Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
State Election Commission vs Malladi Rajendra Prasad And Ors. on 23 June, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(5)ALD97
Author: G.S. Singhvi
Bench: G.S. Singhvi
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, C.J.
1. This appeal is directed against order dated 21-6-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPMP No. 15303 of 2006 in WP No. 12308 of 2006 whereby Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the writ petition i.e., Election-cum-Returning Officer, East Godavari District and District Collector, East Godavari District, have been directed to accept the nomination paper of the writ petitioner Malladi Rajendera Prasad (Respondent No. l herein) for contesting election to Zilla Parishad Territorial Constituency of Tallarevu.
2. In the writ petition filed by him, Respondent No. l averred that as per the schedule of election notified by the State Election Commission (appellant herein), the last date for filing nomination paper was 17-6-2006 and 18-6-2006 was fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers. He filed nomination on 17-6-2006. The same was rejected by the Election-cum-Returning Officer, Kakinada on the ground that his name was not reflected in the electoral rolls of Tallarevu. Respondent No. l further averred that he had made an application before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Kakinada (Urban) for deleting his name from the electoral roll of Kakinada (Urban) and to add the same in the electoral roll of Tallarevu because he had shifted permanent residence from Kakinada (Urban) to Korangi of Tallarevu Mandal, but the same was not decided and, at the time of scrutiny, the officer concerned arbitrarily rejected his nomination paper. He pleaded that the action taken by Election-cum-Returning Officer, Kakinada to reject his nomination paper is liable to be declared as violative of the scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and, therefore, a direction be issued to the respondents to entertain his nomination paper.
3. On a consideration of the averments contained in the affidavit of Respondent No. l, the learned Single Judge passed order dated 21-6-2006 for entertaining his nomination paper.
4. The main ground on which the appellant has assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge is that the writ petition filed by Respondent No. l questioning rejection of his nomination paper is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the appellant, Article 243-0 of the Constitution imposes a complete bar against entertaining of challenge to the election except by way of election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of law enacted by the State Legislature and the learned Single Judge committed an error by entertaining the writ petition filed by Respondent No. l and issuing direction to the authorities concerned to entertain his nomination paper. Another plea taken by the appellant is that the last date fixed for withdrawal of nominations and publication of the list of contesting candidates was 21-6-2006 and, therefore, the learned Single Judge should not have passed interim order on 21-6-2006 for entertaining the nomination paper.
5. Shri A.K. Kishore Reddy relied on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in S. Jyothi v. Presiding Officer/Election Officer, Thottambedu Mandal, Chittoor District and argued that in view of the ratio of that decision, the writ petition filed by his client questioning the rejection of his nomination paper is maintainable and the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by directing the concerned authorities to entertain his nomination paper. Shri Reddy submitted that the petitioner cannot question the result of election on the ground of wrongful rejection of his nomination paper by filing petition under Section 233 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act') read with Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Election Tribunals in respect of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zilla Parishads) Rules, 1995 (for short 'the Rules') and, therefore, the writ petition filed by him has been rightly entertained.
6. Shri Nuty Ram Mohan Rao controverted the arguments of Shri A.K. Kishore Reddy and submitted that the learned Single Judge should have non-suited Respondent No. l in view of the unequivocal bar contained under Article 243-0 of the Constitution. He pointed out that election can be challenged by filing petition under Section 233 of the Act on the ground of wrongful rejection of nomination paper and if the Election Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the nomination paper of any candidate was wrongfully rejected, then, in terms of Rule 12(c) of the Rules, the result of election can be invalidated.
7. We have considered the respective submissions. Article 243-0, which bars interference by Courts in electoral matters, reads as under:
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution
(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of. constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to be made under Article 243-K, shall not be called in question in any Court;
(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.
8. A reading of the above reproduced provision makes it clear that the ambit and reach of the bar contained in Article 243-O is very wide and pervasive. The non~ obstante clause contained therein excludes all other provisions of the Constitution including Article 226 and lays down that the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to be made under Article 243-K shall not be called in question in any Court. It also declares that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. This means that the power of the judicial review conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which constitutes one of the basic features of the Constitution, stands postponed till after the adjudication of the election dispute by an adjudicatory authority constituted under the law enacted by the Legislature of the concerned State. To put it differently, any challenge to the election or any election dispute can be adjudicated only by an authority constituted by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State and not otherwise. The High Court can entertain writ petition against the adjudicatory order passed by the Tribunal etc., constituted under the State legislation, but a petition questioning the election cannot be filed directly under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. Article 329(b), which contains a provision similar to Article 243-O, came up for interpretation before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in N.P. Ponnuswamy v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency . In that case, the appellant was one of the persons who had filed nomination paper to Madras Legislative Assembly from Namakkal Constituency of Salem District. The Returning Officer rejected his nomination paper. The appellant moved the High Court by filing petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prayed for quashing of the order of the Returning Officer and for issue of a mandamus for inclusion of his name in the list of valid nominations. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by observing that it did not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Retuning Officer. On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the word 'election' appearing in Part XV of the Constitution and held:
the word 'election' has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the right sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return the candidate to the Legislature. The use of the expression 'conduct of elections' in Article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning and that meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions which occur in Part XV including Article 329(b). The term 'election' may be taken to embrace the whole procedure whereby an elected member is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll. It is not used in narrow sense.
10. The Supreme Court then considered the question whether the High Court can interfere with the ongoing process of election and answered the same in negative. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the judgments of Madras High Court in Srinivasulu v. Kuppuswami AIR 1928 Mad. 25 and of Lahore High Court in Satnarayan v. Hanuman Prasad AIR 1946 Lahore 85 and approved the ratio of those decisions by making the following observations:
The law of election in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts having been expressly excluded), and Anr. after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a Special Tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any Court. Under the election law, the only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. Article 329(b) was apparently enacted to prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground, and other grounds which may raised under the law to call the election in question could be urged. It follows by necessary implication from the language of this provision that those grounds cannot be urged in any other manner, at any other stage and before any other Court. If the grounds on which an election can be called in question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors, if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a provision like Article 329(b) and in setting up a Special Tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the Article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution could not have contemplated, one of them being that conflicting views may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and by the Election Tribunal, which is to be an independent body, at the stage when the matter is brought up before it.
The Representation of the People Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which means that whenever we have to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections, we have only to look at the Act and the rules made thereunder. Section 80, which is drafted in almost the same language as Article 329(b), provides that "no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part." Section 80, along with Sections 100, 105 and 170 are the main provisions regarding election matters being judicially dealt with, and there is no provision anywhere to the effect that anything connected with elections can be questioned at an intermediate stage.
11. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner , another Constitution Bench considered the scope of non-obstante clause contained in Article 329(b) and laid down the following propositions.
(1) Having regard to the important functions which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognized to be a matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matter and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted.
(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the "election", and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the "election" and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a Special Tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any Court while the election is in progress.
12. In State of Uttar Pardesh v. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti 1995 Suppl. (2) SCC 305, the Supreme Court considered the nature of non-obstante clause contained in Article 243-O and observed:
What is more objectionable in the approach of the High Court is that although Clause (a) of Article 243(o) of the Constitution enacts a bar on the interference by the Court in electoral matters including that questioning of the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K and the election to any Panchayat. the High Court has gone into the question of validity of the delimitation of the constituencies and also the allotment of seats to them. We may, in this connection, refer to a decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission . In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved for the Scheduled Castes. This Court held that the impugned notification was a law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made under Article 327 of the Constitution, and that an examination of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act showed that the matters therein dealt with were not subject to the scrutiny of any Court of law. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the results would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from Court to Court. Although an order under Section 8 or 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act and published under Section 10(4) of that Act puts such an order in the same position as a law made by Parliament itself which could be made by it under Article 327. If we read Articles 243-C. 243-K and 243-0 in place of Article 327 and Sections 2(kk). 11-F and 12-BB of the Act in place of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act. 1950. it will be obvious that neither the delimitation of the Panchayat area nor of the constituencies in the said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged nor the Court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31-9-1994.
(underlining is ours)
13. In Anugrah Narayan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , the Supreme Court considered the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243 ZG, which is para-materia to Article 243-0 and held as under:
In terms of Article 243-ZG of the Constitution there is complete and absolute bar in considering any matter relating to municipal election on any ground whatsoever after the publication of the notification for holding municipal election. The bar imposed by Article 243-ZG is twofold. Validity of laws relating to delimitation and allotment of seats made under Article 243-ZA cannot be questioned in any Court. No election to a municipality can be questioned except by an election petition. Moreover, it is well settled by now that if the election is imminent or well under way, the Court should not intervene to stop the election process. If this is allowed to be done, no election will ever take place because someone or the other will always find some excuse to move the Court and stall the elections.
(Emphasis added)
14. In Manda Jagannath v. K.S. Rathnam , the Supreme Court considered the question whether an order passed by the Returning Officer rejecting Form-B filled by a candidate and refusal to allot party symbol to him could be interfered in a writ petition. The Supreme Court referred to the non-obstante clause contained in Article 329(b) and held:
(i) Under Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India there is a specific prohibition against any challenge to an election either to the Houses of Parliament or to the Houses of Legislature of the State except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for in a law made by the appropriate Legislature. The Parliament has by enacting the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provided for such a forum for questioning such election hence, under Article 329(b) no forum other than such forum constituted under the R.P. Act can entertain a complaint against any election.
(ii) Where the Returning Officer while scrutinizing the nomination paper of the petitioner found that Form B which is required to be filled by the candidate for claiming party symbol was incompletely filled and vital clauses in the Form B were left blank and therefore rejected Form B of the petitioner and refused to allot him party symbol, the order could not be interfered with by High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
(iii) There are special situations wherein writ jurisdiction can be exercised but special situation means errors having he effect of interfering in the free flow of the scheduled election or hinder the progress of the election which is the paramount consideration. If by an erroneous order conduct of the election is not hindered then the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with the orders of the Returning Officers remedy for which lies in an election petition only. In the present case by not allotting a symbol claimed by petitioner the Returning Officer has not stalled or stopped the progress of the election. The petitioner has been treated as an independent candidate and he is permitted to contest with a symbol assigned to him as an independent candidate, and consequently there is no question of stalling the election. His grievance as to such non-allotment of the symbol will have to be agitated in an election petition.
15. A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Kanchanbhail v. Maneklal 1965 (6) GLR 200 (DB), interpreted Section 24 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1962 and Rules 14(2) and 14(8) of the Gujarat District Panchayats Election Rules, 1962, which are pari materia to Section 31 of the 1994 Act and Rule 12 of the Rules. In the first instance, the Division Bench of that High Court formulated the question of law in the following terms:
Now what are the questions which can be raised by an aggrieved person in an application under Section 24? The Section empowers an aggrieved person and any person qualified to vote at an election would be an aggrieved person-to bring the validity of the election into question before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, or the Civil Judge, Senior Divisions, as the case may be, by making an application within fifteen days from the date of declaration of the result of the election. What questions can be raised in such an application must, therefore, depend on what is comprehended within the expression "bringing the validity of the election into question". When an aggrieved person questions the decision of the Returning Officer rejected a nomination paper, can it be said that he is questioning the validity of the election or bringing the validity of the election in question? That raises the question what is the true meaning to be given to the word "elections" in Section 24.
16. The Division Bench then referred to the wider interpretation placed on the term 'election' in N.P. Ponnuswamy's case (supra) and observed:
The context of Section 24 also supports the view that the word "election" has been used in the Section in a wide sense and not in a narrow sense. Section 24 occurs in Chapter III which contains a fasciculus of Sections commencing from Section 18 and ending with Section 26 dealing, as the heading of the Chapter shows, with "Election, Appointment or Co-option of Members of Panchayats, Election Disputes Etc.". We have already pointed out that Section 18 provides that election shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Rules. Section 19 deals with the circumstances in which members may be appointed in lieu of elected members. The division of the electorate into electoral divisions is provided in Section 20 while Section 21 provides for the preparation of the list of voters. Who shall be the person qualified to vote and be elected is dealt with in Section 22 and Section 22A imposes restrictions on simultaneous or double membership of Panchayats. Section 23 lays down the disqualifications which disentitle a person to be a member of the Panchayat or to continue as such member. Then comes Section 24 which provides for the determination of validity of elections. Apart from there being nothing in the language of Section 24 which would indicate that the word "election" has been used in a narrow sense, there is positive evidence in the Section itself which shows that the word "election" as used in it has a wide meaning and questioning the validity of the election within the meaning of the Section includes questioning of the decision of the Returning Officer as regards rejection of a nomination paper. Sub-section (2A) is a provision which throws considerable light on this question. It clearly shows that the validity of an election can be questioned under Section 24 on the ground of any breach of or any omission to carry out or any non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or the rules whereby the result of the election has been materially affected. Unless such a ground is a valid ground available to an aggrieved person for questioning the validity of the election under the Section, it is difficult to see why the Legislature should have thought it necessary to introduce Sub-section (2A) and particularly the Explanation to it. The Legislature was obviously anxious to provide that a mere error by the officer charged with carrying out the rules or a mere irregularity or informality not corruptly caused should not be a ground for questioning the validity of an election but it made it clear by enacting the Explanation that if there is any breach of or, any omission to carry out or any non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or the rules by reasons of which the result of the election has been materially affected, the election may be set aside by the Civil Judge under Section 24. Now Sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 lays down the grounds on which a nomination paper may be rejected by the Returning Officer. If the Returning Officer has rejected a nomination paper otherwise than in accordance with these grounds, the rejection of the nomination paper would clearly amount to a breach of or non-compliance with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 and if in consequence of that, the result of the election has been materially affected - which it undoubtedly would be - the election can be set aside by the Civil Judge. The validity of the election can, therefore, be questioned by an aggrieved person under Section 24 on the ground that a nomination paper was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. This much is clear on a construction of Section 24.
17. The ratio of the aforementioned decisions is that in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot entertain a petition filed by a candidate to the election with the grievance that his nomination has been wrongfully rejected or that he has been deprived of opportunity to contest the election.
18. In view of the above, we hold that the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 questioning the alleged wrongful rejection of his nomination paper is not maintainable and the learned Single Judge committed an error by entertaining the same and issuing an interim direction for consideration of his candidature.
19. Before parting with this issue, we may notice the judgment of three-Judge Bench in Election Commission of India v. As hole Kumar , on which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for Respondent No. l in support of his argument that despite of non-obstante clause contained in Article 243-O, the High Court can pass appropriate order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in furtherance of process of election. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court noticed several judicial precedents including Constitution Bench judgments, Ponnuswamy's case (supra) and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra), and held that judicial intervention with the process of election is impermissible and the aggrieved person has to file an election petition after the process of election is over. This is clearly discernible from Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the judgment, which are extracted below:
29. Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 need to be read with Article 329(b), the former being a product of the latter. The sweep of Section 100 spelling out the legislative intent would assist us in determining the span of Article 329(b) though the fact remains that any legislative enactment cannot curtail or override the operation of a provision contained in the Constitution. Section 100 is the only provision within the scope of which an attack on the validity of the election must fall so as to be a ground available for avoiding an election and depriving the successful candidate of his victory at the polls. The Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill case (vide SCC p. 429, Para 33) asks us to read Section 100 widely as "covering the whole basket of grievances of the candidates". Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 100 is a "residual catch-all clause". Whenever there has been non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or of any Rules or Orders made thereunder if not specifically covered by any other preceding clause or sub-clause of the Section it shall be covered by sub-clause (iv). The result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate shall be set aside for any such non-compliance as the abovesaid subject to such non-compliance, also satisfying the requirement of the result of the election having been shown to have been materially affected insofar as a returned candidate is concerned. The conclusions which inevitably follow are: in the field of election jurisprudence, ignore such things as do not materially affect the result of the election unless the requirement of satisfying the test of material effect has been dispensed with by the law; even if the law has been breached and such breach satisfies the test of material effect on the result of the election of the returned candidate yet postpone the adjudication of such dispute till the election proceedings are over so as to achieve, in larger public interest, the goal of constituting a democratic body without interruption or delay on account of any controversy confined to an individual or group of individuals or single constituency having arisen and demanding judicial determination.
30. To what extent Article 329(b) has an overriding effect on Article 226 of the Constitution? The two Constitution Benches have held that Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides for only one remedy; that remedy being by an election petition to be presented after the election is over and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage. The non-obstante clause with which Article 329 opens, pushes out Article 226 where the dispute takes the form of calling in question an election (see Para 25 of Mohinder Singh Gill case). The provisions of the Constitution and the Act read together do not totally exclude the right of a citizen to approach the Court so as to have the wrong done remedied by invoking the judicial forum; nevertheless the lesson is that the election rights and remedies are statutory, ignore the trifles even if there are irregularities or illegalities, and knock the doors of the Courts when the election proceedings in question are over. Two-pronged attack on anything done during the election proceedings is to be avoided - one during the course of the proceedings and the other at its termination, for such two-pronged attack, if allowed, would unduly protract or obstruct the functioning of democracy.
20. In Paragraph 32 of the judgment, the Supreme Court culled out the following conclusions:
(1) If an election, (the term election being widely interpreted so as to include all steps and entire proceedings commencing from the date of notification of election till the date of declaration of result) is to be called in question and which questioning may have . the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceedings in any manner, the invoking of judicial remedy has to be postponed till after the completing of proceedings in elections.
(2) Any decision sought and rendered will not amount to "calling in question an election" if it subserves the progress of the election and facilitates the completion of the election. Anything done towards completing or in furtherance of the election proceedings cannot be described as questioning the election.
(3) Subject to the above, the action taken or orders issued by Election Commission are open to judicial review on the well-settled parameters which enable judicial review of decisions of statutory bodies such as on a case of male fide or arbitrary exercise of power being made out or the statutory body being shown to have acted in breach of law.
(4) Without interrupting, obstructing or delaying the progress of the election proceedings, judicial intervention is available if assistance of the Court has been sought for merely to correct or smoothen the progress of the election proceedings, to remove the obstacles therein, or to preserve a vital piece of evidence if the same would be lost or destroyed or rendered irretrievable by the time the results are declared and stage is set for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court.
(5) The Court must be very circumspect and act with caution while entertaining any election dispute though not hit by the bar of Article 329(b) but brought to it during the pendency of election proceedings. The Court must guard against any attempt at retarding, interrupting, protracting or stalling of the election proceedings. Care has to be taken to see that there is no attempt to utilize the Court's indulgence by filing a petition outwardly innocuous but essentially a subterfuge or pretext for achieving an ulterior or hidden end. Needless to say that in the very nature of the things the Court would act with reluctance and shall not act, except on a clear and strong case for its intervention having been made out by raising the pleas with particulars and precision and supporting the same by necessary material.
21. In Paragraph 33, their Lordships clarified that aforestated conclusions should not be construed as summary of the judgment but should be read along with earlier part of the judgment containing reasons on which the aforementioned conclusions are based.
22. In our considered view, the case of Respondent No. l does not fall within the ambit of Conclusions No. 2 and/or 4 of the judgment in Ashok Kumar's case (supra) and, at the cost of repetition, we deem it proper to reiterate that a writ petition questioning the alleged wrongful rejection of the nomination paper is not maintainable and the only remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file an election petition after the process of election is over.
23. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Order dated 21-6-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.M.P. No. 16303 of 2006 is set aside and that application is dismissed.
24. While passing the aforementioned order, we are conscious of the fact that in exercise of power under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge in passing interlocutory order, but, as the issue raised in the present appeal affects the very maintainability of the writ petition filed by Respondent No. l and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the ratio of a series of judgments of the Constitution Benches as also the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, we have thought it proper to entertain the appeal and adjudicate on the issue relating to maintainability of the writ petition.
25. At this stage, Shri A.K. Kishore Reddy stated that in view of the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench, the main petition may be disposed of. We appreciate the fair stand taken by the learned Counsel and direct that W.P. No. 12308 of 2006 will be deemed to have been withdrawn to the Division Bench and dismissed as not maintainable.
26. Needless to say that dismissal of the writ petition shall in no way affect the right of the petitioner to file appropriate petition under Section 233 of the Act and seek invalidation of the result of election on the ground of wrongful rejection of his nomination paper.