13/04/2003. The said aspects have been found to be so in the proceedings referred to above. Further, Nagarbhavi layout is a full fledged layout which has been formed by a
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substantial implementation or execution of the Scheme. In the circumstances, petitioners herein cannot once again contend that there is lapse of acquisition insofar as land bearing Sy.No.103, measuring 2 acres is concerned under Section 27 of the BDA Act.
47. It is also relevant to refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.27671/2000, disposed off on 16/01/2004 [Smt. Huchamma since deceased by her Legal Representatives vs. State of Karnataka and others] (Smt. Huchamma), wherein in respect of Sy.No.78 of Nagarbhavi Village, measuring 10 acres 8 guntas of land, which was also notified under the very same notifications under consideration, writ petition was filed seeking a declaration that insofar as acquisition of the aforesaid extent of land was concerned, it had lapsed. In the said decision, it has been held that the question whether the Scheme has been substantially implemented or not would arise for consideration only if it is not implemented by dereliction of duty on the part of the officials without justification. Once it is demonstrated, the BDA was prevented from implementing the Scheme because of interim orders by this Court coupled with the fact of continuous Court
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proceedings, BDA could not take steps for developing the land, nothing more is required to negative the claim under Section 27 of the Act.
48. In this regard, reliance could also be placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishnamurthy vs. Bangalore Development Authority [ILR 1996 Karnataka 1258], wherein this Court has laid down conditions to be fulfilled before the application of Section 27 of the BDA Act. Two conditions to be fulfilled to attract Section 27 are: firstly, there must be failure to execute the Scheme i.e., there must be dereliction of statutory duties without justification and not a mere delay in execution of the Scheme. Secondly, substantial execution in each case depends upon the magnitude of the Scheme and the nature of the work to be executed. Though the burden is on the BDA to furnish materials to the Court to demonstrate substantial execution of the Scheme, it is for the petitioner to place material before the Court to show that there has been dereliction of statutory duties and not mere delay in implementing the Scheme.
49. In the instant case, no such foundation has been laid except invoking Section 27 of the Act. On the other
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hand, the filing of successive writ petition before this Court has been the cause for the delay in developing the land in question and taking advantage of the said fact, petitioners' vendors, who are the sons of the notified khatedar have alienated the land.
50. Another decision of the Division Bench of this Court could also be relied upon in this case, which is in the case of Bangalore Development Authority vs. Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa [ILR 1996 Karnataka 642], wherein it has been observed as under:
"The Section provides that in case the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially within a period of 5 years from the date of publication of the Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act, then the Scheme shall lapse. The plain reading of the Section makes it clear that the Scheme can lapse provided the Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially. The expression "fails to execute the Scheme" clearly indicates that the Section will attract only in cases where the Authority is in a position to implement the Scheme and then fails to do so. It was pointed out on behalf of the Authority that several Writ Petitions were filed in this court to challenge the publication of the Notifications and the acquisition proceedings and in view of the Interim orders granted in those petitions restraining the Authority from proceeding further with the Scheme and the
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acquisition, it was impossible for the Authority to execute the same within the stipulated period of five years prescribed under Section 27 of the Act. In these circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate how it can ever be suggested that the Scheme has lapsed because the Authority had failed to execute the Scheme. It must also be noted that the provisions of Section 27 prescribed that the failure of the Authority to execute the Scheme must be in respect of the substantial part of the Scheme."
51. Therefore, the first and foremost condition to be fulfilled for the applicability of Section 27 of the BDA Act is that the petitioner must establish proper plea and evidence that there was dereliction of statutory duties without justification by the authority in implementation of the Scheme and the second condition is that necessary material must be placed to the effect that the Scheme has not been substantially implemented. Section 27 cannot be invoked if the Scheme has not been implemented when hurdles have been placed by the petitioners themselves in the acquisition proceedings or on account of interim orders passed by Courts which have prevented the BDA from implementing the Scheme. It is only when the BDA has on account of dereliction of duty, not utilised the land for the purpose for which it was acquired, Section 27 would attract. It is in this
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background, that the conduct of the petitioners who approached the Court for declaration that the acquisition has lapsed under Section 27 assumes importance.
52. In the instant case, reference made to the orders passed by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners herein and by the father of the petitioners' vendors in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is the main cause for there being no development in respect of the land in question and the same has prevented the BDA as well as its allottees from forming the layout on the land in question. Therefore, it is held that there is no dereliction of statutory duties of the officials of the BDA. On the other hand, it is on account of the cases filed by petitioners' vendors before this Court as well as the Civil Court which have come in the way of implementation of the Scheme insofar as the land in question is concerned. Hence, Section 27 of the Act is not at all attracted in the present case.
53. With regard to the contention of learned senior Cousnel, Sri Udaya Holla, that the BDA misled this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 by contending that the Scheme had been implemented substantially, whereas as per Annexure "L", it was not so, reference could be made to the order of
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this Court in Smt. Huchamma's case, wherein it has been categorically recorded that out of 1,210 acres of land, only 518 acres were notified for formation of Nagarbhavi first stage and 682 acres were left out. That even in 518 acres, only 28 acres of land was utilized for formation of layout. Thus, by another notification dated 16/08/1985, an extent of 518 acres of land out of 1,210 acres was notified for acquisition and another notification was issued on 05/08/1986 notifying 604 acres of land out of 682 acres and a layout had been formed, sites had been allotted to the allottees and possession certificates have been issued and the allottees had put up construction and living with their families. Therefore, in Huchamma's case also, this Court has categorically held that Nagarbhavi Scheme has been implemented substantially and that Section 27 would not apply, which finding is squarely applicable in the present case.
Hence, point No.3 is answered against the petitioners. Re. Point Nos. 4 & 5:
"4) Whether the withdrawal of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B") by endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") (impugned in this writ petition) by the BDA is just and proper?
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If not, whether the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.15967-15969/2017 are entitled to relief on the basis of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 (Annexure "B")?
5) Whether the principles/doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply in the instant case and the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-969/2017 would succeed on the basis of the said doctrine?"
54. The aforesaid points shall be considered together as they are interlinked.
One of the vendors of the petitioners Gangadhar, made a representation to the BDA on 27/05/2014 seeking "no objection certificate" in respect of land to an extent of 43,544.828 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village. The said representation was made subsequent to the disposal of W.P.No.214/2014 filed by him, which was allowed on 27/01/2014, declaring that the Scheme had lapsed insofar as the aforesaid extent of land in Sy.No.103 was concerned.
The said declaration was made by following the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.46953/2013, dated 13/12/2013, which was filed by Muniramaiah, brother of Gangadhar. In response to the said representation, endorsement at Annexure "B" was issued. At this stage itself, it may be noted that when the said endorsement was issued,
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W.A.No.1024/2014 was pending before the Division Bench, which was filed against the order passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 against Muniramaiah.
55. The contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that on the basis of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, the vendors of the petitioners sold their respective portions to the petitioners therein on 10/09/2014.
Thereafter, endorsement at Annexure "M" has been issued withdrawing the endorsement at Annexure "B" dated 11/06/2014. In the circumstances, Annexure "M" has been assailed by the petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 as it is illegal and being contrary to Annexure "B" and that the principles of estoppel applies and BDA must be directed to be bound by Annexure "B" endorsement dated 11/06/2014.
56. A reading of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 at Annexure "B" would highlight on three aspects namely, (i) that, the acquisition of the land in respect of Sy.No.103, measuring 4 acres 30 guntas had been completed; (ii) that, the award dated 16/05/2002 had been approved on 20/05/2002 and that the acquisition proceeding has been completed by dispatching the compensation amount to the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, under Sections 30 and 31(2) of
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LA Act, 1894 by cheque dated 25/05/2007 possession being handed over to BDA on 30/04/2003 and (iii) that, in W.P.No.214/2014 filed by Gangadhar, this Court had declared that under Section 27 of the BDA Act, the Scheme had lapsed insofar as 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 was concerned. That in view of the said declaration, the said extent of land has been set apart from the acquisition process. While reiterating the aforesaid points, in last phargraph of endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"), it has been stated that the "no objection" issued in endorsement dated 11/06/2014 has been quashed (withdrawn) and that against order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.214/2014, BDA has decided to file writ appeal before the Division Bench of this Court.
57. The point that arises for consideration is, as to whether Annexure "B" was in fact, a "no objection certificate"
in respect of land measuring 43,544.82 sq.ft. on the basis of which the vendors of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967- 15969/2017 could have sold the land to the petitioners. Further, whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel would apply in the instant case. Significantly, no such endorsement was sought nor issued in respect of the portion falling to the
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share of Muniramaiah i.e., 36,308.68 sq.ft., after W.P. No.46953/2013 filed by him was allowed in December 2013.
58. The contents of endorsements dated 11/06/2014 and 04/12/2014 have been highlighted above as the endorsements are in Kannada language. Nevertheless, for immediate reference, the aforesaid of endorsements are extracted as under:
"¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ Bangalore Development Authority ¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/G¥À(¨sÆ À ¸Áé)/761/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 »A§gÀºÀ «µÀAiÀÄB ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸ÀªðÉ £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«ÄäUÉ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥ÀvÀæ PÉÆÃjgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ. G¯ÉèÃRB vÀªÀÄä CfðAiÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀB 27.05.2014 ****** ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ G¯ÉÃè RPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°è 04 JPÀgÉ 30 UÀÄAmÉ ¥ÁægA À ©üPÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 dated 15.07.1982 gÀAzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ CAwªÀÄ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB HUD/249/MNX/85 dated 16.08.1988 gÀAzÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸ÀzÀj d«ÄäUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ 16.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ LwÃ¥ÀÄð gÀa¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀ 20.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé) gÀªÀjAzÀ LwÃ¥ÀÄð C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVzÉ.
¢£ÁAPÀ 03.06.2002 gÀAzÀÄ 12(2) £ÉÆÃnÃ¸ï ¤ÃrzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ 30.04.2003 gÀAzÀÄ C©üAiÀÄAvÀgÀ ±ÁSÉUÉ ºÀ¸ÁÛAvÀj¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
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¢£ÁAPÀ 25.05.2007 gÀAzÀÄ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®A 30, 31(2) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ¨sÀÆ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ºÀtzÀ ZÉPï£ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£Àå ¹n ¹«¯ï £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉÄAiÀÄÄ ¥ÀÆtðUÉÆArgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsÀgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è jmï ¦nµÀ£ï £ÀA.214/2014 £ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÁÛg.É ¸Àzj À ¥ÀPæ Àgt À ªÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÉ £Àq¹ É zÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ AiÉÆÃd£Á C£ÀĵÁ×£ª À £ À ÀÄß ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JA§ CA±Àª£ À ÀÄß ªÀÄ£ÀUA À qÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ F ¥ÀPæ ÀgÀt «²µÀÖ «zÀÄå£Áä£ÀU¼ À £ À ÀÄß DzsÁj¹ ©rJ PÁAiÉÄÝ ¸ÉPÀ£ ë ï 27 gÀrAiÀÄ°è AiÉÆÃd£Á ªÉÊ¥s® À åªÁVzÉ JA§ PÁgÀt ¤Ãr CfðzÁgÀjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«Ää£À ¨sÀƸÁé¢Ãü £À C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£A É iÀÄ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¹ DzÉò¹zÉ.
ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀ »£À߯ÉAiÀÄ°è CfðzÁgÀgÀ PÉÆÃjPÉAiÀÄAvÉ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉĬÄAzÀ ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ JAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ w½¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
¸À»/-
(PÀgq
À ÀÄ »A§gÀºÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀg
Û ÄÀ (¨sÆ
À ¸Áé)
DAiÀÄÄPÀgÛ ª
À j
À AzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆâ¸À®ànz
Ö )É ¨ÉA.C.¥Áæ., ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ.
EªÀjUÉ,
²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsg À ï ©£ï ¯ÉÃmï ªÀÄĤ«ÃgÀ¥Àà, £ÀA.182, ¥ÀAxÀgª À Á¼Àå, ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ gÀ¸ÉÛ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 039."
* * * "¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ Bangalore Development Authority
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¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/DAiÀÄÄPÀg
Û ÄÀ /580/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB 04/12/2014
»A§gÀºÀ
«µÀAiÀÄB ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀg Û À vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA
À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½,
£ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82
ZÀ.C. d«ÄäUÉ ¤ÃrzÀÝ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥Àvª Àæ À£ÀÄß
gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¸ÀĪÀ §UÉÎ.
G¯ÉèÃRB ¸ÀASÉåB ¨ÉAC¥Áæ/G¥À(¨sÀƸÁé)/761/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀB
11/06/2014.
******
ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ G¯ÉÃè RPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ,
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ, AiÀıÀªA À vÀ¥ÀÄgÀ ºÉÆç½, £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°è 04 JPÀgÉ 30 UÀÄAmÉ ¥ÁægA À ©üPÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB A6/PR/SLAO/S/201/82-83 dated 15.07.1982 gÀAzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ CAwªÀÄ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¸ÀASÉåB HUD/249/MNX/85 dated 16.08.1988 gÀAzÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀB 16.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ LwÃ¥ÀÄð gÀa¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀB 20.05.2002 gÀAzÀÄ G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé) gÀªÀjAzÀ LwÃ¥ÀÄð C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVzÉ.
¢£ÁAPÀB 03.06.2002 gÀAzÀÄ 12(2) £ÉÆÃnÃ¸ï ¤ÃrzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀB 30.04.2003 gÀAzÀÄ C©üAiÀÄAvÀgÀ ±ÁSÉUÉ ºÀ¸ÁÛAvÀj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀB 25.05.2007 gÀAzÀÄ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®A 30, 31(2) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ¨sÀÆ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ºÀtzÀ ZÉPï£ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£Àå ¹n ¹«¯ï £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉÄAiÀÄÄ ¥ÀÆtðUÉÆArgÀÄvÀÛz.É ¸Àzj À d«ÄäUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsÀgï gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è jmï ¦nµÀ£ï £ÀA.214/2014 £ÀÄß zÁR°¹gÀÄvÁÛg.É ¸Àzj À ¥ÀPæ Àgt À ªÀ£ÀÄß «ZÁgÀuÉ £Àq¹ É zÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ AiÉÆÃd£Á
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C£ÀĵÁ×£ª À £ À ÀÄß ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JA§ CA±Àª£ À ÀÄß ªÀÄ£ÀUA À qÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ F ¥ÀPæ ÀgÀt «²µÀÖ «zÀÄå£Áä£ÀU¼ À £ À ÀÄß DzsÁj¹ ©rJ PÁAiÉÄÝ ¸ÉPÀ£ ë ï 27 gÀrAiÀÄ°è AiÉÆÃd£Á ªÉÊ¥s® À åªÁVzÉ JA§ PÁgÀt ¤Ãr CfðzÁgÀjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ 43,544.82 ZÀ.C. d«Ää£À ¨sÀƸÁé¢Ãü £À C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£A É iÀÄ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¹ DzÉò¹zÉ.
ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀª£ À ÀÄß C£ÀĵÁ×£U À Éƽ¸À®Ä ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 gÀAzÀÄ £ÁUÀgÀ¨Á« UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸Àªð É £ÀA.103 gÀ°£ è À 43,544.82 ZÀzg À À Cr d«ÄãÀ£ÀÄß ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ ¥ÀQæ A æ iÉĬÄAzÀ ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ JAzÀÄ ªÀÄ£À«zÁgÀjUÉ w½¸À¯ÁVvÀÄ.Û ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ qÀ§Æèöå.¦. £ÀA.214/2014gÀ DzÉñÀzA À vÉ F PÀbÉÃj¬ÄAzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀB 11.06.2014 gÀAzÀÄ 43,544.82 ZÀzÀÄgÀrUÀ½UÉ ºÉÆgÀr¹zÀÝ ¤gÁPÉëÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥Àvª æÀ £ À ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝUÉƽ¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ºÁUÀÆ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ªÉÄî䣫 À ¸À°¸ è ® À Ä ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀªÀÅ ¤tð¬Ä¸À¯ÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ w½¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
(PÀgÀÄqÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæªÀÅ ªÀiÁ£Àå DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û Àªj À AzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£A É iÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ) ¸À»/-
G¥À DAiÀÄÄPÀg Û ÀÄ (¨sÀƸÁé), ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ ¥Áæ¢Pü ÁgÀ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ.
EªÀjUÉ, ²æà JA. UÀAUÁzsg À ï ©£ï ¯ÉÃmï ªÀÄĤ«ÃgÀ¥Àà, £ÀA.182, ¥ÀAxÀgª À Á¼Àå, ªÉÄʸÀÆgÀÄ gÀ¸ÉÛ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 039." Whether endorsement dated 11/06/2014 authorized the vendors of the petitioners to alienate 43,544.82 sq.ft. of
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land to the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 is the question. If so, whether doctrine of promissory estoppel against BDA would apply? On a plain reading of the endorsement, the contents of which are succinctly stated above, it becomes clear that nowhere BDA has stated that petitioners' vendors had the authority or the right to alienate 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land to the petitioners. Even if endorsement dated 11/06/2017 stated that the aforesaid extent of land had been excluded from the acquisition proceedings pursuant to the declaration issued by this Court in W.P.No.214/2014, the endorsement did not imply that the declaration granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.214/2014 had attained finality or for that matter BDA had accepted the said decision. On the other hand, it would be relevant to note that BDA had already preferred W.A.No.1024/2014 against the order passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 by none other than the brother of Gangadhar namely, Muniramaiah who is the other vendor of the petitioners. That declaration was in respect of land measuring 36,308.68 sq.ft. in Survey No.103 of Nagarabhavi Village, which has been purchased by the petitioners in W.P.No.21196/2017. In view of the aforesaid facts, BDA
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decided to file an appeal against the order passed in W.P.No.214/2014, in W.A.No.3124/2014 and on the day the said writ appeal was filed, endorsement dated 04/12/2014 was issued vide Annexure "M". That endorsement merely withdrew the "no objection" issued to Gangadhar, but in the interregnum, on 10/09/2014 Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, the two brothers had alienated their respective extents of land to the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017.
59. The declaration regarding lapse of acquisition under Section 27 of BDA Act was sought by Muniramaiah and Gangadhar by filing separate and independent writ petitions, but "no objection" certificate was sought only by Gangadhar in respect of 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land and not by Muniramaiah. Even then Muniramaiah also sold his share to petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017. Endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was issued only in respect of aforesaid extent of land to Gangadhar in a form which is construed to be a "no objection certificate" by the petitioners herein and not to Muniramaiah the other vendor. Writ appeals were filed by the BDA against both Muniramaiah and Gangadhar against the order of learned Single Judge in which BDA succeeded before
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the Division Bench which judgment has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
60. In view of filing of writ appeal against order dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, which was filed by Gangadhar, endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was withdrawn. The same cannot be termed as illegal or in violation of the rights of the petitioners herein. The reasons for saying so are not far to see: firstly, endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was issued on the request made by Gangadhar, who was the petitioner in W.P.No.214/2014 by seeking a "no objection certificate". If no such request was made, such an endorsement would not have been issued by the BDA. It was not a case of concession made by the BDA suo moto, but on the basis of the order dated 27/01/2014 issued by this Court. Secondly, the endorsement was issued on the basis of the situation as it obtained on 11/06/2014, namely, declaration granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court to the effect that acquisition of land measuring 43,544.82 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village had lapsed. But the declaration granted by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.214/2014 was not ultimate or final. In fact, in respect of a similar declaration granted by this Court in
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W.P.No.46953/2013, by order dated 13/12/2013, which was filed by Muniramaiah, the other vendor of petitioners herein BDA had already appealed against it in W.A.No.1024/2014 and was pending consideration on 11/06/2014. It was, therefore, a natural corollary that BDA decided to challenge order dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, by filing an appeal on 04/12/2014 on which date the endorsement at Annexure "M" was issued, otherwise the two would have been incongruous; particularly, when no such "no objection" certificate in the form of endorsement had been issued in respect of Muniramaiah the other vendor. Thirdly, petitioners, placing reliance on endorsement dated 11/06/2014 issued to one of the vendors ought to have become aware of the following aspects with regard to the land in question: (a) that, 4 acres 30 guntas in Sy.No.103 including 43,544.828 sq.ft. (subject matter of endorsement) was subject to acquisition; (b) that, the petitioners ought to ascertain whether any challenge to the acquisition was made by the vendors of the petitioners or their father who was the notified khathedar of the land in question before this Court and if so, the result of such proceedings and (c) that petitioners ought to have ascertained as to whether order
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dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014, following order dated 13/12/2013 passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 had attained finality or not. Instead, petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, simply purchased 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land under registered sale deed dated 10/09/2014.
61. In fact, in the deed of absolute sale at Annexure "A", the recitals categorically refer to preliminary notification dated 15/07/1982 and final notification dated 16/08/1985, pertaining to 4 acres 30 guntas of land in Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi Village. It is also stated therein that W.P.Nos.46953/2013 and 214/2014 had been filed by the vendors and reference has been made to endorsement dated 11/06/2014. Therefore, the petitioners had actual notice of all these facts and they were aware of the aforesaid significant facts which ought to have triggered further enquiry by the petitioners herein. But despite knowing such facts, petitioners sought to purchase their extent of land under registered sale deed dated 10/04/2014 from their vendors. Had petitioners made pertinent enquiries before purchasing a portion of the land in question, the true facts would have been known to them and possibly they would not have ventured to get the sale deeds registered in their name.
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62. The next related point to be considered is as to whether the issuance of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to one of the vendors of the petitioners amounted to a promise made by BDA from which BDA could not have resiled by issuing impugned endorsement. In other words, whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in the instant case so as to grant relief to the petitioners.
63. The contents of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 need not be reiterated as it has been extracted as well as highlighted.
64. The contention of learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in the instant case and the petitioners must be given relief by holding that BDA was estopped from issuing endorsement dated 04/12/2014 and that on the basis of the promise made in endorsement dated 11/06/2014, petitioners' vendors were authorized and had the right to sell portions of Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi village, in favour of the petitioners herein, who are the alienees.
65. Before answering the said point, it would be useful to refer to some of the decisions on the doctrine of
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promissory estoppel rendered by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited at the Bar.
(i) Learned senior counsel for petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017, 21193-21195/2017 has placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contentions with regard to applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as an equitable doctrine in the instant case.
(a) In Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority And Others vs. State Of Karnataka, By Its Secretary [ILR 2006 KAR 318], the Division Bench of this Court at paragraph-91 onwards discussed the case of M/s.Tata Housing Development Company in the context of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and after relying upon State of Punjab vs. M/s. Nestle India Limited [2004 (6) SCC 465] held that promissory estoppel is a doctrine in equity found in a cause of action against the Government and that it is to enforce a representation made by the Government as a result of which a person would have changed his position to his disadvantage and seeks to enforce his right based on the said doctrine.
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(b) Reference has also been made by the Division Bench to two other Judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Union of India and others vs. M/s.Anglo Afghan Agencies etc., [AIR 1968 SC 718] and M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(1979) 2 SCC 409], to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine it must yield if equity so desires. That the Government should place adequate material before the Court showing the overriding public interest, which compels them not to honour the promise. It is further observed that it is equally well-settled that no representation which is prohibited by law can be enforced. However, the Government must have the power to carry out the promise. If the statute confers power on the Government to enforce the promise made, and there is no prohibition in law, then the Government is bound by such promise.
In the said case, the Division Bench noted that the petitioner in W.P.No.25807/2004 (W.A. No.2757/2005) M/s. Tata Housing Development Company had entered into an agreement with the owners of agricultural lands for purchase of 26 acre 12 guntas for the purpose of construction of
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buildings and structures. The said agreement was entered into in pursuance of the Government New Housing Policy encouraging investment by private sector/co-operative inhousing projects. The case of the petitioners was that the agreement was entered into because of the representation by the Government. In the meanwhile acquisition notifications were issued acquiring the very same lands for Arkavaty Layout. The petitioners sought relief on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Division Bench held that the material on record was not sufficient to grant the relief sought for on the basis of the said doctrine. But the plea regarding promissory estoppel was upheld in the case of petitioners in W.P.28087/2004 who had filed W.A.No.2760/2005, who had intended to develop Software I.T. Park, but not in the case of Tata Housing Development Company in W.P.25807/2004.
(c) In the case of The Union of India and others vs. M/s.Anglo Afghan Agencies etc., [AIR 1968 SC 718], it has been held that even if the case does not fall within the limits of Section 115 of Evidence Act, it is open to the party who acted on the representation of the Government to claim that the Government should carry out
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the promise made by it in the formal contract as required by the Constitution. In the same Judgment, it is further observed that:
"Under our jurisprudence, the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."
(d) In the case of B.L.Sreedhar and others vs. K.M.Munireddy (Dead) and others [(2003) 2 SCC 355], after referring to a catena of decisions of both English and Indian Courts and also treatises on the subject of estoppel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 20 held as under:
"Estoppel though a branch of the law of evidence is also capable of being viewed as a substantive rule of law insofar as it helps to create or defeat rights which would not exist and be taken away but for that doctrine......."
It further observed that:
"Of course, an estoppel cannot have the effect of conferring upon a person a legal status expressly denied to him by a Statute. But where such is not the case a right may be claimed as having come into
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existence on the basis of estoppel and it is capable of being enforced or defended as against the person precluded from denying it".
(e) Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has also relied upon a decision reported in case of New Marine Coal Co., (Bengal) Private Ltd., vs. The Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 152] (paragraphs 16 and 17), wherein it has been observed that:
"Just as estoppel can be pleaded on the ground of misrepresentation or act or omission, so can estoppel be pleaded on the ground of negligence; but before such a plea can succeed, negligence must be established in this technical sense i.e., duty to use due care towards the party misled, or towards the general public of which he is one."
(ii) Learned counsel appearing for respondent - BDA, Sri Kannur, has relied upon the following citations on the issue concerning promissory estoppel:-
(a) In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd., vs. Commercial Tax Officer and others reported in (2005) 1 SCC 625, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of doctrine of promissory estoppel in paragraphs 8, 14 and 15 by observing as under:
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"8. A person may have a "legitimate expectation" of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that "legitimate expectation"' gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation in not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. (See Union of India and Others. v. Hindustan
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Development Corporation and Others, AIR (1994) SC
988).
x x x
14. As was observed in Punjab Communications Ltd.
v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1801, the change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on "Wednesbury reasonableness." The decision-maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of police is for the decision-maker and not the Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. A claim based on merely legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time; present, past and future. How significant is the statement that today is tomorrow's yesterday. The present is as we experience it, the past is a present memory and future is a present expectation. For legal purposes, expectation is not same as anticipation. Legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law.
15. As observed in Attorney General for New Southwales v. Quinn, [1990] 64 Australian LJR 327 to strike the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to
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set the Courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the negotiation of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well- known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider, but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is 'not the key which unlocks the treasure of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits,' particularly, when the elements of speculation and uncertainty are inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New Southwales' case the Courts should restrain
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themselves and respect such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well meant caution. Otherwise, a resourceful litigant having vested interest in contract, licences, etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directing principles thwarted to further his own interest. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario becomes all the more important."
(b) In Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of India and another [(1995) 1 SCC 274], the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel as established in administrative law in India and observed at paragraphs 11 and 12 as under:
"11. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take between the parties.
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12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the Government or the public authority "to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make." There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation."
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In the aforesaid judgment reference has also been made to several dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court where the ambit and scope or amplitude of doctrine of promissory estoppel as evolved through successive decisions starting from the case of M/s.Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. (supra).
(iii) Learned senior counsel Sri D.L.N. Rao, appearing for sixth respondent in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 has also placed reliance of certain dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court on certain nuances of doctrine of promissory estoppel, which are as follows:
(a) In M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd., vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(1979) 2 SCC 409] it has been observed in paragraph 28 as under:
"28. No representation or promise made by an officer can preclude the Government from enforcing a statutory prohibition. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of the law. It is true that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as under:
"We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so desires; if it can be
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shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it."
(b) Further, reliance has been placed on Union of India and others vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [(1985) 4 SCC 369], wherein reliance has been placed on the earlier dictum in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills (supra) and Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees House Ltd., [(1956) 1 All ER 256], wherein the contours of doctrine of promissory estoppel has been explained by the House of Lords speaking through Lord Denning J.
(iv) The recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the doctrine of promissory estoppel could also be usefully cited as under:
(a) In the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2011)3 SCC 193] (Shree
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Sidhbali Steels) at paragraph Nos.32, 33, and 34 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit a particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule, but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. That the doctrine is a principle, which is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel, but for the application of doctrine of the promissory estoppel, the promissee must establish that he suffered detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise. Further, at paragraph No.33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"33. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled
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to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law."
(b) Further, in U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Sant Steels and Alloys (P) Ltd. [(2008) 2 SCC 777], the Hon'ble Supreme Court after surveying a catena of cases observed that whenever the State has made a representation to the public and the public has acted on the representation and suffered economically or otherwise, then in that case, the State should be estopped from withdrawing such benefit to the detriment of such people except in public interest or against the statute.
(c) In State of Rajasthan vs. J.K.Udaipur Udyog Ltd. [(2004) 7 SCC 673], while considering Rajasthan Sales Tax/Central Sales Tax Exemption Scheme for Industries, 1998, pursuant to the fourth new industrial policy on grant of such an exemption and thereafter issuance of corrigendum, which was assailed on the premise that the
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exemption granted was affected by the corrigendum, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"25. An exemption is by definition a freedom from an obligation which the exemptee is otherwise liable to discharge. It is a privilege granting an advantage not available to others. An exemption granted under a statutory provision in a fiscal statue has been held to be a concession granted by the State Government so that the beneficiaries of such concession are not required to pay the tax or duty they are otherwise liable to pay under such statute. The recipient of a concession has to legally enforceable right against the Government to grant of a concession except to enjoy the benefits of the concession during the period of its grant. This right to enjoy is a defeasible one in the sense that it may be taken away in exercise of the very power under which the exemption was granted. (See Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, Kasinka Trading v. Union of India and Shrijee sales Corpn. V. Union of India.)"
(d) In Mohd. Jamal vs. Union of India and another [(2014) 1 SCC 201], while discussing the doctrine of legitimate expectation, reference was made to Sethi Auto Service Station vs. DDA [(2009) 1 SCC 180], wherein it was observed that a person basing his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to establish that he had relied on the said representation and had altered his position and that denial of such expectation worked to his detriment. The
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Courts can interfere only if the decision taken by the authority is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and contrary to public interest. It also reiterated that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where said action is a matter of public policy or in public interest, unless, of course, the action taken amounted to an abuse of power. It was further emphasised that in order to establish a claim of promissory estoppel, it must be proved that there was such a definite promise and not any vague offer which could not be enforced.
(e) In Devi Multiplex and another vs. State of Gujarat and others [(2015) 9SCC 132], at paragraph No.20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noticed development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel through various judgments.
(f) In Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another [(2016)4 SCC 134], it has been observed that a recipient of a concession has no legally enforceable right against Government to grant or continue to grant a concession except to enjoy benefits of concessions during period of its grant. This right to enjoy a
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benefit is defeasible one, in the sense, it may be taken away in exercise of the very power under which the exemption was granted.
(g) In Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited vs. State of Kerala and others [(2016) 6 SCC 766], the Hon'ble Supreme has retraced the history of the doctrine of promissory estoppel through various cases in India, while at the same time quoting the decision of the Australian High Court in Commonwealth of Australia vs. Verwayen [(1990) 170 CLR 394 (Aust)] on the approach of Courts in such matters.
After quoting the Australian decision, at paragraph No.20, it is stated as under:
"20. The above statement, based on various earlier English authorities, correctly encapsulates the law of promissory estoppel with one difference-under our law, as has been seen hereinabove, promissory estoppel can be the basis of an independent cause of action in which detriment does not need to be proved. It is enough that a party has acted upon the representation made. The importance of the Australian case is only to reiterate two fundamental concepts relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel-one, that the central principle of the doctrine is that the law will not permit an unconscionable departure by one party from the
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subject matter of an assumption which has been adopted by the other party as the basis of a course of conduct which would affect the other party if the assumption be not adhered to. The assumption may be of fact or law, present or future. And two, that the relief that may be given on the facts of a given case is flexible enough to remedy injustice wherever it is found. And this would include the relief of acting on the basis that a future assumption either as to fact or law will be deemed to have taken place so as to afford relief to the wronged party."
66. Having regard to the aforesaid judicial dicta, it is noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and that it applies when the Government makes a promise, which would be acted upon by the promisee and relying on the said promise alters his position, then the Government would be bound by the promise and the same would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee. That if the Government is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of the rule are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. However, there are recognized limitations to the principle. Firstly, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and it has to yield when equity so requires. It is only when the Court is
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satisfied that Government ought not to be bound by the promise and should be free to act unfettered by it that the Court would not enforce the promise against the Government. Secondly, no promise could be enforced, which is prohibited by law and thirdly, the person or the authority making the representation of the promise must have the power to carry out the promise. Thus, if there is a clear and unequivocal promise knowing that it would be acted upon by the promisee, who has acted upon the promise, then it would be inequitable to allow the promissor to go back on the promise. Thus, if the doctrine is not to apply in a particular fact situation, then Government should place proper and adequate material before the Court showing the overriding public interest, which compels it not to honour the promise. Further, no representation or promise which is prohibited in law can be enforced. Otherwise the Government is bound by such promise.
67. It is also relevant to note that there is strong judicial opinion to the effect that before invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expression without any supporting material to
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the effect that the doctrine is applicable because the party invoking the doctrine has altered his position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press the said doctrine.
68. On a consideration of aforecited cases on the law of promissory estoppel, the same could be applied having regard to the fact of the present case in light of the contentions raised by respective counsel.
69. The contents of endorsement dated 11/06/2014 have already been referred to while considering point No.4. The endorsement dated 11/06/2014 stated that the acquisition of land in respect of Sy.No.103, measuring 4 acres 30 guntas, has been completed; that the award has been passed and compensation amount has been deposited before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, and possession has been taken and that, in W.P.No.217/2014, filed by Gangadhar before this Court, a declaration has been made to the effect that acquisition has lapsed insofar as 43,544.82 sq.ft. of land in Sy.No.103 is concerned under Section 27 of the BDA Act. The aforesaid endorsement also stated that the aforesaid extent of land was excluded from acquisition process, contrary to the law that, when possession of
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acquired land had been taken, it could not be excluded from acquisition. Also, the said endorsement did not give any authority to Gangadhar, to whom it was issued, or to his brother, Muniramaiah, petitioners' vendors herein to sell the land to a third party. Such a right was not created in petitioners' vendors by the said endorsement. Therefore, on the basis of the said endorsement, petitioners cannot contend that their vendors had acquired a right to alienate respective extents in Sy.No.103 to the petitioners herein. Hence, it is held that there was no promise or representation made to petitioners' vendors authorizing them to alienate respective extents to third parties. The endorsement dated 11/06/2014 merely stated that in view of the declaration granted by this Court in W.P.No.214/2014, the aforesaid extent of land was excluded from acquisition. The implication being, it no longer was part of the Nagarbhavi Scheme as this Court had declared that the Scheme had lapsed insofar as the aforesaid extent of land was concerned in W.P.No.214/2014. But in law, even if the Scheme lapses acquisition does not lapse, particularly when the land has stood vested in the State Government or its beneficiary. This proposition of law is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
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the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) at paragraph No.38. It is, further held that when the lands transferred and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances such status of the property is incapable of being altered by fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act i.e., BDA Act or LA Act, 1894 as these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which property, once and absolutely, vested in the State could be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State once process of acquisition is completed.
70. Further, the position as it existed on 11/06/2014, vis-à-vis the aforesaid extent of land was not the ultimate, as the said endorsement did not state that BDA had communicated that it would not file any appeal against order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014. Reliance placed on file notings of BDA by learned senior counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, is of no assistance for the simple reason that the file notings did not culminate into a communication of the decision taken by BDA at that point of time, not to file an appeal against the order passed in W.P.No.214/2014, to one of petitioners' vendors, Gangadhar.
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In this context, reliance could be placed on Article 166 of the Constitution of India, which relates to the expression of an executive action and unless there is a communication of a decision to the person concerned by giving formal expression to the decision, it cannot be considered to be a crystallized decision. Hence, merely because in the file notings of the BDA, it was noted that there was no reason to file an appeal at that point of time and subsequently, an appeal was filed cannot be held against BDA. On the other hand, the said endorsement issued by the BDA pursuant to the order dated 27/01/2014, passed in W.P.No.214/2014 was contrary to the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.19532/2005 disposed off on 03/08/2006, wherein it was categorically stated that the Scheme had been substantially implemented and that Section 27 was not applicable to the case and the writ petition had been dismissed. The aforesaid writ petition was filed by the very same vendors of petitioners herein who filed the said writ petition as legal heirs of notified khatedar Muniramaiah, their father, the earlier unsuccessful petitioner. Therefore, BDA was justified in filing writ appeal against order passed in W.P.No.217/2014.
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71. The issuance of the endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was not suo motu by BDA as Gangadhar, one of the vendors of the petitioners herein, sought endorsement dated 11/06/2014 from the BDA so as to acquire a semblance of authority to sell the aforesaid extent of land in question to petitioners herein. One cannot ignore the fact that W.P.Nos.46953/2013 and W.P.No.214/2014 were filed separately by petitioners' vendors after entering into an agreement to sell on 03/09/2013 with certain parties. However, as against the orders passed in the aforesaid writ petitions, writ appeals were preferred by the BDA and the Division Bench allowed the writ petitions and dismissed the aforesaid writ petitions as having been hit by the principles of res judicata which judgment has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petitions filed by the vendors. In fact, petitioners' vendors suppressed the fact that they had alienated respective extents to petitioners herein before the Division Bench, which disposed off the writ appeals. Though the petitioners herein preferred review petitions against the judgment of the Division Bench dated 16/11/2015 and in the review petitions the Division Bench held that the said judgment was not binding on the
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petitioners herein as they were not parties to the same, nevertheless, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the petitioners herein who claim to be successors in interest are bound by the judgment of the Division Bench, which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
72. In this regard, it is reiterated as has been discussed while answering Point No.3 that the petitioners herein are not bona fide purchasers. Though the endorsement dated 11/06/2014 has been issued to one of the vendors of the petitioners herein and not to the petitioners and the latter claim benefit under the said endorsement and have set up their claim in these writ petitions on the doctrine of promissory estoppel by assailing the subsequent endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"), the fact remains that the petitioners herein not being bona fide purchasers by not carrying a due diligence exercise cannot plead innocence so as to seek shelter under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. After reiterating what has been stated in the endorsement dated 11/06/2014, Annexure "M" endorsement dated 04/12/2014, states that the said endorsement dated 11/06/2014 is quashed or withdrawn and that against order dated 27/01/2014 passed in
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W.P.214/2014, BDA intends to file an appeal. The reason for issuance of impugned endorsement dated 04/12/2014 is to inform one of the vendors of the petitioners namely, Gangadhar that earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was being withdrawn as BDA had decided to file an appeal against order dated 27/01/2014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014.
73. Therefore, can it be said that endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M") is an unconscionable departure from what has been stated in earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 so as to enforce the same against BDA? No doubt, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a substantive law and no person who has placed himself in a position of disadvantage by acting on a promise made can remain without a remedy and the promisor cannot be permitted to resile from the promise. Nevertheless, there are certain limitations on the application of the doctrine. In other words, the promisor (Government or public authority) must be compelled to carry out its promise or representation. But the same cannot be so when the representation or promise is made contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. Further, the doctrine must yield when the
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equity so desires. If the Government or the public authority demonstrates that having regard to the facts as having transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to the representation made by it, then Court would not raise any equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the same on the Government or the public authority. Further, no promise could be enforced, which is prohibited by law. Thus, while examining the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the relevant facts, actions and position of the parties must be noted in each case.
74. When endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was issued, in my view, the same did not create any right or authority in favour of the vendors of the petitioners to alienate the land in question. Neither did the endorsement state that order passed by this Court on 27/01/2014 in W.P.No.214/2014 had been accepted by the BDA, but the subsequent endorsement dated 04/12/2014 stated that the earlier endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was withdrawn as BDA had decided to file a writ appeal against order dated 27/012014 passed in W.P.No.214/2014. The impugned endorsement dated 04/12/2014 was not an unconscionable
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departure amounting to oppressive conduct by the BDA, for the BDA never represented to petitioners' vendors by endorsement dated 11/06/2014, that it had given up its right to file a writ appeal against the order passed in W.P.No.214/2014 by accepting the order passed in the said case. Therefore, there was no representation or promise made to the vendors of the petitioners by the BDA that, they could treat their extents of land acquired by the BDA as having reverted to them pursuant to the orders of this Court passed in the two writ petitions filed by them. In the absence of any such an indication in the endorsement dated 11/06/2014 there was no promise made to petitioners' vendors to deal with their extents of land in any manner they intended to, including alienating the same to third parties.
75. Further, petitioners cannot be permitted to rely upon endorsement dated 11/06/2014 to contend that they are innocent purchasers and on the basis of the said endorsement, they went ahead to purchase their extents of land. As already stated petitioners herein ought to have carried out a due diligence exercised in respect of the extent of land that they intended to purchase, either they failed to do so or they ignored litigations before this Court including
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pendency of W.A.No.1024/2014 before this Court filed against Muniramaiah, one of the vendors and at their own risk, bought their respective extents of land. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion petitioners herein cannot seek to enforce their right on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the said doctrine does not apply having regard to the facts of this case.
76. Moreover, petitioners herein have not arrayed their vendors as parties in this writ petition. Neither have their vendors assailed endorsement dated 04/12/2014. In fact, they are estopped from doing so as they have been unsuccessful before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and further suppressed the fact that they had alienated their respective portions of the land to the petitioners herein before the Division Bench in the writ appeal. Further,the discussion made while considering Point No.4 is reiterated herein. In the circumstances, the petitioners W.P.Nos.19567- 15969/2017 are not entitled to any relief on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the same does not apply in the instant case. There is no challenge made to endorsement dated 04/12/2014 by the petitioners in
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W.P.No.21196/2017. Point Nos.4 and 5 are accordingly answered against the aforesaid petitioners. Re. Point No.6:
"6) Whether petitioners in W.P.Nos.21193-95/2017 are entitled to any relief in those writ petitions?"
77. The petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017 have assailed work order issued by the BDA in favour of the sixth respondent vide Annexure "P" dated 10/03/2017 and have sought restraint on sixth respondent or any person claiming under the sixth respondent or through them from entering the petition schedule land i.e., 43,544.82 sq.ft. Sixth respondent has contended that petitioners have no locus standi to assail issuance of work order by the BDA. That on 05/01/2016, BDA invited tenders for construction of three BHK Apartments in a portion of Sy.No.103 of Nagarbhavi. The sixth respondent being the lowest bidder was awarded the contract. That the sixth respondent has submitted bank guarantee of Rs.2,37,85,000/- to BDA which is valid till 07/03/2018 only. That the contract work is for an amount of Rs.47,57,00,000/-. It is a time-bound project and has to be completed by 09/09/2018. According to the sixth respondent, it commenced work, but there has been an order
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of status quo granted by this Court in these writ petitions and an application for vacating the interim order has been filed.
78. This point ought not to detain me for long in view of the answers given on the other points for consideration. The petitioners herein having purchased their respective extents of land from their vendors who had lost title to them on account of the same being acquired and vested with the BDA have no locus standi to assail the work order issued by the BDA to the sixth respondent to construct apartments on a portion of the said land. Once the land in question has vested with the BDA on conclusion of the acquisition proceedings and being utilized for the purpose of implementation of the Scheme or allotted to third parties, the allotment made to third parties or the implementation of the Scheme by construction of housing apartments by the BDA through the sixth respondent cannot be assailed as the petitioners have no locus standi to do so. The aforesaid points answered against the petitioners after detailed discussion need not be reiterated again. The same may be read as part of this point for consideration. In the circumstances, Point No.6 is answered against the petitioners by holding that they have no locus standi to assail the work
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order dated 10/03/2017 issued by BDA in favour of the sixth respondent. Hence, W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2005 are liable to be dismissed.
Re. Point No.7:
"7) Whether these writ petitions are hit by the principles of res judicata?"
79. This is an important aspect in these matters, which has been pointed out by learned senior counsel, Sri D.L.N. Rao. According to him, in each of these cases civil Court and/or this Court have already opined to the effect that "the land owners have lost their title as well as possession once the acquisition process has been completed". That this finding of fact cannot be upset in these proceedings merely because petitioners have invoked sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. He submitted that both on the issue of payment of compensation and on taking physical possession of the land in question under which circumstances sub- section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act has been invoked, the findings on facts are against the petitioners herein. That when this Court has already arrived at certain findings on facts in the earlier petitions filed by petitioners' vendors, those findings cannot be reagitated in these writ proceedings. According to learned senior counsel, this Court cannot sit in
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judgment over the findings arrived at in the earlier proceedings concerning the very same land in question by this very Court as those findings have attained finality, particularly when they have been unchallenged or sustained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He submitted that the principles of res judicata would apply to these cases as the finding of facts have been arrived at in the earlier writ petitions and/or appeals instituted by the BDA against the vendors, which cannot be reopened in these subsequent writ petitions filed by the petitioners, who have stepped into the shoes of their vendors, who were the petitioners in the earlier writ petitions. He thus, submitted that the findings on facts concluded by this Court in the earlier cases are binding and cannot be reopened by filing these petitions. Learned senior counsel, contended that the petitions are not maintainable and ought to be dismissed in limine on the ground of res judicata as well as an instance of abuse of process of law and of this Court. He further submitted that grounds which were available to petitioners' vendors when they earlier filed their writ petitions, but not availed of at that time cannot be permitted to be raised in these writ petitions and that the explanation to Section 11 of the CPC, which is
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also applicable to writ proceedings squarely applies to these cases.
80. It has been noted while discussing each of these cases that the petitioners herein cannot be said to have approached the Court of law for the first time. The petitions filed by the respective petitioners herein have a checkered history. While it is not necessary to reiterate the same in detail while considering the contentions of learned senior counsel in light of the principle of res judicata and finality of judgments and orders of Courts and binding nature of findings arrived at between parties, it would only be necessary to revisit the same briefly.
(a) The father of the vendors of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.15967-15969/2017 and connected writ petitions, Muniveerappa filed W.P.No.17707/1986 before this Court challenging preliminary and final notifications dated 15/07/1982 and 16/08/1982 respectively. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated 7-08/03/1991, which order has been reported as Muniveerappa vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 1991 Kar. 3362], wherein the principle of binding precedent has also been discussed even if parties in subsequent proceedings were not parties in earlier
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proceedings, when in earlier proceedings, the findings on the same set of facts and contentions have been given. Thereafter, petitioners' vendors namely, Muniramaiah and Gangadhar, children of Muniveerappa filed W.P.No.19532/2005 before this Court seeking a declaration under Section 27 of the BDA Act to the effect that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed in respect of land bearing Sy.No.103 to an extent of 2 acres 30 guntas. That writ petition was also dismissed. As against the said writ petition, no appeal was preferred by the petitioners and the said order has attained finality. Despite the aforesaid order, Muniramaiah one of the vendors filed W.P.No.46953/2013 seeking a declaration that the acquisition had lapsed. The said writ petition was allowed on 13/12/2013 by the learned Single Judge by holding that the Scheme insofar as petitioners' land was concerned had lapsed having regard to Section 27 of the BDA Act. The other vendor, Gangadhar also filed W.P.No.214/2014 before this Court seeking similar relief. By order dated 27/01/2014, the said writ petition was also allowed by following the reasoning given in W.P.No.46953/2013 referred to above. Against both these orders, BDA preferred W.A.Nos.1024/2014 and 3124/2014
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respectively. The Division Bench of this Court by order dated 16/07/2015, allowed the writ appeals on the precise ground that the aforesaid writ petitions filed by two brothers were not maintainable and the said writ petitions were hit by the principles of res judicata inasmuch as they had earlier together maintained W.P.No.19532/2005 before this Court, which had already been dismissed by order dated 03/08/2006 and which order had attained finality.
Special leave petitions filed by vendors of petitioners assailing the judgment of the Division Bench in S.L.P.Nos.31100-31101/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court have also been dismissed. Even the S.L.P.Nos.19849- 19850/2015 filed by the petitioners herein have been dismissed with liberty to approach other forums as may be available to them in law. The petitioners herein preferred R.P.No.59/2016 before the Division Bench of this Court, which was dismissed by order dated 10/03/2017. Although the Division Bench observed that the orders passed by this Court are not binding on the review petitioners (petitioners herein), as they were not parties to the proceedings before this Court in writ appeals filed by the BDA, nevertheless, the fact remains that the special leave petitions filed by the
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petitioners herein were dismissed. Though in the review petition, this Court has held that the judgment passed in the writ appeals would not be binding on the petitioners herein, the fact of the matter is that the judgment is binding on petitioners' vendors and as petitioners have claimed right, title and interest from their vendors, it is binding on them also.
(b) Similarly, the petitioner in W.P.No.21196/2017 is stated to be a housing company, purchased land measuring 33.34 guntas or 36,308.68 sq.ft. in Sy.No.103, under sale deed dated 10/09/2014 from the very same vendors as petitioners in W.P.No.15967-15969/2017. The details of the cases filed by the petitioner's vendors need not be re-adverted to. However, it is noted that the petitioner herein had filed S.L.P.Nos.19774- 19776/2015, assailing the judgment dated 16/07/2015, passed in W.A.No.1024/2014 and connected writ appeals, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The special leave petitions were withdrawn by the petitioner herein and R.P.No.197/2016 was filed before his Court and on dismissal of the same, this writ petition has been filed seeking relief under Section 27 of the BDA Act as well as under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, which is not maintainable.
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(c) Fourth petitioner, in W.P.Nos.18876/2016 & 18948- 18950/2016 and connected writ petitions, had filed W.P.No.13028/2007 before this Court, which was allowed by learned Single Judge on 20/03/2009. Being aggrieved by that order, BDA preferred W.A.No1490/2009 and the same was allowed by the Division Bench by its judgment dated 16/07/2015. The fourth petitioner preferred S.L.P.Nos.31353- 31354/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which were dismissed on 27/11/2015. Once again these writ petitions have been filed by fourth petitioner and his sons seeking a declaration under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, which is not maintainable on account of the findings arrived at in the previous writ petitions filed by them. Also in O.S.No.773/2016 filed by them seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction, the plaint has been rejected on 19/08/2016.
81. Thus, there is a clear pattern in these writ petitions. The purpose of filing cases repeatedly before different Courts is to seek an order, which would strike at settled state of affairs and unsettle them so as to create an atmosphere of uncertainty not only in the minds of the authorities, but also in the minds of the allottees of BDA as in the instant case. In all this rigmarole there would be certain
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third parties seeking to encash on the uncertainty and enrich themselves illegally and unjustly. When such facts are brought to the notice of the Court, it is the duty of the Court to discourage such litigations on the basis of principles of finality of decisions of Courts of law and also on the basis of the principle of res judicata, which are enunciated in Section 11 of the CPC. Further, if certain prayers have not been sought in the earlier litigation even when those prayers were available to the petitioners they cannot do so subsequently by filing fresh writ petitions. Such petitions would have to be declined on the basis of the principle enunciated in Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
82. That the principle of res judicata concerning finality of orders and judgments is a salutary principle, which is applicable in such matters or there would be no sanctity to the judgments and orders passed by Courts. The general principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on consideration of public policy. One important consideration of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate Courts and, the other principle is, no one should be made to
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face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice.
83. In fact, the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka & others [(2011) 3 SCC 408], disposed of on 02/02/2011 are apposite:
"14. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely, 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is 'nemo debet his ve ari,si constet curiae quod sit pro un act eademn cause' meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest.
15. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and
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malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquishing his right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promise honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties."
84. The Apex Court has also held that there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata as explained in explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC are also applicable to writ petitions. Thus, the attempt of the petitioners herein to re-argue the case which has been finally decided by this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court is a clear abuse of process of the Court. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of K.K.Modi vs. K.N.Modi & others [(1998) 3 SCC 573], wherein it has been held as follows:
"One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which
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has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata".
In light of the above, these writ petitions would also have to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata and for abuse of the process of this Court with costs.
85. This is a classic case of abuse of the process of law as well as this Court for achieving oblique ends. Cases after cases have been filed before this Court in respect of the land in question to seek favourable orders and then to capitalize on the same. This case is an instance of subversion of process of law and justice.
86. The vendors of the petitioners, after entering into agreement to sell the land in question to the agreement holders, filed separately W.P. Nos.46953/2013 and 214/2014 before this Court by seeking the very relief, which had been declined by this Court earlier in W.P.No.19532/2005, which was a writ petition filed by them jointly and which order had attained finality. If this Court had not entertained the aforesaid two writ petitions filed by petitioners' vendors and had simply dismissed the same on the ground of res judicata as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the
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writ appeals filed against those orders, then there would have been no occasion for one of the vendors namely, Gangadhar to seek "No Objection" in the form of an endorsement dated 11/06/2014 from the BDA. It is only because the writ petitions were entertained and allowed by this Court that Gangadhar sought "No Objection" from the BDA and it issued "No Objection" in the form of an endorsement dated 11/06/2014 on the basis of the situation as it obtained on that day. However, wise counsel seems to have prevailed in the BDA and the said endorsement was withdrawn by another endorsement dated 04/12/2014, as by then, writ appeal had already been pending in W.A. No.1024/2014 against the order passed in W.P. No.46953/2013. Therefore, W.A.No.3124/2014 was filed against Gangadhar so as to assail order dated 27/01/2014, which had followed order passed in W.P.No.46953/2013 against which writ appeal was filed. In the circumstances, endorsement dated 11/06/2014 was withdrawn.
87. In the interregnum, petitioners purchased the land in question as per their respective extents on 10/09/2014 and have now filed these writ petitions once again seeking the very same relief, which petitioners'
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vendors sought, albeit unsuccessfully, in the guise of raising a challenge to endorsement dated 04/12/2014. The object and purpose of filing these writ petitions is to secure the imprimatur of this Court on the sale transactions dated 10/09/2014 under which petitioners herein have purchased their respective extent of lands from their vendors. This is because, petitioners' vendors having lost right, title and interest in respect of their respective extents even during the lifetime of their father Muniveerappa, who was the notified khatedar, on completion of the acquisition process, had no right to alienate the same to the petitioners herein as the lands had stood vested with BDA on account of the completion of the acquisition process.
88. This is an archetypal case where land acquired by the BDA has been sold by the legal heirs of the erstwhile land owner-notified khatedar to third parties by completely ignoring the land acquisition process based on the strength of the orders passed by this Court. The orders dated 13/12/2013 and 27/01/2014, passed in the aforesaid writ petitions have been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court, which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Merely because the petitioners were not parties to the
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judgment of the Division Bench would not imply that they can ignore the same so as to legalize their right, title and interest in respect of the extent of lands that they have purchased. Though the petitioners herein have not been parties to the said orders, nevertheless, they are claiming right, title and interest from their vendors. When the vendors had lost their right, title and interest in the respective extents of land, they could not have conveyed anything in the said lands to the petitioners herein. The general principle is that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner, and who does not sell under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had:
nemo dat quod non habet and nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet. Knowing fully well that petitioners' vendors could not have alienated the lands in favour of the petitioners herein, "no objection" was sought by one of the vendors from the BDA so as to acquire a semblance of right to alienate the acquired land. The BDA, however, withdrew the "no objection" granted to one of the vendors namely, Gangadhar once writ appeal was filed
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against him as had been done in the case of his brother, the other vendor.
89. In my view, the issuance of endorsement or its withdrawal is not significant. What is significant is, the legal heirs of the erstwhile land owner, Muniveerappa, alienated land, which had been acquired and vested with the BDA to third parties namely, petitioners herein on receipt of valuable consideration. This act of alienation by the legal heirs of the erstwhile land owner is in blatant violation of the acquisition process as well as the orders passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition filed by them. Having been unsuccessful in that writ petition, nevertheless, they strategized to sell the land acquired from they by filing writ petitions before this Court and being successful in those writ petitions alienated the land in respect of which they had no title. It is reiterated that these writ petitions have now been filed by the purchasers only to legalize their purchase of the land, which has been acquired and stood vested with the BDA and BDA in turn has allotted to third parties. Therefore, this is a typical case where the process of this Court has been misused by petitioners' vendors for the purpose of achieving oblique ends and the petitioners have filed these writ petitions as if they
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are innocent purchasers for valuable consideration and thus, they are bona fide purchasers.
90. In my view, they cannot be termed as bona fide purchasers, for they have not demonstrated as to, in what way they are the bona fide purchasers and why this land has been purchased, which was acquired and stood vested with the BDA. There have been several litigations in respect of the land in question and BDA was seeking to secure the acquired land for the purpose of allotting it to third party- allottees. But alienations have been made by petitioners' vendors to the petitioners. How could the petitioners ignore the fact that their respective extents of lands situated in Nagarbhavi Village had been the subject matter of acquisition and that their vendors had been unsuccessful in writ petitions filed challenging the acquisition when these facts of acquisition of land for Nagarbhavi Scheme is in the public domain and in fact, noted in their sale deeds? Therefore, notice must be imputed to the petitioners herein of the said facts. The petitioners herein ought to have made enquiries about the acquisition of land, which they sought to buy and as to whether there had been any litigation in respect of the same. Had the petitioners ascertained about the aforesaid
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two aspects, the truth or reality would have dawned on them. Then they may not have ventued to purchase the respective extents of the land in question. Not having done so, they cannot be considered as bona fide purchasers without notice of the acquisition process.
91. On the other hand, despite the acquisition process having been completed and inspite of cases filed by the vendors being unsuccessful, they have with open eyes and at their own risk purchased respective extents of land from their vendors, who had no right to convey the same to them. For this, the petitioners would have to hold themselves responsible and not their vendors or the BDA or the allottees of the BDA. Courts cannot be "used", "misused" or "abused" for the purpose of achieving such oblique ends i.e., by buying land from persons, who had no right to sell as it had been acquired and vested with the State or BDA as the case may be and therefore, had no right to convey title to petitioners. The petitioners cannot approach this Court so as to seek its imprimatur on the said transaction in the guise of assailing endorsement dated 04/12/2014 (Annexure "M"). When petitioners' vendors had no right, title or interest in the land in question, on the same having vested with BDA, they
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could not convey any title in the land to petitioners herein. Therefore, this Court, by ignoring the aforesaid aspects of the case, cannot hold that the petitioners herein are bona fide or innocent purchasers. Otherwise, acquired land could be alienated by erstwhile notified khatedars by ignoring the acquisition process, which would simply lead to a collapse of the acquisition process and cause havoc in exproprietary legislation. Then no acquisition process would retain its sanctity even when such process has been carried out in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the writ petitions would have to be dismissed, but with nominal costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- per batch of writ petitions payable to respondent/Bangalore Development Authority, which has been dragged once again to this Court in all cases, except in W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017, wherein it is payable to respondent No.6/Company.
92. The summary of findings are as under:-
(i) That sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which creates a new right in the land owners is applicable only to those lands where initiation of acquisition is under the provisions of LA Act, 1894 and not any other enactment. The said section does not apply to those acquisition proceedings,
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which have been initiated under any other Central enactment or State enactment such as BDA Act or KUDA Act, as the case may be.
(ii) As the acquisition in the instant cases have been initiated under the provisions of BDA Act, the petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
(iii) While holding so, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Offshore Holdings Private Limited, Bondu Ramaswamy, Girnar Traders (3) and Sukhbir Singh. Consequently, the dictum of this Court in K.M. Chikkathayamma and other decisions which are not in consonance with the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are not applicable to the present case.
(iv) Assuming that the petitioners are entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, writ petitions are dismissed having regard to the fact that petitioners have not proved their case under the said sub-section.
(v) Having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court in the earlier litigations discussed
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above, it is held that Nagarbhavi Scheme has been implemented substantially and Section 27 is not attracted to the present case and in respect of the land in question.
(vi) It is held that endorsement at Annexure "M"
dated 04/12/2014, was rightly issued by the BDA by withdrawing its earlier endorsement at Annexure "B" dated 11/06/2014.
(vii) It is held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
(viii) That W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017 are dismissed as the petitioners therein have no locus standi to challenge work order dated 10/03/2017 issued in favour of sixth respondent therein.
(ix) These writ petitions are dismissed as being hit by the principles of res judicata and are an instance of abuse of law and process of this Court.
93. In the result, these writ petitions are dismissed with nominal costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- per batch of writ petitions, payable to respondent/Bangalore Development Authority, except in W.P.Nos.21193-21195/2017, wherein costs are payable to respondent No.6/Company. The said
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costs shall be paid within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.
In view of dismissal of the writ petitions, applications seeking vacating of interim order stand dismissed and I.A.No.5/2016 stands disposed.
Sd/-
JUDGE *mvs/s/msu/sbn /an/nm/gh/js/hr