Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt Anita Jain vs Dilip Kumar on 1 November, 2017
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Civil Revision No.88/2017
Indore, dt. 01/11/2017
Shri Veer Kumar Jain, learned senior counsel with Shri
Abhishay Jain, learned counsel for the applicant.
Shri Rajendra Kumar Samdani, learned counsel for the
respondents.
The applicant before this Court has filed present revision petition against order dated 09/02/2017 passed in Civil Suit No.52-A/2017 by which the trial Court has refused to decide the preliminary issue in respect of limitation.
The contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that It is an undisputed fact in the present case that the mother of the respondents executed a registered sale deed in favour of the Petitioner on 23/01/2010 with respect to the suit property. The petitioner is admittedly in possession of the suit property. The present suit was filed on 03/02/2016 i.e. nearly after lapse of 6 years.
In respect of the suit in question, the respondents have challenged the aforesaid sale deed. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid sale deed, which was executed by Ratanbai, the respondent No.1 and wife of respondent No.2 are attesting witnesses. Thus since inception, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were not only fully aware of the execution of the said sale deed but were the consenting parties also.
He further submits that the respondents have filed the -2- present suit stating therein that by a sale deed dated- 03/05/1956, the suit property was purchased by their mother, Ratanbai and their grandmother, Jhumabai. Thereafter, Jhumabai had executed a Will in favour of Ratanbai regarding her share in the suit property and Jhumabai had expired. Thus, Ratanbai became the sole owner of the suit property. It is further claimed that Ratanbai had executed a Will with respect to the suit property in favour of the respondents and another brother Padam Kumar. It is further stated that the petitioner by playing fraud got executed a registered sale deed in her favour from Ratanbai with respect to the suit property. It is further claimed that after death of Ratanbai and according to her Will, the respondents are the owners of the suit property. The respondents have paid fixed Court fees on the plaint instead of ad-valorem Court fees.
Learned senior counsel Shri Jain submits that the respondents have also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction which was dismissed and it was held that the suit is prima-facie barred time. An appeal filed against the said order was also dismissed as prima-facie the suit was barred by time.
The applicant filed written statement challenging the averments made in the plaint. The learned trial Court has framed six issues in the matter. Out of the 6 issues, issue No.4 and 5 were ordered to be considered as preliminary issues. The issue No.4 is with respect to valuation and Court fees, while the issue No.5 is with respect to the fact whether the suit is barred by time -3- or not ?
It is pertinent to mention here that nowhere it is claimed by the respondents that Respondent No.1 and wife of respondent No.2 are not the attesting witnesses to the sale deed in question.
The respondents have stated that on 26/01/2016 the Petitioner started demolishing the ground floor of the suit property, therefore, the cause of action has arisen on that day and the suit is within time.
The learned trial Court by order dated 09/02/2017 has held that issue No.5 i.e. issue with regard to limitation and the suit being barred by limitation, will be considered after recording the evidence. With regard to issue No.4 relating to valuation and Court fees, the learned trial Court has held that the respondents are liable to pay ad-valorem Court fees according to the valuation of the suit property (sale deed). The learned trial Court has granted them time to pay ad-valorem Court fees.
In the present case, it is not in dispute nor can be disputed that the respondents since inception were fully aware being the witness to the sale deed that their mother executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The said sale deed was never disputed either by the mother during her life time and nor thereafter, till filing of the suit. It can not also be disputed that the petitioner is in possession of the suit property. It is also pertinent to mention that in the suit, the respondents have filed a photocopy of the certified copy of the sale deed and the said certified copy was obtained in -4- the year 2010. Hence, the respondents were fully aware of the sale deed and its nature. It is also not in dispute that under the provisions of Limitation Act, the limitation prescribed is 3 years from the date of execution of sale deed. Hence the suit is certainly barred by time and for determination of the said issue no oral evidence is required because execution of sale deed and witnessing thereto by the respondents is neither in dispute nor is disputed.
Thus, the undisputed facts reveal that plaintiff No.1 himself was a witness to the sale deed in question. The wife of the plaintiff No.1 was again witness to the sale deed in question which was executed on 23/01/2010. A certified copy was also obtained by them on 16/07/2010 and undisputedly, the civil suit has been filed on 03/02/2016.
This Court in the case of Leeladhar & Others Vs. Anwar Patel (Civil Revision No.275/2011 on 08/03/2016) in paragraph No.6 to 25 has held as under:-
"6- The first ground raised in the application preferred under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was that the so called agreement was executed on 10/06/1985 and the land in question was sold to the defendants No.1, 2 and 3 in the year 1995 and the suit was filed in the year 2011 for declaring the sale deed as null and void. It was further stated that in light of the judgment delivered in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industires Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Vs. State of Haryana & Another reported in 2009(4) MPLJ 315, the registration of the document is a notice to all concerned and therefore, as the sale deeds were executed in the year 1995 and the civil suit was filed in the year 2011 for declaration in respect of cancellation of sale deeds, was hopelessly barred by limitation. 7- Another ground was raised before this Court that the trial -5- Court while dismissing the application preferred under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC has failed to consider the necessary averments so as to attract the provisions of Sec.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Another ground has been raised that the trial Court has failed to consider that the suit is barred by Sec.34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Another ground was raised that the trial Court has failed to consider that the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) has not complied with the mandatory provisions of order VI Rule 4(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
8- It was also argued that earlier also a civil suit was filed i.e. Civil Suit No.5-A/20011 which was filed in respect of some piece of land with a prayer clause for restraining the defendants therein from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and subsequently with the same prayer including a prayer for cancellation of sale deeds a subsequent suit was filed and therefore, the subsequent suit was hit with the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.
9- Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has vehemently argued before this Court that the plaintiff is not a title holder of the property and in absence of any right, title or interest, he is seeking declaration of sale deeds as null and void in respect of title holder who has derived the title on account of registered sale deed. It has also been stated that instead of filing a suit for specific performance of contract, a suit has been filed for declaration of sale deeds as null and void. He has also stated that the so called agreement was executed in the year 1985 and in the year 2011 a suit for specific performance of contract has become hopelessly time barred and therefore, no suit for specific performance of contract was filed. 10- It has also been argued that in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is nowhere stated. He has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Karim Bhai Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in ILR 2009(3) 3167.
11- On the other hand, Shri Assudani has vehemently argued before this Court that such an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is not at all maintainable. He has argued that the Order II rule 2 will not operate as a bar in respect of the second suit is in respect of cancellation of sale deed. It has also been vehemently argued that in light of the Sec.53 of the Transfer of Property Act on account of part performance of contract and also on account of factum of possession which was delivered to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is certainly having a right and interest in the property. Hence, the moment the plaintiff came to the knowledge of the sale deeds, he has filed a civil suit in the year 2011 immediately praying cancellation -6- of sale deed and therefore, in light of Sec.53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the civil suit is very much maintainable. 12- Shri Assudani has placed reliance upon judgments delivered in the case of Chetak Constructions Ltd. Indore Vs. Om Prakash & Others reported in 2002(5) MPLJ 129, Shrimant Shamrao Suryawanshi & Anr. Vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryawanshi & Anr. reported in 2002(1) MPLJ 589, Ghanshyam & Ors. Vs. Babulal reported in 2004(3) MPLJ 172, Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani reported in 2003(4) MPLJ 439, Bhikam Chandra Vs. Ghichi Bai reported in 1999(II) MPWN Note No.136, Ambaram & Ors. Vs. Pramilabai & Ors. reported in 1997(1) MPLJ 13. 13- The relevant statutory provisions necessary for adjudicating the civil revision reads as under:-
"Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:-
2. Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any protection of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.- Were a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if the omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action."
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:-
11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of
action;
(b) where the the relief claimed is undervalued,
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and the plaintiff, on being required by the
Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of rule 9;
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.
Sections 53-A and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act:-
[53-A.- Part performance.--Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that 2[***] where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any -8- right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.]
54.- "Sale" defined.--''Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.
Sale how made.--Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale.--A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.
Sections 34 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:-
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.-- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.-- A trustee of property is a "person interested to deny" a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.-9-
41. Injunction when refused.-- An injunction cannot be granted--
(a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings;
(b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought;
(c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body;
(d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter;
(e) to prevent the breach of a contract the
performance of which would not be
specifically enforced;
(f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an
act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance;
(g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced;
(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust;
(i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his
agents has been such as to disentitle him to
the assistance of the court;
(j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest
in the matter."
14- From reading of 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, it is clear
that a prospective purchaser is entitled to protect his possession, only if, he has done something further in pursuance of the contract. In the present case, though the alleged agreements to sale and possession of the Respondent No.1 are disputed but even if, they are considered as it is, clear from the plaint that the Respondent No. 1 has done nothing in pursuance of the alleged agreements to sale. It is also not pleaded that the Respondent No.1 was ready and willing to perform his part of contract or was willing to get sale deed executed. It is also pertinent to mention that according to the proviso
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no such right is available against the purchaser for consideration without notice like the present petitioners. Hence, the Respondent No. 1 is not entitled to maintain the suit for permanent injunction u/s 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Nanjegowda & Ors. Vs. Gangamma & Ors. reported in (2011) 13 SCC 232. The apex Court in paragraph 9 has held as under:-
"9. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a party can take shelter behind this provision only when the following conditions are fulfilled. They are:
(i) The contract should have been in writing signed by or on behalf of the transferor;
(ii) The transferee should have got possession of the immovable property covered by the contract;
(iii) The transferee should have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(iv) The transferee has either performed his part of the contract or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
A party can take advantage of this provision only when it satisfies all the conditions aforesaid. All the postulates are sine qua non and a party cannot derive benefit by fulfilling one or more conditions."
15- Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Manik Rao & Ors. Vs. Ramesh & Ors. reported in 2012(2) MPLJ 683, wherein the this Court in paragraphs No.7 and 8 has held as under:-
"7. The condition precedent for applicability of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are firstly, that there should be a contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property; secondly, that the contract should be in writing and its terms can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; thirdly, that the transferee in part-performance of the contract has taken possession of the property or any part thereof or if he is already in possession, he continues in possession in part-performance of the contract; fourthly, that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and fifthly, that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Besides that, a party relying on section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act has to plead and prove the readiness and willingness on its part to perform the contract.
8. From perusal of paragraph 3(ka) of the written
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statement, it is apparent that defendants instead of filing the suit for specific performance of the contract, had initiated proceedings before the revenue Court for acquisition of title. The defendants in their written statement have failed to plead the readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. On the other hand, the defendants had initiated the proceedings under section 190 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 for conferral of Bhumiswami rights in 1967 and, therefore, the defendants are not entitled to benefit of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. For the aforementioned reasons, the second substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in the negative and against the appellants."
16- It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that a suit on basis of section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act is not maintainable as the said provision can be used as a shield and not as sword. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has relying upon several judgments and has argued that a suit on the basis of section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act can be filed. Leaving this question apart, in view of proviso to the Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and also in view of section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, because the Respondent No.1 has not resorted to equally efficacious remedy i.e. by filing a suit for specific performance, hence the suit for permanent injunction was not maintainable.
17- It is not in dispute in the present case that the Respondent No.1 is not the owner of the suit land as there is no conveyance deed in his favour and the Respondent No. 1 is claiming his right on the basis of alleged agreements to sale. It cannot be disputed that in view of clear provision of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement to sale does not confer any title. Thus, if the Respondent No. 1 himself is not the owner of the suit property, how can he challenge the title of the other who acquired title by registered sale deed in his favour. It is settled position of law that a person can challenge the title of other, only if, he himself is having title in the suit property. Apart from it in view of the proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, until the Respondent No. 1 claims ownership or claim relief for specific performance for acquiring title for he is entitled to claim, in absence of the same, a mere suit for declaration as the present suit is clearly hit by the proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
18- It cannot be disputed that the Respondent No.1 has filed a previous suit i.e. C.O.S. No. 5-A/2011 before the XIII Civil Judge
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Class-I, Indore and during the pendency of the said suit the present suit was filed. It has been argued by learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the relief prayed in the present suit is different from the previous suit. The question is, when the suit property and claim of the Respondent No.1 is the same, why was the relief prayed in the present suit not claimed/prayed in the previous suit, while the same could have been and should have been claimed in the previous suit and if the same was not claimed or omitted to be claimed, the subsequent suit would be clearly hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC. In view of the aforesaid provision of law, present suit is clearly barred by law and hence, the plaint is liable to be rejected. 19- The provisions of Order VI Rule 4-A of CPC are mandatory in nature and it is clear from the bare perusal of the suit, it is clear that there no necessary pleadings which are mandatorily required to be made in the plaint. Thus failure to comply with the aforesaid mandatory provisions of law would lead to rejection of the plaint. 20- The present suit is clearly barred by time as the sale deeds challenged in the suit are of the year 1995 and the suit has been filed in the year 2011 i.e. after more than three years of execution and registration of the sale deeds. The law being that registration of document is notice to whole world as has been held in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. Through Director Vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in 2009(4) MPLJ 315 as under :-
"8. The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future "any right, title or interest"
whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs.100 and upwards to or in immovable property. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transaction relating to immovable property, even if the document is
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lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, so as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title of the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified."
21- It is also clear that the present suit filed in the year 2011 to challenge the sale deeds of the year 1995 i.e. after 16 years is clearly barred by time, while the period of limitation is only 3 years. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners' name in the revenue record were also recorded in the year 1995. Thus, the suit filed by the Respondent No.1 is clearly barred by limitation as has been held by this Court in the case of Nanhi Bai Vs. Govind Rao reported in MPWN 2006 V. 3 NOTE 88 as under:-
"9. Regarding substantial question of law No.(b) :
The gift deed is dated 6.2.1976 and the suit for its cancellation has been filed by the plaintiff on 6.4.1986. Under Article 59 of the Indian Limitation Act, the prescribed period of limitation is three years from the date of execution of instrument first become knowledge to the plaintiff. It is no more in dispute that Ex.D-1 gift deed dated 6.2.1976 is very well in the knowledge of the plaintiff right from the day of its execution and, therefore, the suit for cancellation of document ought to have been brought within three years from this date. Since the suit has been filed on 8.4.1986, therefore, it has become time barred.
Substantial question of law No. (b) is thus answered accordingly."
22- The aforesaid facts are undisputed and are clear from the
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plaint and undisputed documents and the objections raised by the petitioners are purely legal objections, hence no evidence with regard thereto is required and can be decided on the basis of legal position. Thus, the learned trial court has clearly committed jurisdictional error firstly in not considering the aforesaid objection and secondly in holding that evidence is required to be recorded for deciding the aforesaid issues.
23- The petitioners have also raised objections with regard to valuation of the suit, court fees, etc. It has also been objected that the petitioners are in possession of the suit land since 1995 which is not only proved from the registered sale deeds as also from the revenue record. There no evidence to even show that the Respondent No. 1 is in possession of the suit land, hence a suit without claiming the relief of possession is not maintainable. Certain objections with regard to the alleged agreements to sale are also raised. These objections may require some kind of evidence, however in view of the above legal objections, the suit is barred and hit by law, therefore, there more than sufficient grounds to reject the plaint.
24- The manner in which the learned trial court has dealt with the judicial precedent relied upon by the petitioners is also not proper because it has merely been observed that those citations are not applicable in the present circumstances without any discussion. Even all objections, which are purely legal objections, are not considered and decided. This approach of the learned trial court clearly amounts to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law. 25- In view of the aforesaid, the suit filed by the Respondent No.1 is clearly barred by law and allowing its continuance would be gross misuse of process of law, hence the plaint deserves to be rejected and consequently the suit deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, the present civil revision stands allowed. The application preferred under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 stands allowed and the plaint is rejected."
In light of the aforesaid judgment it can be safely gathered that the plaintiffs were having knowledge of the sale deed which was executed in the year 2010 and therefore, as the limitation provided is only three years for challenging the sale deed, the issue framed by the trial Court in respect of limitation has to be answered in favour of the defendants.
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In another case Nanhibai Vs. Govindrao reported in 2006(iii) MPWN 88 in paragraph No.9, this Court has held as under:-
"9. Regarding substantial question of law No. (b) :
The gift deed is dated 6-2-1976 and the suit for its cancellation has been filed by the Plaintiff on 6-4-1986. Under Article 59 of the Indian Limitation Act, the prescribed period/of limitation is three years from the date of execution of instrument first become knowledge to the Plaintiff. It is no more in dispute that Ex. D-l gift deed dated 6-2-1976 is very well in the knowledge of the Plaintiff right from the day of its execution and, therefore, the suit for cancellation of document ought to have been brought within three years from this date. Since the suit has been filed on 8-4-1986, therefore, it has become time barred. Substantial question of law No.
(b) is thus, answered accordingly."
In light of the aforesaid, as civil suit was filed after six years from the date of execution of the sale deed praying declaration of sale deed as null and void, the suit was certainly barred by limitation in light of Article 59 of the Limitation Act.
Resultantly, the revision stands allowed and the suit is dismissed as it is barred by limitation.
Certified Copy as per rules.
(S. C. SHARMA)
JUDGE
Tej
Tej Digitally signed by Tej Prakash Vyas
DN: c=IN, o=High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, ou=Administration,
Prakash postalCode=452010, st=Madhya
Pradesh,
2.5.4.20=9476cde1d020b647977772
129e067359e9c0bf4b42c56550ea31
Vyas
d297b1b54c15, cn=Tej Prakash Vyas
Date: 2017.11.03 11:41:29 -07'00'