Karnataka High Court
Smt Lakshmamma vs State Of Karnataka on 2 January, 2018
Author: B.V.Nagarathna
Bench: B.V.Nagarathna
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 2nd DAY OF JANUARY, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
WRIT PETITION Nos.60045-60048/2014 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT LAKSHMAMMA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
W/O LATE MADEGOWDA,
2. SRI CHANNABASAVARAJU
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
S/O LATE MADEGOWDA
3. SRI SHANKARA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
S/O LATE MADEGOWDA,
4. SRI MAHADEVA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
S/O LATE MADEGOWDA,
PETITIONERS NO.1 TO 4 ARE
R/AT 1ST MAIN ROAD,
KUMBAR KOPPAL,
MYSORE-570 016. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI R.S.RAVI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, KGS-II,
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M.S. BULILDING, K.R. CIRCLE,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTORITY,
JLB ROAD, MYSORE,
REP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER,
MUDA OFFICES,
MYSORE-570 001.
3. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
JLB ROAD, MYSORE-570 001.
4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
MYLSORE DISTRICT,
MYSORE-570 001.
5. SRI M.P.VENKATAGIRIGOWDA
S/O LATE PUTTASWAMY GOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/A MANUGANAHALLI,
BILIKERE HOBLI,
HUNSUR TALUK,
MYSORE DISTRICT-570 002.
6. SMT VIJAYA JAYARAMU
W/O DR. JAYARAMU,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/A NO. 186, 10TH CROSS,
SHIVAJI ROAD, N.R. MOHALLA,
MYSORE-570 006.
7. SMT SATHY SHESHADRI
W/O SHESHADRI,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 281, GOKULUM III STAGE,
BANGALORE-560 064.
8. SMT K.PONNAMMA SWAMY
W/O LATE E.N.KUPPASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 88 YEARS,
R/A NO.32, SHIVAJI ROAD,
L.R MOHALLA, MYSORE-570 006.
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9. SRI B.T.SADASHIVA
S/O PUTTEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/A BYATE THIMMANA KOPLU,
ENNE HOLE POST,
PANDAVAPURA TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT-570 007.
10. SMT ARCHANA DESHPANDE
W/O ANANDA DESHPANDE,
AGED ABOUT 49 LYEARS,
R/A NO.123/A,
BRINDAVAN EXTENSION,
IST STAGE, MYSORE-570 016.
11. SMT M.YASHODA
W/O S.RAMACHANDRA,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/A LNO.798, KATUR ROAD,
III STAGE, GOKULUM,
MYSORE-570 008.
12. SMT T.ANASUYA
D/O M.C.THIMMEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/A NO.8, IST STAGE,
III MAIN, JAYANAGAR,
CHAMARAJAMOHALLA,
MYSORE-570 006.
13. SRI B.S.NARAYAN
S/O B.M.S. IYENGAR,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
R/A NO.C2,
GOKULAM MAIN ROAD,
JAYALAKSHMIPURAM,
MYSORE-570 002.
14. SRI NAGESH
S/O DORESWAMYGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
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R/O NO.212, 4TH CROSS,
NEW STREET, KUMBARA KOPPALU,
MYSORE-570 016.
15 . SRI DEVAPPA
S/O DORESWAMYGO9WDA,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
R/A NO.395,
NINGAYYANA KERE ROAD,
KUKMBARA KOPLU,
MYSORE-570 016. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIJAYA KUMAR A. PATIL, AGA FOR R-1)
*****
THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
DECLARE THAT R-2 AND R-3 HAVE NO SUBSISTING RIGHT
OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE
NOTIFICATION DATED 29.03.1984, PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE DATED 31.03.1984 VIDE ANNEXURE-F,
IN VIEW OF SECTION 24 OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR
COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT,
2013 AND ETC.,
THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR
PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Petitioners have sought for the following reliefs in these writ petitions:
(a) To declare that the 2nd and 3rd respondents have no subsisting right over the land in question by virtue of the notification dated 29.03.1984, -5- made in No.HUD 82, MIB 82, published in the Official Gazette dated 31.03.1984, vide Annexure-F; in view of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013;
(b) To declare the Notification dated 27.9.2005 made No.LAC:435/85-86, u/s 16(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 27.9.2005 vide Annexure-S, as null and void by virtue of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013;
(c) To declare the Notification dated 15.11.1984 made in No.ULA 2170/1976-77 issued by the respondent No.4 as null and void vide Annexure-
U, by virtue of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999;
(d) Grant such other relief/relieves as deem fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.
2. Petitioners submit that in respect of the land in question, which is Sy.No.337 measuring 1 acre of -6- Hinkal Village, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk and District, petitioners formed a residential layout after obtaining permission from Hinkal Mandal Panchayath. Thereafter, house sites have been sold to respondent Nos.5 to 15.
The petitioners have sought the aforesaid prayers having regard to the fact that respondent Nos.1 to 4 initiated acquisition proceedings in respect of several lands including the land in question by issuance of Preliminary Notification dated 25.06.1981 under Section 16(1) of the City of Mysore Improvement Act, 1903 (hereinafter, referred to as "1903 Act", for the sake brevity) and the same was followed by a Final Notification dated 29.03.1984 under Section 18 (1) and (2) of the said Act.
3. According to the petitioners, general award was passed in respect of the lands sought to be acquired including the land in question on 21.04.1986, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-G to the writ -7- petitions. The contention of the petitioners is that no separate award has been passed in respect of the land in question. In the circumstances, petitioners have sought the aforesaid prayers.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned AGA appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 4 and perused the material on record.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners firstly submitted that Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, referred to as "2013 Act" for the sake brevity), is applicable even in respect of acquisitions initiated under the Act. Secondly, he submitted that under Section 27 of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987, (hereinafter, referred to as "KUDA Act" for the sake brevity), which has substituted 1903 Act, this Court may declare that the acquisition has lapsed as -8- the scheme for which the land was sought to be acquired has not been substantially implemented.
Thirdly, he submitted that when the award has not been passed in the name of the petitioners, possession from them could not have been taken from the respondent -
Authorities. Therefore, the acquisition is deemed to have lapsed. In the circumstances, petitioners' counsel sought for the aforesaid reliefs being granted to them.
6. Per contra, the learned AGA appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 4 on advance notice submitted that Section 24 of 2013 Act does not apply to acquisition initiated under 1903 Act or even under KUDA Act, which Act has repealed 1903 Act under which acquisition has taken place. He further submitted that the petitioners cannot seek a declaration under Section 27 of the KUDA Act at this belated point of time assuming that it applies. He also drew my attention to the general award at Annexure-G dated -9- 21.04.1986 and contended that the award has been passed in respect of the land in question and that the petitioners at this belated stage cannot file these writ petitions and seek the aforesaid reliefs. In the circumstances, learned AGA sought for dismissal of these writ petitions.
He also drew my attention to the fact that the petitioners in fact have no locus standi to file these writ petitions as even according to them, they have sold the land in question in the form of sites to respondents No.5 to 15. Therefore, he submitted that these writ petitions may be dismissed on that basis also.
The contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners shall be considered in seriatim.
7. The first contention is with regard to the applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act to an acquisition initiated under 1903 Act which was in force
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prior to the enforcement of KUDA Act and the same is repealed. The object and purpose of the said Act was for the improvement of City of Mysore and to provide space for its future expansion. Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter II of the said Act dealt with the constitution of the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of City of Mysore, which was charged with execution of object and purposes of the Act. Chapter III of the said Act dealt with Improvements Schemes, under which, for the purpose of implementation of a scheme, the Trust had the power to acquire land and the same was delineated under Sections 14 to 18 of the said Act, which read as under:
"Sec.14.(1)- The Board may, subject to the control of the Government,-
(a) draw up detailed schemes (hereinafter referred to as "improvement schemes") for the improvement or expansion or both of the areas to which this Act applies;
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(b) undertake any words and incur any expenditure for the improvement or development of any such area and for the framing and execution of such improvement schemes as may be necessary from time to time.
(2) The Board may also from time to time make any new or additional improvement schemes-
(i) on its own initiative, if satisfied of the sufficiency of its resources, or
(ii) on the recommendations of the Municipal Council if the Council places at the disposal of the Board the necessary funds for framing and carrying out any such scheme, or
(iii) otherwise.
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may, whenever they deem it necessary, require the Board to take up any improvement scheme or works and execute it subject to such terms
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and conditions as may be specified by the Government.
Sec.15-Every improvement scheme under section 14- (1) shall, within the limits of the area comprised in the scheme, provide for-
(a) the acquisition of any land which will, in the opinion of the Board, be necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme,
(b) re-laying out all or any land including the construction and reconstruction of buildings and the formation and alteration of streets,
(c) draining streets so formed or altered;
(2) may, within the limits aforesaid, provide for-
(a) raising any land which the Board may deem expedient to raise for the better drainage of the locality,
(b) forming open spaces for the better ventilation of the area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area,
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(c) the whole or any part of the sanitary arrangements required,
(d) the establishment or construction of markets and other public requirements or conveniences; and (3) may, within and without the limits aforesaid, provide for the construction of buildings for the accommodation of the poorer and working classes, including the whole or part of such classes to be displaced in the execution of the scheme. Such accommodation shall be deemed to include shops.
Sec.16.(1) Upon the completion of an improvement scheme, the Board shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein and a statement specifying the land which it is proposed to acquire and of the land in regard to which it is proposed to recover a betterment fee may be seen at all reasonable hours; and shall-
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(a) communicate a copy of such notification to the President of the Municipal Council who shall, within thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, forward to the Board, for transmission to Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Municipal Councillors may think fit to make with regard to the scheme;
(b) cause a copy of the said notification to be published during three consecutive weeks in the Mysore Gazette, and posted up in some conspicuous part of their own office, the Deputy Commissioner's office, the office of the Municipal Council and in such other places as the Board may consider necessary.
(2) During the thirty days next following the ay on which such notification is published in the Mysore Gazette, the Board shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the Municipality or local body concerned or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax
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or land revenue assessment on any building or land which it is proposed to acquire in executing the scheme, or in regard to which the Board proposes to recover a betterment fee, stating that the Board proposes to acquire such building or land or to recover such betterment fee for the purpose of carrying out an improvement scheme and requiring an answer within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, stating whether the person so served dissents or not, to such acquisition of the building or land or to the recovery of such betterment fee, an dif the person dissents, the reasons for such dissent.
(3) Such notice shall be signed by, or by the order of, the Chairman and shall be served-
(a) by delivery of the same personally to the person required to be served, or if such person is absent or cannot be found, to his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or building; or
(b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person as aforesaid; or
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(c) by post addressed to the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person.
17. (1) Upon compliance with the foregoing provisions with respect to the publication and service of notices of the scheme, the Board shall, after consideration of any representation or answer received under Section 16 and after inserting in the scheme such modifications as they may think fit, apply to Government for sanction to the scheme.
(2) The application for sanction shall, save in the case provided for n sub-section (3) be accompanied by-
(a) description with full particulars of the scheme including the reasons for any modifications inserted therein;
(b) complete plans and estimates of the cost of executing the scheme;
(c) a statement specifying the land proposed to be acquired;
(d) any representation received under sub-
section (1) of section 16;
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(e) a schedule showing the rateable value,
as entered in the Municipal
assessment-book, at the date of the publication of a notification relating to the land under section 16, or the land assessment, of all land specified in the statement under clause (c); and
(f) such further particulars, if any, as may be prescribed by Government.
(3) When under any improvement scheme provision in made for the construction of dwellings for the poorer and working classes, the Board may, after complying with the provisions of section 16, forthwith submit to Government for sanction plans and estimates for the construction of such dwellings, and on receipt of such sanction the provisions of section 18 shall, with all necessary modifications, be applicable to the part of the scheme providing for the construction of such dwellings, as if such part were the scheme.
18. (1) (a) On receipt of the sanction of Government, the Chairman shall forward a declaration for notification under the signature of a Secretary to Government, stating the fact of
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such sanction and that the land proposed to be acquired by the Board for the purposes of the scheme is required for a public purpose.
(b) The declaration shall be published in the [Mysore Gazette] and shall state the limits within which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and the place where a plan of the land may be inspected.
(c) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose, and the Board shall, upon the publication of the said declaration, proceed to execute the scheme.
(2) (a) If at any time it appears to the Board that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme, the Board may alter the scheme for the purpose of making such improvement, and shall, subject to the provisions contained in the next two clauses of this sub-section, forth with proceed to execute the scheme as altered.
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(b) If the estimated net cost of executing the scheme as altered exceeds, by a greater sum than [five per cent,] the estimated net cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned, the Board shall not, without the previous sanction of Government, proceed to execute the scheme as altered.
(c) If the scheme as altered involves the acquisition, otherwise than by agreement, of any land other than that specified in the schedule accompanying the scheme under section 17(2) (e), the provisions of sections 16 and 17 and of sub-section (1) shall apply to the part of the scheme so altered, in the same manner as if such altered part were the scheme.
[18-A. (1) When by the making of any improvement scheme, any land in the area comprised in the scheme, which is not required for the execution thereof will, in the opinion of the Board, be increased in value, the Board, in framing the scheme, may declare that a betterment fee shall be payable by the owner of
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the land or any person having an interest therein in respect of the increase in value of the land resulting from the execution of the scheme.
(2) Such increase in value shall be the amount by which the value of the land, on the completion of the execution of the scheme estimated as if the land were clear of buildings, exceeds the value of the land prior to the execution of the scheme estimated in like manner, and the betterment fee shall be on- third of such increase in value.
18-B (1) When it appears to the Board that an improvement scheme is sufficiently advanced to enable the amount of the betterment fee to be determined, the Board shall, by a resolution passed in this behalf, declare that, for the purpose for determining such fee, the execution of the scheme shall be deemed to have been completed and shall, thereupon, give notice in writing to every person on whom a notice in respect of land to be assessed has been served under sub-section (2) of section 16 or to the successor-in-interest of such person, as the case may be, that the Board proposed to assess the amount of the betterment
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fee payable in respect of such land under section 18-A. (2) The Board shall then assess the amount of betterment fee payable by each person concerned after giving such person an opportunity to be heard and such person shall, within three months from the date of receipt of notice in writing of such assessment from the Board, inform the Board in writing whether or not he accepts the assessment.
(3) When the assessment proposed by the Board is accepted by the person concerned within the period specified in sub-section (2), such assessment shall be final.
(4) If the person concerned does not accept the assessment made by the Board or fails to give the Board the information required under sub-section (2) within the period specified therein, the matter shall be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Government.
18-C. (1) If the Government are satisfied after such inquiry as they think fit that any arbitrator appointed under sub-section (4) of section 18-B has misconducted himself, they may remove him.
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(2) If any such arbitrator dies, resigns, becomes disqualified, is removed, or refuses to perform or in the opinion of the Government, neglects to perform or becomes incapable of performing his functions, the Government shall forthwith appoint another arbitrator.
(3) When the arbitrator has made his award, he shall sign it and forward it to the Board and such award shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), be final and conclusive and binding on all persons.
(4) Any party aggrieved by an award may, within one month from the date of the communication thereof, appeal to the District Judge, Mysore Division, whether the case arises within or outside the limits of the City and any order or decision of the said District Judge shall be final and conclusive and bind on all persons.
18-D. The Board shall pay to the arbitrator a fee to be determined by the
Government in respect of the whole of the scheme for which his services are utilized.
18-E. (1) The arbitrator shall give notice of his proceedings and conduct them in the
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manner prescribed by the Government and communicate the substance of his award in writing to the parties concerned :
Provided that every party to such proceedings shall be entitled to appear before the arbitrator either in person or by his authorized agent.
(2) The arbitrator shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and other material objects.
(3) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the arbitrator shall be in his discretion and the arbitrator shall have full power to determine by whom or our of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid and to give all necessary directions for the purpose.
18-F. When the amount of all betterment fee payable in respect of land in the area comprised in the scheme has been determined under section 18-B or 18-C, as the case may be,
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the Board shall, by a notice in writing, to be served on all persons liable to such payment, fix a date by which such payment shall be made, and interest at the rate of four per cent per annum upon any amount outstanding shall be payable from that date.
18-G. (1) Any person liable to pay a betterment fee in respect of any land, may, at his option, instead of paying the same to the Board, execute an agreement with the Board to leave the payment outstanding as a charge on his interest in the land, subject to the payment in perpetuity of interest at the rate of four per cent per annum, the first annual payment of such interest to be made one year from the date referred to in section 18-F. (2) Every payment due from any person in respect of a betterment fee and every charge referred to in sub-section (1) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment and notwithstanding the existence of any mortgage or other charge, whether legal or equitable, created either before or alter the commencement of this Act, be the first charge upon the interest of such person in such land.
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(3) If any installment of interest due under an agreement executed in pursuance of sub-section (1) be not paid on the date on which it is due, the betterment fee shall become payable on that date, in addition to the said installment.
(4) At any time after an agreement has been executed in pursuance of sub-section (1), any person may pay off the charge created thereby, with interest, at six per cent per annum up to the date of such payment.
18-H. All moneys payable in respect of any land by any person in respect of a betterment fee under section 18-B or section 18- C or by any person under the agreement executed in pursuance of sub-section (1) of Section 18-G, shall be recoverable by the Board (together with interest due, up to the date of realization at the rate of four per cent per annum) from the said person or his successor- in-interest in such land in the manner provided by the Mysore City Municipalities Act, 1933, for the recovery of taxes and if the said money is not so recovered, the Chairman may, after giving public notice of his intention to do so, and not
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less than one month after the publication of such notice, sell the interest of the said person or successor in such land by public auction, and may deduct the said money and the expenses of the sale from the proceeds of the sale, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the defaulter.
18-I. The Board may direct by what authority any powers or duties incident under the Mysore City Municipalities Act, 1933, to the enforcement of any process for the recovery of taxes, shall be exercised and performed when that process is employed under section 18-H. 18-J. If any land in respect of which the payment of a betterment fee has been accepted in pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 18-B, or has been made after its determination under section 18-C or in respect of which an agreement in regard to the betterment fee has been executed under section 18-G, be subsequently required for any of the purposes of this Act, the payment or agreement shall not be deemed to prevent the acquisition of the land in pursuance of a fresh declaration published under section 6 of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
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18-K. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, the Board may, with the previous sanction of the Government, take up such works in regard to any area as the Board considers necessary or desirable for the further improvement of that area :
Provided that the municipal council shall be consulted if such area lies within the limits of the City.
The expenditure incurred or proposed to be incurred or such portion thereof, as may be determined by the Board and approved by the Government in carrying out such works, may be recovered by a pro rata levy on the owners of properties benefited by such works as may be determined by the Board. The said sum may be recovered as any other sum due to the Board under the provisions of this Act.
18-L. Where the increase in value of any land is the result of the execution of an improvement scheme made on the recommendation of the municipal council and for which the Council has placed at the disposal of the Board the necessary funds for framing
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and carrying out such schemes, the betterment fee collected by the Board from the owners of such land shall be credited by the Board to the municipal fund of the council]".
The Board could also acquire land otherwise than by agreement from the owners of the land. Section 23 of the said Act reads as under:
"Sec.23- The acquisition otherwise than by agreement of land within or without the City under this Act shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and by the following further provisions, namely:-
(1) Upon the passing of a resolution by the Board that an improvement scheme under Section 14 is necessary in respect of any locality, it shall be lawful for any person either generally or specially authorized by the Board in this behalf and for his servants and workmen, to do all such acts on or in respect of land in that locality as it would be lawful for an officer duly authorized by Government to act under Section 4 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, and for his
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servants and workmen, to do thereunder; and the provision contained in section 5 of the said Act shall likewise be applicable in respect of damage caused by any of the acts first mentioned.
(2) The publication of a declaration under section 18 shall be deemed to be the publication of a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
(3) For the purposes of section 50 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Board shall be deemed to be the local authority concerned.
(4) After the land vests in the Government under section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the Board agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the Board, and the land shall thereupon vest in the Board".
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The Notifications in the instant case which are dated 25.06.1981 and 29.03.1984 have been issued under the said Act.
8. The said Act has been repealed and substituted by KUDA Act, which has been enforced from 16.11.1987 to provide for the establishment of Urban Development Authorities for the planned development of major and important urban areas in the State and the areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith. The object and purpose of KUDA Act and Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "BDA" Act) are in pari materia. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases has held that the scheme and object of the BDA Act is distinct and different from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, referred to as the "LA Act, 1894", for the sake brevity).
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9. Although, recently this Court in the case of Smt K.M.Chikkathayamma and Others Vs. The State of Karnataka, Urban Development Department and Others reported in ILR 2016 KAR 1603, has held that the acquisition initiated under the KUDA Act would come under the scope of Section 24 of 2013 Act, by a more recent judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Evershine Monuments (earlier known as M/s. Granite exporters) and Others Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others in W.P.Nos.17852- 17856/2014 and connected matters disposed of on 14.12.2017, by following the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been held that Section 24 would not apply to any acquisition initiated under the BDA Act. In other words, it has been held that if an acquisition proceeding has been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, in such a case only, Section 24 of 2013 Act would be applicable.
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10. Section 24 of the 2013 Act is extracted for immediate reference as under:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been
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taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
The title or preamble to Section 24 reads as "Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894" shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. It is explicit, restricted in its scope and not expansive in nature. It is only where the acquisition process has been initiated under LA Act, 1894 that the acquisition would lapse, on the existence of conditions as stated in sub-section (2)
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of Section 24. Same is the case with regard to Clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24.
11. The said Section has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh and others [(2016) 16 SCC 258] (Sukbhir Singh). In said case the acquisition was under the provisions of LA Act, 1894 and not under any other Central or State enactment. Further, it has been held as under:
"11. Section 24(1) begins with a non- obstante clause and covers situations where either no award has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, or where an award has been made under Section 11, land acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed.
12. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The
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necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows:
(a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-
obstante clause keeping sub-section (1) out of harm's way;
(b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;
(c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act;
(d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act;
(e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again."
(underlining by me)
12. Further, in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another [(2017)
- 36 -
6 SCC 751], (Manav Dharam Trust) referring to Sukhbir Singh, it has been observed as under:
"24. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the 1894 Act was under Section 11-A where what would lapse is the ... "entire proceedings for the acquisition of land" whereas under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in passing of an award under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or compensation was not paid within five years prior to 1-1-2014. In other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and taking of possession within the five year period prior to 1- 1-2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in DDA v. Sukbhir Singh: (SCC p.283, para 26)
- 37 -
"26. ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression "deemed to have lapsed"
because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have been ended."
Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an impediment for the transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments cease to exist."
(underlining by me)
- 38 -
13. The aforesaid observations have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question whether subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of attorney holders etc. have locus standi to file a petition seeking declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which, even according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the only issue arising in that case. But, nevertheless, the aforesaid observations have been made in the context of land acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894.
14. Further, in the case of Aligarh Development Authority vs. Meghsingh (AIR 2016 SC 2912), which is also a case arising under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, at paragraph 6 and 7, it has been held as under;
"6. Section 24 of the 2013 Act envisages mainly two situations; i) where the land acquisition proceedings had already been
- 39 -
initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force.
(ii) where the Award has been passed but neither the owner has been dispossessed nor has he been paid the compensation. Under the first, where the award had not been passed, the acquisition proceedings could continue; but the compensation will have to be determined under the scheme of 2013 Act. Under the second category, there is a statutory lapse of the proceedings. There is also an incidental third situation, where award under the 1894 Act had already been passed prior to coming into force of the 2013 Act, but payment is yet to be made and possession is yet to be taken. In that case, the further proceedings after the award could continue under the old Act of 1894; but if either payment or possession has not taken effect in five years prior to the 2013 Act, then proceedings will lapse.
7. In the case before us, since admittedly the award has not been passed, there arises no question of lapse. The land acquisition proceedings would continue but with the rider that the award will have to be passed and
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compensation determined under the provisions of 2013 Act."
Thus, by following the observations and interpretation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it becomes clear that Section 24 of the 2013 Act, [whether it is sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)] applies only when acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, on that short ground alone, it could be held that Section 24 of the 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the BDA Act.
15. The relevant portion in the said judgment could be conveniently extracted as under:
"33. Next, it is necessary to discuss Smt. K.M. Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603], which is a recent judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court and which is the sheet-anchor of learned counsel for the petitioners.
- 41 -
a) The points for determination in the aforesaid case are culled out for immediate reference as under:
"a) Whether the petitions in WP 38868-70 and WP Nos.38871-74/2015 are maintainable in view of the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KUDA Act having been quashed and the same being the subject matter of an appeal before a Division bench of this Court.
b) Whether the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or the LA Act, 2013, should be applied to acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KUDA Act and the BDA Act, if the proceedings are not completed as on the date of coming into force of the LA Act, 2013.
c) What order should follow in each of these petitions."
Learned Single judge has culled out the ingredients of the said sub-section which is extracted later.
b) It is necessary to delineate on this case in detail as heavy reliance has been placed on
- 42 -
the said decision by learned counsel for the petitioners. The primary contention canvassed in the aforesaid case was, as to, whether 2013 Act would be applicable to acquisitions initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (KUDA Act) and BDA Act. If the answer to the same was in the affirmative, then the acquisition proceeding in the aforesaid case which concerned BDA Act also was deemed to have lapsed.
c) In that case, the contention of learned Senior Counsel and learned Counsel for the petitioners was, where a statute is cited by a reference (the cited statute) (LA Act, 1894) into an another statute (the referring statute) (BDA Act/KUDA Act) any repeal or amendment of the cited statute is automatically carried over or reflected in the referring statute. This was in contrast, to a case of legislation by incorporation wherein the repeal or amendment of the incorporated statute does not automatically affect the incorporating statute. It was further contended in the said case that in Offshore Holdings Private Limited, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, Section 36 of the BDA Act (a provision in pari materia with Section 36 of
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KUDA Act) to be a case of legislation by incorporation. But, the repeal of LA Act, 1894 and substitution of 2013 Act created an exception and when the exception applied, the effect would be one of legislation by reference. It was contended that, if LA Act, 1894, was to be applied to acquisitions made under the KUDA Act post 01.01.2014, the quantum of compensation to the land owners in relation to acquisitions under the KUDA Act would be lesser than the compensation vis-à-vis acquisition made under 2013 Act, even though the purpose of the acquisition is same (urban or town planning and allotment of house sites). Similarly, the additional benefits in relation to rehabilitation and resettlement of affected families would also not be available to the land owners even though the purpose of the acquisition remains the same. It was emphasized in that case that the provisions of 2013 Act are more beneficial to the land owners and affected families in land acquisition proceedings. The discriminatory effect as regards compensation and other benefits would occur because there is a complete change in the legislative approach in relation to land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement
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under 2013 Act which is more beneficial to the land owners. It was further contended in the said case that the land owners would thus be entitled to different rates of compensation and other resettlement and rehabilitation benefits, depending upon which Act the acquisition is made, whether under the BDA Act or KUDA Act or the central land acquisition enactments resulting in a discriminatory effect being in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
d) Per contra, the State through learned Advocate General submitted in the said case that the intention of Section 24 in 2013 Act is different and distinct in that the said section has specific reference to acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894. That the object and purpose of Section 24 is not only to save acquisition initiated under LA Act, 1894, but also to declare lapse of acquisition under sub- section (2) of Section 24 and to also give the benefit of the 2013 Act under certain circumstances. It was further contended that Section 27 of KUDA Act as well as BDA Act provide for lapse of scheme of development and consequent inoperation of Section 36 of the Act. That BDA Act being a complete code by itself,
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lapse of acquisition has to be considered under that Act only. It was further contended that Section 24 is more in the nature of a transitory provision and an exception and operates as a link between LA Act, 1894 and 2013 Act.
e) While considering point No.2 extracted above, learned Single Judge in the said case held with regard to interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as under:-
"Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013 provides for lapse of acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, on the satisfaction of certain conditions, which are as follows:
a. The award of compensation should have been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the LA Act, 2013. In that, it should have been passed prior to 01.01.2009;
AND b. Physical possession of the land has not been taken;
OR c. Compensation has not been paid.
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The Apex Court has interpreted the requirement of possession being taken under Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, to mean that actual physical possession has to be taken and mere symbolic possession would not suffice."
(emphasis by me) Although learned Single Judge has noticed that sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies to acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, nevertheless has also held that the "answer to the second point for consideration is that it is the LA Act, 2013 that shall be applied to acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act and KUDA Act, that have remained without being completed in all respects as on 1.1.2014, and proceedings that have been initiated thereafter".
f) Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Section 24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as KUDA Act. Learned Single Judge however noted that sub-section (2) of Section 24 is a substantive provision of law which saves acquisition as well as affords the prospect of land sought to be
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acquired reverting to the land owner under certain conditions.
34. The said decision was rendered on 10.03.2016. It is stated at the Bar that the said decision has been appealed against by the BDA and a Division Bench of this Court has stayed the order passed in the said case.
x x x
37. In my humble opinion, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case as well as similar judgments in other cases, in the context of KUDA, 1987 and BDA Act have been rendered without making an analysis of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, with regard to its applicability to acquisitions initiated under those Acts as opposed to acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894. Further, judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard have not been considered and followed and without bearing in mind the distinction in the object and scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, as well as the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that regard. Learned Single Judge by his order has granted relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. While a reference has been made to the decisions of the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy, Munithimmaiah, and Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd., the said reference is not in depth, as a detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgments, which have been rendered on a detailed comparison of LA Act, 1894 with BDA Act, would have thrown light on the object and scope of Section 24 of 2013 Act.
38. Reliance placed on the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions referred to above in detail would clearly indicate that the object and scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, being distinct and meant for different purposes, it cannot be construed that acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, is an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the judgment in Chikkathayamma's case does not take into consideration the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh and the subsequent decision in the case of Manav Dharam Trust, which are directly on the issue of applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act to only acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894.
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39. With respect, the judgment in the case of Chikkathayamma and other judgments which are similar in nature cannot be considered to be binding precedent as they are contrary to the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above as well as the provision of Section 24 of the 2013 Act and hence cannot be applied to the present cases which deal with acquisition under BDA Act. There are also additional reasons for holding so.
40. Revisiting the words of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, what is significant to note is the fact that the said Section expressly refers to land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894. The said Section does not incorporate the words "or proceedings initiated under any other enactment". Therefore, the expression "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894"
are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. In this regard, the rules of interpretation of a statute would become
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relevant and reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in light of their own views as to policy" unless it is shown to adopt a purposive
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interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case.
41. In this context, Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India reported in AIR 2002 SC 1351 could be relied upon wherein, Cross on "Statutory Interpretation" (Third Edition, 1995) has been relied upon as follows:-
"Thus, an 'ordinary meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used."
42. The aforesaid principles being squarely applicable to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the same must be interpreted having regard to the intention of the Parliament. In this regard, one cannot lose sight of the fact that 2013 Act repeals only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central or State enactment dealing with acquisition. Therefore, what are sought to be
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saved under Section 24 of the 2013 Act, are those acquisitions initiated only under LA Act, 1894 and not any acquisition initiated under any other Central or State enactment. Therefore, the words "acquisition proceedings initiated under any other enactment" cannot be added or supplemented by the Court after the expression "in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"
under both sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Further, the short title of Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as "Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases." This is another indication that Section 24 applies only to those acquisition "initiated" under the provisions of LA Act, 1894.
43. Further, Section 24 creates a new right in favour of land owners in as much as they are entitled to relief under certain circumstances as stipulated in Section 24 of the Act. One such relief is under sub-section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned
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therein exist. One overbearing condition is that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply.
44. The reasons as to why Parliament has incorporated Section 24 in the 2013 Act are evident and not far to see. The said section creates a new right in favour of land owners whose lands have been acquired under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, which has been repealed and substituted by 2013 Act. The 2013 Act is not a substitution for other Central enactments pertaining to acquisition of land or for that matter any other State enactment. Therefore, Section 24 uses the expression that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. But while creating a new right in favour of land owners under Section 24, Parliament at the same time has intended two further aspects: first, saving acquisition under LA Act, 1894 and second, not encroaching upon other Central or State enactments. As far as State enactments dealing with acquisitions are concerned, Parliament intentionally has not touched upon any State
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enactment. The reason being that several State enactments have been made drawing sustenance from Entry 5, List II or State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, whereas LA Act, 1894 as well as 2013 Act could be traced to Entry 42 List III (Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Moreover, as has been explained above, the object and scope of the BDA Act made under Entry 5 List II (State List) are distinct from LA Act, 1894 substituted by 2013 Act.
45. Further, the State enactments have their own provisions concerning lapse of acquisition such as Section 27 of BDA Act or KUDA Act and Section 24 of 2013 Act cannot trammel upon those provisions of the State Acts such as BDA Act or KUDA Act. The State enactments may have referred to certain provisions of LA Act, 1894, particularly with regard to determination of compensation and such other matters. Reference to LA Act, 1894 in the State enactments for certain purposes does not imply that the acquisition is initiated under LA Act, 1894. What is of prime importance for Section 24 of 2013 Act to apply is that acquisition proceedings must
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have been initiated under LA Act, 1894 and not any other law. Losing sight of this aspect would create confusion in the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act. If the said provision is to apply to acquisitions initiated under a State enactment, such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, then Section 27 of the said Acts which also deal with lapse of acquisition under certain circumstances will be rendered nugatory, otiose or redundant on prevailing of circumstances mentioned in Section 24 of the 2013 Act. In this regard, it is also observed that when State Acts such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, have specific provisions in the form of Section 27 concerning lapse of acquisition, Section 24 of the Parliamentary enactment i.e., 2013 Act, cannot be applied, when acquisitions are under State enactments. This is because, the State or Central Laws concerning acquisition are enacted under different entries and in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and therefore, they operate in different fields. This is so, although, the State enactments may refer to the provisions of LA Act, 1894 for certain purposes.
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46. At this stage itself, it may be observed that the issue as to whether LA Act, 1894 has been incorporated into BDA Act by the device of legislation by incorporation or legislation by reference is wholly foreign and outside the scope of controversy while considering the applicability of Section 24 to acquisition initiated under any law (whether State or Central), de hors LA Act, 1894. The arguments of learned counsel for the land owners - petitioners in Chikkathayamma's case on the aforesaid aspect was unwarranted and wholly digressive from the issue to be considered in that case namely, whether Section 24 of 2013 Act was applicable to acquisitions initiated under any law other than LA Act, 1894, such as, BDA Act, KUDA Act. The dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard after comparing the scheme of LA Act, 1894 and BDA Act, are binding and authoritative and the same cannot be brushed aside or ignored by not applying the same in appropriate cases, such as the present one.
47. Thus, 2013 Act has not only repealed the LA Act, 1894, but has substituted the said Act. The 2013 Act is a totally distinct enactment and a complete code by itself. Hence, for the
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aforesaid reasons, initiation of acquisition under State enactments such as BDA Act is not the same as initiation of acquisition under LA Act, 1894.
48. Further, it is noted that 2013 Act has, by virtue of Section 114 thereof, repealed LA Act, 1894. Section 114 reads as under:
"114. Repeal and Saving: (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."
Therefore, what is saved under Section 114 of 2013 Act are only those acts and actions initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, which ought to be saved having regard to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under:
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"6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
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and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a saving clause as per sub-section 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under LA Act, 1894. Sub-section (1), lays down the conditions when the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, would be amenable to the provisions of 2013 Act or, continued under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, on certain conditions or circumstances prevailing. Under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the Parliament has, by a deeming provision, intended that if certain conditions are satisfied, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed.
x x x
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50. Therefore, for a declaration of lapse of acquisition, the pre-conditions or conditions precedent mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act must apply. Most importantly the said conditions must prevail in an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, and not with regard to acquisition initiated under any other enactment be it Central or State enactment. Therefore, before land owners could seek relief under sub- section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which is a right created in their favour, the basic postulate that must be borne in mind is to ascertain, in the first instance, as to under which law, acquisition has been initiated; whether under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or any other law. If it is under any other law, then in my view Section 24 would not be applicable to such acquisitions. The dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited clearly enunciate that an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act being distinct from an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, it cannot be held that acquisition process initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, would also
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encompass acquisition proceedings initiated under any other law such as, the BDA Act. As already noted, the two enactments being distinct having a different object and scope and acquisition of lands being only incidental to the main object and scope under the BDA Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the two Acts cannot be considered on par, so as to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act is "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894."
51. As already observed, Section 24 of the 2013 Act creates a new right in the land owners. For the exercise of said right, certain conditions have to exist, the most significant of them being, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of land owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the BDA Act or KUDA Act. In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals
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and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
"105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being
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beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.
(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such
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modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament."
The enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 105 consists of the following thirteen Parliamentary enactments, namely:
"THE FOURTH SCHEDULE [See section 105] LIST OF ENACTMENTS REGULATING LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958).
2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962).
3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (14 of 1948).
4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886).
5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 (18 of 1885).
6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (33 of 1978).
7. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956).
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8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962).
9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 1952).
10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (60 of 1948).
11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (20 of 1957).
12. The Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003).
13. The Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)."
52. Therefore, Parliament itself has listed the Central enactments to which 2013 Act does not apply. This is because Parliament was conscious of the fact that LA Act, 1894 was substituted by the 2013 Act, which is distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments.
53. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any
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other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise.
54. In the result, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as the acquisitions in these cases were initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act and not under the LA Act, 1894. It is further held, with respect, that Chikkathayamma's and other similar decisions, having regard to the dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited, are not applicable as binding precedent in the present case. Further, most of the decisions referred to above have granted relief on the basis of factual determination as per sub-section 2 of Section 24 and without considering the question of law which arises in these cases. Further, in some
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cases, the petitioners have themselves not pressed sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Even then, relief has been granted on a determination made on facts and by holding that there has been abandonment of acquisition/lapse of acquisition.
55. Hence, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed, as the petitioners are not entitled to relief under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as the said section does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act.
16. The reasoning given on the basis of the dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, which though, are in the context of BDA Act in comparison with LA Act, 1894, the same reasoning would squarely apply to acquisition initiated under 1903 Act. The said Act has been repealed and substituted by KUDA. The provisions of KUDA Act are almost in pari materia to the provisions of the Act, but KUDA has a provision, which is in the nature of Section 27, which is not found in 1903 Act.
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17. As already noted KUDA Act is the Act to provide for the establishment of Urban Development Authorities for the planned development of major and important urban areas in the State and the areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith.
Chapter II of the KUDA Act deals with the Urban Development Authority. Section 3 of the KUDA Act deals with the constitution and incorporation of the Authority and other Sections of the said Chapter are related to the constitution and incorporation of the said Authority.
Section 14 of the KUDA Act deals with object of the Authority, which reads as under:-
"Sec.14- Objects of the Authority.- The objects of the authority shall be planning and promoting and securing the development of the urban area and for these purposes the authority shall have the power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of moveable and immovable property, whether within or outside the urban area under its jurisdictions, to carry out building, engineering and other operations and
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generally to do all things necessary or expedient for the purpose of such development and for purposes incidental thereto".
Chapter III of the KUDA Act pertains to Development Schemes. Sections 17 to 19 of Chapter III of the KUDA Act are relevant, which read as under:
"Sec.17- Procedure on completion of scheme.- (1) When a development scheme has been prepared, the authority shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement specifying the land which is proposed to be acquired and of the land in regard to which betterment tax may be levied may be seen at all reasonable hours.
(2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the Local Authority, which shall, within thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, forward to the authority for transmission to the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Local Authority may think fit to make with regard to the scheme.
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(3) The authority shall also cause a copy of the said notification to be published in two consecutive issues of a local newspaper having wide circulation in the area and affixed in some conspicuous part of its own office, the Deputy Commissioner's Office, the Office of the Local Authority and in such other places as the authority may consider necessary.
(4) If no representation is received from the local authority within the time specified in sub-section (2), the concurrence of the Local Authority to the scheme shall be deemed to have been given.
(5) During the thirty days next following the day on which such notification is published in the local newspapers the authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the Local Authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax of land revenue assessment on any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the authority proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person to show cause within thirty days from the date of
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the receipt of the notice why such acquisition of the building or land and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made.
(6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the Commissioner and shall be served.-
(a) by personal delivery of, if such person is absent or cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or the building; or
(b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person; or
(c) by registered post addressed to the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person.
Sec.18- Sanction of scheme.- (1) After publication of the scheme and service of notices as provided in Section 17 and after consideration of representations, if any, received in respect thereof, the authority shall submit the scheme, making such modifications, therein as it may think fit to the Government for sanction, furnishing.-
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(a) a description with full particulars of the scheme including the reasons for any modification inserted therein;
(b) complete plans and estimates of the cost of executing the scheme;
(c) a statement specifying the land proposed to be acquired;
(d) any representation received under sub- section (2) of section 17;
(e) a schedule showing the rateable value as entered in the municipal assessment book on the date of the publication of a notification relating to the land under Section 17 or the land assessment of all land specified in the statement under clause (c); and
(f) such other particulars, if any, as may be prescribed.
(2) Where any development scheme provides for the construction of houses, the authority shall also submit to the Government plans and estimates for the construction of the houses.
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(3) After considering the proposal submitted to it the Government may, by order, give sanction to the scheme.
Sec.19- Upon sanction, declaration to be published giving particulars of land to be acquired.- (1) Upon sanction of the scheme, the Government shall publish in the Official Gazette a declaration stating the fact of such sanction and that the land proposed to be acquired by the authority for the purposes of the scheme is required for a public purpose.
(2) The declaration shall state the limits within which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and the place where a plan of the land may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and the authority shall, upon the publication of the said declaration, proceed to execute the scheme.
(4) If at any time it appears to the authority that an improvement can be made in any part of the scheme, the Authority may alter
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the scheme for the said purpose and shall subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) forthwith proceed to execute the scheme as altered.
(5) If the estimated cost of executing the scheme as altered exceeds by a greater sum than five per cent of the estimated cost of executing the scheme as sanctioned, the authority shall not, without the previous sanction of the Government, proceed to execute the scheme, as altered.
(6) If the scheme as altered involves the acquisition otherwise than by agreement, of any land other than the land specified in the schedule referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 18, the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 and of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to the part of the scheme so altered in the same manner as if such altered part were the scheme.
(7) The authority shall not denotify or reconvey any land included in the scheme without the specific orders of the Government.
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(8) The authority shall not allot any land to any individual, organisation or authority, the civic amenity area earmarked in the scheme without the orders of the Government".
Section 25 of the KUDA Act deals with the power of Authority to take up works for further development.
Section 27 of KUDA Act prescribes that the Authority has to execute the Scheme within five years, which reads as under:
"Sec.27- Authority to execute the scheme within five years.- Where within a period of five years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19, the Authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become in-operative".
Chapter IV deals with the acquisition of land.
Section 35 of KUDA Act states that subject to the provisions of the Act and with the previous approval of the Government, the Authority may enter into an agreement with the owner of any land or any interest
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therein, situated within the urban area for the purchase of the said land. Section 36 of KUDA Act deals with applicability of the LA Act, 1894, to an acquisition under KUDA Act and the same reads as under:
"Sec.36- Provisions applicable to the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.- (1) The acquisition of land under this Act otherwise than by agreement within or without the urban area shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the authority shall be deemed to be the local authority concerned.
(3) After the land vests in the Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the authority agreeing to pay any further cost which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the authority, and the land shall thereupon vest in the authority".
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Further the State Government has a power to transfer the land belonging to it or to the local authority under Section 37 of KUDA Act.
Be that as it may, having regard to the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the dictum in K.M.Chikkathayamma's case would not apply to any acquisition initiated under 1903 Act or under KUDA Act.
18. The next contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that Section 27 of KUDA Act deals with lapse of scheme. The said Section which comes under KUDA Act may be applied in the instant case. As already pointed out by the learned AGA, a provision, in the nature of Section 27 is not found under 1903 Act.
Therefore, petitioners cannot raise a contention under Section 27 of KUDA Act, insofar as the acquisition in question is concerned, as the acquisition was made
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under 1903 Act, which was a legislation prior to the enforcement of KUDA Act. Assuming for the sake of argument, the case of the petitioners could be considered under Section 27 of KUDA Act, it is noted that the Preliminary and Final Notifications in the instant case are of the years 1981 and 1984 respectively. The common award was passed on 21.04.1986. The scheme for which the land was acquired was for formation of Vijayanagar layout involving 24 acres. Learned AGA submits that the said scheme has been implemented long ago. But the petitioners have raised the contention under the KUDA Act which is a subsequent enactment by filing these writ petitions in the year 2014. Therefore, contention of the petitioners under Section 27 of KUDA Act (assuming that it could be raised by them) has been raised at a very belated stage. Hence, the writ petitions would have to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, insofar as the contention regarding Section 27 of KUDA
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Act is concerned by placing reliance on judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
19. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:-
a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. V. Mamata Mohanty] the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963
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does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches.
b) In the case of Shankar Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar & Ors. [2011 AIR SCW 3033], the Apex Court at Para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows:
"53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or
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delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."
c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Sawaran Latha and others v. State of Haryana and others [2010(4) SCC 532] has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year
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2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged.
d) In Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M.Meiyappan & Others [2010 AIR SCW 7130], when the acquisition proceedings were challenged ten years after notifications were issued, the Apex Court held that the High Courts should not have entertained the writ petition particularly after passing of the award and that the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches.
e) In Swaika Properties (P) Limited and another v. State of Rajasthan & others [2008 (4) SCC 695], the Apex Court has followed its earlier decisions in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & others [(1996) 11 SCC 501] by observing as follows:
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"After the award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not already taken, exercising power under Section 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. But in this case Section 91 of the BMC Act statutorily comes into play which would indicate that the Land Acquisition Officer while making award should intimate to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the amount of compensation determined and all other expenses. The Corporation shall pay over the same to the Land Acquisition Officer."
It was held that the writ petition had been filed after possession was taken over and the award had become final and therefore, the writ petition
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had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Motilal Agarwal and others [(2011) 5 SCC 394], as the filing of the writ petition was 9 years after the declaration was issued under Section 6(1) of the Act and the delay of six years after passing of the award and the delayed filing of the writ petition was a reason for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. It was held that in a challenge made to the acquisition of land for the purpose of public purpose Courts have consistently held that the delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously, if the petitioner fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay.
g) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others v. D.R.Lakshmi & others, wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain writ petitions where there is inordinate delay,
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while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
h) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & others [(2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus:-
"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."
i) In fact in S.S.Balu and others v. State of Karnataka [(2009) 2 SCC 479], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time.
j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh
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Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & others [(2012) 12 SCC 797].
k) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [(2014)4 SCC 109], on the doctrine of delay and laches and approach of the Court in that regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled as under:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
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delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
(l) Further, recently in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri and others [(2015) 15 SCC 602], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that the writ Court while deciding a writ petition he has to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice.
6. The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable having regard to the facts of the present cases.
16. The next contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to the common award being passed. According to learned counsel, in the
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instant case, the common or general award has not been followed by individual award and that in the absence of any individual award being made in the names of the petitioners, the acquisition insofar as the land in question has lapsed. The said contention also cannot be considered at this point of time. The petitioners ought to have raised such a contention, if the same was available, at the earliest point of time. It is reiterated that the acquisition Notifications are of the years 1981 and 1984 and the common or general award was passed on 21.04.1986, but the writ petitions have been filed on 19.12.2014 nearly three decades later.
Learned counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.09.2012 in W.A.No.15462/2011 and connected matters filed by these petitioners. The appellants in the said writ appeals challenged order dated 23.06.2009 passed in W.P.No.23558/2005. The said writ appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay. The judgment
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dated 07.09.2012 passed in W.A.No.15462/2011 and connected matters by the Division Bench of this Court reads as under:
"After arguing the matter at length, the learned counsel for the appellants seeks permission to withdraw these appeals on the ground that appellants are required to challenge the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
2. If the appellants can challenge the proceedings initiated under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, they are entitled to challenge the same.
3. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed as withdrawn".
20. The Division Bench of this Court has reserved liberty to the appellants therein (petitioners herein) to assail the proceedings initiated under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, if they are entitled to do so. On the strength of that liberty, the petitioners could not have initiated these writ petitions.
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21. It is also relevant to observe that when the petitioners have alienated the land in question to respondent Nos.5 to 15 in the form of house sites, they have no locus standi to seek any relief in respect of the land in question as they have no right, title and interest in the same.
22. In the circumstances, it is held that Section 24 of 2013 Act does not apply to any acquisition initiated under 1903 Act or KUDA. That Section 27 of KUDA does not apply to the instant acquisition.
Secondly, the writ petitions have to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on the ground of locus standi.
In the result, these writ petitions are dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE PB