Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ravindra Nagar vs Gnctd on 23 May, 2025
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Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 349/2024
Reserved on: 14.05.2025.
Pronounced on: 23.05.2025.
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Ravindra Nagar,
Age 35 years,
S/o Sh. Chahat Ram Nagar,
R/o- Village Dujana, Post- Dujana,
District- Gautam Budh Nagar,
UP-203207
Sub.: Dismissal
Group „C‟ ... Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan)
Versus
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through the Chief Secretary,
Govt. of NCTD,
A-Wing, 5th Floor,
Delhi Secretariat,
New Delhi-110113
2. The Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters,
Jai Singh Road
New Delhi.
3. The Joint Commissioner of Police
Eastern Range: Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Jai Singh Road
New Delhi.
4. The Deputy Commissioner of Police
Shahdara District: Delhi
Through the Commissioner of Police
Jai Singh Road
New Delhi. ... Respondents
(By Advocate:Mr. Bijendra Singh Sharma)
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Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A): -
By way of the present O.A. filed u/s 19 of the AT Act, 1985, the applicant, in Para 8 of the O.A., has prayed for the following reliefs: -
"(a) To quash and set aside an order dated 31.8.2020 whereby the extreme punishment of dismissal from service is inflicted upon the applicant, order dated 13.12.2023 whereby the statutory appeal of the applicant has been rejected and to further direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant back in service with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowance.
And/or Any other relief that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be awarded to the applicant."
2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the applicant and have prayed for dismissal of the present Original Application. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder denying the contentions of the counter affidavit and reiterated his claim in the OA.
FACTS OF THE CASE
3. The brief facts of the present case are as follows: the applicant was appointed as a Constable in the Delhi Police on 25.05.2008. He contended that he has an unblemished service record. He further submitted that he has always discharged his duties with utmost sincerity and holds high respect for the law of the land. The applicant stated that he is the sole breadwinner of his family and has dependents to support. His family comprises of his wife (a homemaker), one son (11 years old), and his elderly father and mother.
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Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
4. The applicant further contended that he was falsely implicated in a criminal case registered as FIR No. 314/20 dated 26.06.2020 under Sections 307 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act, at P. S. Seemapuri. The FIR was registered on 26.06.2020, and the applicant was taken into custody on the same date. He was subsequently placed under suspension vide order dated 27.06.2020.
5. To the applicant‟s great surprise, he received the dismissal order dated 31.08.2020 while he was in judicial custody as the Disciplinary Authority invoked the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India to impose the extreme punishment of dismissal from service without holding a departmental enquiry upon the applicant. The reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry are vague and based on mere suspicion and surmise. Hence, the present Original Application is being filed.
6. The order dated 31.08.2020, whereby the extreme punishment of dismissal from service was inflicted upon the applicant by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, and the order dated 13.12.2023, whereby the applicant‟s statutory appeal was rejected, are being challenged on the following grounds:
The order of the Disciplinary Authority itself establishes that the preliminary enquiry (PE) was conducted to establish the guilt of the applicant, and that too, behind the applicant‟s back.4
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The order of the Disciplinary Authority is bad in law, as the reasons recorded for dispensing with the departmental enquiry (DE) are not sustainable in the eyes of law.
In the public interest, and in accordance with the rule of law, it was incumbent upon the authorities not to invoke the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in the present case and instead to provide the applicant with an opportunity to present his defence in a departmental enquiry (D.E.). The gravity of the alleged misconduct in this case cannot, by itself, justify the invocation of powers under Article 311 (2) (b). In line with the rule of law, the applicant must be afforded a fair opportunity to present his defence in a regular D.E., unless such an enquiry is reasonably impracticable. The reasons recorded in the impugned order for dispensing with the D.E. are not tenable in the eyes of law. Article 311 (2) (b) is being misused as a shortcut mechanism to dismiss the applicant from service.
The Disciplinary Authority, in the impugned order, has assumed that the allegation in the present case already stand proved, and based on such presumptions, has proceeded to pass the said the aforesaid impugned order. Once the order of the Disciplinary Authority is founded on an assumption that the allegations are proved and that too solely on the basis of a preliminary enquiry, it is enough to vitiate the order. Such an order is bad in law, as it is based on assumptions, suspicion, and surmises.
The order of the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking and mechanical in nature. It fails to consider the specific factual and legal submissions of the applicant, which were well-supported by recent 5 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 judicial pronouncements. The applicant had apprised the Appellate Authority of recent judgments passed by the Tribunal in cases concerning the invocation of Article 311 (2) (b). However, the Appellate Authority did not consider even a single such judgment, thereby rendering the order mechanical and unsustainable in law. The Appellate Authority also took into account the Medical Legal Certificate (MLC) while deciding the appeal, despite the fact that it bears no relevance to the invocation of powers under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The witnesses in question are all official witnesses, and even the Appellate Authority acknowledges that documentary evidence is available. Yet, the department continues to shy away from conducting a D.E., presuming that the allegations have already been proved. The authorities failed to recognize that such presumptions do not satisfy the strict conditions necessary for invoking Article 311 (2) (b). The reasons recorded for dispensing with the D.E. -- that it is not reasonably practicable -- are vague, unwarranted, and based entirely on suspicion and surmise, rendering the action bad in law. The Appellate Authority has also failed to appreciate the core argument raised by the applicant in his statutory appeal -- namely, that a D.E. is indeed possible in the present case, and the reasons provided by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with it are legally untenable. This reasoning has been addressed by the Tribunal in numerous cases involving the same respondents, where similar orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities have been quashed. The Appellate Authority‟s order is also based on presumption, suspicion, and surmise, and is, therefore, legally unsustainable. 6
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The Appellate Authority simply presumes that the allegations against the applicant stand proved and, on that basis, concludes that the power under Article 311(2)(b) can be invoked. This clearly reflects a misuse of Article 311(2)(b), which is not intended to operate on presumptions or pre-judgment. Such reasoning reflects a clear non-application of mind on the part of the Appellate Authority.
The Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate that a D.E. is very much possible in the present case. If a preliminary enquiry (P.E.) was feasible, then a regular D.E. is also feasible. The appeal has been rejected solely on presumptions and assumptions. Even as per the P.E., all the witnesses relied upon by the department are police officials. Thus, under no circumstances can the applicant pose a hindrance to these witnesses deposing in any enquiry or criminal trial.
The Appellate Authority has placed undue reliance on the P.E., without appreciating that the same was conducted behind the applicant‟s back. Consequently, no finding of guilt arising from such a P.E. can be lawfully relied upon against the applicant. This renders the order of the Appellate Authority bad in law.
The applicant was granted interim bail on 08.06.2021 and has remained on bail since then. It is a matter of record that charges have been framed against the applicant in the criminal case, and the trial is commenced. Thereafter, the applicant was granted regular bail vide order dated 17.05.2023 passed by the learned ASJ-04, Shahdara/KKD. The conditions of regular bail are reproduced herein below:
"In the present case, charge has already been framed. Trial is likely to take some time. No purpose would be served of keeping the accused in JC. Ct. Amod/injured has also appeared in the court and has submitted that he has no objection if the bail is granted to 7 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 accused. There is no other previous involvement of the accused and nothing to suggest that accused would influence the witnesses or would temper with evidence or would abscond. There is nothing to suggest that accused has misused his liberty during the period of interim bail as per HPC guidelines. In view thereof, applicant/accused is admitted to bail on his furnishing a personal bond in sum of Rs.30,000/- with two sureties of the like amount subject to the following conditions: -
(1) during the period of bail, the accused/applicant shall not try to contact or influence, directly or indirectly, any of the witnesses 0f the present case;
(2) the accused/applicant shall not misuse the benefit of bail by indulging in commission of similar offence in future, (3) the accused/applicant shall not leave the country without prior permission of the court, (4) the accused/applicant shall appear before Ld. Trial Court on each and every date of hearing (5) the accused/applicant shall intimate the court in case of change of his address.
(6) the accused/applicant shall furnish his details in performa Annexure B annexed to "the judgment1 of H6n'ble High Court of Delhi in Sunil Tyagi Vs. The State ofNCT ofDelhi in Crl. Misc. no.
5328/2013."
It is a matter of record that the conditions stipulated by the learned Court were never violated by the applicant. The aforesaid bail order further establishes that the reasons recorded for dispensing with the departmental enquiry (D.E.) are based merely on suspicion and surmises. On the contrary, the learned Trial Court clearly recorded that the applicant has no history of any previous offence and has duly complied with all the conditions of interim bail. It is further a matter of record that even the regular bail was granted subject to certain conditions, and there has been no violation of the same by the applicant. These facts render the orders of both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority bad in law.
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Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The applicant has been falsely implicated in the criminal case. At no point, did the applicant fire at Amod Bhadana with the intention to harm him. The applicant harbours no animosity or motive against Amod Bhadana to support such an act. Therefore, the applicant has been falsely implicated in FIR No. 314/2020 dated 26.06.2020, registered under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act at P.S. Seemapuri. It is a matter of record that charges have been framed in the criminal case.
According to the prosecution‟s version, as noted in the order of the Disciplinary Authority, there are three witnesses -- ASI Okesh Pal, Constable Mohit, and Constable Amod Bhadana -- all of whom are police officials. Therefore, under no circumstances can the applicant be seen as a hindrance to these witnesses deposing either in a departmental enquiry or before a trial court.
It is an admitted fact that in the present case, a preliminary enquiry (P.E.) was conducted through the ACP/PG Cell, and the dismissal order dated 31.08.2020 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority. If a P.E. was feasible, then a D.E. is also clearly possible. The Tribunal, in a catena of judgments involving the same issue under Article 311 (2) (b), has allowed various Original Applications von the same ground. In recent judgments involving the same respondent, the Tribunal has quashed and set aside dismissal orders issued under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India on the specific ground that if a preliminary enquiry (P.E.) is possible, then a departmental enquiry (D.E.) is also possible. Furthermore, as per the conditions laid down in Circular No. 5545- 645/P.Cell/Vig./P.Misc. dated 11.09.2007, concurrence from the Special 9 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 Commissioner of Police (Administration) is required before taking a decision under Article 311 (2) (b). The condition precedent is as follows:
"Only in cases w here Disciplinary Authority is personally satisfied on the basis of material available on file that the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and keeping in view the specific circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2)
(b) should such an action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be conducted and it is essential to bring on record all such facts.
It has also been decided that before passing an order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution, Disciplinary Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.)"
There was no concurrence of the Special Commissioner of Police in this case as required under the aforesaid circular. Therefore, the impugned order has been passed in violation of the circular dated 11.09.2007, rendering it bad in law and passed without jurisdiction and competence by the authorities.
The impugned orders have been issued in utter violation of the principles of natural justice and the applicable departmental rules and procedures. Under the guise of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, the applicant was dismissed from service without he being subjected to a departmental inquiry.
The Disciplinary Authority has recorded that the allegations against the applicant stood proved in the Preliminary Enquiry (P.E.) itself.
However, this cannot be a valid ground to invoke Article 311 (2) (b). The P.E. report was neither supplied to the applicant nor was he made a part of the enquiry. As per settled law, if a Preliminary Enquiry is possible, then a Departmental Enquiry (D.E.) is also possible, and in such circumstances, Article 311 (2) (b) cannot be invoked in the case of the applicant.10
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The Disciplinary Authority did not make even the slightest effort to initiate a departmental inquiry. Only after initiating such an inquiry can a conclusion be drawn that conducting of DE is not reasonably practicable. Instead, the Disciplinary Authority merely on presumptions and surmises concluded that a D.E. is not reasonably practicable without assigning the cogent reason(s). No order for initiating a D.E. was ever issued, making the reasoning behind its impracticability untenable. The Disciplinary Authority failed to apply its mind, ignoring that invoking Article 311 (2) (b) requires the pre-condition that a D.E. is not reasonably practicable. To reach this conclusion, valid and substantial reasons must be recorded, which has not been done in this case.
In the present case, the reasoning is based on the assumption that the applicant has committed the alleged offence, thereby negating the need for a departmental inquiry. Such an assumption cannot withstand judicial scrutiny for the invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. It is well-established in law that the graver the charges, the greater the obligation to afford an opportunity to the delinquent official to defend himself. The seriousness of the charge is never a valid ground to invoke Article 311 (2) (b).
The impugned order is bad in law as it lacks robust, clear, and substantial reasoning for dispensing with the D.E., being based instead on mere suspicion and surmise.
This is a classic case of the misuse of the power vested in the Disciplinary Authority under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, rendering the order bad in law.11
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The reasons recorded by the authorities for dispensing with the departmental inquiry do not withstand legal scrutiny. The justification in the impugned order for invoking Article 311 (2) (b) appears to have been recorded only to avoid holding a departmental inquiry.
It is a settled principle of law that a finding of guilt arrived at without conducting a departmental enquiry is per se unlawful and vitiates the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant was found guilty without being given an opportunity to present his defence, which is sufficient to invalidate the order.
The authorities also failed to consider that no substantial material was collected during the P.E. to justify the conclusion that any witness, particularly the victim, would be discouraged from appearing in a D.E. The Disciplinary Authority's order contains no averment that any witness felt threatened or intimidated and would refuse to testify in the inquiry. Instead, based solely on the nature of the allegation, the authority concluded--on suspicion and assumption--that the D.E. would not be reasonably practicable.
Such a conclusion reflects a non-application of mind and is arbitrary and biased. It suggests a shortcut approach to dismiss the applicant by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b), based solely on the gravity of the allegations.
The impugned order is legally unsustainable as there is no admissible material or evidence to establish that any witness is being threatened, intimidated, or unwilling to testify in a departmental inquiry. The reasons recorded for dispensing with the D.E. under Article 311 (2) (b) are thus based merely on speculation and assumption.12
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 The order of the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated as it ignores Rule 15 (3) and Rule 16 (3) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980. These provisions allow for the use of previously recorded statements of witnesses in case they are unavailable. Hence, citing potential non-appearance of witnesses as a reason to dispense with a departmental inquiry is not sustainable under the said rules.
The Disciplinary Authority, acting under the garb of Article 311 (2)
(b), relied only on suspicion and conjecture to dispense with the departmental inquiry, thereby depriving the applicant of a fair opportunity to defend himself and causing grave prejudice. This case is one of no evidence and no misconduct, but merely one of allegations based on probabilities and suspicion. To avoid holding a D.E., the authorities have adopted a shortcut by invoking Article 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India.
It is important to note that the kind of circumstances contemplated in illustrative cases or any other circumstances that could make a departmental inquiry impracticable--must actually exist at the time, the Disciplinary Authority concludes that the inquiry is not feasible. It is not legally permissible for the authority to anticipate potential future developments as grounds for dispensing with a departmental inquiry, or to deny the applicant a charge-sheet on that basis.
7. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the latest judgments of the Tribunal qua the same respondent on the use of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India namely, (i) Order/judgment dated 13.12.2023 in O.A. No.1019/2023 in the matter of Dushyant Vs. GNCTD; (ii) Order/judgment dated 16.08.2023 in O.A. Nos. 13
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
3436/2022 & 3494/2022 in the matter of Sandeep Moun Vs.
GNCTD and Sandeep Bishnoi Vs. GNCTD; (iii) Order/judgment dated 17.07.2023 in O.A. No. 1318/2022 in the matter of Manish Kumar Vs. GNCTD; (iv) Order/judgment dated 27.04.2023 inO.A. No. 1038/2017 in the matter of Neeraj Kumar Vs. GNCTD & Ors.;
(v) Order/judgment dated 28.07.2023 in O.A. No. 1038/2017 in the matter of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Govt. of NCTD & Ors.;(vi) Order/judgment dated 17.06.2021 in O.A. No. 1114/2018 in the matter of Tara Dutt Vs GNCT of Delhi & Ors.; and (vii) Order/judgment dated 16.04.2025 in O.As Nos. 645/2024 with O.A. No. 579/2024 in the matter of Akash Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors. and Mangtu Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors. respectively. The applicant is also relying on the common order/judgment dated 10.02.2022 of this Tribunal in connected O.As. Nos.1383/2020, 3508/2018, 4021/2016, 3027/2018, 2777/2019, 3267/2019, 467/2020 and 34/2021 titled Sumit Sharma Vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
8. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid act of the respondents, the applicant approached this Tribunal by way of the present OA.
9. Counter reply has been filed by the respondents on 09.04.2024 wherein the respondents have stated thaton26.06.2020Constable (Exe.) Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD (PIS No.28082355) (here-in-after called the applicant), Constable (Exe.) Amod Bhadana, No. 822/SHD posted in Police Station Seemapuri was assigned as Beat Officer in Beat No. 8. He returned back to police station after completion of his beat duty and was having dinner in Room No. 126, 1st floor, P.S. Seemapuri. At around 14 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 10.30 PM, another staff, the applicant who was deployed on Jaguar Motorcycle Duty, came in his room. They had hot argument on some issue and all of sudden, the applicant took out his service pistol which was got issued to him on that day for duty, and fired towards Constable (Exe.) Amod Bhadana. The bullet hit in his chest and he fell down. Immediately, he was taken to SDN Hospital where he was referred to AIIMS Trauma Centre where he took treatment. Accordingly, a case vide FIR No.314/20, dated 26.06.2020 u/s 307 IPC & 27 Arms Act, P. S. Seemapuri was registered against the applicant.
10. The respondents submitted that the applicant committed the most abominable act and arrested in this case which is not expected from an officer of a uniformed force. As such he was placed under suspension vide order dated 27.06.2020. In this regard, a preliminary enquiry was ordered into the matter under Rule 15 (1) of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 vide office dated27.06.2020 and entrusted to ACP/PG Cell/SHD, which revealed that it is clear that the applicant had fired bullet upon Constable Amod Bhadana with govt. pistol, purposely got issued by him from Malkhana (GP) of P. S. Seemapuri at 10.40PM for commission of offence, due to which, Constable Amod Bhadana sustained gunshot injury. In the matter a case vide FIR No. 314/2020 u/s 307 IPC and 27 Arms Act was registered at P.S. Seemapuri. During investigation, the applicant was arrested into the matter and had accepted his guilt in his disclosure statement. Further, ASI Okesh Pal, who was performing duty of D.O. in P.S. Seemapuri, is one of the prime witnesses of the case, as he had heard the noise of fire between 10:30 PM and 11:00 PM and Constable Amod Bhadana had instantly informed 15 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 him that the applicant had fired bulled upon him. Apart from this, Constable Mohit had also heard the noise of fire at about 10:45 PM. It is pertinent to mention here that the pistol used in commission of offence was seized. Due to this, Constable Amod Bhadana admitted in AIIMS Hospital for treatment.
11. On perusal of arms issuance register at the time of commission of offence, it is absolutely clear that the applicant had got issued weapon from Malkhana of P.S. Seemapuri at 10:40 PM with the sole motive of causing injury to Constable Amod Bhadana. Moreover, being a trained and experienced police officer, he was well aware of the commission and consequences of firing bullet. During the preliminary enquiry, it was observed that the applicant misused the govt. pistol and attempted to murder his colleague namely Constable Amod Bhadana as such his further continuance in the police force was likely to cause irreparable loss to the functioning and credibility of the organization. The indulgence of police personnel in such dastardly act would destroy the faith of officials/colleagues in the police department. He had acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a police officer of a disciplined force. Such type of act would cause a highly deleterious impact on the entire force.
12. From the contents of the FIR of this criminal case and from his disclosure statement, it is evident that the applicant had committed a heinous crime of attempt to murder, which is alarming, abhorrent and requires to be dealt with a heavy hand. A policeman, who is entrusted with the sacred responsibility of upholding the rule of law indulges in 16 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 such a heinous crime, is unbecoming of a police officer. Such act of ghastly crime produces highly deleterious impact on the organization which is unbecoming of a police officer and his further retention in police force is undesirable. The accused was in lawful custody and there was no scope of his release on bail near future. The criminal case takes a lot of time to complete the marathon litigation processes to reach his logical end and the accused would draw subsistence allowance for a long period. Besides, it was highly unlikely that anyone would depose against, such a reckless criminal in the departmental proceedings, as they all worked in the same organization. Further there is existing practice that the PWs first depose before the court of law to avoid any controversy or leakage of facts and also the accused constable was in lawful custody so he could not have participated in the DE proceedings. Under these circumstances, it was not practicable to hold a regular departmental enquiry against the accused Constable.
13. Taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances of above mentioned case, it was clear that the applicant had committed the gravest act of misconduct which cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like the police whose basic duty is to protect the life and liberty of citizen in the society. He indulged in an abominable act which is not expected from personnel of a uniformed force. The shameful act committed by him had not only tarnished the image of the police force and brought disgrace to the organization but had also demoralized other police officer/staff. It was a clear instance of a law enforcer turning into the lawbreaker and had thereby projected a very bad image of Delhi 17 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 Police in the eyes of the general public as well as of the police department.
14. It was an apt case wherein exemplary punishment was awarded to the applicant so as to send a strong message and to prevent further recurrence of such crime. The involvement of the applicant in such a criminal act is not only undesirable, but it also amounts to serious misconduct and indiscipline and is totally unbecoming of a police officer. The applicant should not be allowed to continue in police service and dismissed immediately without following the regular departmental proceedings, the fact finding was really not needed as the contents of case FIR No. 314/2020 u/s 307 IPC& 27 Arms Act, P.S. Seemapuri, Delhi and the preliminary enquiry conducted into the matter had proved his involvement in this case.
15. Therefore, the then Disciplinary Authority was satisfied that the acts and grave misconduct of the applicant attracted the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the constitution of India and made him completely unfit for police service. After completing the preliminary enquiry into the matter, in compliance of the circular issued from PHQ into the matter vide No. 5545-645/P. Cell (Vig.), dated 11.09.2007, the enquiry report was forwarded to Spl. C.P./L&O (North) Delhi for seeking his concurrence to dismiss the applicant under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and same was approved by the Competent Authority.
16. Therefore, keeping in view of the sensitivity of the matter, the then disciplinary authority ordered to dismiss the applicant from Delhi 18 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 Police under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India with immediate effect and his suspension period from 27.06.2020 to the date of issue of order was also decided as period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes which would not be regularized in any manner vide office order No. 5912-6030/HAP (P-11)/Shahdara District, dated 31.08.2020. The applicant filed an appeal which was considered and rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order No. 5244-49/SO/ER (AC- II), dated 13.12.2023.
17. In rejoinder filed by the applicant on 05.08.2024, learned counsel for the applicant has reiterated the averments as noted above. However, in support of claim of the applicant reliance has also been placed on the following judgments; namely (i) Order/judgment dated 19.02.2024 of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 2407/2024 in the matter of Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Dushyant Kumar, 2024:DHC:1247:DB; (ii) Order/judgment dated 13.03.2024 of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 10452/2023 in the matter of Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Ex. Ct. Naeem Khan, 2024:DHC;2034:DB; (iii) Order/judgment dated 22.04.2024 of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) 15229/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Ex. Const. Jatin Kumar, Exe., 2024:DHC:3137:DB, (iv) Order/judgment dated 22.04.2024 of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Kapil, 2024:DHC:3030:DB; and (v) Order/judgment dated 29.04.2024 of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 12944/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Ravinder Singh, 2024:DHC:3384:DB.
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18. We have perused the pleadings available on record and considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the Orders/Judgments referred to and relied upon by the learned counsels for the respective parties carefully.
19. The dismissal order of the applicant was passed by the Disciplinary Authority when the applicant was in judicial custody. The Disciplinary Authority while issuing punishment order dated 31.08.2020 (Annexure- A/1) has invoked the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismissed the applicant from service. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of the disciplinary order is as follows:-
"In this regard, a Preliminary Enquiry was ordered into the. Matter under Rule15 (1) of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 vide this office No. 3631/HAP/SHD, dated 27.06.2020 and entrusted to ACP/PG Cell, which revealed that it is clear that Constable Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD had fired bullet upon Constable Amod Bhadaha, No. 822/SHD, with Govt. Pistol, purposely got issued by him from Malkhanla (GP) of P.S. Seemapuri at 10.40 PM for commission of offence, due to which, Constable Amod Bhadana sustained gunshot injury. In the matter, a case vide FIR No. 314/2020 u/s 307 IPC and 27 Arms Act has been registered at P.S. Seemapuri. During investigation, Constable Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD was arrested in to the matter and had accepted his guilt in his disclosure statement. Further, ASI Okesh Pal, who was performing duty of DO in P.S. Seemapuri, is one of the prime witnesses of the case, as he had heard the noise of fire between 10.30 PM and, 11 PM and Constable Amod Bhadana had instantly informed him that Constable Ravindra Nagar had fired bulled upon him. This apart Constable Mohit, No. 1/415/SHD had also heard the noise of fire at about 10.45 PM. It is pertinent .to mention here that the Pistol used in commission of offence has been seized. Constable Amod Bhadana is still admitted at AIIMS Hospital.
On perusal of arms issuance register at the time of commission of offence, it is absolutely clear that Constable Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD had got issued weapon from Malkhana of P.S. Seemapuri at 10.40 PM with the sole motive of causing injury to Constable Amod Bhadana. Moreover, being a trained and experienced police official, he was well aware of the commission and consequences of firing bullet.
Through the facts surfaced during the preliminary enquiry, it has been observed that Constable (Exe.) Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD (PIS No. 28082355) has misused the Govt. Pistol and attempted to murder his colleague namely Constable Amod Bhadana, No. 822 SHD, as such his further continuance in the police force is likely to cause irreparable loss to the functioning and credibility of the organization. The indulgence of police personnel in such dastardly act would destroy the faith of 20 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 officials/ colleagues in the police department. He had acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a police officer of a disciplined force. Such type of act would cause a highly deleterious impact on the entire force.
Moreover, from the contents of the FIR of this criminal case, his disclosure statement it is evident hat Constable (Exe.) Ravindra Nagar, No. 848 /SHD has committed a heinous prime of attempt to murder of his colleague, which is extremely alarming, most abhorrent and requires to be dealt with a heavy hand. A policeman, who is charged with the scared responsibility. of upholding the rule of law himself indulge in such an act of heinous crime and lawlessness, the faith of the common man in Government's authority gets shattered. Such acts of ghastly crime produces highly deleterious impact on the organization which renders him liable and unbecoming of a government servant of 'his further retention in police force would be highly undesirable. The accused is still in lawful custody and there is no scope of his r lease on bail near future. The criminal case will take a lot of time to complete the marathon litigation processes to reach his logical end and the accused will draw subsistence allowance for a long period. Besides, it is highly unlikely that anyone will depose against such a reckless criminal in the departmental proceedings, as are working in the same organization. Further there is existing practice that the PWs first depose before the court of law to avoid any controversy or leakage r facts and also the accused constable is in lawful custody as such· cannot participate in the DE proceedings. Under these circumstances, it would not be practicable to hold a regular departmental enquiry against the accused Constable.
Taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances of above mentioned case, it is amply clear the defaulter has committed the gravest act of misconduct which cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like the police whose basic duty is to protect tie life and liberty of citizen in the society. He indulged himself a most abominable apt which is not expected from a personnel of a uniformed force. The shameful act committed by him has not only tarnished the image of the police force and brought disgrace to the organization but has also demoralized other police officer/staff. It is a. clear instance of a law enforcer turning into the lawbreaker and has thereby projected a very bad image of Delhi Police in the eyes of the general public as well lb police department which tried to erode the faith in a police department.
Hence, it is an apt case wherein exemplary punishment needs to be awarded to the defaulter so as to send a strong message and to prevent the recurrence of such unacceptable behaviours of moral turpitude. The involvement of the Constable in such criminal act is not only undesirable, but it is also amounts to serious misconduct and indiscipline, totally unbecoming of a police officer. Constable Ravindra Nagar should not be allowed to continue in police service and needs to be dismissed immediately without following the proceedings of regular departmental proceedings, although purpose of the. fact finding is really no needed as the contents of case FIR No. 314//2020 u/s 307 IPC & 27 Arms Act, P.S. Seemapuri, Delhi and the Preliminary Enquiry conducted into the matter has proved his involvement in this case.
Therefore, the undersigned is satisfied that the acts and grave misconduct of defaulter Constable Ravindra Nagar, No. 848/SHD attracts the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and makes him completely unfit for police service.
After completing the Preliminary Enquiry into the matter, in compliance of the circular issued from PHQ into the matter vide No. 5545-645/P. Cell 21 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 (Vig.), dated 11.09.2007, the enquiry report was forwarded to Spl. C.P./L & O (North) Delhi for seeking his concurrence to dismiss the defaulter under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and same has been approved by the competent authority.
Therefore, I, AMIT SHARMA, IPS, Dy. Commissioner of Police, Shahdara District, Delhi hereby order to DISMISS Constable (Exe.) Ravindram Nagar, No. 848/SHD (PIS No. 28082355) from Delhi Police under article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India with immediate effect. His suspension period from 27.06.2020 to the date of issue of is order is also decided as 'period not spent on duty' for all intents and purpose and the same will not be regularized in any manner."
19. The applicant made a statutory appeal dated 22.03.2023 (Annexure- A/3) wherein specifically submitted that he could not make the appeal within the stipulated time frame and the said delay is neither intentional nor deliberate. The dismissal order dated 31.08.2020 (Annexure-A/1) was received by him (in Judicial custody) on 08.09.2020. The applicant came out from judicial custody on 08.06.2021 and filed an appeal dated 22.03.2023 (Annexure-A/3) against punishment order to the Joint Commissioner of Police. However, Appellate Authority vide order dated 13.12.2023 (Annexure-A/2) rejected his appeal. For facility of reference, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the appellate order, the same reads as under:-
"On perusal of arms issuance register at the time of commission of offence, it is absolutely clear that the appellant had got issued weapon from Malkhana of PS/Seemapuri at 10:40 pm with the sole motive of causing injury to Constable Amod Bhadna. Moreover, being a trained and experienced police official, he was well aware of the commission and consequences of firing bullet.
Through the facts surfaced during the preliminary enquiry, it was observed that the appellant had misused the govt. pistol and attempted to murder of his colleague namely Constable Amod Bhadana, No. 822/SHD, as such, his further continuance in the police force was likely to cause irreparable loss to the functioning and credibility of the organization. The indulgence of police personnel in such dastardly act would destroy the faith of officials/colleagues in the police department. He had acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a police officer of a disciplined force. Such type of act would cause a highly deleterious impact on the entire force.
Moreover, from the contents of FIR of this criminal case and his disclosure statement, it is evident that the appellant had committed a heinous crime of attempt to murder of his colleague, which is extremely 22 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 alarming, most abhorrent and requires to be dealt with a heavy hand. A policeman, who is charged with the scared responsibility of upholding the rule of law himself indulge in such an act of heinous crime and lawlessness, the faith of the common man in government's authority gets shattered. Such acts of ghastly crime produces highly deleterious impact on the organization which renders him liable and unbecoming of a government servant of his further retention in police force would be highly undesirable. The accused was in lawful custody and there was no scope of his release on bail in near future. The criminal case will take a lot of time to complete the marathon litigation process to reach his logical end and the accused will drat subsistence allowance for a long period. Besides, it is highly unlikely that anyone will depose against such a reckless criminal in the departmental proceedings, as are working in the same organization. Further there is existing that the/ PWs first depose before the court of law to avoid any controversy or leakage of facts and also the accused constable was in lawful custody as such cannot participate in the DE proceedings. Under these circumstances, it is not/ practicable to hold a regular departmental enquiry against the accused Constable.
Taking into the totality of facts and circumstances of above mentioned case, it is amply clear that the appellant had committed the gravest act of misconduct which cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like the police whose basic duty is to protect the life and liberty of citizen in the society. He indulged hin4self in a most abominable act which is not expected from a personnel of a uniformed force. The shameful act committed by him had not only tarnished the image of the police force and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police officer/staff. IE is a clear instance of a law enforcer turning/ into the lawbreaker and had thereby projected a very bad image of Delhi Police in the eyes of the general public as well as police department which tried to erode the faith in a police department.
Hence, it is an apt case wherein exemplary punishment needs to be awarded to the appellant so as to send a strong message and to prevent the recurrence of such unacceptable behaviors of moral turpitude. The involvement of the appellant in such~ criminal act is not only undesirable, but it is also amounts to serious misconduct and indiscipline, totally unbecoming of a police officer. The appellant should not be allowed to continue in police service and needs to be dismissed immediately without following the proceedings of regular departmental enquiries, although purpose of the fact finding is really not needed as the contents o case FIR No. 314/2020 u/s 307 IPC & 27 Arms Act, P. S. Seemapuri, Delhi and he preliminary enquiry conducted into the matter had proved his involvement in this case.
Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was satisfied that the acts and grave misconduct of the appellant attracts the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the constitution f India and makes him completely unfit for police service.
In view of overall facts and circumstances, the appellant was dismissed from service a d his suspension period 27.06.2020 to the date of issue of order was also decided as period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes vide order ~o. 5912-6030/HAP(P-II)/Shahdara District, dated 31.08.2020. Hence this appeal which is time barred. Following the appeal, I have heard the appellant in person. During personal hearing, the appellant has stated nothing new to what he has 23 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 already submitted in writing. I have gone through the submissions of the appellant and on examination of the MLC of Const. Abodh Kasana. Further, the MLC of the injured Const. Abodh Kasana has been examined. Perusal of MLC reveals the A/H/0 gunshot injury having the following observations:-
Entry wound on (Rt.) side of chest (literally).
3 cm below the clavicle size (=1x1 cm) Density.
Subcutaneous emphysema (PP). No surrounding other this Rt. side of chest.
There is no tattooing, singing or burning mentioned in the MLC which shows that injury has been caused from a certain distance to Const. Abodh Kasana by the appellant when they both were alone in the room. The above act of the appellant shows that he had committed a heinous crime of attempt to murder of his colleague, which is extremely alarming and most abhorrent. A policeman, who is charged with the scared responsibility of upholding the rule of la himself indulge in such an act of heinous crime and lawlessness, the faith off the common man in government's authority gets shattered.
Keeping in view of the above, I find no reason to intervene with the order passed by t e Disciplinary Authority. The appeal is, therefore, rejected being devoid of merit and substance.
Let the appellant be informed accordingly."
21. The learned counsel for the respondents pleaded that the respondents have given detailed justification of invocation of the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in their Disciplinary order and Appellate order. They repeatedly stated that further continuation of the applicant in disciplined force like Delhi Police which is responsible for protecting the society and citizens of the country from immoral and disrespectable activities will rudely shake the faith of the citizens in Delhi Police Force. The applicant has acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a Police Officer. Therefore, keeping in view the position in the matter, the respondents have resorted to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismissed the applicant from the government service.
22. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have come to the decision on the presumption that alleged offence has been 24 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 committed by the applicant, so there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry, these reasons cannot stand to the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. It needs to be tested whether the reasons recorded in the impugned order for invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are justifiable or the provisions of above- mentioned Article of the Constitution of India are invoked only to avoid the disciplinary enquiry and get rid of the applicant in convenient manner. The Disciplinary Authority did not mention the reasonable grounds even when Preliminary Enquiry was ordered against the applicant. It could be seen from the appellate order that Appellate Authority had rejected the appeal in a mechanical manner without addressing on specific submissions of the applicant and merely on presumptions that the allegation against the applicant is presumed to be proved and the witness might not have come forward to depose against the applicant despite the fact the most of the witnesses are the police officials. The Appellate Authority is simply assuming that the allegations against the applicant stands proved and this justification is good enough to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and to dismiss the applicant. The Appellate Authority did not appreciate that in the present case, the majority of the witnesses are official witnesses. If preliminary enquiry is possible, then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Similarly, if the trial is possible then the departmental enquiry is also possible. However, both Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority did not make any efforts to conduct departmental enquiry and resorted to invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the 25 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 Constitution of India to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the applicant. This could be construed as strong bias of respondents towards the applicant and their disdain approach to uphold Rule of Law. The respondents being senior police officer holding high position are required to run the administrative decision making lawfully. Earlier also while deciding other matters, we have pointed out that a serious course correction is needed in the respondent Department while handling such cases and it is for their betterment, if they take effective steps in that direction. We need not further ponder upon this point and leave it here.
23. In the recent matter decided on 14.08.2024 by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.11276/2024 and CM Appl. 46705/2024. CM Appl. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. OM Prakash & anr., wherein the Commissioner of Police had been directed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi „to personally look into such matters and take proper decision so that Courts/Tribunals are not burdened with a case where departmental inquiries can be initiated. We hereby make it clear that if such like petitions are filed in future wherein dismissal or suspension orders are passed without holding any enquiry without any plausible reasoning, certainly heavy cost will be imposed and that too, will be recovered from the Officer, who takes such type of unwarranted decision'.
24. It is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has assumed as if the allegations made in criminal case (FIR) had already stand proved and thus with this presumptions, the present impugned order has been issued. Once the order of Disciplinary Authority is based on assumption 26 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 as if the allegations made against the applicant already stand proved that too on the basis of contents of FIR, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of Disciplinary Authority as the same being bad in law and being based on assumptions, suspicion and surmises. Further, the Disciplinary Authority is assuming that the offence has been committed by the applicant and under this assumption, the present order of Disciplinary Authority is being passed by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. There are circulars, catena of judgments of judicial forums which clearly provide that if the allegations are grave then more opportunity should be provided to the delinquent official to put forward his defense. The applicant has not been subjected to a departmental enquiry and merely on assumptions, the disciplinary authority adopting a short cut and has invoked the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority is based on suspicion and surmises. There is no occasion for the disciplinary authority to record that in the present case departmental enquiry is neither reasonably practicable nor there is anything on record which suggests that efforts had been made by the Disciplinary Authority to conduct the inquiry in the present case. The usage of expression like "as there is a reasonable belief" itself shows that the reasoning is based on suspicion and surmises. The reasoning to be recorded by Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry has been dealt by this Tribunal in various O.As. qua the same department i.e. Delhi Police. It is observed that most of witnesses are official witnesses in criminal case; once the criminal trial and preliminary enquiry are possible, then 27 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 departmental enquiry is also possible as has been held by this Tribunal as well as by the Hon‟ble High Courts in a catena of cases. There is no material in the hand of Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order which could even suggest that witnesses or complainant will not come in departmental enquiry. There is no clear and robust evidence in front of respondent authority that the applicant has made any attempt to influence any witness. Thus the order of disciplinary authority is bad in law.
25. The applicant is Constable in Delhi Police. It is a lowest rank among the subordinate officer, thus, it is absolutely wrong to record that applicant is in any position to influence or threaten any witness. There is no admissible material or evidence before the authorities to conclude that any witness is threatened or intimidated or will not depose in departmental enquiry and thus reason recorded by the disciplinary authority for dispensing with the Departmental Enquiry by invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are not tenable. As stated above, the applicant holds the position of Constable in the Delhi Police. If the department is confident in the merits of its case, it is unclear what prevented it from affording the applicant an opportunity to defend himself through a departmental inquiry. The flimsy reasons based on conjecture and surmises for invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India by the disciplinary authority are not sustainable in the eyes of law in view of catena of decisions on this issue by the Tribunal and the Hon‟ble High Courts. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondents in order to construe that the allegations are true against the applicant that 28 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 too at the back of the applicant. This fact also clearly shows that Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been adopted as a convenient tool to dismiss the applicant in the present case. There is no material placed on record to indicate that the witness(es) or the complainant would be unwilling or unavailable to participate in the departmental enquiry. The impugned order is passed with the presumption that the allegations are proved against the applicant. In such a situation, the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked in the case in hand as it amounts to abuse of process of law.
26. In the public interest, and in keeping with the rule of law, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities not to invoke Article 311 (2)
(b) of the Constitution of India in the present case, but rather to afford the applicant an opportunity to present his defence through a regular departmental enquiry. The gravity of the alleged misconduct, by itself, cannot justify the invocation of powers under Article 311 (2) (b). In accordance with the principles of natural justice and the rule of law, the applicant must be given a fair opportunity to defend himself in a departmental enquiry, unless it is shown that holding such an enquiry is not reasonably practicable. The reasons cited in the impugned order for dispensing with the enquiry are not legally sustainable. The invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) in this case appears to have been adopted as a shortcut, bypassing the due process of law. It remains unclear why the departmental enquiry, which had already been ordered, was not conducted and why the respondents abruptly chose to proceed under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution.
29
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
27. The reasoning to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be based on suspicion and surmises and probability. Once the Disciplinary Authority records that there is a probability that complainant and witness are put on constant fear and threat as a reason to dispense with departmental enquiry, the onus to establish that such situation prevails is based on the efforts made by them to conduct departmental enquiry and imminent failure to hold the said departmental enquiry due to such actions of the applicant. Therefore, on the one hand taking no action to conduct disciplinary enquiry and while on the other citing the imaginary reasons of giving threat to witnesses etc., are the reasoning based on mere probability, suspicion and surmises and cannot be attached any credence. No material is placed before the authority to come to the conclusions that Departmental Enquiry is not possible and invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is the only solution available to the respondents. The reasoning to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot rest on mere suspicion, surmise, or probabilities. Once the Disciplinary Authority records that there is a probability of the complainant and witnesses being under constant fear and threat as the basis for dispensing with the enquiry, the burden lies on the authority to substantiate such a claim. This includes demonstrating the efforts made to conduct the departmental enquiry and showing that such efforts failed due to the alleged conduct of the applicant. Merely refraining from initiating or pursuing the enquiry, while simultaneously citing hypothetical threats to witnesses, reflects reasoning rooted in conjecture rather than concrete evidence. Such justification, based solely on assumptions, lacks legal validity. No 30 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 material has been placed on record to support the conclusion that holding a departmental enquiry was not possible, or that invoking Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India was the only viable course of action available to the respondents.
28. It is further observed that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked following a preliminary enquiry. The purpose and procedure for conducting such a preliminary enquiry prior to invoking Article 311 (2) (b) have been clearly outlined in the departmental circular dated 11.09.2007. However, in the present case, the preliminary enquiry appears to have been conducted in complete disregard of the provisions of the said circular. The Disciplinary Authority proceeded to pass an order under Article 311(2)(b) without adhering to the procedural safeguards mandated therein. Such action amounts to a violation of the circular dated 11.09.2007, which was issued in compliance with the judgment Tribunal in case of Suresh Kumar Vs. GNCTD in O.A. No. 2500/2006.
29. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority to dispense with the departmental enquiry is legally unsustainable. As stated earlier, the Disciplinary Authority failed to make even the slightest effort to initiate a departmental enquiry. It is only after such an enquiry is initiated, and genuine attempts to conduct it are made, that the Authority can reasonably conclude that holding the enquiry is not practicable. In the present case, without undertaking any such effort and relying solely on presumptions and conjectures, the Disciplinary Authority unilaterally concluded that conducting a departmental enquiry was not feasible. No 31 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 order initiating a departmental enquiry was ever issued by the department. Therefore, the claim that holding a departmental enquiry was not reasonably practicable is unfounded and cannot be sustained in law.
30. It appears that the Disciplinary Authority has failed to properly apply its mind to the legal requirement that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India must be exercised subject to a specific pre-condition, namely, that holding a departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable. To arrive at such a conclusion, the Disciplinary Authority is legally bound to record cogent and justifiable reasons. However, in the present case, the reasoning is rooted in the assumption that the applicant has already committed the alleged misconduct and, therefore, a departmental enquiry is unnecessary. Acting on this presumption, the Disciplinary Authority concluded without any demonstrable effort to conduct an enquiry that the nature of the alleged act is so grave that it is practically not feasible to proceed with one. Such reasoning does not withstand judicial scrutiny under the law governing the invocation of Article 311 (2) (b). It is a well-established principle that the graver the allegations, the greater the need to provide the delinquent official a fair opportunity to defend himself. The seriousness of the charge cannot, by itself, be a decisive factor for dispensing with a departmental enquiry. On the contrary, it strengthens the necessity of adhering to the principles of natural justice.
31. The present case exemplifies a clear misuse of the power vested in the Disciplinary Authority under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of 32 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 India and is, therefore, bad in law. The reasons recorded by the authorities for dispensing with the departmental enquiry do not withstand legal scrutiny. The purported justifications provided in the impugned order for invoking Article 311 (2) (b) appear to be aimed merely at circumventing the conduct of a regular departmental enquiry. It is a well-settled principle of law that any finding of guilt against a delinquent official, arrived at without the conduct of a proper departmental enquiry, is per se sufficient to vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, a finding of guilt has been rendered against the applicant without holding any enquiry and without affording him an opportunity to present his defence. Such a course of action is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and is sufficient to invalidate the impugned order. Furthermore, the authorities have failed to establish the existence of any substantive material to support the conclusion that witnesses would be unwilling or discouraged from participating in a departmental enquiry. The impugned order, therefore, reflects non-application of mind, arbitrariness, bias, and a deliberate attempt to adopt a shortcut for dismissing the applicant solely on the basis of the gravity of the allegations, rather than following due process of law as mandated under the Constitution.
32. The applicant preferred an appeal 22.03.2023 (Annexure-A/3) against the punishment order of dismissal dated 31.08.2020 (Annexure- A/1). The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal on 13.12.2023 (Annexure-A/2) merely on the basis of the contents of the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority without adverting to the 33 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 averments made by the applicant in his appeal and, therefore, the same is also deserves to be quashed.
33. In support of our reasons as recorded above in the preceding paras, we place reliance on the following judgements/orders:-
(i) Order dated 13.12.2023 passed by this Tribunal in the case of Dushyant Kumar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced below:-
"8. A catena of cases of the Orders/Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and of this Tribunal on the issue as involved in the present case were also considered by the Division Bench (consisting one of us) while deciding the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra).
9. Having regard to the above, we have carefully perused the impugned order(s), we find that nothing has been recorded in the impugned order(s) or shown to us that the applicant had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness (es) and/or the prospective witness (es). From the impugned orders, it is also evident that neither any effort was made by them to conduct an enquiry, nor there is any evidence that despite their best efforts, the respondents would not have been able to produce the witness (es) to lead evidence against the applicant. Further 18 OA No.1019/2023 nothing is brought on record that witness (es) has/have been threatened by the applicant or they were too scared of the applicant to come forward in the regular enquiry proceedings. It is also found that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order has very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant, as no reason at all has been recorded in this regard and the applicant is guilty of committing grave misconduct and was involved in the aforesaid offences.
10. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circular dated 11.9.2007. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, including in one referred to hereinabove.
11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA is squarely covered by the common 19 OA No.1019/2023 Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 in Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) and a batch of cases. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be partly allowed and hence, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:- (i) 34 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 Orders dated 03.10.2022 (Annexure A/1) and dated 10.3.2023 (Annexure A/2) passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively are set aside; (ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject; (iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and (iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
12. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
(ii) The order of this Tribunal was challenged before the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 2407/2024 in the matter of Govt. of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Dushyant Kumar, the Hon‟ble High of Delhi dismissed the Writ Petition being meritless vide order dated 13.12.2023. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:-
"14. In the light of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in concurring with the Tribunal that the petitioners' decision to dispense with the enquiry was wholly unsustainable. The petitioners appear to have proceeded on an erroneous presumption that merely because a criminal case has been registered against the respondent, he was to be treated as guilty of the misconduct. No doubt, the respondent is a police officer, whose misconduct can never be condoned, but this would not imply that the principles of natural justice should be given a complete go by. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have not given any valid reason for dispensing with the enquiry except for repeatedly stating that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. This course of action, in our view, is completely impermissible.
15. Before we conclude, we may also consider the decision in Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) relied upon by the petitioners. We, however, find that instead of forwarding the case of the petitioners, the said decision supports the case of the respondent. It would, therefore, be apposite to refer to paragraph no.44 of the said decision, which reads as under:-
"44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre- decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post- decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Even before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University 35 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 of Cambridge [(1723) 1 Str 557:93 ER 698].) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated:" „To do a great right‟ after all, it is permissible sometimes „to do a little wrong‟." [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential"."
16. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the petitioners have not only ignored the decisions of the Apex Court laying down the parameters for applicability of Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India, but have also ignored their own circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the impugned order.
17. The writ petition being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed with all pending applications."
(iii) In the order dated 16.04.2024 passed in O.A. Nos. 542/2023 & 591/2023 in the case of Deepak vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors by this Tribunal. The Tribunal held as under:-
"20. In the present case, as apparent from the reasons recorded by the respondents in the impugned order, it is apparent that the respondents have arrived at the conclusion for dispensing with the regular inquiry due to the involvement of the applicants in a grave and serious case. The respondents have jumped to the conclusion that on account of serious allegations, the applicants have become ineligible to be continued in police force. There is no finding that the 24 applicants and/or anybody on their behalf have at any point of time even attempted to influence or coerce any of the witness. Even there is no finding that the applicants in the captioned OAs who are very junior officers under the respondents were in a position to influence the witnesses who are generally senior officials working in the Government of India and particularly in CBI. It is also nowhere recorded by the respondents as to how if not only preliminary inquiry was found possible, but also the criminal trial is possible in the said case FIR with the support of more than nineteen witnesses and at no point of time the prosecution has even felt that those witnesses are not likely to turn up and regular inquiry was not possible in the matter. It is undisputed that regular inquiry is a Rule whereas dispensing with the same is only an exception. Though the respondents have recorded that if regular inquiry is initiated, the same is liable to take a long time, however, no reason has been 36 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 given for the same and it is apparent that such reasoning and finding is based on surmises and conjectures.
21. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the OAs are allowed with the following order(s) :- (i) impugned orders dated 10.08.2022 and 25.01.2023 are set aside. The applicants shall be reinstated in service forthwith. (ii) the applicants shall be entitled for all consequential benefits in accordance with relevant rules and instructions on the subject. (iii) the aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iv) the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicants if they are so advised, of course in accordance with rules and instructions on the subject.
22. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs."
(iv) In Writ Petition (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM App. No. 4759/2023 in the case of Commissioner of Police Delhi Police & Ors. Vs. Manjeet; The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi vide its judgement dated 22.04.2024 has held as under: -
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was that due to seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by him it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It also emerges that on the basis of the allegations levelled against the respondent in the FIR coupled with the findings of the preliminary enquiry, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of a serious offence and therefore deserve to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The petitioners have sought to dispense with the enquiry in such a casual manner and that too only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, an enquiry against him was likely to be difficult on account of his influence. This course of action is clearly violative of Article 311(2)
(b) of the Constitution of India.
10. We have also considered the decision in Dushyant Kumar (Supra) and find that in the said case, this Court had rejected a similar challenge by the petitioners to the Tribunal's quashing of a dismissal order passed after dispensing with the enquiry. In fact, this Court after considering the circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007 issued by the petitioners themselves, observed that despite there being a requirement to record cogent reasons to dispense with the enquiry, the petitioners were passing cryptic orders dispensing with the enquiry in the most mechanical manner.37
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately.
This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, with an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry. Furthermore, it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him, as the learned Tribunal has already granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all applications.
13. Before we conclude, we are constrained to observe that in a large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed by the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner, Delhi Police to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons."
(v) In other Writ Petition (C) No. 4201/2024 on 20.03.2024 in case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh. The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi has held as under:-
"10. From a perusal of the aforesaid, we find that the petitioners have proceeded to dispense with the enquiry against the respondent only because of the grave nature of allegations levelled against him and have simply observed that since the respondent had lowered the image of the police department and goodwill of a uniformed organisation, an exemplary punishment of dismissal ought to be imposed upon him so as to send a clear message to undesirable persons and to prevent reoccurrence of such crimes. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the dismissal order passed by the petitioners did not contain any justifiable reason whatsoever for dispensing with the enquiry. What clearly emerges is that the petitioners have proceeded on the premise that such police officers, who are charged with serious misconduct, should be immediately dismissed from service. This approach, in our view to dispense with an enquiry, would not meet the parameters laid down under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
11. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that merely because the respondent was a police personnel, would not entitle the petitioners to give a complete go-bye to the requirement of holding a departmental enquiry against him without recording any 38 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 justifiable reasons as to why departmental enquiry could not be held against him.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no infirmity with the impugned order. The writ petition, being meritless, is along with accompanying application, dismissed."
(vi) Against the aforesaid Order/Judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court, the respondents had filed a Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11681/2024, Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh, before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 10.07.2024 has dismissed the said SLP and thus, the judgment of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi has attained finality.
34. In another matter, the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 5562/2024, titled Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sant Ram, vide its judgment dated 23.04.2024 in paras 9 to 12 has held as under:-
"9. A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was their presumption that the respondent would threaten or intimidate the complainant and other witnesses. The petitioners were further of the view that a prolonged enquiry would cause more trauma to the complainant. It is also evident from the dismissal order that the petitioners had, on the basis of the evidence led in the preliminary enquiry, already made up their mind that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and had lowered the image of the police force in the eyes of the public.
10. In our considered view, even though the charges against the respondent are very serious and the interest of the complainant deserves to be protected, it does not imply that the principles of natural justice as also the provisions of section 11 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 should be given a complete go by on the basis of mere presumptions. Only because the respondent is a police personnel, would in our view, not be a ground either to presume that the witnesses will not come forward to depose against him in a regular enquiry or to hold him guilty without conducting the statutorily prescribed departmental enquiry and that too in a matter like the present where the complainant and the witnesses are also police personnel. In fact, what emerges is that on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry itself, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and therefore deserved to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our 39 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. This course of action, in our considered opinion, was clearly violative of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
11. No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, dispense with the requirement of an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry and had also been admitted by him. We therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Tribunal that the petitioners have dispensed with the enquiry only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, would threaten the witnesses and holding of an enquiry would cause trauma to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him. As is evident from the impugned order, the learned Tribunal, while setting aside the dismissal order, has granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all accompanying applications."
35. In pursuance to the order of this Tribunal in O.A. No. 14/2018, titled Sant Ram Vs. Commissioner of Police and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 5562/2024, the respondents reinstated the services of that applicant Shri Sant Ram in that case. The order dated 26.07.2024 is reproduced as under:-
"In pursuance of judgment dated 06.02.2024 passed by the Principal Bench of Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) & Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A), Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in O.A. No.14/2018 titled Sant Ram Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. and judgment dated 23.04.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rekha Palli & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, High Court Delhi in W.P.(C) No.5562/2024, CAV 181/2024, CM Appl.22929/2024 - Stay, CM Appl. 22930/2024 - Ex./LLOD titled Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sant Ram as well as opinion of Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. Addl. Solicitor General of India that "this is not a fit case for filing of SLP", the order of the disciplinary authority passed vide No.1833- 1900/HAP/PTC (P-II) dated 01.08.2017 vide which Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324PTC (PIS No.28060573) was dismissed from the Delhi Police force under Article311(2) (b) of Constitution of India 40 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 deciding his suspension period as period not spent on duty and the order passed by the Appellate Authority vide No.106- 66/SO/Jt.C.P/Trg, dated 03.11.2017 rejecting his appeal, are set aside. Accordingly, Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) is hereby re-instated in service from dismissal with immediate effect without prejudice to the further departmental action to be taken against him in accordance with the law.
He is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal as he had already been placed under suspension vide D.D.No.29- A/PTC/JK dated 22.07.2017 and formal issued vide order No.1738- 70/HAP/PTC (DA-II) dated 26.07.2017. His dismissal/suspension period will be decided later on.
Let Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) be informed accordingly.
In other judgment of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No.1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet, the following circular was issued by the Office of Commissioner of Police as under:-
"No. 174/C/HC/24 5110-60 DA-III/Court Cell/PHQ dated 13.05.2024 To The Deputy Commissioner of Police, All District including Units, New Delhi.
Sub: W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet.
Memo Enclosed please find here with a copy of letter No. 10264/W/DHC/ Writs/D-9/2023 dated 26.04.2024 received from the Registrar General, Delhi High Court along with copy of the order dated 22.04.2024 wherein the Hon'ble has observed that " in large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before the this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed b y the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons.
It is, therefore, requested that the aforementioned directions of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi shall be taken into consideration before 41 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 passing termination orders by dispensing with the departmental enquiries in future.
This issues with the approval of Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
(Hareesh H.P) Deputy Commissioner of Police Legal Division/ PHQ, Delhi"
Relying upon the circular issued on 11.09.2007, a similar order was passed by the respondents in the OA No. 1088/2021 as under:-
"The respondents, after considering the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) and the Order(s)/Judgment(s) passed by this Tribunal have issued another circular dated 11.09.2007 (Annexure A/13 of the rejoinder filed in OA 467/2020). In the said circular, they have emphasized that the disciplinary authority should pass a speaking order(s) based and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior inquiry and before passing such order(s), the disciplinary authority should be satisfied that it is not practicable to hold an inquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and the disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The said circular dated 11.09.2007 reads as under:-
"CIRCULAR No. 5545-645/P. Cell/Vig. Dated 11.09.2007 An analysis has been done by PHQ in 38 cases pertaining to the period between 1.1.2000 to 31.12.05 where action under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India was taken against the defaulters. The analysis shows that out of the 38 cases, the action of the department has been upheld by CAT only in two cases and out of these two cases and only one case action was upheld by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and most of these cases have been remanded back in the Department by the Tribunal for initiating departmental inquiry.
Though some cases are still pending in the Hon'ble High Court for decision, in a majority of cases, Disciplinary Authorities have resorted to Article 311 (2) (b) on assumptions and conjectures. No speaking orders were passed based on and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior enquiry. Orders for dismissal were passed arbitrarily violating Article 311 and the principles of natural justice.
Henceforth, it has been decided that whenever any Disciplinary Authority intends to invoke Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, he must keep in mind the judgment in the case of UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Only in cases where Disciplinary Authority is personally satisfied on the basis of material available on file that the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. 42 Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 and keeping in view of specific circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) should such an action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be conducted and it is essential to bring on record all such facts. It has also been decided that before passing on order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, Disciplinary Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.
This has the approval of C.P., Delhi.
Sd/-
(S.N. SRIVASTAVA) JT. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE:
HDQRS,: DELHI"
36. The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in WP (C ) No. 11276/2024 and CM Appl. No.46705/2024, CM Appl. No. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash & Anr. decided on 14.08.2024 has taken a serious cognizance of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority resorting to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of above-mentioned judgment is as follow:-
"20. Accordingly, finding no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, the present petition is dismissed.
21. Before parting with this matter, we hereby direct the Commission of Police Delhi to personally look into such matters and take proper decision so that Courts/Tribunals are not burdened with a case where departmental inquiries can be initiated. We hereby make it clear that if such like petitions are filed in future wherein dismissal or suspension orders are passed without holding any enquiry without any plausible reasoning, certainly heavy cost will be imposed and that too, will be recovered from the Officer, who takes such type of unwarranted decision.
22. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Commissioner of Delhi Police for information and compliance."
37. Recently, the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of GNCTD & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh Chauhan decided on 20.09.2024 recorded the following order:-
43
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024 "1. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submits that in view of judgment dated 14.08.2024 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) 11276/2024 titled as The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. OM Prakash & anr., petitioners may be allowed to withdraw the present petition.
2. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
3. Petitioners are directed to examine all such petitions pending before this Court which are falling under similar circumstances and to file application to withdraw the said petitions, if they consider it necessary."
38. Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned order passed by the respondents is not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circulars dated 11.09.2007 and 13.05.2024. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and Hon‟ble High Court(s) and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which are referred to hereinabove. It shall be in the benefit of respondents, if they conduct a departmental inquiry and ascertain the root cause of the incident, which happened in the premises of the Police Station, to avoid reoccurrence of such type of incident in future.
39. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA deserves to be partly allowed and the same is partly allowed with the following directions: -
(i) The impugned order dated 31.08.2020 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 13.12.2023 (Annexure-A/2) passed by the Appellate Authority are quashed and set aside.44
Item No.12/C-II OA No. 349/2024
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
(iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within a period of eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this Order; and
(iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law and complete the same in an expeditious manner.
40. Pending MAs, if any, stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/neetu/