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32. Mr. Nairman, learned Senior Counsel, at the out set, contended before us that provisions of Section 2(f)(iii) read with Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 are statutory provisions concerning acquisition of lands and must, therefore, be strictly as also fairly and reasonably construed. In support of this submission, Mr.Nariman relied Page 0970 upon (State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad)(paragraph 14) (Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan) (para 6) and (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Darius Shapur Chenai). Mr.Nariman then contended that the public notices in all these cases under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act were in respect of 'forest" and not "land". Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act only covers notices issued in respect of "any land" in contradistinction to the term "forest" used in earlier sub-clauses. It is, therefore, submitted that Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act, the statutory provision relied on by the State to contend that the petitioners lands had automatically vested in the State Government with effect from 30th August, 1975, is not attracted at all. Besides the 1975 Act first defines "forest" (section 2(c-1)) and then defines "private forests" separately in Section 2(f) as meaning "any forest which is not the property of Government". In none of the cases in these petitions, is the land, said to be vested by virtue of falling within the first part of Section 2(f), namely, "private forest means any forest which is not the property of the Government...." The petitioners land in each of these petitions are said to be covered only under the latter part of Section 2(f) viz. Section 2(f)(iii) (the inclusive part of the definition). The statement of objects and reasons of the Act clearly shows that the Act was enacted to take over and protect what were truly private forest as on 30th August, 1975 and the paramount object is also stated in the said Act. He then submitted that inclusive part of the definition in Section 2(f) viz. Section 2(f), (i), (ii) and (iv) clearly relate to a state of events existing on 30th August, 1975 and it is this context that the provision in Section 2(f)(iii) falls for consideration. Mr.Nariman, therefore, submitted that Section 2(f)(iii) is applicable and referable to a valid notice in time i.e. at or about the time of enactment of 1975 Act i.e. 30th August, 1975. Mr. Nariman, then, emphasized that on a true construction of 1975 Act a "private forest" not only means any forest which is not the property of government (as defined in Section 2(c-i) but includes (i) any land declared before 30th August, 1975 to be a forest under Section 34A of the Forest Act (section 2(f)(i);(ii) any forest in respect of which a notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act is in force immediately before 30th August, 1975 (section 2(f)(ii) and (iii) any land taken over as forest pursuant to an application by the owner himself under Section 38: (section 2(f)(iii). He then submitted that it is in this context that Section 2(f))(iii) of the 1975 Act read with Section 35(3) of the Forest Act must necessarily be confined to cases where valid and subsisting notices were issued at any time within one year before 30th August, 1975 and in respect of which proceedings had not been completed on 30th August, 1975, the date, when Section 35 was repealed by Section 24 of the 1975 Act. It is in respect of such notices alone that the 1975 Act treated the issue of such notices as effectuating a deemed vesting under Section 3 of the 1975 Act. Mr.Nariman then submitted that the words "a Page 0971 notice has been issued under Sub-section 3 of Section 35 of the Forest Act" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act expressly incorporates the entire Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Forest Act and must be read in the context of that provision. He submitted that the issue of notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is for a purpose of eliciting objections from the notice and for the State Govt. duly considering the same which implies that the notice must be brought to the knowledge of the noticees as provided in Section 35(5) of the Forest Act. Mr.Nariman submitted that the notices published in the Bombay Government Gazette in1956 (in case of Godrej), in 1957 (in case of Oberoi constructions) and in 1957 (in the case of Nanbhoy Jeejeebhoy) cannot be relied upon by the State Government as notices falling under Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act because (i) in the case of Oberoi Constructions they are subsequent transferees and it is not shown that the notices of 1957 in their cases were served on the then owners as required by Section 35(5) and mandated by Section 35(5A) or even if they were served why notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act was not issued. The only inference could be that these notices were not pursued as the State Government did not on further consideration treat these lands as forest lands and the lands had to be forest before Section 35(3) or Section 35(1) could be invoked. Secondly, in the case of Godrej for instance although they remained owners after the Notices were published in the Bombay Government Gazette (in the year 1956) it has been brought on record that Godrej were never served with these notices.

86. With regard to scheme of the Section 2 of Maharashtra Private Forest Act, 1975, the learned Advocate General submits that since the provisions Page 0999 of Indian Forest Act were found to be inadequate to achieve the goal of conservation of forest, the State Government passed the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975. Under Section 3 of the said Act notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force etc. all private forests in the State stood acquired and vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government with all the rights over it. Section 2 of the said Act defines the expressions used in the Act. Section 2(c-i) defines "forest" and Section 2(f) defines private forest. The definition of the expression private forest is in two parts. First part defines what private forest means. According to this part it means any forest which is not the property of the Government. Therefore, any land satisfying the definition of forest under Section 2(c-i) and which is not the property of Government stands covered by this definition. The second part of Section 2(f)(iii) is inclusive part. It adds 6 mutually exclusive categories which are to be included in the definition of private forest. It is, therefore, submitted that though a land may not be a forest falling in the first part of the definition of private forest which is an exhaustive definition, still, it can be a private forest if it is covered by any of the later inclusive portions of the definition. For this purpose he placed reliance on the four relevant inclusive parts of Section 2(f)(i) to 2(f(iv) of the Act.

88 Thus, a private forest can be a forest as defined in Section 2(c-i) of the Act, but it can also be covered by the inclusive part of the definition namely Section 2(f)(iii). Hence, to attract to Section 2(f) it need not necessarily be a forest as defined by Section 2(c-i) of the 1975 Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission of the petitioner that unless a land is forest as defined under Section 2(c-i) it cannot be a "private forest."

89. Section 2(f)(iii) "mentions" Section 35(3) notice only because the notice identifies forest. A careful look at the provision of Section 2(f)(iii) reveals that it mentions the provisions of Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Page 1000 Act, 1927 for the purpose of identification of a land for the purpose of treating it to be private forest. The legislature has not incorporated the provisions of Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act into this provision. Therefore, the provision of Section 35(3) cannot be referred to for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act. It is material to note that the legislature was well aware of the provisions of Section 35(4) onwards of Chapter V of the 1927 Act, but still no reference is made to these provisions though obviously nothing stopped the legislature from doing so if it so intended. Learned Advocate General submitted that it is well settled principle of law that where the wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous recourse to different principles of interpretation may not be resorted to. He relied upon the case (Swadish Match AB v. SEBI and Anr.). This is also because if the legislature willfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in the subsequent statute or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute in a language which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. He relied upon the case (Commissioner of sales Tax v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur). To do so "would be entrenching upon the preserves of legislature", the primary function of a Court of law being "Jus dicere and not jus dare." The will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature or in other words to the will of the law. Therefore, where the Legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without en-grafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law giver.

125. There is much substance in the contention of the learned A.G. that Section 2(f) defines Private Forest and while defining it, the Legislature includes any "land" in respect of which notices have been issued under Section 35 of the 1927 Act. Merely because, in Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, the expression "Forest" is used that is of no significance. The word "forest" is defined in Section 34-A of the 1927 Act and the definition is for the purpose of Chapter V. The term includes any land containing trees, shrubs, pasture land and any other land whatsoever which the State Government may by notification in the official gazette declare to be a forest. Section 35 deals with protection of forest for special purposes and in the same, subsection 3 is appearing. The words "or land" were deleted from Sub-section 35(3) of the 1927 Act. When the Private Forest Acquisition Act was enacted, the word "private forest" has been defined to mean any forest which is not a property of Government. It includes any land as would be clear by Section 2(f)(i),(iii) and (iv). The intention appears to be obvious, inasmuch as the Legislature intended to include not only forest but land, declared before the "Appointed Day" to be a forest under Section 34A of the 1927 Act and any forest in respect of which any notification is issued under Section 35(1) of that Act and such notification is in force immediately before the appointed day. If the Legislature did not exhaust itself and proceeded to include such land in respect of which notices have been issued under Section 35(3) and excluded an area not exceeding two hectares in existence as the Collector may specify so also a land in respect of which notification has been issued under Section 38 of the 1927 Act, then, nothing is left out. All private forests have to vest in the State. For the purposes of effective and complete vesting, firstly, the word "forest" was defined in the Private Forest Act. Thereafter "Private Forest" has been defined. In such circumstances, the submission of Mr.Nariman that the words "or land" being deleted from Section 35(3) would have definite bearing on the matter cannot be accepted. As rightly urged by the learned A.G. the provisions in Section 35(3) are not incorporated in the Private Forest Act. Therefore, that provision cannot be referred to for the purposes of interpretation of Section 2 (f)(iii). That apart, Section 34 A of 1927 Act included land of certain description and, therefore, the said word has been deleted from Section 35(3). Further, the land may not be falling in the first part of the definition of the Page 1020 term Private Forest but if it is covered by latter inclusive portion, then, it would be a private forest. If the submissions of the petitioners in this behalf are accepted, then, we would be doing violence to the plain language of Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest Act. Petitioners do not dispute that forests are lands also. In such circumstances and when there is an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is consistently followed by this Court, then, it is not possible to accede to the submissions of the petitioners. Merely because the petitioners canvassed a submission with regard to deletion of words "or lands" from Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, we cannot, by accepting that, dilute the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Chantamani's case.