Bombay High Court
Sukhraj Bhikchand Jain vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr. on 15 February, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(3)BOMCR463, 1996 A I H C 2094, (1996) 2 MAH LJ 511, (1996) 2 MAHLR 445, (1996) 2 ALLMR 319 (BOM), (1996) 3 BOM CR 463
Author: A.P. Shah
Bench: A.P. Shah
JUDGMENT A.S.V. Moorthy, J.
1. The contentions raised and reliefs sought for in both the writ petitions are the same and hence they can be disposed of by a common order.
2. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 4739 of 1987 is a member of the Lasalgaon Agricultural Produce Market Committee, while the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5866 of 1987 is a trader and a member of the Islampur Agricultural Produce Market Committee. The reliefs sought for in the above writ petitions are: (i) to issue a writ of certiorari striking down the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 1987- Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 1987- seeking to amend the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 and (ii) thereby declare that the provisions of sections 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19 & 29 of the Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 1987 seeking to amend the provisions of the Maharashtra Act No. XX of 1964, are unconstitutional, void and inoperative and, for that purpose, issue necessary writs and orders.
3. It is the contention of the petitioners that a perusal of statement of objects and reasons annexed to the Act of XXVII of 1987 would show that the State Legislature proceeded on certain assumptions which are wholly baseless and incorrect. The petitioners would further submit that there is no nexus between the amendments introduced by the Act XXVII of 1987 and the object, if any, to be achieved. According to the petitioners, most of the provisions are unconstitutional, illegal and arbitrary, rendering the whole democratic functioning of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees, a mockery. The further plea of the petitioners is that the amendments effected proceed on the total erroneous assumption, ignoring the actual working of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees and that there is a basic distrust among the trading community which is sought to be almost eliminated from the control of the Market Committee. The petitioners would further contend that the traders are experts in the field of marketing the agricultural produce and their experience in the field is totally overlooked.
4. The Counsel for the writ petitioners advanced the following arguments in support of the above contentions:-
(i) Section 5 of the Amending Act gives power to the Chairman and the Secretary of a Market Committee to suspend a licence. The Secretary being a paid employee, the Chairman can prevail over the Secretary and there is large scope for the Chairman to act arbitrarily and for personal gains and with mala fides.
(ii) Section 6 of the Amending Act is to the effect that the disputes of the Committee will be decided by the Dispute Sub-Committee and the original provisions to refer their disputes to an arbitrator and then to the Board, had been taken away. This settlement of the disputes by the Dispute Sub-Committee is wholly arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice.
(iii) By section 8 of the Amending Act, the representation by the trading community is reduced from 3 to 2 which had adversely affected interests of the traders. That apart, the maximum limit/upper limit prescribed for the total number of members of the market committee which was originally eighteen, has been deleted and thereby the position would be that the strength of the market committee would be unlimited.
(iv) According to section 12 of the Amending Act, both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman could be only from the elected agriculturist members. This would seriously prejudice the rights of the traders.
(v) By section 15 of the Amending Act, section 29(2)(vii) has been included which deals with regulating the making carrying out and enforcement or cancellation of sales, weighment, delivery, payment to be made in respect thereof and all other matters relating to the marketing of notified agricultural produce in the prescribed manner. There are no rules prescribed in this regard and, that being so, this provision cannot be enforced till the rules are framed.
(vi) By Amending Act, section 29(2)(xviii) has been introduced regarding levy, take, cover and receive charges (fees), rates and other sums of money to which the Market Committee is entitled. According to the petitioners, this is vague and in the absence of any power in the Act, these provisions of the amended section 29(2)(xviii) could only operate in vacuum.
(vii) By insertion of sub-section (4) of section 31, vast and arbitrary powers have been given for charging market fees not only to buyers but also to the commission agents, processors or traders. That apart, power has also been given to impose penalty and deduct the same from the deposit kept with the Market Committee and from the Bank which gives the guarantee to such buyers, commission agent, processors or trader. There are no guidelines as to in which case this power will be exercised and in what manner it will be exercised.
(viii) By virtue of section 32-A which has been introduced by the Amending Act, power is given even to the servants of the market committee to enter, inspect and seize their accounts. This provision is wholly contrary to the basic concept underlying rule of law enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution and further it would affect the rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Article 19 of the Constitution.
(ix) Under section 32-B, introduced by the Amending Act, power is given to the market committee to write off loss, shortage or fee etc. This would result in loss to the committee and there are no guidelines for distinguishing the cases where power to write off such a loss may be exercised depending upon whether it is a case of fraud or negligence or any other manner.
(x) Section 52-A (by virtue of the Amending Act XXVII of 1987) unbridled and uncanalised power of compounding of offences against the provisions of the Principal Act of 1973, is given. The power conferred is bound to be misused and there are no guidelines for exercising such power and as such the same is wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional.
4. Before dealing with various points raised by the petitioner, it would be relevant at this juncture to quote the object of the Act, viz. the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 as well as Amending Act XXVII of 1987 as under:---
"An act to regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas and markets to be established therefor in the State: to confer powers upon market committees to be constituted in connection with or acting for purposes connected with such markets; to establish Market Fund for purposes of the Market Committees and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.
WHEREAS it is expedient to regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas and markets to be established therefor in the State; to confer powers upon market committees to be constituted in connection with or acting for purposes connected with such markets; to establish Market Fund for purposes of the Market Committees and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid; It is hereby enacted in the Fourteenth Year of the Republic of India as follows:"
The statement of object and reasons of the Amending Act XXVII of 1987, reads as follows:-
"The Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1963 (Mah. XX of 1964), is enacted to regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce with a view to protect the agriculturists from the exploitation by unscrupulous elements in trade practices. The Act has been in force in this State during the last two decades and certain deficiencies and shortcomings have come to notice. Suggestions for improvement in the implementation and working of the Act have been received from all quarters. The Government of India had also appointed a Working Group to examine the legislation relating to regulation of agricultural marketing in the country. A model Bill on the basis of the recommendations of the Working Group was circulated by the Government of India for the consideration of the State Governments. After considering the provisions of the Model Bill and the suggestions received by Government as aforesaid, the Government of Maharashtra considers it expedient to make certain amendments to the Act."
5. Let us now examine the various contentions of the petitioners in the light of the objects of the Act as referred above.
6. The first point raised by the petitioners is that by section 5 of the Amending Act, section 8 of the Principal Act has been substantially amended and the power of suspending the licence which power hitherto vested in the market committee in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of the Principal Act has indeed been vested in the Chairman and the Secretary of a market committee. According to him, by inserting sub-section (1-A) after sub-section (1) in section 8 of the Principal Act, it has now been provided that only the Chairman and the Secretary of a market committee acting jointly may suspend a licence for any of the reasons for which the market committee may suspend the licence under sub-section (1) of section 8. According to him, the Secretary being a paid employee, has hardly any voice in the presence of any other members of the market committee and particularly its Chairman. He would further contend that experience shows that the Secretary has absolutely no controls over the arbitrariness and misuse of power by the Chairman of the market committee and the result of the proposed amendment would be to vest unfettered powers with the Chairman to act arbitrarily and for personal gains with mala fide. Suspending licence of a trader is a serious matter and, that being so giving power to the Chairman and the Secretary to suspend the licence would seriously affect the interests of traders.
7. Section 6 of the Principal Act deals with regulation of marketing of the agricultural produce. Section 7 deals with grant of licence. Section 8, as it stood prior to 1987 viz. Prior to the amendment, was as follows:-
"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), a Market Committee may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend or cancel a licence
(a) if licence has been obtained through wilful misrepresentation or fraud;
(b) if the holder thereof or any servant or anyone acting on his behalf with his express or implied permission, commits a breach of any of the terms or conditions of the licence;
(c) if the holder of the licence in combination with other holders of licences commits any act or abstains from carrying out his normal business in the market with the intention of wilfully obstructing, suspending or stopping the marketing of agricultural produce in the market area in consequence whereof the marketing of any produce has been obstructed, suspended or stopped.
(d) if the holder of the licence has been adjudged an insolvent; and has not obtained his discharge; or
(e) if the holder is convicted of any offence under this Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), but subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Director may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by order suspend or cancel any licence granted or renewed under this Chapter.
(3) No licence shall be suspended or cancelled under this section, unless the holder thereof has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such suspension or cancellation."
8. It may be pointed out that these provisions section 8(1) to 8(3) continue to be in the statute and are very much in force even on today. So the position prior to 1987, i.e. before the amendment and after the amendment has been that the market committee, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may suspend or cancel a licence for any of the reasons enumerated in section 8(1) to 8(1)(e). A reading of section 8(3) would show that such suspension or cancellation can be done only on giving a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such suspension or cancellation. In other words, if there is a violation of the conditions by a trader, what the market committee has to do is (before suspending or cancelling a licence) first it has to issue a show cause notice to a trader. Obviously, for such purpose, the market committee which consists of 18/20 members, has to meet and decide. Now, after giving of such a notice, a trader must be given sufficient time to show cause for the said notice. Then again the market committee has to meet and examine the explanation given by a trader and then decide whether a trader's licence is liable to be suspended or it is a fit case where cancellation of licence is called for. Needless to mention that this entire process would take several weeks and prior to 1987, i.e. before this amendment of even as the provisions stand today, there has been no power for the market committee to pass an order of interim suspension of a licence pending final decision to suspend or cancel., to meet the gravity of situation. By the amendment, i.e. section 8(1)(A) what is sought to be done is, that in case, if it is found that a trader is violating any of the conditions of a licence, then the Chairman and Secretary acting jointly for the reasons to be recorded in writing by order can suspend a licence for a period not exceeding 15 days to prevent continuance of mischief, damage or loss by a trader to the market committee. This power is necessary to take immediate and prompt action against erring licence. That apart, the market committee can meet in the meantime and decide its course of action. As the market committee consists of 18/20 members (as the case may be) and as it is not possible and practicable for the market committee to meet immediately, i.e. in a few hours, this power of interim suspension for a period not exceeding 15 days has been rightly given to the Chairman and the Secretary who will normally be available on the spot. The petitioners' apprehension that the Chairman of the market committee would, in all probabilities, misuse power for some personal; reasons, is not well founded for two reasons: (1) it is not as if the Chairman alone is passing the order. The order has to be passed by both the Chairman as well as the Secretary that too only for a period not exceeding 15 days. (ii) Even assuming both of them act arbitrarily and pass patently erroneous order, the petitioners have got a right of appeal under section 52-B of the Act. They can file an appeal and obtain necessary orders. The petitioners cannot, by imagining that the power will be misused, persuade this Court to strike down the said provision. As already seen, but for this provision the market committee will be totally helpless to take an immediate and prompt action when a trader violates the conditions of the licence. As discussed above, the Act as stood prior to 1987, there was no power of interim suspension by which the licence of a trader could be suspended on the spot to prevent any loss or damage to the market committee. The petitioners are under the wrong assumption that section 8(1-A) replaces the section 8(1) to 8(3). Hence there is no substance in this contention put forth by the petitioners.
9. The second contention of the petitioners is that section 10 of the principal Act has been amended and by virtue of which now the present position is that settlement of dispute could be only before the Dispute Sub-Committee and that earlier provision for settlement of disputes before an arbitrator and thereafter an appeal to the board, has been taken away and this would result in serious prejudice to the petitioners resulting in violation of Articles 14 and 19 etc. of the Constitution of India.
Section 10(1) of the Act, as it stands today, provides for settlement of disputes between buyers and sellers or their agents including any disputes regarding the quality or weight or payment of any agricultural produce, or any matter in relation to the regulation of marketing of agricultural produce in the market area, the market committee of that area shall constitute a Dispute Sub-Committee. The members are:
"(2) The Dispute Sub-Committee shall consists of-
(a) the Vice-Chairman of the Market Committee, who shall be the Chairman of the Dispute Sub Committee;
(b) two members of a committee representing agriculturists whether elected or nominated;
(c) one member of a committee representing the traders whether elected or nominated; and
(d) one member from amongst persons who, in the opinion of the Director, are experts in marketing or agricultural produce."
Thus, it could be seen that there is a representative for the traders and that apart there is also one member who, in the opinion of the Director, is an expert in the marketing of agricultural produce. Further more, the Vice Chairman of the market committee shall be the Chairman and acts with responsibility and is a public servant. It is not as if the dispute is decided by a single person. The Sub-Committee which consists of five members and which also includes the representative of traders, only decides the dispute. Whatever grievance the petitioners have, can put forth before the Dispute Sub-Committee. One of the members, being a trader, certainly will look after the interests of all traders. That being so, there is absolutely no basis for the petitioners to apprehend that the functioning of the Dispute Sub-Committee could be wholly arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The petitioners can always come before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the Dispute Sub-Committee constituted by the market committee acts arbitrarily.
10. The next submission made by the petitioners is that while old sub-section (1) of section 13 has been provided for election of three traders and commission agents, by virtue of the present amendment, it has been reduced to two and thus seriously affecting the interests of the traders. That apart, while the principal Act, maximum members of the market committee were 18 and under the Amending Act, the word "eighteen" has been deleted thereby there is no upper limit prescribed for the total members of the market committee.
The above submission of the petitioners cannot be accepted. There is no dispute that when compared to the traders, the agriculturists (growers) are in very large numbers. As already pointed out, the Act is intended to help and protect the interests of the producers/ growers who were subjected to exploitation and that is the reason for the majority representation being given to the producers. If, the Legislature in its wisdom having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the Act and also having regard to the large number of growers of agricultural produce, has given a larger representation to them on the market committee than the traders who are infinitesimally few as compared to growers and given a chance to the growers alone to become Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee, that legislation cannot be struck down as discriminatory. It is not for this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the correctness or otherwise of the same. It is ultimately for the Legislature to consider and to decide.
As far as the next contention of deleting the word "eighteen" in section 13, it could be seen that the Act deals with two kinds of market committees. Under section 13(1), it lays down that every market committee shall consist of members enumerated in this section. One could see that the total number of members comes to eighteen.
Section 13(1)(a) deals with, of course, a market committee, but this is with regard to the area comprising Greater Bombay and Turbhe village in Thane Taluka, of Thane District. The Act would make a distinction and as far as this market committee is concerned, it would consist of twenty members. So the intention appears to be in deleting the word "eighteen" is that the Act deals with two kinds of market committees; a market committee where there will be only eighteen members and the other market committee where there will be twenty members. That being so, there is no substance in the grievance of the petitioners that by deleting the word "eighteen" that the market committee can have unlimited numbers of members and which would prejudice the interests of the petitioners.
11. The petitioners also contended that by virtue of amendment, now the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the market committee can be only amongst the elected agriculturists members. According to them, the result is that none of the traders who are members of the market committee can ever be eligible to be a Chairman or Vice Chairman of the market committee. According to the petitioners, the entire approach on the part of the 1st respondent is arbitrary and this would seriously prejudice the petitioners' right under Article 19 of the Constitution.
Here again, the petitioners' contention cannot be accepted. As already referred to earlier, the Act is enacted to regulate the marketing of agricultural produce and certain other produce with a view to protect the agriculturists from exploitation by unscrupulous elements in trade practice. It came to the notice of the Legislature certain deficiencies and short-comings in the principal Act and after so considering, the Legislature passed the Amending Act of XXVII of 1987. If the Legislature in its wisdom having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the Act and also having regard to the larger number of growers of agricultural produce, has given a larger representation to them on the market committee than the traders and given a chance to the growers alone to become Chairman and Vice Chairman of a market committee. That legislation cannot be struck down as discriminatory.
The Division Bench of the Madras High Court had an occasion to consider a similar provision in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (the Act XXVII of 1987). The Madras High Court took the similar view holding that it is ultimately for the Legislature to decide and restrict as to who can contest or who can be elected as a Chairman of the market committee. In the case reported in Raja Palyan Paruthi Panchu Sangam v. State of T.N., . The Division Bench observed:
"The Act is intended to help and protect the interests of the producers who were subjected to exploitation and that is the reason for the majority representation being given to the producers. Section 10 of the Act says that every market committee shall consist of 16 members and it shall be constituted in such a manner that 9 out of the 16 members shall consist of growers and 4 members shall be officials. If the Legislature in its wisdom having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the Act and also having regard to the large number of growers of agricultural produce, has given a larger representation to them on the market committee than the traders who are infinitesimally few as compared to growers and given a chance to the growers alone to become Chairman of the market committee, that legislation cannot be struck down as discriminatory."
12. In the same decision the Madras High Court considered the validity of section 10 of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act. Section 10 of that Act (Act XXVII of 1989) confers power on the State Government to nominate non-official and official members numbering. A plea was raised before the said High Court that section 10 of the Act providing for the constitution of the marketing committee is undemocratic, invalid and therefore, it is liable to be struck down. The further contention was that section 10 is not in consonance with democratic set up and leave it open to the arbitrary way of nominating the representatives by the Government who would be only henchmen and thereby the market committee is made a tool to its own political influence or gain whosoever may be the ruling party and that therefore undemocratic. The Madras High Court rejected contentions and while doing so placed reliance on the decision (Division Bench). It will be useful and relevant to quote a passage from the judgment of Madras High Court which in turn quotes the judgment of the A.P. High Court, as under:-
"16. In N. Sreerama Murthy v. State, , a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court while upholding the validity of a similar provision in Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Live-Stock) Markets Act, 1966 empowering the Government to nominate members of market committee held as follows:
"6. Sri Venugopala Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contends that the Division Bench, striking down section 5(1) and (2) of the principal Act, declared that it was the elected members that on best subserve the interests of the different interests represented on the market committee, The amended Act gives a go by to the system of election and is contrary to the intendment of the judgment of this Court. He argues that if the provisions were held to be violative of Article 14 because the principle of election was not observed with respect to the representatives of the growers of the agricultural produce and owners of livestock and products of livestock as well as in the case of traders the amended provision must also be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We must point out that this is not the correct interpretation of the earlier judgment of this Court. The Court, in declaring the said provision to be violative of Article 14 pointed out that growers of agricultural produce, owners of livestock and products of livestock on the one hand and the traders in agricultural produce, owners of livestock and products of livestock on the other, represent two vital interests in the market committee and if one interest was represented by those elected from among themselves, and according to the Bench elected representatives are better suited to safeguard the interests of the particular section, the other section also ought to have been given an opportunity to be represented by members elected from among themselves. Such a discrimination was held to be striking at the root of the validity of that provision. What would have been the provision if the legislature had made provision for nomination of both the interests, that is, growers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock and products of livestock on the one hand and the traders on the other, did not come up for consideration in that case. Whatever may be said about the system of nomination as compared to the system of election to particular body, when all the interests are to be informally represented either by elected representatives or by nominated members, none of such groups can complain of hostile discrimination. That is what the legislature in its wisdom has now done. Now, both the traders and the growers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock and products of livestock, are to be nominated by the Government by a notification. May be, if provision was made for election of the representatives of the growers and owners of livestock and products of livestock, would have been better, but the legislature in its wisdom must have thought nomination of persons representing the two groups was in the best interests of the market committees. Whatever criticism on such a provision may be open to, cannot certainly be questioned on the ground that it is violative of Article 14, of the Constitution. May be, the Legislature after considering the several aspects, was of the view that the interests of the traders as well as the growers of agricultural produce and the owners of livestock and products of livestock are better served by nomination of the members of those categories. May be, the administrative difficulties and financial burden of conducting elections to several market committees especially when growers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock run into several lakhs weighed with the legislature in abandoning the election process. Or may be, it thought that on committees like this, persons with special knowledge or experience may not come forward to seek election and the Government preferred to secure their services by nominating them to these committees in the hope that the committee would function better. Those are matters entirely for the legislature to consider and decide. It is not the province of this Court to say that the method of election alone is to be preferred as against the method of nomination in constituting the market committees. It is a matter of opinion. So long as such nomination does not violate any provisions of the Constitution, the Court cannot substitute its own view in matters such as these and strike down the legislation. It may be pointed out that the passage from the judgment of this Court relied upon by the learned Counsel to the effect that interests are best protected by permitting the affected owners of those interests to elect their representatives to the market committee were made only to emphasise that the others interest was not similarly represented by the elected members but was represented only by nominated members. It was never meant that the persons to man the market committees must be chosen only by the process of election from among the members of that category. In our view, in as much as all the interests envisaged by the Act are represented by persons nominated by the Government, no question of hostile discrimination arises so as to hold the said amended provisions of the enactment to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
We hold that these are matters entirely for the legislature to consider and decide. That being so we held that, we do not find any substance in the contentions raised by the petitioners.
13. The next point raised by the petitioners is that section 29(2)(vii) deals with regulating the making carrying out and enforcement or cancellation of sales, weighment, delivery, payment to be made in respect thereof and all other matters, relating to the marketing of notified agricultural produce in the prescribed manner. According to him, there are no rules framed in this regard and that being so this provision cannot be enforced. Answer to the point is that if no rules have been framed in respect of enforcement of a particular provision of the Act, then obviously such provision in the Act cannot be enforced till such rules are framed. The word "Prescribed" has been defined in section 2(1)(m) of the Act, viz. "Prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act. That being so, the petitioners are not put to any prejudice by virtue of such a provision in the Act. If the concerned authority enforces the provision of the Act before framing of the rules, then he can always approach this Court for proper remedies.
14. The next submission made by the petitioners is that section 29(2)(vii) is vague and in the absence of any power in the principal Act to levy, take, recover and receive changes (fees) rates and other sums of money to which the market committee is entitled, could operate only in vacuum.
15. Section 30(5) of the Act reads thus:
"The dues to a Marker Committee shall consist of fees to be levied and collected from a purchaser by or under this."
Section 31(1),(2),(3) of the principal Act reads as under:
"Section 31 of the principal Act shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) of that section; and
(a) after sub-section (1) as so re-numbered the following sub-sections shall be added, namely:
"(2) It shall be competent to a Market Committee to fix, with the prior approval of the State Government the rate of commission (adat) to be charged by the commission agents in respect of an agricultural produce or class of agricultural produce marketed in the market area.
(3) It shall be the duty of the buyer, commission, agent, processor, and trader to pay the market fee fixed immediately after weighment or measurement of the agricultural produce is done. The buyer, the commission agent processor or trader who fails to pay the market fee as fixed above shall be liable to pay a penalty as prescribed in addition to such fees."
Chapter IX of the Act deals with penalties, i.e. penalty for contravention of section 6; penalty for not complying with directions under section 26; penalty for making or recovering trade allowance; penalty for failure to obey order under section 40; penalty for contravention of section 42', general provisions for punishment of offences and compounding of offence. Now reading of the above provisions would show that a market committee has power to levy, fees, charges impose fine or penalties etc. Now section 29 deals with powers and duties of the market committee. While enumerating the powers and duties of the market committee, what is stated in the said provision is that the market committee shall levy, charge, recover and receive the amount due to the market committee. If the market committee imposes any levy, fees, or charges without power or authority under the Act, then certainly the petitioners can have a grievance and can approach proper forum for redressal of his grievance. We do not find any substance in this submission made by the petitioners.
16. The next attack by the petitioners is with regard to section 17 of the Amending Act which amends section 32 of the principal Act. The petitioners have not pointed out as to how this provision, viz. section 31(2) to 31(4) of the Act, as it stands today, could affect their rights or how it is violative of Article 14 of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. As already pointed out, the petitioner, in the first writ petition is a member of the committee and the petitioner in the second writ petition is a trader. It is not known how they can speak for a commission agent or a processor. As far as section 31(4) is concerned, it gives power to a market committee to recover the amount of fees along with the amount of penalty and it further provides that in case if the amount is not paid, as demanded by the market committee, the market committee can, from the amount of deposit kept with the market committee by the buyer etc. or from the Bank which gives the guarantee to such buyer etc., pay the amount so demanded. Here again, the market committee is recovering only the amount due to it and nothing more. It is not as if the said amount is sought to be recovered twice by the market committee, firstly, from the amount of deposit kept with the market committee by the buyer and secondly from the Bank. That being so, we do not find any substance in the submission made by the petitioners in so far as this point is concerned.
17. The next grievance of the petitioners is that section 32-A has been introduced by virtue of which any officer or servant of the market committee can call upon a trader to produce the accounts and seize the same. According to him, this section is arbitrary and is bound to result in misuse of power. We are afraid that the petitioners have not looked into relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules of 1967. Rule 94-A is the straight answer to the apprehension of the petitioners. Rule 94-A reads as follows:-
"94-A. Power to order production and power of entry, inspection and seizure of documents:-
(1) The Market Committee may, authorised by a resolution passed in that behalf, an officer not below the rank of an Assistant Secretary of the Market Committee for the purposes of section 32-A. (2) The officer so authorised by the Market Committee shall give a written notice to such person for production of the record before him or indicating the desire to enter the premises for inspection or seizure of the record. The officer shall take along with him two panchas when he intends to seize the record.
(3) The officer so authorised should give the person from whom the record is seized, a list of record seized, duly witnessed by the panchas and signed by the person from whom the record is seized, and when such person refuses to sign the list the fact shall be recorded in the panchanama.
(4) The officer shall not retain the seized record for more than fifteen days and shall within that period, return the record to the person according to the list and such person shall give a receipt for having received back the record seized and where such person refuses to give a receipt, the fact shall be recorded before the panchas on the list itself.
(5) The officer shall not remain at the premises longer than necessary (6) The officer shall exercise the aforesaid powers only from sunrise to sunset.
(7) Papers only relating to business in Agricultural Produce and payment of market fee and payment of sale price to sellers be ordered to be produced or inspected or seized.
(8) The authorised officer concerned shall immediately give a report to market committee and to the Director about the production, inspection or seizure or the documents and his findings and the secretary shall place the report before the next ensuing meeting of the market committee.
(9) The market committee shall before talking any action on the basis of report as mentioned above call upon the person by a notice to explain why action should not be taken against him and shall give a hearing to him."
As can be seen from the said provision; a person who has been given the power for entry; inspection; seizure etc. in an officer not below the rank of Assistant Secretary of the market committee.
18. The rule also lays down the procedure to be followed by the said officer as well as his powers and duties. That being so; there is no scope for such an officer to act in an arbitrary manner. Here there is no basis for the apprehension of the petitioners.
19. The petitioners would attack 32-B of the Act which empowers the market committee to write off loss; shortage or fees etc. which is irrecoverable. His apprehension is that it would prejudice the right of the market committee and would cause serious loss to the market committee. They would further plead that there are no guidelines and this would create a havoc.
20. A reading of the provision would show that such power can be exercised only in cases where the amount due to the market committee is less than rupees five hundred. That apart; before such write off, a duty is cast upon the market committee to obtain a sanction from the Director. The petitioners will not be justified in assuming that the market committee (which consists of 18 members and 20 members depending upon the market committees) as well as the Director would act without proper care and caution and in an arbitrary manner. If the market committee is required to waste its energy and resources initiating the proceedings etc., the principal object of forming the market committee viz. to help the growers would be lost. That apart, as already pointed out, such power is limited only to cases not exceeding Rs. 500/-. There is no substance in the submission of the petitioners and we reject the same devoid of merits. Further more, we find that under section 52-B of the Act, right of appeal is given to the aggrieved person. Hence we do not see any substances as far as this contention is concerned.
21. Final submission made by the petitioners is section 52-A and B - unlimited power of compounding of offence against the provisions of the principal Act. As already pointed out, the market committee cannot be expected to waste its energy and resources in initiating the production etc. Section 52-A reads as follows:
"52-A(1) The market committee may accept from any persons who has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence (other than contravention of sections 6 and 7 ) against the Act or the rules or bye-laws made thereunder by way of compounding of such offence---
(a) where the offence consists of the failure to pay or the evasion of any fee or other amount recoverable under this Act or the rules or the bye-laws made thereunder, in addition to the fee or other amount so recoverable, a sum of money being not less than the amount of such fee or other amount with a minimum of two hundred and fifty rupees; and (b) in any other case, a sum of money not exceeding one thousand rupees."
22. We find that there are sufficient safeguards in the provisions. A casual reading of the sub-section shows that the market committee not only recovers all dues but also something extra. In fact, by compounding, the market committee only stands to gain in all respects. That apart, even if there is any mistake or violation, committed by the market committee in compounding of the offences, the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal under section 52-B of the Act to the Director. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention also.
23. Thus, it may be seen that various provisions of the Amending Act XXVII of 1987 have been enacted only to further safe-guard the interests of growers and for efficient functioning of the market committee, it cannot be said that there is no nexus between the amendments introduced by the Act XXVII of 1987 and the object sought to be achieved. Certainly each and everyone of the amendments enacted under the Amending Act XXVII of 1987 would help to achieve the object as well as for more efficient functioning of the market committee. There is no substance in the plea of the petitioners that most of the provisions are unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary rendering the whole democratic functioning of the market committees, a mockery. The petitioners have not placed any material to substantiate their plea that amendments affected proceed in the total erroneous assumption, ignoring the actual working of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees and there is a basic distrust among the trading community. The allegations made by the petitioners are vague and the petitioners have not substantiated the same by any iota of evidence.
24. There are no merits in the writ petitions and same are liable to be dismissed. Rules discharged.