Madras High Court
Vijayalakshmi Cashew Co vs The Commissioner on 20 December, 2011
Author: K.Chandru
Bench: K.Chandru
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 20/12/2011
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU
W.P.No.22891 of 2005
Crl.O.P.(MD)No.4397 to 4401 of 2010
and
W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006
and
M.P.(MD)Nos.2 and 3 of 2006, 2,3,2,3,2,3,2,3,2 and 3 of 2010
Vijayalakshmi Cashew Co.,
rep by its Manager,
M.R.Vijayanandan,
162,Thanjavur Road,
Kandarvakottai,
Pudukkottai District. .. Petitioner in
WP.No.22891 of 2005
K.Raveendranathan Nair .. Petitioner in
all Criminal O.Ps.
Vijayalaxmi Cashew Company,
Kollan-691 001.
Kerala State,
represented by its Proprietor,
K.Raveendranathan Nair. .. Petitioner in
W.P.(MD)No.8952 /2006
Vs.
1.The Commissioner,
Agricultural Marketing and
Agri Business, Guindy,
Chennai-32.
2.The Secretary,
Pudukkottai Market Committee,
Pudukkottai.
3.The Supervisor,
Regulated Market,
Kandarvakottai,
Pudukkottai District. .. Respondents in
WP.No.22891 of 2005
Ga.Ilakkumipathi,
Supervisor and Head Officer,
Regulated Market,
Gandharvakottai,
On behalf of the Marketing Committee,
Pudukkottai. .. Respondent in
all Criminal O.Ps.
1.The Government of Tamil Nadu,
represented by its Secretary,
Department of Agriculture,
Fort St. George,
Chennai-600 009.
2.The Commissioner,
Agricultural Marketing and Agri Business,
Guindy, Chennai-600 032.
3.The Trichy Marketing Committee,
Trichy-20.
Represented by its Secretary.
4.The Supervisor,
Regulated Market,
Jayankondam,
Perambalur District. .. Respondents in
W.P.(MD)No.8952 /2006
W.P.No.22891 of 2005 has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus to forbear the respondents 1
to 3 from demanding or collecting market fee from the petitioner in respect of
cashew nut kernel brought into the notified market area for being process and
after processing transferred to or despatched to places outside the notified
area without any sale as per the proviso to Section 24(1) of Tamilnadu
Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act, 1987.
Crl.OP(MD)Nos.4397, 4398, 4399, 4400 and 4401 of 2010 have been preferred under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. to stay all further proceedings in STC Nos.2103, 2102, 2101,
2100 and 2099 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Court, Pudukkottai.
W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006 has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for
the records of the third respondent pertaining to its order in
Na.Ka.No.Aa2/3911/05, dated 4.7.2006 on its file, quash the same and to direct
the respondents to forbear from levying any fee from the petitioner on any
notified agricultural produce brought into any notified market area for the
purpose of processing only or for export as per proviso to Section 24(1) of the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987.
!For Petitioners ... Mr.K.N.Thampi in WP(MD)No.8952 /2006
and in all Crl.O.Ps.
Mr.G.Sankaran in W.P.No.22891 of 2005
^For Respondents ... Mr.R.Chandrasekaran for R2 and R3
in WP.No.22891 of 2005
Mr.T.S.Md.Mohideen, AGP
- - - -
:COMMON ORDER
The matter arises under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987. The petitioner in both writ petitions is one and the same company, I.e., Vijayalakshmi Cahew Company, having their headquarters at Kollam, Kerala State. The first writ petition was represented by its Branch Manager at Gandarvakottai, Pudukkottai District. The second writ petition was represented by its Proprietor K.Raveendranathan Nair. The proprietor of the said company is also the petitioner in all the five criminal original petitions.
2.The Branch Manager at Gandarvakottai filed the first writ petition before the Principal Bench on 15.7.2005 seeking for a direction to forbear the respondents, i.e., the Commissioner for Agricultural Marketing and Agricultural Business, Chennai, the Secretary, Pudukkottai Market Committee and the Supervisor, Regulated market, Gandarvakottai from demanding or collecting market fee from the petitioner in respect of cashew nut kernel brought into the notified market area for being processed and after processing being transferred or despatched to a place outside the notified area without any sale as per the provisions of Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987. That writ petition was admitted on 18.7.2005. Pending the writ petition, in WPMP No.24943 of 2005, an interim injunction was granted with a condition that the petitioner furnishes bank guarantees in favour of Pudukkottai Market committee as and when any demand was made in respect of the removal of the processed cashew nut kernel from the notified area. Subsequently, the interim injunction was made absolute on 01.02.2008.
3.Even at the time of filing of the writ petition before the Principal Bench, the Registry raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition before the principal bench as Gandarvakottai where the petitioner's processing plant is located comes under Pudukkottai District which is covered by the Madurai Bench. The petitioner's counsel made an endorsement that the Commissioner for Agricultural Marketing was the controlling authority and a representation made to him was pending consideration. Further, as the relief was claimed against all respondents, the writ petition is maintainable.
4.This stand of the petitioner is misnomer. Because the cause of action in that writ petition was due to demands made by the third respondent, Supervisor of the Regulated Market, Gandarvakottai vide notice dated 27.4.2004. It was informed that the petitioner was doing the business of bringing Cashew nut into the notified market area for the purpose of processing and export. But, it was found that the quantities which were not processed and exported within 30 days of its arrival were deemed to be brought and sold within the notified market area. On the basis of the monthly returns filed by the petitioner, calculations were done. Thereafter, the petitioner sent a representation.
5.The real reason for moving the Principal Bench was to get an omnibus stay against the respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Act. In fact, criminal complaints were filed by the third respondent before the court of Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai in S.T.C.No.2099 of 2005 for prosecuting the petitioner under Section 49 read with Section 51 for non payment of the fee to the market committee and for levying penalty under Section 48(1)(a). The learned Magistrate had taken the complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. on his record and had issued processes on the proprietor of the petitioner company. The complaint lodged was dated 6.7.2005. All the complaints filed for different periods were taken on file as STC Nos.2099, 2100, 2101, 2102 and 2103 of 2005.
6.After the processes were received by the petitioner, they moved another writ petition being W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006 before the Madurai Bench. That writ petition was filed on 26.09.2006. The prayer in the writ petition was to challenge an order dated 4.7.2006 issued by the third respondent Secretary, Trichy Marketing Committee. In that impugned order, the Secretary of Trichy Marketing Committee had demanded fee in terms of Section 24(1) towards payment of fee for the marketing committee at Jeyankondam. It was stated that since the petitioner has got an interim stay before the Principal Bench and they were directed to pay 50% of the amount as fee demanded and for the balance fee, a bank guarantee was directed to be furnished. For the subsequent periods 2004-05 and 2005-06, further amounts were demanded. The printed form of permission book given to them earlier was stopped on account of non payment of fee. The interim order was only applicable to the earlier proceedings issued. But since the writ petition was still pending, it is only after the judgment, the petitioner's demand made as per letter dated 10.6.2006 could be considered.
7.The said writ petition was admitted on 12.10.2006. Pending the writ petition, this court had granted an interim injunction directing the petitioner to furnish bank guarantees as and when a demand was made for the removal of cashew nuts from the notified area. Having obtained an interim order both at the Principal Bench and at the Madurai Bench, the petitioner moved this court with five criminal original petitions in the year 2010 purporting to be under Section 482 Cr.P.C., challenging the further proceedings in the summary trial, pending before the Judicial Magistrate's Court, Pudukkottai.
8.The petitioner in his original petitions merely stated that since the court had already seized of the matter and an interpretation of provisions of the statute, i.e., Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987 was required to be done by this court, he wanted the trials to be stalled pending disposal of the writ petition. He further stated that the petitioner was the resident of Kollam and he had to travel several miles to attend the court. Therefore, the purpose of filing criminal original petitions is for a stopgap arrangement.
9.First of all, the petitioner never disclosed about the pendency of five criminal cases in which processes were served on him. In the original affidavit filed in W.P.No.22891 of 2005, in paragraph 9, he had merely stated that he was threatened with distraint proceedings including initiation of criminal prosecution. But actually complaints under Section 200(1) were lodged with the Magistrate and processes were issued to the petitioner. He had filed application under section 205 Cr.P.C. to excuse his presence in the Court. In any event, the processes issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate is not under challenge. On the contrary, he merely wanted stay of further proceedings in STC cases pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai till the disposal of the writ petition in W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006. Even this prayer is flawed because W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006 was filed against the proceedings initiated by the Trichy Marketing Committee on behalf of Jeyankondam Regulated Market. Whereas the criminal cases were filed by the Supervisor of Gandarvakottai Regulated Market. As against that authority, only the first writ petition was pending before the Principal Bench. Therefore, the attempt of the petitioner is to some how stall further proceedings before the criminal court. Even for maintaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, which is an inherent power vested on the court, the petitioner had not invoked the said jurisdiction except for a stopgap arrangement of stalling the summary trial case over a period of six years in the guise of the second writ petition.
10.The ground raised in the criminal original petitions was that the writ petition involved an interpretation of Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987, which was a technical offence and a decision of the court will depend upon the decision to be rendered by this court in that writ petition. It is shocking as to how this could be a ground to stall the criminal proceedings initiated by an authority under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1987. The learned Magistrate who had issued the processes is competent enough to interpret the provisions of the Act before the petitioner was convicted for any offence.
11.Even assuming that he punishes the petitioner with any penalty on a wrong interpretation of the legal provision, the Cr.P.C itself provides for appellate remedies under Chapter XXIX and Revisional remedy under Chapter XXX of the Cr.P.C. If for any reason, the learned Magistrate has any doubt, the Cr.P.C itself provides for a reference being made to this court by the Magistrate. Section 395(2) Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
"395(2) : A Court of Session or a Metropolitan Magistrate may, if it or he thinks fit in any case pending before it or him to which the provisions of sub- section (1) do not apply, refer for the decision of the High Court any question of law arising in the hearing of such case."
12.Further, even he challenged the process issued in a quash petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C, that issue could have been decided by the criminal side of this court. Therefore, the only attempt of the petitioner was to stall the criminal proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai with the help of the two writ petitions, one filed at the Principal Bench and the second at the Madurai Bench. Since both would never be taken up together and they can be kept eternally pending. It was because of this reason, when W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006 came to be posted before this court on 09.12.2011, on finding that the petitioner has placed reliance upon the omnibus interim order obtained before the Principal Bench, this court directed the Registry to get appropriate orders from the Hon'ble Chief Justice to have the matter pending before the Principal Bench to be transferred and heard along with the present writ petition. The Hon'ble Chief Justice vide an order dated 09.12.2011 directed the matter to be transferred to the Madurai Bench. Accordingly it was transferred and listed for hearing on 16.12.2011. Since the counsel for the petitioner sought for further time, all the matters, i.e. two writ petitions and five criminal original petitions were posted on 19.12.2011 for final disposal.
13.Heard the arguments of Mr.K.N.Thampi, learned counsel for petitioners and Mr.T.S.Md. Mohideen, learned Additional Government Pleader taking notice for respondents.
14.The learned counsel Mr.K.N.Thampi, on noticing that a serious exception was taken by this court about filing of the first writ petition before the Principal Bench, when there was no cause of action, referred to two judgments of the Supreme Court. First case was the case relating to Navinchandra N.Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966 so as to contend that if a part of the cause of action arose, then that court will also have jurisdiction.
15.The second case related to Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2010) 1 SCC 457 so as to contend that even if a fraction of cause of action accrued within the territories of a State, that State will have jurisdiction.
16.On the contrary, in respect of criminal offences, the jurisdiction of an High Court is well defined. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg.Ltd reported in 2006 (3) SCC 658 dealt with the scope of power under Article 226 of the Constitution while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction in interfering with the orders of Magistrates taking cognizance under Cr.P.C. It was held that an High Court under Article 226 should not ordinarily interfere with an order taking cognizance by a competent Court of law. Only an High Court in whose jurisdiction the order of the Subordinate Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court also must remind itself about the doctrine of forum non conveniens also. It is necessary to refer to the passages found in paragraphs 25, 28 to 29 in that judgment which are as follows:-
25. It is no doubt true that in a criminal matter also the High Court may exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction but interference with an order of the Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will stand somewhat on a different footing as an order taking cognizance can be the subject-matter of a revisional jurisdiction as well as of an application invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. A writ of certiorari ordinarily would not be issued by a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution against a judicial officer. (See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v.
State of Maharashtra9.) However, we are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai10 wherein this Court upon noticing Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar9 and also relying on a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra11 opined that a Judicial Court would also be subject to exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The said decision has again been followed in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash12. It is, however, not necessary to dilate on the matter any further. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was noticed recently by this Court in State of U.P. v. Surendra Kumar13 holding that even in terms thereof, the Court cannot pass an order beyond the scope of the application thereof. In Surya Dev Rai10 we may however, notice that this Court categorically stated that the High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari exercises a very limited jurisdiction. It also made a distinction between exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It categorically laid down that while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court can issue a writ of certiorari only when an error apparent on the face of the record appears as such; the error should be self-evident. Thus, an error according to this Court needs to be established. As regards exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution it was held: (SCC p. 689, para 24) "The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction."
28. We have referred to the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution only to highlight that the High Courts should not ordinarily interfere with an order taking cognizance passed by a competent court of law except in a proper case. Furthermore only such High Court within whose jurisdiction the order of the subordinate court has been passed, would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution unless it is established that the earlier cause of action arose within the jurisdiction thereof.
29. The High Courts, however, must remind themselves about the doctrine of forum non conveniens also. [See Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express16.] (Emphasis added)
17. Significantly in that judgment, even the decision relied on by the petitioner i.e. Navinchandra N.Majithia's case (cited supra) was referred and explained. Therefore, when a competent Court is seized of the matter, it is not open to this Court to issue a writ in the nature of prohibition and such a writ petition will not lie.
18.It must be noted that it is not a case of interpreting the territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2), but the jurisdiction between two benches. The presidential notification under Section 51-A of the States Reorganization Act allotted the jurisdictions in respect of 13 districts which included Pudukkottai District solely for the Madurai Bench. By impleading the Commissioner without claiming any relief directly against him, the petitioner ought not to have filed the writ petition at the Principal bench at Chennai.
19.It is not the case of Mr.K.N.Thampi, learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 24(1) of the 1987 Act will apply to only the agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area. But, the proviso to Section 24(1) will not apply to the case of processing or for exporting and if it was done within 30 days, then until the contrary is proved, it is presumed to have been brought into such notified market area for buying and selling and shall be subject to the levy of fee under the section. The explanation 1 to the section states that all notified agricultural produces taken out or proposed to be taken out of a notified market area shall unless the contrary is proved be presumed to be bought or sold within such area. Therefore, since the act provides for penalty for contravention, the petitioner should be heard before a levy is made. It was also his case, there was nothing on record to show that any goods after processing were retained beyond 30 days.
20.The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon a judgment of the division bench of this court in Rambhai Gopalbhai Patel Vs. Coimbatore Market Committee reported in 1989 Writ L.R. 345. But that judgment arose under the earlier Act viz., the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1959 and related to Section 18(1). In that context, in paragraphs 6 and 7, the division bench had observed as follows:
"6....Therefore, when the beedi tobacco which had been bought within the notified area by the purchasers was sold, the liability or incident to pay fee would arise,....
7.Hence, in respect of beedi tobacco, if purchase is made outside the notified market area and if by that time the ownership in the property had already been transferred in favour of such a purchaser and thereafter goods are bought within the notified area; then under such circumstances, they would not be liable to pay any fee under S.18, because they cannot be treated as purchasers of the produce, within the notified market area. If such produces are sold by them, they would not be liable to pay fee, provided the purchasers from them could be identified. It is only when they cannot be identified, the seller of such a produce could be called upon to pay fees. Therefore, beedi tobacco being brought into the notified market area by purchases made outside the notified area, would not by itself entitle the respondent-Committee to demand payment of fee...."
21.It is not clear as to how the judgment rendered under the old Act will have relevance to the case on hand. On the other hand, after the repeal of the old Act, the section introduced under Section 24 vastly differs in its language. A comparative analysis of both sections will give the correct picture. Hence it is necessary to refer to the changes made on the matter of collection of fee by local marketing committee in respect of 1959 Act and 1987 Act and are reproduced below:
The Tamil Nadu Agricultural The Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1959 Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act,1987
18.Levy of (fee) by market committee.- 24.Levy of fee by market committee- (1)The [The market committee shall levy a fee on market committee shall levy a fee on any notified agricultural produce bought any notified agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area at or sold in the notified market area at a rate not exceeding forty-five paise and a rate not less than one rupee subject to a minimum of twenty-five but not exceeding two rupees for every paise for every hundred rupees of the hundred rupees of the aggregate amount for aggregate amount, for which the notified which the notified agricultural produce is agricultural produce is bought or sold bought or sold whether for cash or for whether for cash or for deferred payment deferred payment or other valuable or other valuable consideration. consideration.
Explanation I.-For the purpose of this Provided that, when any agricultural produce sub-section, all notified agricultural bought into any notified market produce taken out or proposed to be taken area for the purpose of processing only, out of a notified market area shall, or for export is not processed or unless the contrary is proved, be presumed exported therefrom within thirty days from to be bought or sold within such the date of its arrival therein, it area. shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been brought into such Explanation II.-In the determination of notified market area for buying and the amount of the fees payable under selling, and shall be subject to the levy of this Act, any fraction of ten paise fee under the section on the value of the less than five paise shall be disregarded agricultural produce, as if it had and any fraction of ten paise equal to or been bought and sold therein.
exceeding five paise shall be regarded as ten paise. Explanation I - For the purpose of this sub-section, all notified agricultural (2)The fee referred to in sub-section (1) produces taken out or proposed to be shall be paid by the purchaser of the taken out of a notified market area, notified agricultural produce concerned: shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be bought or sold within Provided that where the purchaser of such area.
a notified agricultural produce cannot be Explanation II-In the determination of the identified, the fee shall be paid by the amount of the fee payable under this seller.] Act, any fraction of ten paise less than five paise shall be disregarded and any fraction of ten paise equal to or exceeding five paise shall be regarded as ten paise.
22.The proviso to section 24(1) and the explanation-1 are not found in the earlier enactment. The earlier enactment only dealt with the sale within the notified area and not about process and detention beyond 30 days in the notified area.
23.The Supreme Court's decision referred to in the affidavit in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1980 SC 1124 = 1980 Supp SCC 27 also will have no relevance to this case as the Supreme Court had dealt with the U.P. Act 7 of 1978 and the relevant section there, was similar to the Section 18(1) of the Old Act. Therefore, the introduction of old provisions will have no relevance to the new section introduced by the legislature.
24.On the other hand, in the complaint filed against the petitioner pending in five STCs before the Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, the specific allegation was that after bringing the cashew nut kernels by procuring it and processing it, they were exporting the cashew nuts. But after the exported portion of processed cashew nuts, the rest of the cashew nuts were sold locally. The monthly statement furnished clearly indicated that there has been default in payment of the market fee. In such circumstances, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that explanation-1 and proviso to Section 24(1) will not apply to the case of the petitioner.
25.On the other hand, the petitioners are Traders within the meaning of the TNAPMR Act and the definition is held to be not merely action of purchasing of particular goods, but it comprises of wide range of activities. In interpreting the similar provision found in Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, the Supreme court vide its judgment G. Giridhar Prabhu v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee reported in (2001) 3 SCC 405, in Paragraph 17 observed as follows:-
17.We are unable to agree with the submissions of Mr Sarangan. As can be seen from the Preamble the Act is to provide for better regulation of marketing of agricultural produce. In the Act certain exemptions have been given to the producer which exemptions have not been given either to an importer or an exporter or a trader. These exemptions, therefore, have been given to the producer because the producer is the person who produces the main agricultural produce. The main agricultural produce, which may be a notified agricultural produce, could then be converted into various other notified agricultural produce/s by subjecting the same to a process or manufacture. The person who so processes or manufactures a different notified agricultural produce would not be a producer. To be noted that an importer imports or causes goods to be imported into the market area for the purpose of selling, processing, manufacturing or for any other purpose, except for one's own domestic consumption. Thus, it is clear that a person who imports would not be a producer. The import would be for the purpose of selling or processing or manufacturing or for any other purpose except for one's own domestic consumption. Similarly, the term "exporter" makes it clear that an exporter is not a producer. A trader is also a person who buys notified agricultural produce for the purpose of selling or processing or manufacturing or for any other purpose except for the purpose of domestic consumption. The definition of the term "trader" is not a restrictive definition. It is not restricted to a person who only buys. If a person buys for domestic or personal consumption, then he would not be a trader. It is only when a person buys for the purpose of selling or processing or manufacturing that he would become a trader. Thus a person may buy, process or manufacture and then sell. When he processes or manufactures notified agricultural produce which he had bought, it may change its character and become another notified agricultural produce. Thus, by way of examples, a person may buy milk and through processes make them into butter and/or cheese or a person may buy hides and skins and by a process make it into leather. However, merely because a distinct and separate notified agricultural produce comes into existence does not mean that the person who bought, processed and sold ceases to be a trader. The term "trader"
encumbrances (sic embraces) not just the purchase transaction but the entire transaction of purchase, processing, manufacturing and selling."
26.Therefore, in the petition, the omnibus prayer not to collect the market fee in terms of Section 24(1) does not stand to reason as it does not take into account proviso to Section 24(1) and Explanation 1 appended therein. It is not as if the petitioner was never heard. On the other hand, repeated demands did not find any reply and considering the nature of the toll collected from the department, if the petitioner disputes or claims that he need not pay the amount will result in subsequent criminal prosecution. It is always open to the petitioner to set up a proper defence and prove his innocence, failing which the petitioner has also remedy of appeal or revision.
27.Under these circumstances, both writ petitions are misconceived and bereft of legal reasons. Accordingly, W.P.(MD)No.8952 of 2006 will stand dismissed. No costs. W.P.No.22891 of 2005 will stand dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) payable to the Gandarvakottai Regulated Market, Pudukkottai. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.
28.Since criminal original petitions were filed as a stopgap arrangement, in view of the dismissal of both writ petitions, all the criminal original petitions also will stand dismissed. There is no impediment for the criminal court to proceed with the trial. Since the petitioner is being prosecuted in five summary trial cases are pending, this court is not inclined to express any opinion on the merits of the criminal complaints, lest it may prejudice the outcome of the criminal cases. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed. No costs.
vvk To
1.The Commissioner, Agricultural Marketing and Agri Business, Guindy, Chennai-32.
2.The Secretary, Pudukkottai Market Committee, Pudukkottai.
3.The Supervisor, Regulated Market, Kandarvakottai, Pudukkottai District.
4.The Secretary, The Government of Tamil Nadu, Department of Agriculture, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009.
5.The Secretary.
The Trichy Marketing Committee, Trichy-20.
6.The Supervisor, Regulated Market, Jayankondam, Perambalur District.