Kamarudheen P vs The Vice-Chancellor on 7 October, 2025

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Kerala High Court

Kamarudheen P vs The Vice-Chancellor on 7 October, 2025

The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.9954 of 2024 filed W.A.No.117 of 2025 under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 21.11.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. The 2 nd respondent, Manager of the College wherein the appellant in W.A. No.117 of 2025 is working as an Assistant Professor, filed W.A.No.326 of 2025 challenging the very same judgment, but on some other grounds. Since the points to be decided in these writ appeals are interconnected, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. For convenience of reference, the parties and documents are referred to in this judgment as they are referred to in W.A. No.117 of 2025, unless otherwise stated.

2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the appellant is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Malayalam at Farook College under the management of the 2 nd respondent. The appellant was suspended from service by Ext.P1 order dated 14.02.2020 issued by the 2nd respondent in pursuance of Ext.P7 6 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 complaint dated 13.02.2020, alleging sexual harassment, received from the 4 th respondent, a student of the College, through the Principal on 13.02.2020. The appellant contends that he was suspended by the 2nd respondent without any disciplinary proceedings, which renders the suspension order itself illegal, being the one issued in violation of Section 60(2) of the Calicut University Act, 1975, ('the Act' in short), which says that no Teacher of a private college shall be kept under suspension by the educational agency except when disciplinary proceedings are initiated against him. The appellant further contends that he has been kept under suspension for more than 3 years without reporting to the Vice-Chancellor the reason for suspension, which is violative of Section 60(3) of the Act.

2.1. The appellant pleads that, as per Section 60(4) of the Act, the disciplinary proceedings had to be completed within a period of three months from the date of suspension or within such further period as may be allowed by the Vice-Chancellor after hearing the parties concerned. The order or direction issued by the Vice-Chancellor granting time beyond three months is appealable under Section 60(5) of the Act, before the Appellate 7 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 Tribunal. The appellant was not served with the order of the 1 st respondent granting time for completing the disciplinary proceedings, and as such, he could not challenge the same, invoking the provisions under Section 60(5) of the Act.

2.2. The appellant further states that he submitted Ext.P9 representation dated 04.08.2021 before the 2 nd respondent to modify or revoke the order of suspension. Thereafter, the appellant approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.22760 of 2021 seeking a direction to the 2 nd respondent to consider Ext.P9 and pass orders reinstating him in service. By Ext.P10 judgment dated 27.10.2021, this Court disposed of the writ petition directing the 2nd respondent to decide Ext.P9 representation in accordance with law within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of that judgment. Though Ext.P10 was forwarded to the 2 nd respondent on 17.11.2021 and a hearing was conducted on 13.12.2021, no orders were passed till April 2023. The appellant again approached this Court with W.P.(C)No.13229 of 2023. When that writ petition was pending, the appellant received Ext.P11 notice dated 20.11.2023 from the Registrar of the Calicut University informing him that a hearing was scheduled at the 8 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 chamber of the Vice-Chancellor on 25.11.2023. In that hearing, the appellant submitted a statement denying the allegations.

2.3. According to the appellant, by Ext.P2 communication dated 27.01.2024, the 2nd respondent informed the appellant that the Management has appointed the 3 rd respondent as the Enquiry Officer and the appellant should appear before the Enquiry Officer. Along with Ext.P2, Ext.P3 statement of allegations dated 25.01.2024 and Ext.P3(a) memorandum of charge were also enclosed. On the request of the appellant, the copies of the documents referred to in the statement of allegations were supplied to him by post, and he received the same on 10.02.2024. The appellant was granted 15 days time to submit his written statement. However, before submitting his statement, he received Ext.P4 letter dated 12.02.2024 sent by the 3 rd respondent proposing to conduct the enquiry on 21.02.2024 at 4.00 p.m. The appellant states that the enquiry was also not properly proceeded with by the 3rd respondent.

2.4. On receipt of Ext.P2 notice appointing the Enquiry Officer, the appellant requested the respondents to furnish copies of the order under Section 60(4) of the Act and a copy of the 9 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 proceedings leading to such order. Besides, the appellant submitted Ext.P14 representation dated 04.03.2024 before the 1 st respondent seeking a copy of the communication submitted by the Manager under Section 60 (3) of the Act and a copy of the orders of the Vice-Chancellor dated 17.11.2023 and 25.11.2023. Those copies were not served to the appellant. However, on 06.03.2024, the 3rd respondent served the appellant Ext.P15 order dated 19.12.2023, which refers the order of extension of time passed by the 1st respondent granting three months' time from 18.12.2023 to complete the disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter, the appellant filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2.5. Originally, the 4th respondent was not there in the party array of the writ petition. After the filing of the writ petition, the 4th respondent self-impleaded in the writ petition by filing I.A.No.1 of 2024. Subsequently, the writ petition was amended on the application of the appellant, incorporating additional pleadings and additional reliefs. After the amendment, the reliefs sought by the appellant in the writ petition are as under:

"i. Call for the records leading to Ext P15 and the 10 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 proceedings initiated vide Exts.P1, P2 and Ext.P4 and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction;

i.(a) call for the records leading to Exts.P3 and P3(a) and quash the same by issuing writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction;

ii. Direct the 2nd respondent to disburse all service benefits to the petitioner, declaring that the period of keeping petitioner out of service from 14.02.2020 under the guise of suspension is in violation of Section 60 of the Calicut University Act and Statute;"

3. The 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit dated 01.08.2024 in the writ petition, opposing the reliefs sought therein.

4. Along with I.A.No.4 of 2024, the 2 nd respondent produced Exts.R2 (a) to R2(o) documents. Thereafter, the 2 nd respondent filed a counter affidavit dated 18.11.2024 opposing the pleadings in the writ petition and producing therewith Exts.R2(p) to R2(u) documents.

5. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition as mentioned above. Paragraphs 9 to 11 and the last paragraph of that judgment read thus:

W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 "9. I have carefully gone through the records and heard the contentions raised from both sides. As far as the challenge against Ext.P15 is concerned, one of the main objections raised by the respondents is that, the said order is appealable, as contemplated under Section 60(5) of the Calicut University Act 1975 and therefore the challenge against the same need not be entertained by this Court. Thus, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent, there is a provision that enables the petitioner to file an appeal against Ext.P15 which he has not availed of. Besides, while considering the challenge against the decision taken by the Vice-Chancellor, another crucial aspect to be noted is that the petitioner participated in the disciplinary proceedings by attending in person and also through the Lawyer. The records would also indicate that he sought adjournments on various dates, specifically undertaking that he would cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings. The challenge has been raised against the said order just before the expiry of the period stipulated by the Vice-Chancellor for completing the enquiry, and the materials clearly reveal that the enquiry could not be completed within the time prescribed by the Vice Chancellor, due to adjournments sought by the petitioner himself. Therefore, I do not find this as a case in which the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is to be invoked. This is particularly because of the reason that the petitioner participated in the disciplinary proceedings without an demur and also that despite the fact that he was 12 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 having an appellate remedy as contemplated under Section 60(5), he did not avail it.

10. As far as the challenge raised by the petitioner against the order of suspension is concerned, even though the order of suspension was passed, without initiating any disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner did not raise any challenge in this regard at any point of time before commencement of the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor. It is also to be noted that such a challenge was raised much after the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings, that too after participating in such enquiry proceedings and getting the matter prolonged by repeated adjournments. Of course, it is true that the suspension order could not have been passed without an enquiry, by virtue of Section 60(2) of the Calicut University Act. However, the fact remains that the order of suspension remained unchallenged and the challenge was raised at a time when the disciplinary proceedings were already initiated. Therefore, as of the date the challenge was raised, there were disciplinary proceedings in progress, and the petitioner was participating in the enquiry wherein he sought repeated adjournments by undertaking on multiple occasions that he would cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings.

11. In such circumstances, for the above reasons, the challenge against the order of suspension need not be entertained. The conduct of the petitioner in seeking adjournments in the disciplinary proceedings, and to raise a 13 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 challenge just before completing the term fixed by the vice- chancellor for completing the enquiry, does not appear to be proper. Therefore, I do not find any bona fides on the part of the petitioner, in raising a challenge at this belated stage. In such circumstances, I am of the view that this is not a fit case in which the writ petition is to be entertained. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. However, it is clarified that, the observations made by this Court will not preclude the petitioner from invoking his statutory remedies available under section 60 (5) of the Calicut University Act, 1975 against the impugned orders. If any such remedies are invoked, the appropriate authority shall decide the issues raised therein untrammelled by any of the observations made in this judgment. Even though the learned counsel for the second respondent sought an extension of time, in view of the fact that this Court stayed the proceedings on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court on 13.03.2024, I am of the view that it is not for this Court to entertain the same. It shall be open for the respondents to seek appropriate orders from the Vice-Chancellor".

6. Challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant filed W.A.No.117 of 2025. The Manager filed W.A.No.326 of 2025, contending that the learned Single Judge ought to have extended the time for completing the disciplinary proceedings.

7. In W.A.No.117 of 2025, the 1st respondent filed a 14 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 counter-affidavit dated 20.02.2025.

8. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, who is the appellant in W.A.No.326 of 2025, and the learned counsel for the 4 th respondent.

9. The learned Senior Counsel would argue that Ext.P1 suspension order dated 14.02.2020 was issued by the 2 nd respondent without initiating any disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. As per Section 60(2) of the Act, no teacher of a private college shall be kept under suspension by the educational agency without initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him. Therefore, Ext.P1 order itself is illegal. As per Section 60(4) of the Act, the disciplinary proceedings initiated under sub-section (2) shall be completed within a period of three months or within such further period as may be allowed by the Vice-Chancellor after hearing the parties concerned. In the instant case, the extension order was issued by the Vice-Chancellor, without hearing the appellant. Moreover, the request for extension was made by the 2nd respondent, without initiating the disciplinary proceedings, and hence the Order granting extension of time for three months from 15 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 18.12.2023, to complete the disciplinary proceedings issued by the Vice -Chancellor is not sustainable. The order of the Vice- Chancellor was never communicated to the appellant, and hence, without knowing the same, he participated in the disciplinary proceedings. He was served with Ext.P15 order only when he made Ext.P13 application under the Right to Information Act seeking various information, including the order of the Vice- Chancellor, if any. At any rate, the continuance of the suspension order of the appellant is illegal, and the learned Single Judge failed to consider these aspects in its right perspective.

10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent would submit that immediately on getting Ext.P7 complaint dated 13.02.2020 from the 4 th respondent, as mandated under Section 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ('POSH Act', in short), a committee was constituted on the same day to inquire about the allegations raised against the appellant and the committee submitted Ext.R2(p) report dated 05.03.2020. Ext.P1 suspension order was issued on 14.02.2020, and therefore, it can be treated as issued only after initiation of the enquiry. After 16 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 submission of Ext.R2(p) report, the Police took the entire records pertaining to the enquiry by giving Ext.R2(q) request dated 09.06.2020, and hence the further enquiry was stalled for some period. Meanwhile COVID-19 pandemic also affected the enquiry. Subsequently, the Manager has submitted Ext.R2(s) request dated 09.10.2023 to the Vice Chancellor seeking extension of three more months' time to complete the disciplinary proceedings. The appellant was then issued with Ext.P11 notice in accordance with Section 60(4) of the Act on 20.11.2023, intimating the date of hearing as 25.11.2023. Thereafter, by Ext.P15, it was intimated that further time was granted to complete the disciplinary proceedings from 18.12.2023 by the Vice Chancellor. By Ext.P4, the Enquiry Officer requested the appellant to participate in the enquiry by intimating the date of the hearing. The appellant submitted Ext.R2(t) letter dated 31.01.2024, and Ext.R2(u) application dated 29.02.2024 and those documents would show that the appellant had assured to cooperate with the enquiry. Meanwhile, on 13.03.2024, the appellant obtained a stay order in the writ petition, and the time granted by the Vice-Chancellor to complete the enquiry was over during the period of that stay order. 17

W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 The learned counsel would further submit that W.A.No.326 of 2025 is filed by the 2nd respondent only for the reason that the period granted by the Vice-Chancellor to complete the proceedings was over during the pendency of the stay order passed in the writ petition. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Hariharan Pillai v Principal, Sree Kerala Varma College and another [2007 (4) KHC 182] and that of the Apex Court in Vijayakumaran C.P (Dr.) v. Central University of Kerala and others [2020 (1) KHC 982] in support of his Arguments.

11. The learned counsel for the 4 th respondent would submit that the 4th respondent is the aggrieved person in this matter, and even if there are any procedural flaws, it will not give any right to the appellant to get his suspension revoked. The 4 th respondent is a handicapped person, and showing any leniency in favour of the appellant on technical grounds will give a wrong message to the society.

12. The incident alleged in this case occurred on 06.12.2019. The 4th respondent gave Ext.P7 complaint regarding the same on 13.02.2020. Immediately on getting that complaint, on the very same day, as mandated under Section 11 of the POSH 18 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 Act, an internal enquiry committee was constituted by the Principal of the College. The appellant was then placed under suspension by Ext.P1 order dated 14.02.2020 of the 2 nd respondent, wherein it is stated that he is suspended with immediate effect from 14.02.2020 (Friday) F.N, until further orders, pending enquiry.

13. It is relevant to note Sections 2(h), 4, 11 and 13 of the POSH Act at this moment, which are extracted hereunder:

"2(h) "Internal Committee" means an Internal Complaints Committee constituted under Section 4.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee.--

(1) Every employer of a workplace shall, by an order in writing, constitute a Committee to be known as the "Internal Complaints Committee":

Provided that where the offices or administrative units of the workplace are located at different places or divisional or sub-divisional level, the Internal Committee shall be constituted at all administrative units or offices. (2) The Internal Committee shall consist of the following members to be nominated by the employer, namely:--

(a) a Presiding Officer who shall be a woman employed at 19 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 a senior level at workplace from amongst the employees:

Provided that in case a senior level woman employee is not available, the Presiding Officer shall be nominated from other offices or administrative units of the workplace referred to in sub-section (1):

Provided further that in case the other offices or administrative units of the workplace do not have a senior level woman employee, the Presiding Officer shall be nominated from any other workplace of the same employer or other department or organisation;

(b) not less than two Members from amongst employees preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience in social work or have legal knowledge;

(c) one member from amongst non-governmental organisations or associations committed to the cause of women or a person familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment:

Provided that at least one-half of the total Members so nominated shall be women.

(3) The Presiding Officer and every Member of the Internal Committee shall hold office for such period, not exceeding three years, from the date of their nomination as may be specified by the employer.

(4) The Member appointed from amongst the non-

governmental organisations or associations shall be paid such fees or allowances for holding the proceedings of the Internal Committee, by the employer, as may be prescribed. (5) Where the Presiding Officer or any Member of the 20 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 Internal Committee,--

(a) contravenes the provisions of Section 16; or

(b) has been convicted for an offence or an inquiry into an offence under any law for the time being in force is pending against him; or

(d) has so abused his position as to render his continuance in office prejudicial to the public interest, such Presiding Officer or Member, as the case may be, shall be removed from the Committee and the vacancy so created or any casual vacancy shall be filled by fresh nomination in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

xxx xxx xxx

11. Inquiry into complaint.--

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 10, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall, where the respondent is an employee, proceed to make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent and where no such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed or in case of a domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, if prima facie case exist, forward the complaint to the police, within a period of seven days for registering the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and any other relevant provisions of the 21 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 said Code where applicable:

Provided that where the aggrieved woman informs the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, that any term or condition of the settlement arrived at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has not been complied with by the respondent, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry into the complaint or, as the case may be, forward the complaint to the police:

Provided further that where both the parties are employees, the parties shall, during the course of inquiry, be given an opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings shall be made available to both the parties enabling them to make representation against the findings before the Committee.

(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the court may, when the respondent is convicted of the offence, order payment of such sums as it may consider appropriate, to the aggrieved woman by the respondent, having regard to the provisions of section 15.

(3) For the purpose of making an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:--

(a)summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person 22 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 and examining him on oath;

(b)requiring the discovery and production of documents; and

(c)any other matter which may be prescribed. (4) The inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be completed within a period of ninety days.

   xxx                              xxx                 xxx

   13. Inquiry Report

(1) On the completion of an inquiry under this Act, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall provide a report of its findings to the employer, or as the case may be, the District Officer within a period of ten days from the date of completion of the inquiry and such report be made available to the concerned parties.

(2) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend to the employer and the District Officer that no action is required to be taken in the matter. (3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be--

(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules 23 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 applicable to the respondent or where no such service rules have been made, in such manner as may be prescribed;

(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules applicable to the respondent, from the salary or wages of the respondent such sum as it may consider appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or to her legal heirs, as it may determine, in accordance with the provisions of Section 15:

Provided that in case the employer is unable to make such deduction from the salary of the respondent due to his being absent from duty or cessation of employment it may direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the aggrieved woman:

Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay the sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee or, as the case may be, the Local Committee may forward the order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land revenue to the concerned District Officer. (4) The employer or the District Officer shall act upon the recommendation within sixty days of its receipt by him."

(Underline supplied)

14. As per Section 60(2) of the Act, no teacher of a private college shall be kept under suspension by the educational agency except when disciplinary proceedings are initiated against him. As per Section 60(3) of the Act, when a teacher of a private college is suspended for a period exceeding 15 days, the matter, together 24 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 with the reasons for suspension, shall be reported to the Vice- Chancellor. As per Section 60(4) of the Act, any disciplinary proceedings initiated under sub-section (2) shall be completed within a period of three months or within such further period as may be allowed by the Vice-Chancellor after hearing the parties concerned.

15. According to the appellant, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him only by issuance of Ext.P2 communication dated 27.01.2024 with Ext.P3 statement of allegations dated 25.01.2024 and Ext.P3(a) memorandum of charges. Therefore, the order of suspension, the continuance of the same beyond 15 days without obtaining the orders of the Vice- Chancellor, and even the obtaining of Ext.P15 extension order are illegal. During the course of arguments, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in P.R Nayak v. Union of India [(1972) 1 SCC 332], Union of India v. Anil Kumar Sarkar [(2013) 4 SCC 161] and that of this Court in Sobha S.N v. State of Kerala and others [2015 (4) KLT SN 60] in support of his arguments that a delinquent shall not be kept under suspension without initiating 25 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 disciplinary proceedings and the proceedings is normally said to be initiated only when a charge sheet is issued.

16. In P.R. Nayak [(1972) 1 SCC 332], the issue before the Apex Court was the suspension of a member of the Indian Civil Service who was governed by the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969, which provides for suspension during disciplinary proceedings. After referring Rule 3 of that Rules, the Apex Court held that an order of suspension before the actual initiation or commencement of disciplinary proceedings is clearly outside the ambit of that Rule. In Paragraph 18 of that judgment, the Apex Court held thus:

"18. There is no gainsaying that there is no inherent power of suspension postulated by the Fundamental Rules or any other rule governing the appellant's conditions of service. Except for Rule 3 of the A.I.S. (D and A) Rules, 1969 no other rule nor any inherent power authorising the impugned order of authorising the impugned order of suspension was relied upon in this Court in its support. Therefore, if Rule 3, which is the only rule on which the appellant's suspension pending disciplinary proceedings can be founded, does not postulate an order of suspension before the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the Government initiating such proceedings can only place under suspension the member 26 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 of the Service against whom such proceedings are started, then, the impugned order of suspension which in clearest words merely states the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant are contemplated, without suggesting actual initiation or starting of disciplinary proceedings, must be held to be outside the rule. The impugned Order of suspension, it may be pointed out, is not like an order of suspension which without adversely affecting the rights and privileges of the suspended Government servant merely prohibits or restrains him from discharging his official duties of obligations. An order of that nature may perhaps be within the general inherent competence of an appointing authority when dealing with the Government servant. The impugned order made under Rule 3 of A. I. S. (D and A) Rule, 1969 on the other hand seriously affects some of the appellant's rights and privileges vesting in him under his conditions of service. To mention some of the disabilities resulting from his suspension, he is not entitled to get his full salary during suspension, but is only to be paid subsistence allowance and in certain circumstances some other allowances; in order to be entitled to the subsistence allowance he is prohibited from engaging in any other employment, business, profession or vocation (vide Rule

4); the appellant is not permitted to retire during the period of suspension; indeed, the impugned order specifically prohibits the appellant even from leaving New Delhi during the period of suspension, without obtaining the previous permission of the Central Government. The fact that these 27 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 prejudicial consequences automatically flow from the impugned order under "the rules also lends support to our view that the clear and explicit language of Rule 3 must not be so strained to the appellant's prejudice as to authorities an order of suspension on the mere ground that disciplinary proceedings against him are contemplated. The precise words of Rule 3 are unambiguous and must be construed in their ordinary sense. The draftsman must be presumed to have used the clearest language to express the legislative intention, the meaning being plain Courts cannot scan its wisdom or policy".

17. In Anil Kumar Sarkar [(2013) 4 SCC 161], the Apex Court held that the disciplinary proceedings commence only when a chargesheet is issued. Departmental proceeding is normally said to be initiated only when a charge sheet is issued.

18. In Sobha [ 2015 (4) KLT SN 60], a learned Single Judge of this court, by referring to the relevant provisions under the Kerala University Act, which is in pari materia with that of the Calicut university Act and also the judgment of the Apex court in P.R. Nayak [(1972) 1 SCC 332], held that placing a teacher under suspension even before service of charge memo is violative of the statutory provisions.

19. In Hariharan Pillai v Principal, Sree Kerala Varma 28 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 College and another [2007 (4) KHC 182], a contention was raised by the petitioner therein before this Court that his suspension was bad due to non-initiation of disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under Section 60(2) of the Act. After considering the rival contentions, this Court in paragraph 4 of that judgment held thus:

"4. Section 60(2) of the Act provides that no teacher of a private college shall be kept under suspension by the educational agency except when disciplinary proceedings are initiated against him. Statute 71(2) of the Statutes provides the procedure for imposing major penalties. That provision enjoys that the person who is being proceeded on counts of indiscipline, for imposition of major penalties, has to be given a show cause notice after framing definite charge or charges, on the basis of a complaint that is received, or on consideration of the report of an investigation, or for other reasons. The stage of formulation of the charge or charges and the tentative decision of the management to impose a major penalty, calling for the requirement to follow Statute 71(1) of the Statutes would arise only after a deeper consideration of the complaint, investigation report or other reasons which may be required to be adverted to and considered to issue a show cause notice after framing of charge or charges, in terms of Statute 71(1) of the Statutes. But the initiation of proceedings contemplated by Section 60(2) of the Act takes 29 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 within its sweep a larger area of consideration which commences much earlier than the exercise of formulating the charges in terms of Statute 71(1) of the Statutes. The point of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the scope of such proceedings in terms of Section 60(2) of the Act, is not the same as the situs of commencement of the procedure in terms of Statute 71(2) of the Statutes. The sweep of Section 60(2) of the Act is wider in import than the dictate of Statute 71 of the Statutes and has to be understood to include the power to issue an order of suspension, even before framing charges and issuing a show cause notice on specified charges. There is nothing wrong in placing a person under suspension if, on the materials on record, the disciplinary authority is satisfied that he has to be so placed pending finalisation of initiation of disciplinary proceedings. There is no lack of jurisdiction to do so.

20. In Vijayakumaran C.P [2020 (1) KHC 982], the issue that came up for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the order issued under the signatures of the Vice-

Chancellor of the Central University of Kerala is a simpliciter termination or ex facie stigmatic. In paragraph 10 of that judgment, the Apex Court held thus:

"10. Upon receipt of complaints from aggrieved women (girl students of the University) about the sexual harassment at 30 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 workplace (in this case, University campus), it was obligatory on the Administration to refer such complaints to the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, within the stipulated time period as predicated in Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (for short, 'the 2013 Act'). Upon receipt of such complaint, an inquiry is required to be undertaken by the Internal Committee or the Local Committee in conformity with the stipulations in Section 11 of the 2013 Act. The procedure for conducting such inquiry has also been amplified in the 2015 Regulations. Thus understood, it necessarily follows that the inquiry is a formal inquiry required to be undertaken in terms of the 2015 Regulations. The allegations to be inquired into by such Committee being of "sexual harassment" defined in Section 2(n) read with Section 3 of the 2013 Act and being a serious matter bordering on criminality, it would certainly not be advisable to confer the benefit on such employee by merely passing a simple order of termination. Such complaints ought to be taken to its logical end by not only initiating departmental or regular inquiry as per the service rules, but also followed by other actions as per law. In such cases, a regular inquiry or departmental action as per service rules is also indispensable so as to enable the employee concerned to vindicate his position and establish his innocence. We say no more".

21. From Ext.R2(p) report dated 05.03.2020 submitted by the committee constituted by the college to inquire about the 31 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 allegations in Ext.P7 complaint filed by the 4 th respondent, it is evident that the said committee was constituted on the date of the complaint itself, i.e., on 13.02.2020. It was thereafter Ext.P1 suspension order was issued by the 2 nd respondent.

22. The sexual harassment of women at the workplace results in violation of the fundamental rights of a woman to equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and her right to life and to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business includes a right to a safe environment free from sexual harassment. The POSH Act was enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of the ratification of the decision in the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and intended to grant protection against sexual harassment and the right to work with dignity.

23. A reading of Section 11(1) of the Posh Act makes it clear that the Internal Committee shall conduct the inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the employee. Similarly, Section 13(3) of the Posh 32 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 Act says that the internal committee or the local committee, as the case may be, if arrives at the conclusion that the allegation of sexual harassment raised against the respondent has been proved it shall recommend the employer or the District Officer as the case may be to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent or where no such service rules have been made, in such manner as may be prescribed.

24. The POSH Act came into force with effect from 09.12.2013, much after the coming into force of the Calicut University Act, 1975. As mentioned above, the intention behind the enactment of the POSH Act is to create a safe and secure environment free from sexual harassment in the workplace. At the time of the judgments in P.R Nayak [(1972) 1 SCC 332] and Hariharan Pillai [2007 (4) KHC 182], the POSH Act was not enacted. In Anil Kumar Sarkar [(2013) 4 SCC 161], Sobha [2015 (4) KLT SN 60] and Vijayakumaran C.P [2020 (1) KHC 982], the provisions of the POSH Act did not come up for consideration before the Court concerned. The disciplinary proceedings in those cases were not initiated based on a 33 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 complaint that would fall under the provisions of the POSH Act. The enquiry initiated therein are purely under the Service Rules applicable to the delinquents therein and not under the special statute as that of the instant case. There were no sanction or extension of period by the authority concerned, like that granted by the Vice Chancellor, or assurance from the delinquent to co-operate with the enquiry as done by the appellant herein. Therefore, the judgments in P.R Nayak [(1972) 1 SCC 332], Hariharan Pillai [2007 (4) KHC 182], Anil Kumar Sarkar [(2013) 4 SCC 161], Sobha [2015 (4) KLT SN 60] and Vijayakumaran C.P [2020 (1) KHC 982] relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant are not applicable to the facts of the instant case.

25. When Section 11 read with Section 13 of the POSH Act makes it clear that the internal committee or local committee if arrives at a conclusion that the allegation of sexual harassment raised against the delinquent has been proved, it shall recommend the employer or the District Officer as the case may be to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules applicable to the delinquent, 34 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 there is no meaning in saying that the delinquent can be suspended from service only after initiating disciplinary proceedings under the relevant Service Rules. If such an interpretation is given to the provisions of POSH Act, the purpose of the Act will become otiose. It is true that there is no hindrance for starting a parallel disciplinary proceedings against the incumbent concerned under the provisions of the applicable Service Rules also, even if an inquiry as contemplated under the POSH Act was already initiated against him. Therefore, while considering the relevant provisions under the POSH Act with that of the Calicut University Act, we are of the considered opinion that the inquiry conducted by the internal committee or local committee as provided under Section 11 of the POSH Act can also be treated as initiation of disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of Section 60(2) of the Calicut University Act.

26. Apart from the above, there are other peculiar circumstances in this case, which necessary to be taken note of while analysing the contentions of the parties concerned. After the submission of the report by the internal Committee, by Ext.R2(q) notice dated 09.06.2020, Police had requested the documents 35 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 pertaining to the complaint, and according to the 2 nd respondent, they were handed over to the Police. Moreover, during that period the entire world was affected by COVID-19 pandemic. Noting the difficulties faced by the citizens, the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 was excluded from the operation of Limitation by the Apex Court as per the order dated 10.01.2022 in M.A.21/2022 in M.A.665/2022 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.03/2020 titled In Re: Cognisance for Extension of Limitation [See: (2022) 3 SCC 117].

27. As noted herein before, by Ext.R2(s) request dated 09.10.2023, the 2nd respondent requested the Vice-Chancellor to extend the period of disciplinary proceedings. By Ext.P15, the period for completion of disciplinary proceedings was extended for three months from 18.12.2023 by the Vice-Chancellor. Exts.P11 and P15 documents would show that before extending the period, a hearing was conducted on 25.11.2023 at the chamber of the Vice-Chancellor, and the orders were issued on 18.12.2023. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the order of extension was granted by the Vice-Chancellor without hearing him is not acceptable.

W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146

28. The appellant did not challenge the order of extension granted by the Vice-Chancellor on the grounds available under Sections 60(2) and (3) by filing any appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 60(5) of the Act. Even in the earlier round of litigation by filing W.P.(C)No.22760 of 2021, the appellant conceded for consideration of Ext.P9 representation by the 2 nd respondent. Moreover, as found by the learned Single Judge, the appellant participated in the disciplinary proceedings by submitting Exts.R2(t) and (u) representations. He has not raised any objection against the disciplinary proceedings and assured that he will co-operate with those proceedings.

29. It is at the fag end of the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant approached this Court with the writ petition challenging his suspension order and stalled the same by obtaining the interim Order. While considering the fact that now the disciplinary proceedings have almost reached the stage of conclusion and the time for completion of those proceedings was extended by the Vice-Chancellor, we find no reason to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant. But, while considering the fact that the disciplinary proceedings were stalled due to the 37 W.A Nos.117 and 326 of 2025 2025:KER:73146 stay granted in the writ petition during the extended period granted by the Vice-Chancellor, we deem it appropriate to direct the 2nd respondent to complete the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant at the earliest.

In the result, the writ appeals are disposed of by setting aside the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and directing the 2nd respondent to complete the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, in accordance with law.

Sd/-

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-

sks                                MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE

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