Karnataka High Court
M/S. M.S. Kannappa Automobiles vs Sri.Koladamatt Mahasamsthana on 29 July, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 KAR 2608
Bench: B.V.Nagarathna, Jyoti Mulimani
:1:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU R
DATED THIS THE 29th DAY OF JULY, 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE Mrs. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA
AND
THE HON'BLE Miss. JUSTICE JYOTI MULIMANI
WRIT APPEAL No.1061 OF 2013 [KLRA]
C/w.
WRIT APPEAL No.872 OF 2013 [KLRA]
IN W.A. No.1061 of 2013:
BETWEEN:
1. M/S. S.M. KANNAPPA AUTOMOBILES,
BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER,
SRI S.M. KANNAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS L.Rs.
1(a) SRI K. JAYAKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
S/o. S.M. KANNAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs.
1(a1) JAYAKUMAR SRI. VENKATESH
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
S/o. LATE K. JAYAKUMAR
R/AT 387/A, BANGIAPPA GARDEN,
SHANTHI NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 027.
1(b) SMT. K. NANDINI,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
D/o. S.M. KANNAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRs.
1(b1) BHANUPRAKASH
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
:2:
1(b2) DINESH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
1(b3) GANESH
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
APPELLANT Nos.1(b1) to 1(b3)
ARE CHILDREN OF NARAYANASWAMY
AND DECEASED SMT. K. NANDINI,
@ VIJAYA NARAYANASWAMY,
(DECEASED APPELLANT No.1(b))
ALL ARE R/AT 387/A,
BANGIAPPA GARDENS, SHANTHINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 027.
1(c). K. RAJASHEKAR
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
S/o. S.M. KANNAPPA. ... APPELLANTS
[ BY SRI. Y.K.NARAYANA SHARMA, ADVOCATE FOR
APPELLANT No.1(a1);
SRI ADITHYA SONDHI, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
SRI. ANISH ACHARYA, ADVOCATE FOR
APPELLANT No.1(b1 TO b3);
SRI S.VIJAY SHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
SRI K.ANANDARAMA, ADVOCATE FOR APPELLANT
No.1(c)]
AND:
1. KOLADAMATT MAHASAMSTHANA
No.15, H. SIDDAIAH ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 027,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT HEAD,
SRI SRI SRI SHANTHAVEERA SWAMYGALU,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/AT KOLADAMUTT,
BANGALORE - 560 027.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
:3:
3. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
BANGALORE NORTH,
BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
D.C's OFFICE COMPOUND,
BANGALORE - 560 009.
4. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
FOR ABOLITION OF INAMS, BANGALORE,
CRESCENT ROAD,
BANGALORE.
5. M/s. S.M. KANNAPPA AUTOMOBILES PVT. LTD.,
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT No.2, DR. MARI GOWDA ROAD,
NEAR LALBAGH,
BANGALORE - 560 087,
BY ITS DIRECTOR,
BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS. ... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI S.M.CHANDRASHEKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE AND
SRI RAVI B. NAIK, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
MISS VIJETHA R.NAIK FOR RESPONDENT No.1;
SRI A.C.BALARAJ, LEARNED AGA, FOR
RESPONDENT Nos.2 TO 4;
SRI V.SRINIVASA RAGHAVAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
SRI. ARUN SRIKUMAR AND
MISS.NITYA KALIGOTLA FOR RESPONDENT No.5]
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION No.25308 OF 1993 DATED
14.12.2012.
IN W.A. No.872 of 2013:
BETWEEN:
M/s. S.M. KANNAPPA AUTOMOBILES PVT. LTD.,
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 AND
:4:
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT No.2,
DR. MARIGOWDA ROAD, NEAR LAL BAGH,
BANGALORE - 560 027,
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS DIRECTOR
MR.BHARATH BHUSHAN NARANG,
S/o. LATE SRI OM PRAKASH NARANG,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS. ... APPELLANT
(SRI V.SRINIVASA RAGHAVAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
SRI. ARUN SRIKUMAR AND
MISS.NITYA KALIGOTLA FOR APPELLANT)
AND:
1. KOLADAMATT MAHASAMSTHANA
No.15, H. SIDDAIAH ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 027,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING HEAD
SRI SRI SRI SHANTAVEERA SWAMYGALU,
AGED MAJOR, RESIDING AT
KOLADAMATT MAHASAMSTHANA.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT, VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
3. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
BANGALORE NORTH,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
DC's OFFICE COMPOUND,
BANGALORE - 560 009.
4. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
FOR ABOLITION OF INAMS, BANGALORE,
CRESCENT ROAD, BANGALORE.
5. M/s. S.M. KANNAPPA AUTOMOBILES,
BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER
SRI S.M. KANNAPPA,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS L.Rs.
(a) SRI K. JAYAKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
(b) SMT. K. NANDINI
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
:5:
(c) SRI K. RAJASHEKAR
AGED MAJOR,
RESPONDENT Nos.5(a) to 5(c) are
R/AT NO.236, 6TH CROSS,
2ND BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 011.
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI S.M.CHANDRASHEKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE AND
SRI RAVI B. NAIK, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w.
MISS VIJETHA R.NAIK FOR RESPONDENT No.1;
SRI A.C.BALARAJ, LEARNED AGA, FOR
RESPONDENT Nos.2 TO 4]
SRI S.VIJAY SHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/w
SRI K.ANANDARAMA, ADVOCATE FOR
RESPONDENT No.5(c)]
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION No.25308 OF 1993 (KLRA)
DATED 14.12.2012.
THESE WRIT APPEALS COMING ON FOR HEARING ON
24.06.2020 AND THE SAME HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY,
NAGARATHNA J. PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
These appeals assail the order of the learned Single Judge dated 14.12.2012 passed in Writ Petition No.25308 of 1993 [KLRA]. Writ Appeal No.1061 of 2013 has been preferred by respondent Nos.4(a) to 4(c) in the writ petition, while Writ Appeal No.872 of 2013 has been preferred by respondent No.5 in the writ petition.
:6:Brief facts of the case:
2. Succinctly stated, these appeals arise from the order of the learned Single Judge impugned herein by which, the order of the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru North Taluk, Bengaluru ('Land Tribunal' for the sake of brevity) dated 01.09.1984 passed in case No.INA.60/79-80 (Annexure 'G' to the writ petition) was set aside. The Land Tribunal had passed the order under the provisions of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the sake of brevity].
3. Briefly stated the facts are, Sri.S.M.Kannappa claiming to be a tenant had filed an application for registration of occupancy under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act. The application pertained to land measuring two acres nineteen guntas (2A-19G) in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village, Kasaba Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, Bengaluru, along with the buildings standing thereon (hereinafter :7: referred to as the ('land in question'). The reason for making the said application was that pursuant to the issuance of the notification under Section 1(4) of the Act on 04.04.1970, all the provisions of the said Act (other than Sections 2, 34 ad 36 which had already come into force) came into force with effect from 01.07.1970 which is the date of vesting.
4. The basis for making such an application by Sri.S.M.Kannappa was that by an Agreement of Lease dated 06.02.1967, registered on 08.02.1967, the land in question was leased for a period of twenty (20) years to run an automobile industry on a rent of Rs.501/- per month, with permission to put up structures on the land in question. When the lease was in force, the provisions of the Act became applicable to the said land and hence, the application was made by Sri.S.M.Kannappa. This is because, the land in question was a portion of larger extent of land which was granted as a minor inam to respondent No.1, which is a religious institution (Mutt). Hence, :8: the proceedings pursuant to the issuance of the notification on 04.04.1970 under Section 1(4) of the Act was commenced by Sri.S.M.Kannappa as an applicant.
5. Consequently, the application was filed on 30.12.1970 by S.M.Kannappa seeking occupancy and declaration of rights vis-à-vis land in question. By order dated 03.12.1974 by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, Bengaluru, the said application was rejected. Consequently, Writ Petition No.2373 of 1975 was filed before this Court which was disposed of on 19.02.1979 by setting aside the order dated 03.12.1974 and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration. Subsequently, the Land Tribunal was conferred with the jurisdiction to consider such applications and by order dated 01.09.1984, the Land Tribunal held that the applicant was entitled to registration of occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act.:9:
6. As already noted, on the Land Tribunal granting registration of occupancy rights of the land in question in the name of Sri.S.M.Kannappa, (after the land vested in the State Government) in terms of Section 6 read with Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, led to respondent No.1/Mutt filing Writ Petition No.25308 of 1993 nearly nine years after the order of the Land Tribunal and by order dated 14.12.2012, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of the Land Tribunal dated 01.09.1984. Being aggrieved, these appeals have been preferred.
Submissions:
7. We have heard Sri.S.Vijay Shankar, learned senior counsel along with Sri.K.Anandarama, learned counsel for appellant No.1(c) in W.A. No.1061 of 2013; Sri.Aditya Sondhi, learned Senior counsel for Sri.Anish Acharya, learned counsel for appellant Nos.1(b1) to (b3); Sri.Y.K.Narayana Sharma, learned counsel for appellant No.1(a1); Sri.V.Srinivasa Raghavan, learned senior counsel along with Miss.: 10 :
Nitya Kaligotla, learned counsel for appellant in the connected appeal namely, W.A No.872 of 2013; Sri.S.M. Chandrashekar and Sri.Ravi B.Naik learned senior counsel, along with Miss Vijetha R.Naik, for respondent No.1; Sri.A.C.Balaraj, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos.2 to 4 in both the appeals and perused the material on record. Submissions on behalf of appellant:
8. Learned Senior counsel, Sri.Vijay Shankar appearing for Sri.K.Anandarama, learned counsel for appellant No.1(c), while drawing our attention to the scheme and provisions of the Act, at the outset, contended that respondent No.1/Mutt had no locus standi to challenge the order of the Land Tribunal by filing the writ petition as there was no lis between the applicant and the Mutt or the inamdar i.e., holder of the minor inam. That under Section 3 of the Act, there are certain consequences which ensue on the vesting of inam land in the State. The said consequences are subject to the rights accruing to the holder of the : 11 : minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be, as well as the tenants, Pujari/Archaka, etc., provided they make their respective applications under the provisions of the Act. On such an application being made, the same would be determined under Sections 9, 11 and 12 of the Act and consequently, the rights which accrue to the persons referred to above would be considered and accordingly, there would be registration of occupancy under the provisions of the Act.
9. That in the instant case, though respondent No.1/Mutt could have made an application under Section 7 of the Act, did not make any such application under the Act. This is an admitted fact. In the application filed by Sri.S.M.Kannappa, respondent No.1/Mutt was arrayed as a respondent as it was the lessor of the land in question which was inam land before it vested in the State Government and therefore, was only a formal party and not a party against whom there was any lis. The Mutt was made : 12 : a party before the Land Tribunal as it was the holder of minor inam and the rights of such a party would have been subject to Section 7(1)(iii) of the Act.
That, before the Land Tribunal, respondent No.1 admitted that the land in question was a Devadaya inam land endowed to the Mutt as an inam. In view of the admitted Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967 and the fact that the State Government on 07.11.1967 had ratified the Lease Deed, respondent No.1/Mutt had also admitted the tenancy. Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid admissions and considering the case for registration of occupancy rights made by the applicant--Sri.S.M.Kannappa as being tenable, the Land Tribunal by its order dated 01.09.1984 permitted the registration of the applicant as an occupant in respect of the land in question. The Land Tribunal further declared that the building on the said land was constructed by the lessee and therefore, the applicant had the right, title and interest in the said building. Hence, while contending that respondent No.1 /Mutt : 13 : had no locus standi to file the writ petition, as it was not a person aggrieved, reliance was placed on Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra, [(2013) 4 SCC 465] (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan) and Ramanna vs. State of Karnataka, [ILR 1991 Kar. 1771 (DB)] (Ramanna).
10. It was next submitted that the learned Single Judge had misconstrued the Act, as one intended to bring about agrarian reforms and therefore, was applicable only to agricultural lands. Learned senior counsel contended that the scheme of the Act was not appreciated in its proper perspective and it was construed to be akin to Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, ('Land Reforms Act', for short). It was submitted that the object and purpose of the two Acts are distinct. That the Act was enacted for the purpose of abolition of inams and the conversion of inam lands in ryotawari patta by granting occupancy rights to the inamdars or various classes of tenants mentioned under the Act, as also other classes of : 14 : persons who are entitled thereto. But, the purpose of Land Reforms Act is different. The Land Reforms Act is a legislation enacted to effectuate radical agrarian reforms by imposing ceiling on the land holders and termination of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of the tenanted lands and by conferring occupancy rights on tenants personally cultivating the lands.
11. That on the issuance of Notification dated 04.04.1970 under Section 1(4) of the Act with effect from 01.07.1970, all religious and charitable inam lands stood vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. But, under the Land Reforms Act, only agricultural lands held by or in possession of the tenants as on 01.03.1974 vested in the State. That the expression 'tenant' in the Land Reforms Act would mean an 'agricultural tenant' and 'land' under the said Act would mean agricultural land, which is not the case under the Act in question. That the Act is applicable to both agricultural as well as non- agricultural land.
: 15 :
12. It was contended that there was an error in the order of the learned Single Judge in analyzing the provisions of the Act. That there are no provisions under the Act restricting application for registration of occupancy rights only in respect of agricultural lands, as the Act applies to agricultural lands as well as non- agricultural lands as well as agricultural lands used for non-agricultural purposes, which is evident from various provisions of the Act. In this regard, reliance was placed on two decisions, namely, Munibasappa vs. Thippasetty Mutt and others, [1980 (1) KLJ 168], (Munibasappa) and Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple vs. Chinnathayappa, [ILR 1990 KAR 4242], (Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple).
13. It was next contended that the land in question, being Devadaya inam land, which is admitted by respondent No.1/Mutt and which is evidenced by the Quit Rent Register as an inam, is covered under the provisions of the Act. The inam : 16 : lands stood vested with the State Government on the issuance of the Notification under Section 1(4) of the Act, resulting in certain specific consequences as per Section 3 of the Act. The said consequences have not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge in its proper perspective. That one of the consequences of inam land vesting in the State is that the holder of the minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be, has to make an application under Sections 7 or 8 respectively or under Section 12 for registration of occupancy but in the instant case, no such application has been made by respondent No.1/Mutt. Consequently, it has lost all its right, title and interest in the land in question. Similarly, every tenant including kadim tenant, permanent tenant or protected tenant would have to make an application seeking registration of occupancy rights and that tenant's right to seek registration of occupancy rights is a supervening right and over-rides the right of a holder of a minor inam or an inamdar to seek : 17 : registration of occupancy. This is evident from Sections 7 and 8 of the Act.
14. In this regard, it was contended that there are two categories of tenants: the first category comprises of kadim tenant (Section 4), permanent tenant (Section 5) and protected tenant (Section 5A). Every other tenant comes under the second category of tenant who is entitled to apply under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act seeking declaration of his rights conferred under the Act. In this regard, reliance was placed on A.R.Venkatachalaiyengar and others vs. State of Mysore, [AIR 1980 Kar.1(FB)] (A.R.Venkatachalaiyengar) and Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple (supra) to contend that Sri.S.M.Kannappa filed the application under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act on the basis of the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967 under which the land in question was leased by respondent No.1/Mutt. It was submitted that under the Lease Deed, the lessee was permitted to put up the building on the lands in : 18 : question and the same was put up pursuant to the sanctioned plan, licences and other legal requirements being complied with. But, the learned Single Judge has erroneously held that there was no material in support of the said facts.
15. It was further contended that the expression 'holder' in Section 12 of the Act is to be understood in the context of Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888 ('Land Revenue Code', for short) which has been repealed and substituted by the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('Land Revenue Act' for short). That the principle of legislation by reference applies in the instant case. That Section 202 of the Land Revenue Act, deals with 'repeal and savings'. Particularly, under Sub-section (3) of Section 202 of the Act (Repeal and Savings Clause), all references to the Code would have to be made to the corresponding provisions of the Repealing Act, i.e., to the Land Revenue Act. The expression 'holder of land' is defined in Section 2(11) of the Land Revenue Act, to : 19 : mean to be lawfully in possession of the land whether such possession is actual or not; 'holding' means a portion of land held by a holder; 'occupant' means a holder in actual possession of unalienated land other than the tenant, provided that where the holder in actual possession is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant; "occupancy" means a portion of land held by an occupant. Further, Section 2(34) of the Land Revenue Act defines a 'Tenant' to mean a lessee. Therefore, a lessee under a lease deed is a tenant of agricultural land under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act.
16. It was further contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant that Section 6 of the Act uses the expression 'every tenant' which would also include a lessee. Also, the proviso to Section 3(1)(g) of the Act is relevant inasmuch as the Government cannot dispossess any person of any inam land, in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie : 20 : entitled to be registered as an occupant or to be continued as a tenant pursuant to the vesting of such land in the Government. In this regard, reliance was placed on Rajamma vs. Hanumakka, [(2011) 4 Kant.L.J. 208] (Rajamma) to underscore the meaning of statutory vesting under the provisions of the Act. Sita Ram Bhandar Society vs. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT Delhi and others, [(2009) 10 SCC 501] (Sita Ram Bhandar Society) was also pressed into service to emphasize on the consequence of vesting of land in the Government. Written arguments have also been filed on behalf of the said appellant.
17. Written Arguments have also been filed by the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos.872-873 of 2013. In support of which learned senior counsel, Sri.V.Srinivasa Raghavan submitted that the appellant, Sri.S.M.Kannappa is a successor-in-interest to M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles. That the land in question was leased by respondent No.1/inamdar to : 21 : M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles pursuant to which buildings comprising of a petrol bunk and industrial sheds were put up on the land in question as per the Lease Agreement. That it is not in dispute and in fact, it is an admitted fact that, M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles had been a lessee/tenant of the land in question under respondent No.1. That the buildings/structures were put up by M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles pursuant to rights granted under the Lease Deed and were, thus, owned by it as on the date of vesting, i.e., 01.07.1970. That these buildings existed even prior to the date of vesting under the statute on 01.07.1970 and no right in the buildings or structures were to contractually vest in the lessor until the expiry of 20 years under the registered Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967.
18. Further, the land in question stood vested in the State Government with effect from 01.07.1970 and notice dated 09.08.1971 was issued in that regard directing the lessee to pay rents to the Government. : 22 : This notice also has not been challenged by respondent No.1. That pursuant to Section 3 of the Act, the inamdar has ceased to have any right in the land in question, except what has been reserved under the Act. Respondent No.1 never chose to prefer any application under the Act so as to be registered as an occupant under any of the applicable provisions of the Act. That the application was made on 30.12.1970 for registration of occupancy rights by M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles, but the same was not considered by the Government and the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, passed an order dated 03.12.1974 which order was challenged in Writ Petition No.2373 of 1975 and the said writ petition was allowed and the matter was remanded on 19.02.1979. After remand, the Land Tribunal conducted spot inspection and thereafter, passed order dated 01.09.1984. The Land Tribunal declared to the lessee the right to own the buildings constructed on the date of vesting under Sections 11 : 23 : and 12 of the Act. Premium of Rs.400/- was demanded by the State and the same was paid and the Land Tribunal conferred rights under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act, which order was challenged by respondent No.1/inamdar in Writ Petition No.25308 of 1993 (KLRA). That the learned Single Judge was not right in setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal, was the submission.
19. In the above factual background, learned senior counsel, Sri.Srinivasa Raghavan contended that respondent No.1 had no locus standi to prefer the writ petition against the order of the Land Tribunal. That the preliminary objection as to locus standi of respondent to file the writ petition was raised by the appellant herein. But, the said contention was neither considered nor discussed by the learned Single Judge. Respondent No.1, not having filed any statutory claim for registration of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question in terms of the provisions of the Act, could not have challenged the order of the Tribunal as : 24 : respondent No.1 was not a person aggrieved. Merely because respondent No.1/inamdar was arrayed as a formal party to the claim before the Land Tribunal and the same being granted, the inamdar could not be a person aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal. That on coming into force of the Act, all right, title and interest in the subject land vis-à-vis respondent No.1 ceased and in the absence of any claim for registration of occupancy rights being made by respondent No.1/inamdar, it had conceded all rights in favour of the applicant. That being the position, respondent No.1 had no grievance or locus standi to challenge the order of the Land Tribunal. In this regard, reliance was placed on Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs. H.M.Seervai, Advocate-General of Maharashtra, Bombay, [(1970) 2 SCC 484] (Adi Pherozshah Gandhi) and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, [(1976) 1 SCC 671] (Jasbhai Motibhai Desai).
: 25 :
20. It was further contended that the Act is applicable not only to agricultural lands and agricultural tenants but also for non-agricultural lands. That on a reading of Sections 7, 8, 11 to 13 of the Act, the same would become evident and the Act cannot be crippled or rendered otiose by holding that it applies only to agricultural lands. A detailed reading of the Act would reveal that it applies to various kinds of lands including uncultivated lands, forest, mines and minerals, fisheries, quarries, etc.
21. Further, it was contended that the expression 'tenant' under the Act cannot extend only to agricultural tenants. In fact, Section 6 of the Act uses the expression 'every tenant' which would imply that a tenant of a non-agricultural land or agricultural land used for non-agricultural purpose is also covered under the Act. Further, Section 27 of the Act contemplates that tenants who are entitled to be continued as tenants under the State or the Government thereafter are to be registered as : 26 : occupants. That admittedly, M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles was a tenant of respondent No.1 and the application made was to continue it as a tenant under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act and thereafter under Chapter IV of the Act, to register such a tenant as an occupant under Section 27 of the Act. The Tribunal has precisely followed the aforesaid Sections and on receipt of the premium demanded, the registration of occupancy has been granted to the applicant, which has been succeeded to by the appellant/company herein. That the steps taken pursuant to the order of the Land Tribunal in paying the premium and the receipt of endorsement issued thereafter have not been challenged by respondent No.1/inamdar. This aspect has not been considered by the learned Single Judge.
22. That the learned Single Judge has completely ignored the fact that M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles owned the building put up pursuant to the lease deed and that respondent No.1/inamdar had : 27 : agreed to the construction of the buildings and the ownership thereof. This is also evident from the statement of objections filed by respondent No.1 before the Tribunal. That buildings on land which belong to other persons is well known in law and the same has been recognized under Sections 7, 8 and 11 of the Act which, in addition, provide for rights of parties when buildings have been put up by persons other than inamdar or holder of a minor inam, as the case may be.
23. That the private buildings have been put up by the lessee in the instant case and the question of their ownership ought to have been examined by the learned Single Judge. That in the instant case, under Section 11 of the Act, the ownership of the building would enure to the benefit of the tenant and not to anybody else. That the Legislature has been conscious of the fact that in 1950's when the Act was enacted, the value of the building invariably exceeded that of the vacant land, unlike present times. : 28 : Therefore, the owners of private buildings were permitted to retain their buildings which were put up at great cost. Hence, under Sections 7, 8 and 11 of the Act, the Legislature has not permitted the inamdar to seek occupancy rights in respect of the buildings, which were put up by others. In fact, Sections 7 and 8 expressly bar the claim of an inamdar for registration of occupancy rights where a third party has put up the building on the tenanted inam land and the occupancy expressly vests with the owner of the buildings and not in the inamdar. That Sections 7 and 8 clearly makes a distinction between the building owned by the inamdar and those by others and the buildings put up by others and not by the inamdar, would vest in those persons who have put up the buildings and not the inamdar. The inamdar is, thus, entitled to vesting of such buildings which were owned by the inamdar himself before the date of vesting. This is evident on a reading of Sections 7(2) and 8(2) of the Act in juxtaposition with Section 11 of the Act. : 29 : Therefore, the buildings referred to in Section 11 cannot be the buildings owned by the inamdar, but by a person other than inamdar who had constructed it. Also the claim of the owner of such buildings erected on inam land is a superior or has supervening claim to the claim of the inamdar. That the right to be registered as an occupant in the holder of a minor inam or an inamdar under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act are couched in certain restrictions as there are rights of tenants/owners of buildings and others which are expressly reserved under the Act and hence, the registration of the inamdar as an occupant is subject to the rights of the tenants and owners of buildings being registered under the Act.
24. It was also contended that the expression 'vesting' in Section 11 of the Act would encompass not just the private building itself put up by the owner thereof, but also the appurtenant land. That in the instant case, the Land Tribunal found that the building and sheds cover the entire extent of land and hence, : 30 : the subject land vested along with the building in the building owner, i.e., the tenant. That the reasoning of the learned Single Judge with regard to the tenancy of M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles in respect of the land in question is arbitrary and against the spirit of Section 11 of the Act.
25. Further, there can be no differentiation whatsoever between agricultural and non-agricultural lands under the Act. That under Section 12 of the Act also, M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles is entitled to keep the land as it was the holder of such land on the date of vesting. That without making any application under Section 12 of the Act, respondent No.1 cannot contend that he is the holder of the land and thus, entitled to retain the land. It was pointed out that on the publication of the Notification dated 04.04.1970 under Section 1(4) of the Act and with effect from 01.07.1970, all lands coming within the scope and ambit of the Act stood vested in the State Government and if any person sought registration of : 31 : occupancy, then he had to make an application in that regard. That, vesting in the State Government was by operation of law and in the absence of any application by a party, the land would continue to vest in the State subject to the rights of the applicants to be determined as per the Act. Therefore, making an application for seeking a claim in the inam land is a sine qua non of assertion of a right and in the absence of such an application being made, it must be held that there was an abandonment of all rights under the Act.
26. It was further submitted that the Land Tribunal rightly interpreted Section 12 of the Act and held that a lessee being in lawful possession of the land is a holder of the land and having raised structures thereon was entitled to keep the land. That the right, title and interest of an inamdar in respect of an inam land has been enunciated in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act and an inamdar or holder of a minor inam : 32 : cannot be a holder under Section 12 nor can claim rights therein, when the land is tenanted.
27. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge was not right in mechanically applying the provisions of Land Reforms Legislation to the land in question. The object of Land Reforms Law is to confer occupancy rights on the tiller of the land but under the Act, the object is to abolish inam lands and vest all such lands in the State and thereafter, to recognize the rights of certain persons who are entitled to claim occupancy rights or to be continued as tenants and registered as occupants under the State under various provisions of the Act. It was also contended that there are inter se disputes between the appellant in this case and the appellants in Writ Appeal No.1061 of 2013 which could only be decided by the competent civil court, but there is no dispute between the appellants vis-à-vis the order of the learned Single Judge impugned in these appeals, which is illegal and : 33 : bad in law and the correctness of the order of the Land Tribunal has to be considered in these appeals.
28. Sri.Aditya Sondhi, learned senior counsel, contended that the writ petition ought to have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge as the inamdar/respondent No.1 had no right to file the same. The only right provided under the Act for the inamdar is to make an application within the prescribed time for seeking registration of occupancy rights in terms of Sections 7 or 8 of the Act. If such an application was made, it would have been considered under Section 9 of the Act. But, in the instant case, when no such application was made by respondent No.1/inamdar, it would imply that it has given up all its rights, title and interest in respect of the land in question, which vested in the State Government pursuant to the notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Act with effect from 01.07.1970. That it is only the right of the tenant vis-à-vis land in question which had to be considered in the instant : 34 : case, as the tenant of the land in question made an application under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act. Therefore, respondent No.1/inamdar is not a rival claimant in that sense and hence, respondent No.1 could not have maintained the writ petition as it was not an aggrieved party.
29. In the above context, it was further submitted that under Section 3(1)(c) of the Act, all rights of the inamdar are extinguished except the right to file an application seeking registration of occupancy rights on the vesting of all inam lands in the State Government. That the same is by operation of law. Respondent No.1 has not challenged the said vesting nor the notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Act. Therefore, the writ petition had to be dismissed on that score also. It was further contended that by allowing the writ petition and setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal, no relief has been granted to respondent No.1 by the learned Single Judge, but on the other hand, the impugned : 35 : order has adversely affected the appellant. Moreover, the State did not question the Tribunal's order and even if it is to be presumed that the learned Single Judge's order would be affirmed in these appeals, the resultant position is, the vesting of the land in question in the State would continue. Respondent No.1/inamdar would get no right whatsoever in the land in question. That such being the position and respondent No.1 not having any locus standi to challenge the order of the Land Tribunal, the learned Single Judge could not have given a ruling on the applicability or otherwise of the Act vis-à-vis the land in question, particularly when the State has no grievance against the order of the Land Tribunal.
30. Learned senior counsel, Sri Sondhi, next contended that the case with regard to the nature of the land, whether it is agricultural or non-agricultural land, is immaterial to the case. The object of the Act is to abolish all inams and to vest all inam lands in the State. The right, title and interest of the inamdars in : 36 : the inam lands ceased and the Act recognizes the rights of certain persons such as the tenants, Archaks and inamdars also, provided appropriate application is made claiming those rights. That in the absence of any such application being made by the inamdar, no right under the Act could be conferred. That in the instant case, respondent No.1/inamdar is not a person aggrieved and hence, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed in limine. Instead, the learned Single Judge went into merits of the case and has given adverse findings for setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal at the instance of respondent No.1/inamdar who has no say in the matter. On the aspect of the locus standi, reliance was placed on two decisions namely, Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha vs. M/s. S.Lal And Company (P) Ltd., [(1973) 2 SCC 696] (Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha) and Ayaaubkhan (supra). It was contended that academic questions cannot be decided by Law Courts at the instance of a party who has no say in the matter. In this regard, : 37 : reliance was placed on Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vs. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and another [(1983) 1 SCC 147] (Sanjeev Coke).
31. Sri.Y.K.Narayana Sharma, learned counsel appearing for appellant No.1(a)(1) contended that there is no controversy that the land in question is an inam land and the provisions of the Act are applicable to the land in question. That on the issuance of the notification under Section 1(4) of the Act, the inamdar lost all right, title and interest in the inam subject to what is reserved under the provisions of the Act. That respondent No.1/Mutt is the inamdar and Sri.S.M.Kannappa was the tenant. The fact that the tenant put up the buildings on the land in question is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the inamdar did not make any application under the provisions of the Act under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act nor even under Section 11 of the Act. That on the : 38 : application made by Sri.S.M.Kannappa, the order was passed by the Land Tribunal.
32. Further, the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the differences between the Land Reforms Act and the Act in question. That, under the Land Reforms Act, there is no continuation of tenancy and the tenants have the right to apply under the Act, otherwise, tenanted land will vest with the State. But, under the provisions of the Act, tenancy continues even after the tenanted land vests with the State. In the place of the landlord who is the inamdar, the State Government would step into his shoes. Whatever rent was paid by the tenant to the landlord/inamdar, it would have to be paid to the State Government as per Section 23 of the Act. The tenancy would continue until the same is terminated as per Sections 24 and 25 of the Act. But, the tenancy would come to an end once the occupancy rights are granted. When the inam land is tenanted, then the inamdar cannot be registered as an occupant. This is clear from Sections : 39 : 7 and 8 of the Act. In other words, the rights of the inamdar are subject to the rights of the tenants. The object and purpose of making the inamdar a party to a proceeding before the Land Tribunal is only to resolve a dispute regarding tenancy, in other words, whether the inam land was tenanted or not. But, in the instant case, respondent No.1/Mutt inamdar admitted the tenancy and therefore, there was no scope for any dispute before the Land Tribunal. It was also admitted before the Land Tribunal by respondent No.1/Mutt inamdar that the construction of buildings was by the tenant and hence, under Section 11 of the Act, the owner of the buildings would be vested in respect of the buildings constructed by him. In the instant case, it is also not in dispute that the buildings on the land in question have been put up by the tenant. Hence, the occupancy rights were granted to the tenant. Therefore, there was no reason to file the writ petition. According to learned senior counsel : 40 : Sri.Sharma, the aforesaid aspects have not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge who has set aside the order of the Tribunal. Hence, the order of the learned Single Judge may be set aside and the order of the Land Tribunal may be given effect to, was the submission.
Submissions on behalf of respondent No.1/Mutt:
33. Sri.S.M.Chandrashekhar, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1, contended that the land stood vested with the State Government on 01.09.1955 when the Act was enforced and not pursuant to issuance of the notification on 04.04.1970 with effect from 01.07.1970. That after the lands stood vested with the State Government, tenancy was created in the instant case. It was next contended that the Act is not applicable as the grant is in favour of Jangama and hence, it is a Jangama grant and the same is covered under the provisions of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, : 41 : 1954. Further, assuming that the Act is applicable to the instant case and the inam is a Devadaya inam, vesting had taken place in the year 1955 itself and not with effect from 01.07.1970. That Devadaya inam, a separate notification ought to have been issued and in the instant case, in respect of the inam, no such notification has been issued. It was also contended that Section 6 of the Act is not applicable as the lease is for a non-agricultural purpose and Chapter-IV of the Act is not applicable in the instant case. That, if there is any agricultural activity carried on by the tenant then Chapter IV of the Act would apply and not otherwise. Therefore, the Tribunal was not right in registering the occupancy rights in favour of the applicant. In the circumstances, learned senior counsel contended that there is no merit in these appeals and the same may be dismissed.
34. Sri.Ravi. B.Naik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 contended that respondent No.1 is the holder of the land in : 42 : question as inamdar and the inam was granted by the State Government on 29.10.1897 which is reflected in the Final Quit Rent Register produced as document No.18 at page No.672 of the Convenience Compilation. The land in question was endowed by the State Government as Devadaya inam land in favour of respondent No.1/Mutt. The holder of the land/inamdar entered into a lease deed in favour of M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles represented by its partner, Sri.S.M.Kannappa and others dated 06.02.1967, for a period of twenty years on a rent of Rs.501/- per month. That on coming into force of the Act, the land in question stood vested with the holder of the land/inamdar as per Section 12 of the Act.
That the object and scheme of the Act is to abolish inams and confer Ryotwari patta either on the tiller of the soil (agricultural tenant) or to the Institution. That the Act has vested all the inam lands in the State Government. The Act is essentially a legislation towards agrarian reforms. Thus, the Act has created : 43 : a direct relationship of the agricultural tenant or institutions with the State Government and the rent was made payable to the State directly. The same has been observed in the case of Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar and others vs. Government of A.P. and another [(1996) 3 SCC 75] (Peddinti Desika Iyengar). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 with respect to religious and charitable inams.
35. It was further submitted that the Act under consideration is a piece of legislation made by the State Legislature under Entry 18, List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which inter alia deals with land tenures including the relationship of the landlord and the tenant, which is essentially a law made for achieving agrarian reforms. Therefore, the entire Act must be viewed in the aforesaid perspective. When so viewed, it becomes clear that : 44 : M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles was not an agricultural tenant at all.
36. Learned Senior Counsel, Sri.Naik, further contended that under Section 12 of the Act, the land in question vested with the holder of the land. It was not necessary for the holder of the land to make an application under Section 12 of the Act. That no enquiry is contemplated under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, there was no need for respondent No.1 being the holder of the land to make an application for grant of occupancy rights in its favour. That under Section 12 of the Act, the land vests in the holder and he is entitled to keep the land.
37. It was further contended that the expression 'holder of the land' is defined under Section 2(10) of the Mysore Code, 1888 and Section 2(9) thereof defines 'to hold the land'. That by virtue of Section 12 of the Act, respondent No.1/Mutt being the holder of the land, was entitled to keep the land. : 45 : It was further contended that the land in question had lost its agricultural character and there was deemed conversion of the land and hence, Section 12 of the Act was attracted in the instant case. Further, under Section 3 of the Act, certain rights of the inamdar are expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act; Section 12 of the Act is one such savings clause. It was further submitted that the land in question has lost its agricultural character. That even in the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967 it was clearly stated that the land is not fit for cultivation and there has been conversion of the land in question. Respondent No.1, being the holder of the land is entitled to keep the land as per Section 12 of the Act. The property also lies within the jurisdiction of the Bengaluru City Corporation. Respondent No.1 has paid taxes in respect of the same and hence, it is deemed to have been converted. That earlier, even on 15.08.1939, the land in question was partially converted by the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The appellant : 46 : herein being a contractual tenant cannot be considered to be an agricultural tenant. Also in Munibasappa vs. Tippasetty Mutt, [ILR 1979 Kar. 2444], (Munibasappa), it was held that a lessee of an inam land used for non-agricultural purpose is not entitled to claim right to the land under Section 12 of the Act. That it is only a holder of the land who can claim the said right and in the instant case, it is the inamdar/respondent No.1.
38. That in the case of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi and others vs. State of Bombay, [AIR 1959 SC 459] (Ram Narain Medhi), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956, held that an inamdar cannot include a tenant. Further, the applicant in the instant case cannot be construed to be a tenant under Section 6 of the Act. That the applicant in the instant case is a contractual tenant and the lease was for running of automobile industry, which is for a non-agricultural : 47 : purpose and hence, Section 6 of the Act does not apply in the instant case.
39. Further, the applicant cannot also be construed to be a deemed tenant as per the provisions of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, as under the said Act, a 'tenant' means an agriculturist who holds land on lease from a landlord and includes a person who is deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, Section 6 of the Act is not applicable to the instant case. Further, Section 27 of the Act contemplates payment of revenue to the Government by the tenant which is on the basis of the agricultural crops only. Also in Savithramma and Others vs. State Of Karnataka and Others, [ILR 1998 KAR 2064] (Savithramma), it has been held that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to non- agricultural lands. That the occupancy rights can be claimed by a person as a tenant only if the lands are agricultural in nature and the person claiming the right is personally cultivating the same. That the : 48 : learned Single Judge has rightly held that, since, the appellant herein is not an agricultural tenant, he cannot claim any right over the buildings constructed on the scheduled property. That adjacent tenants of the land in question also made an application under the provisions of the Act. The land therein was also used for non-agricultural purposes. In Sri B.V.Ramachandrappa vs. State of Karnataka by its Secretary Revenue Department and others in LRRP No.3513 of 1990 (B.V.Ramachandrappa) disposed on the same day on which the writ petition was disposed of, the learned Single Judge held that tenants of non-agricultural purposes cannot claim any right under the provisions of the Act. That B.V.Ramachandrappa had filed Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed on 04.12.2018 and prior to that review petition (RP No.32 of 2013) filed had also been dismissed, confirming the order passed by this Court in LRRP No.3513 of 1990. Therefore, learned senior : 49 : counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the appeal may be dismissed and the claim of the appellant may be rejected.
Reply to arguments of Sri.S.M. Chandrashekar, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1/Mutt:
40. By way of reply, learned senior counsel Sri.S.Vijay Shankar, contended that the land in question is not a grant to a Jangama nor is it a Jangama grant, but it is a Devadaya minor inam grant. This fact is also admitted by respondent No.1 and the said fact is supported by Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967 and ratification order dated 07.11.1967 and also in the statement of objections filed by the Mutt stating that the lands are endowed to it as Devadaya inam lands. The statement of the inamdar before the Land Tribunal is also an admission of the fact that the land in question is Devadaya inam land and hence, the contention raised for the first time in the writ appeal that it is Jangama land and therefore : 50 : the Act is not applicable is wholly erroneous. Further, respondent No.1/Mutt is also known as Annipura Shree Kolada Mutt Mahasamsthana and the land was endowed for the support of the Mutt at Annipura. The Quit Rent Register would also indicate that the inam was made in the year 1897 in favour of the Mutt as it is admittedly a religious and charitable institution. Moreover, the revenue records in the form of Index of Lands and Record of Rights clearly show the land in question as Devadaya inam granted to Kolada Mutt which is dedicated to the deity. Therefore, the inam in question is a religious inam and the inamdar is respondent No.1/Mutt.
41. It was further contended that pursuant to the notification issued on 04.04.1970, the land stood vested with the State Government with effect from 01.07.1970. That Section 1(4) of the Act is a piece of conditional Legislation conferring power on the State Government to bring the Act into force, (excluding certain Sections, which had come into force : 51 : immediately) by issuance of a notification. In this regard, reliance was placed on Orient Paper and Industries Limited and another vs. State of Orissa and others, [1991 Supp. (1) SCC 81] (Orient Paper Industries) and In Re. Delhi Laws Act, 1912 [AIR 1951 SCC 332].
42. It was further contended that it is not necessary for a specific notification to be issued in respect of the inam in question inasmuch as Section 1(4) of the Act contemplates only a specific exclusion of a particular inam by a special notification and in the absence of such a notification being issued, all inams would be covered under the provisions of the Act. The use of the expression "other than such Devadaya Inams in unalienated villages" in section 1(4) of the Act is significant in this regard. This interpretation also becomes clear on account of the Amendment Act No.33 of 1969, wherein if a notification is issued under Section 1(4) of the Act, all minor inams are included and for an exclusion of any minor inam, there has to : 52 : be a specific exclusion by way of a notification and that in the instant case, there is no such notification which has been issued. Thus, on and from the appointed day i.e., on 01.07.1970, the land in question which is a minor inam stood vested with the State Government and the contention that there ought to have been a specific notification in respect of the inam in question, is without any merit.
43. It was also submitted that the 'date of vesting' is defined under Section 2(2) of the Act to mean the date appointed by a notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Act bringing into force the provisions of the Act, other than Sections 2, 34 and 36 and hence, in the instant case, the date 01.07.1970 ought to be considered as the date of vesting and not 01.09.1955, as contended by the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1. In this regard, it was also submitted that 01.07.1970 is not the date on which the Act was brought into force in areas other than the Old Mysore area and that on 01.09.1955, the : 53 : Act came into force in Old Mysore areas and under Section 1(4) of the Act, on the issuance of the notification on 04.04.1970, all Sections of the Act (other than Sections 1, 2, 34 and 36 which had already come into force), became enforceable in respect of the minor inams in the State.
44. It was also contended by way of reply that Section 6 of the Act refers to every tenant other than the classes of tenants specifically mentioned therein and the expression 'other than' is significant. Therefore, a lessee of an inam land is also a tenant of the land and in the above context, Sections 6, 11, 12, 25 and 27 have to be interpreted harmoniously. That, pursuant to the vesting of the land in question in the State Government for the purpose of continuation of the tenancy, an application was made as per Section 6 of the Act and that the State Government did not terminate the tenancy prior to the consideration made by the Land Tribunal in the instant case. : 54 : Reply to arguments of Sri.Ravi B.Naik, Senior Advocate:
45. Learned senior counsel, Sri.S.Vijay Shankar, submitted that the Act in question is relatable to Entry No.18 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. But, that by itself will not make the Legislation as one pertinent to agrarian reform.
Entry No.18 of List-II of Seventh Schedule is only a source of power. But, the nature of legislation can be gathered by looking to the enactment itself and the object and purport it seeks to achieve. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the Act has been enforced only for the purpose of bringing in agrarian reform.
46. In this regard, it was contended that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Peddinti Desika Iyengar's case is not applicable to the instant case. It was further submitted that the revenue records as well as the Lease Deed clearly indicate that the land in question is an agricultural land but the land was leased for non-agricultural purpose. Further, : 55 : there has been no conversion of the land in question. A "typed copy" of a conversion order cannot be believed as its genuineness is suspected.
47. It was further contended that the reliance placed on Savithramma's case by learned counsel for respondent No.1 is misconceived as the said judgment does not take note of the previous Division Bench's judgment in the case of Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple. It was further argued that on the issuance of the notification under Section 1(4) of the Act, all inam lands stood vested in the State subject to the rights expressly saved. The said right is to apply for registration of occupancy and in order to seek such registration, an application had to be filed. Therefore, filing of an application is a sine qua non for declaration of rights saved by the statute. The reason being, that on the issuance of the notification, the rights of the inamdar ceased except to the extent saved under the Act and the lands stood vested in the State Government and if the inamdar had to be : 56 : registered as an occupant, then it was necessary that an application be made. But, in the instant case, no such application was made by the inamdar. Even if such an application was made by an inamdar and if tenancy is admitted, the rights of the tenant would over-ride the right of the inamdar and the tenant has to be registered as an occupant. Therefore, the contention of respondent No.1 that even without making an application under Section 12 of the Act, the inamdar can keep the land, is wholly incorrect, was the submission. In this regard, it was also contended by learned senior counsel that the expression 'holder' in Section 12 of the Act, does not refer to the inamdar, per se as holder means a person who is in possession and enjoyment of the land. Such a person could also be a tenant until the tenancy is terminated. Every tenant would have the right to hold the land during the subsistence of the tenancy. That the expressions 'holder' and 'to hold land' under the Land Revenue Code and subsequently, Land Revenue Act : 57 : are significant. That in the instant case, inamdar is not the holder of the land in question under Section 12 of the Act.
48. It was further contended by learned senior counsel, Sri.Vijay Shankar, that the learned Single Judge failed to note the fact that under Section 202(3) of the Land Revenue Act, the Mysore Land Revenue Code has been repealed and any reference in any enactment or law or in any instrument to any provision of any of the enactment or law repealed by sub-section (1) of Section 202 shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of the Land Revenue Act. It was therefore, contended that under Section 2(11) of the Land Revenue Act, the expression 'to hold land' means to be lawfully in possession of the land, whether such possession is actual or not. Therefore, a tenant is a holder of the land and an inamdar can never be a holder of the land when a tenancy has been created by the inamdar.
: 58 :
49. That in Munibasappa, an application was filed only under Section 12 of the Act to keep the land. No application was filed under Sections 6, 11 or any other provision by any tenant or owner of the building. But, in the instant case, respondent No.1/inamdar has not filed any application whatsoever, much less under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, no right of the inamdar could be determined under the provisions of the Act for the registration of the occupancy rights. It is only persons who apply, who can seek determination for registration as an occupant and in respect of the tenant, until the said determination is made as per Sections 6, 9, 11 and 12 of the Act, the tenancy would continue. That, in the instant case, the appellant/tenant applied in view of Sections 6 and 11 of the Act and there was no rival application made by respondent No.1 herein/inamdar. Hence, in that sense, the inamdar is not a rival claimant at all. Therefore, the judgment in Munibasappa has no application. Moreover, in Munibasappa, no application : 59 : was filed by the tenant as per Section 6 of the Act and on termination of the tenancy as per Section 3 of the Act, the tenant was liable to be dispossessed but the facts in the instant case are contrary.
50. That in the instant case, the appellant/tenant was entitled to be continued in possession and enjoyment until his rights were determined as per Chapter IV of the Act. In this regard, it was also contended that if the expression 'holder' refers to inamdar only, then there was no necessity to use the expression 'holder', rather, the word 'inamdar' would have been used under Section 12 of the Act.
51. In this regard, it was emphasized by learned senior counsel, Sri.Vijay Shankar, that if the inam land is tenanted then the claim of the inamdar stands excluded and the inamdar can only have a right to dispute the tenancy or make an application under Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, as the case : 60 : may be. All other rights would stand extinguished. Therefore, in the instant case, when respondent No.1 did not make any application under the Act, it had no locus standi to file the writ petition. It was further contended that even to claim a benefit under Section 12 of the Act, an application had to be made, as every piece of inam land stood vested in the State Government on the issuance of the notification under Section 1(4) of the Act and the rights of the inamdar vis-à-vis inam land ceased. Therefore, even if the inamdar sought any right or benefit under the Act, an application was necessary. If respondent No.1 claims that it had a right under Section 12 of the Act, then an application had to be made by the inamdar under the said Section. In the absence of such an application, respondent No.1/inamdar had no right, interest or locus standi to file the writ petition.
52. The next submission was that under Section 6 of the Act, no doubt, there is a specific reference to kadim tenant or permanent tenant, but : 61 : the expression 'every tenant of the inamdar' is significant inasmuch as every tenant of an inamdar is entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of the land of which he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. Therefore, Section 6 of the Act cannot have a limited application, but an expansive and inclusive interpretation must be made having regard to the words "every tenant". If the same is made, then the appellant herein, being a tenant/lessee as per the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967, was entitled to be continued as a tenant on the inam land vested in the State Government.
53. It was further contended that the reference made to Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 ('Tenancy Act, 1952' for short) by respondent No.1 is wholly misconceived as the said Act has been repealed by the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Land Reforms Act, 1961) and as per Section 142 of the said Act, the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 stands repealed. It was : 62 : also submitted that the contention of respondent No.1 that Section 27 of the Act applies only to agricultural tenants is also not correct. Section 24 is found in Chapter IV of the Act and it refers to Section 6 of the Act, which deals with continuation of tenants under the Government on the vesting of inam lands pursuant to the issuance of the notification under Section 1(4) of the Act. That, in the instant case, as per Section 27 of the Act, on payment of the premium on the land, the claimant / Sri.S.M.Kannappa was issued 'Hakkupatra' on 10.09.1984.
54. It was also pointed out that Section 6 of the Act refers to tenants other than agricultural tenants. This is because, under Section 31-A of the Act, it is stated that Tenancy Act, 1952, for the time being in force shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be applicable and govern the relations of persons who are entitled to be registered as occupants under Sections 4, 5, 7 and 8 and the agriculturists who hold lands on lease from such persons as tenants : 63 : immediately before the date of vesting. That Section 31-A of the Act does not refer to Section 6. Hence, Section 6 refers to a tenant who is not an agricultural tenant and who is entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of the land of which he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting.
55. It was further submitted that under Section 11 of the Act, any building constructed by any person other than the inamdar has the right to claim the land of the building. This is clear on a conjoint reading of Sections 7, 8 and 11 inasmuch as it makes it clear that a private building which is constructed by the tenant, other than the inamdar, on the land, the inamdar cannot stake a claim. It vests with the person who built it i.e., the owner of the building.
56. With regard to the judgment of the learned Single Judge in LRRP No.3513 of 1990, B.V.Ramachandrappa's case, it was submitted by : 64 : learned senior counsel that the case was disposed of on the basis of observations made in the impugned order that the impugned order is a subject matter of this appeal and even though the SLP filed against the said judgment has been dismissed, the same would not become a precedent to be applied in the instant case. That when a Special Leave Petition is dismissed, the doctrine of merger does not apply and hence, the judgment in B.V.Ramachandrappa cannot be considered to be a precedent in the instant case.
57. Although, certain arguments were attempted to be addressed regarding the cause-title in the context of, as to, whether, S.M.Kannappa had made his application dated 30.12.1974 in his individual capacity or on behalf of M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles, we do not think it is necessary to dwell upon the details of the said arguments, as this appeal could be decided keeping aside the inter se dispute between the two appellants in the instant case, namely the lessee, M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles, : 65 : represented by the legal representatives of Sri.S.M.Kannappa and M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles Private Limited, the appellant in the connected appeal.
58. Sri.Srinivasa Raghavan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in Writ Appeal Nos.872-873 of 2013 pointed out that Entry No.18 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution speaks of "rights in or over land, land tenures including the relationship of landlord and tenant, collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land, etc." The entry is not restricted to agricultural land or agrarian reforms only, rather the entry empowers the State to make the laws with reference to land. That the scope of Entry No.18 has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Narian Medhi (supra), which is also relied upon by the respondent as well. But, the expression "land" cannot be restricted to mean only agricultural land or in relation to agrarian reforms only. That the judgment in Peddinti Desika Iyengar (supra) is a case which dealt only with interpretation : 66 : of two Andhra Pradesh Acts of the State of Andhra Pradesh one of which was the Act of 1956 pertaining to inams in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It did not deal with non-agricultural tenancy unlike the Act under consideration, which is the Karnataka State Act. It was submitted that respondent No.1 is not right in contending that the tenant must include only an agricultural tenant and reliance placed on Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple (supra) is misplaced, as in the said case, this Court was dealing with an application under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and not under the Act. The judgment in the said case does not deal with the issue, as to, whether, a person could make an application for grant of non-agricultural land used for non-agricultural purpose. In the said case, it was held that possession of the applicant was unlawful and therefore, the said applicant could not make a fresh application under the Land Reforms Act and the earlier finding was considered to determine the nature of possession. It was submitted that in the : 67 : said case, there was no interpretation made of the scope of the word 'tenant' used under Section 6 of the Act. That the said judgment does not assist in interpreting whether non-agricultural lessees are tenants or not.
59. In the same way, it was submitted that the provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1952 do not apply to the case on hand. That M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles was indubitably a tenant of the inamdar for the purpose of the Act and in that context, as per Section 2(1) of the Act, all words and expressions defined in the Land Revenue Code shall have the same respective meanings as in that Code with the modifications made under the Act. Therefore, it is the Land Revenue Code, which has been repealed and substituted by the Revenue Act, 1964 which has to be applied in the instant case and therefore, the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 does not apply.
: 68 :
60. It was also submitted that the expression 'every tenant' in Section 6 of the Act is significant. That, initially the expression 'protected tenant' did not find a place under the Act and the rights of the protected tenant were incorporated as per Section 5A of the Act and therefore, the interpretation made by respondent No.1 that the expression 'every tenant' refers only to a protected tenant is incorrect. That it would include all tenants other than the kadim, permanent and protected tenants. Moreover, neither Section 6 of the Act nor the Land Revenue Code, 1888 or the Land Revenue Act, 1964 restricts the expression tenant only to an agricultural tenant. Hence, an expansive meaning would have to be given. This becomes clear on a reading of Section 27 of the Act which deals with registration of tenants as occupants. Therefore, the scope of Section 27 of the Act also cannot be limited to agricultural lands only. That, the reference to crops under Section 27 of the Act is only for the purpose of computing payment of : 69 : dues from the tenant as consideration for grant of occupancy rights and the same cannot restrict the wider meaning and scope of Section 6 of the Act.
61. That admittedly, M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles was a tenant of respondent No.1/inamdar under Section 6 of the Act. Such a tenant was entitled to be continued as a tenant as per Chapter-IV of the Act and to be registered as an occupant under Section 27 of the Act on payment of premium. Further, the building or structures on the land in question, admittedly, were put up by M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles in terms of the Lease Deed and on expiration of the lease, the landlord was entitled to the same. But, in the instant case, the land stood vested with the State Government and the inamdar has lost all right, title and interest in the land in question except what is saved under the Act and on making an application under the provisions of the Act. The fact that M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles owned the building has been ignored by the learned Single : 70 : Judge which is an error apparent on the face of the record. It was submitted that the tenant had the right to the valuable property on which the building was put up under the provisions of the Act and not the landlord or the inamdar in the instant case. That under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, the inamdar is entitled to such building owned by it as on the date of vesting other than the building which vest in the persons who owned it as on the date of vesting. Therefore, the buildings referred to in Section 11 of the Act cannot be a building owned by the inamdar. That Section clearly states that the person who owned the building immediately before the date of vesting would vest in him on and from the date of vesting. Therefore, it refers to owners of private building other than the inamdars. The claim of owners of such building erected on inam lands is superior to the claim of the inamdars. The same is evident on a reading of Sections 7(1)(iii) and 8(1)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, the buildings put up by the tenant/lessee in the : 71 : instant case, do not vest in the inamdar under Section 11 of the Act.
62. It was further submitted that respondent No.1 is not entitled to any benefit under Section 12 of the Act as the land has not been converted. Further, no reliance could be placed on a purported conversion order dated 15.09.1939 as this document has not seen the light of the day and it is only in this writ appeal, a copy of the same is sought to be produced, without there being any explanation as to why the said document was never produced in the earlier proceedings if it was a genuine document/record. Further, the document does not bear any seal or signature and it is only a photo copy of the notarized copy (notarized in 2008) of a typed copy of an alleged conversion order. It refers to only a portion of Sy.No.15 i.e., to an extent of one acre thirty-three guntas (01A-33G) only, but the land in question measures two acres nineteen guntas (02A-19G) and therefore, the so called conversion order does not at : 72 : all refer to the land in question. Also, no boundaries are mentioned to the converted land and the genuineness of the purported order of conversion is a subject matter of separate proceedings. Hence, on the basis of the conversion order, the inamdar cannot claim any benefit under Section 12 of the Act, was the submission of the learned senior counsel Sri.Srinivasa Raghavan. It was also contended that, on the other hand, under the Lease Deed, it has been mentioned that the land in question was not fit for cultivation and had come within the limits of Bengaluru City Corporation before the date of vesting in the State Government and therefore, was being let-out for an automobile garage; by that the nature of the land did not change from agricultural to non-agricultural, was the contention.
63. It was also submitted that respondent No.1 was not the holder of the land on the date of vesting and hence, Section 12 is of no assistance to respondent No.1. It was reiterated that making of : 73 : formal application was a sine qua non for claiming the rights under Section 12 of the Act and in the instant case, respondent No.1 had not made any such application. Therefore, it was estopped from seeking any benefit under Section 12 of the Act. It was reiterated that the interpretation of the expression 'holder of such land' in Section 12 of the Act referred to an inamdar, only was incorrect. It was submitted that a holder of such land and holder of a minor inam are distinct expressions, which is evident on a reading of Sections 3(1)(k) and 4(1) of the Act, as there could be persons holding the land under the tenants and also a tenant could be a holder of the land. Therefore, the argument of respondent No.1 that an inamdar is a holder for the purpose of claiming rights under Section 12 is untenable particularly, when a tenancy is created.
64. It was also submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Munibasappa failed to note that Land Revenue Code, 1888 was repealed : 74 : by the Land Revenue Act, 1964, to explain the definition of 'holder' in the context of landlord to include anyone who is in lawful possession of the land. This is clarified by Section 2(11) of the Land Revenue Act, which states that 'to hold land' or to be a 'land- holder' or 'holder of land' means, to be lawfully in possession of the land, whether such possession is actual or not. Therefore, under the said Act, a tenant lawfully in possession of any land under the lease deed is a holder of such land. That the definition of the word 'holder' under the Act cannot be in terms of the repealed statute, namely the Land Revenue Code, 1888, but it has to be in terms of the Land Revenue Act in view of Section 202 of the latter Act.
65. It was also submitted that as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur, [(1989) 1 SCC 101] (Gurnam Kaur), the judgment in Munibasappa's case is per incuriam having regard to Section 202(3) of the Act of 1964. Therefore, it was : 75 : contended that it is not only an inamdar is entitled under Section 12 of the Act to keep the land, but any holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land including a lessee/tenant if the other contingencies mentioned in Section 12 of the Act apply.
66. It was submitted that the Land Tribunal rightly interpreted Section 12 of the Act in terms of the Land Revenue Act, to hold that the lessee being in lawful possession of the subject land and having raised the structures thereon was entitled to keep the land under Section 12 of the Act. In this regard, it was pointed out that it is only under Sections 7 and 8 that the land or the building thereon could vest in the inamdar as a holder of a minor inam or as an inamdar and not under Section 12 when land is tenanted in which case, sections 11 or 12, as the case may be, would apply.
67. The contentions regarding the right of the appellant in Writ Appeal Nos.872-873 of 2013 to be : 76 : registered as a successor need not be gone into in this appeal, as already stated, it is an inter se dispute between the appellants in the two appeals.
68. Sri.Y.K.Narayana Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, by way of reply, contended that there is no distinction between Sections 27 and 27A of the Act. They both refer to Section 6 of the Act. That the Act contemplates both agricultural as well as non-agricultural leases. That Sri.S.M.Kannappa was the sole surviving partner and as a proprietor, he made an application in his name and the application was granted in his name and the registration of occupancy rights enures to his legal representatives.
69. Sri.Ravi B.Naik, sought to clarify that any reference to a tenant under the Act, should be in respect of the agricultural land which is put to cultivation, otherwise there could be no claim made : 77 : under the Act. In this regard, paragraph 4 of the Shri Dharamarayaswamy Temple was relied upon.
70. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent Nos.2 to 4 submitted that the order of the Land Tribunal was not challenged by the State. The said order has been set aside by the learned Single Judge and that appropriate orders may be made in these appeals.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:
71. Having heard the learned senior counsel as well as the learned counsel for the respective parties, and on perusal of the material on record, the following points would arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether respondent No.1/Mutt had the locus standi to file the writ petition assailing the order of the Land Tribunal dated 01.09.1984?
(ii) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal dated 01.09.1984 and thereby allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1/Mutt?
(iii) What order?: 78 :
72. From the detailed narration of facts and contentions, it is not in dispute from the pleadings that the land in question was endowed to respondent No.1/Mutt in the year 1897 as a Devadaya inam, although it was sought to be contended otherwise by one of the senior counsel for respondent No.1/mutt. It is also not in dispute that by Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967, respondent No.1/Mutt--inamdar (holder of a minor inam) leased the land in question for the purpose of running an automobile garage, with permission to put up the buildings on the said land. The structures were put up by the lessee after seeking 'No Objection' Certificate, sanctions and permissions from the concerned authorities. When the matter stood thus, Notification dated 04.04.1970 was issued by the State Government under Section 1(4) of the Act. Sri.S.M.Kannappa made an application for registration of occupancy rights. The basis for making the application by Sri.S.M.Kannappa was the issuance of Notification under Section 1(4) of the Act dated : 79 : 04.04.1970 notifying the date as 01.07.1970 for vesting all inam lands in the State Government. Consequently, the aforesaid application was made by Sri.S.M.Kannappa seeking registration of occupancy rights under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act, which was granted by order dated 01.09.1984 and which was impugned by respondent No.1 in the writ petition. The said order was challenged by respondent No.1/Mutt before the Single Judge in the year 1993, who allowed the writ petition and thereby set aside the order of the Land Tribunal. Hence, these appeals.
At the outset, we state that the matters are being considered from the perspective of what was the position as on 01.07.1970 when the land in question stood vested with the State.
73. The first and foremost contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that respondent No.1/inamdar (holder of a minor inam), who had lost all right, title and interest in the land in question on the issuance of the notification dated 04.04.1970 on : 80 : the land having vested in the State Government subject to the rights reserved or saved under the Act, did not take steps by making an application as per the provisions of the Act for getting the same registered as an occupant. Hence, respondent No.1 did not have the locus standi to file the writ petition. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the admission of facts made by respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal. It is not necessary to reiterate the contentions in that regard except to highlight the fact that the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants have also contended that respondent No.1 was not an aggrieved person so as to maintain the writ petition.
74. It was next submitted, the reason as to why respondent No.1 herein was arrayed as a party before the Land Tribunal was on account of the fact that, respondent No.1, as an inamdar of the land in question, had leased it to M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles and therefore, as the inamdar- lessor, was arrayed as a formal party before the Land : 81 : Tribunal. That there was no claim whatsoever made by the inamdar seeking registration of occupancy rights in its name. Therefore, there was no lis between the parties and respondent No.1/inamdar was in no way aggrieved by the order of the Land Tribunal inasmuch as no claim was made by it before the concerned authority under the Act seeking registration of occupancy rights. In the absence of there being any rival claim, respondent No.1 could not have been aggrieved by the order of the Land Tribunal, was the contention of the appellants.
75. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the right of respondent No.1 arose under Section 12 of the Act and hence, the order of the Land Tribunal being against the right, title and interest of respondent No.1, was rightly challenged by the said party before this Court in the writ petition and the learned Single Judge was justified in entertaining the same and also : 82 : allowing it, by setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal.
76. In this regard, at the outset, it would be useful to refer to the following citations (which were cited at the Bar) on the aspect of locus standi and the right of an aggrieved party to seek legal remedy:
(a) In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from a legal injury can challenge the act/action/order, as the case may be, in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either, for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right or, when there is a complaint that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there : 83 : must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such a right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same, vide State of Orissa vs. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952 SC 12], Saghir Ahmad vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 728], Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1044], Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. [AIR : 84 : 1996 SC 2736] and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) vs. S.C. Sekar [(2009) 2 SCC 784].
It was further held that a legal right, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, person aggrieved does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized. (vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji vs. Home Insurance Co. of New york, [AIR 1974 SC 1719] and State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India, [AIR 1977 SC 1361]).
(b) That if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved, vide Anand Sharadchandra Oka vs. University of Mumbai, [(2008) 5 SCC 217]. : 85 :
(c) As to the expression locus standi of a person to apply for a writ of certiorari, reliance could be placed on Jasbhai Motibhai Desai wherein the provisions of Bombay Cinemas Registration Act, 1953 and the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 came up for consideration and paragraphs 36 to 41 of the said judgment read as under:
"36. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody of meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the past-time of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the : 86 : ulterior intent of some applicants in this category may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold.
37. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer- circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not be "persons aggrieved".
38. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some board tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the : 87 : statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognized by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals? : 88 :
39. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules to which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction.
40. Did the appellant have a legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which has been subjected to or threatened with injury? The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative.
41. The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option, in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellants did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the No-Objection-Certificate before the District : 89 : Magistrate or the Government. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate, and failed, the Act would not give him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to the State Government, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any license under Section 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of Section 8A."
(underlining by us)
(d) Learned senior counsel Sri Srinivasa Raghavan has placed reliance on Adi Pherozshah Gandhi (supra), wherein it was observed that any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a 'person aggrieved'. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. It is no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure : 90 : him. That the order is wrong or that it acquits someone who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance.
77. Before answering the point regarding locus standi, it is necessary to dwell upon two aspects of the matter: Firstly, the scheme of the Act under consideration. Secondly, as to, whether, even in the absence of making an application under the provisions of the Act, respondent No.1 could assail the order of the Land Tribunal.
Scheme of the Act:
1. Short title, extent, application and commencement.-(1) This Act may be called the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955.
(2) It extends to the whole of the Karnataka Area except Bellary District.
(3) It applies to.-
(a) Religious imams including the Sringeri Jahgir; and
(b) Charitable imams.
: 91 :Explanation.- 'Religious inam', or 'charitable inam', means a grant of a village, portion of a village or land entered in the register of imams, quit-rent register, or nay revenue account maintained by or under the authority of Government as Devadaya inam or Dharmadaya inam, as the case may be;
(4) This section and Sections 2, 34 and 36 shall come into force at once and the rest of this Act shall come into force in minor inams other than such Devadaya inams in unalienated villages in such area and on such date, as the Government may be notification specify, and in any inam village, on such date as the Government may by notification specify in respect of such inam village.
2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.-
(1-A) x x x x (2) "Date of vesting" in relation to an inam means, the date appointed by a notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 to be the date on which the provisions of this Act (other than Sections 2, 34 and 36) shall come into force in such inam;
xxxx
: 92 :
(5) "Inam" includes an inam village
and a minor inam;
(6) "Inamdar" means a religious or
charitable institution owning an inam;
(7) "Inam Village" means an alienated village whether Sarvamanya or Jodi or a portion of such village;
xxxx Explanation.- In respect of the Sringeri Jahgir, "inam village" means the group of inam villages specified in the Schedule to the Sringeri Jahgir Inam Settlement Act, 1897;
(10) "Minor Inam" means an alienated holding other than an inam village, situated in an alienated village or in an unalienated village;
(11) "Notification" means a notification published in the Karnataka Gazette;
xxxx (15) "Tribunal" means a Tribunal consisted under Section 48 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.
3. Consequences of the vesting of an inam in the State.-(1) When the notification : 93 : under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of any inam has been published in the Karnataka Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect on and from the date of vesting, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the following consequences shall ensure, namely.-
(a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Code, relating to alienated holdings, shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the inam; and the provisions of the Land Revenue Code and all other enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply to the said inam;
(b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, cultivated lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries, shall cease and he vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances;
: 94 :
(c) the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the inam other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act;
(d) all rents and land revenue including ceases and royalties accruing in respect of lands comprised in such inam on or after the date of vesting shall be payable to the State and not to the inamdar and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be valid;
(e) all arrears of revenue, whether as jodi or quit-rent and cesses, remaining lawfully due on the date of vesting in respect of any such inam shall after such date continue to be recoverable from the inamdar by whom they were payable and may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be realized by the deduction of the amount of such arrears and cesses from the compensation money payable to such inamdar under this Act;
(f) no such inam shall be liable to attachment in execution of any decree or other process of any court and nay attachment existing on the date of vesting or any order for attachment passed before such : 95 : date in respect of such inam, shall cease to be in force;
(g) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the inam and all accounts, registers, pattas, mutchalikas, maps, plans and other documents relating the inam which the Government may require for the administration thereof:
Provided that the Government shall not disposes any person of any land in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitle to be registered as the occupant or to be continued as a tenant;
(h) the inamdar whose rights have vested in the State of Karnataka under clause (b) shall be entitled only to compensation from the Government as provided in this Act;
(i) the relationship of landlord and tenant shall, as between the inamdar and a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant or nay other tenant, be extinguished;
(j) the relationship of superior holder and inferior holder shall, as between the : 96 : inamdar and the holder of a minor inam, be extinguish;
(k) kadim tenants, permanent tenants and other tenants in the inam and persons holding under them and holders of minor imams shall, as against the Government, be entitled only to such rights and privileges and be subject to such conditions as pre provided for by or under this Act; and any other rights and privileges which may have accrued to them in the inam before the date of vesting against the inamdar shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such inamdar.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall operate as bar the recovery by the inamdar of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his rights as inamdar and any such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law which but for this Act would be available to him.
6. Other tenants to be tenants under Government.-Every tenant of the inamdar other than a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant shall, with effect on and from : 97 : the date of vesting, and subject to the provisions of chapter IV, be entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of land of which he was a tenant under the Inamdar immediately before the date of vesting:
xxxx 6-A. Pujari, archak, etc., to be registered as an occupant on certain conditions.-(1) Where the inamdar is an institution of religious worship, a person.-
(i) rendering religious service in or maintaining the institution as a pujari, archak or the holder of a similar office by whatever name called; or
(ii) rendering any service in such institution, and personally cultivating for a continuous period of not less than three years prior to the date of vesting by contributing his own physical labour or that of the members of his family and enjoying the benefits of any land comprised in the inam of such institution without paying rent as such in money or kind to that institution in respect of such land, shall, with effect from the on the date of vesting and subject to the provisions of Section 27-A be entitled to be registered as an occupant of such land. : 98 : (2) In addition to the annual land revenue payable in respect of the land a person entitled to be registered as an occupant of any land under sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay to the State Government as premium for ownership of that land an amount equal to one hundred times the land revenue of such land plus in the case of lands classified as dry but possessing facilities for irrigation from any source of water which is the property of the Government.-
(i) Where two crops of Rupees six hundred paddy can be raised in and sixty per acre.
a year or where sugarcane can be raised. (ii) Where one crop of Rupees four hundred paddy can be raised in and forty per acre. a year. (iii) Where semi-dry Rupees two hundred crops can be grown. and twenty per acre.
The amount of premium shall be payable in not more than ten annual installments along with the annual land revenue and in default of such payment the amount due shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is payable.: 99 :
7. Lands and buildings to vest in the holder of a minor inam.-(1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (3) every holder of a minor inam shall, with effect on and from the dated of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands which immediately before the date of vesting were included in his holding other than.-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigations;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 4, 5, 5-A or 6-A or is entitled to be continued as a tenant under Section 6; and
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (3) every building situated within the limits of the minor inam and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam, shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the holder of the minor inam.
: 100 :
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the holder of a minor inam shall not be entitled to alienate the land or the building vesting in him under sub- section (1) or (2), except by way of lease for a term not exceeding five years:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any alienation effected with the previous sanction of the prescribed authority.
8. Lands and buildings to vest in the inamdar.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) every inamdar shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than.-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A or 7 or is entitled to be continued as a tenant under Section 6; and : 101 :
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by and person other than the inamdar.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (3) every building situated within the limits of the inam which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the inamdar shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the inamdar.
Explanation.-In this section "inamdar" means an inamdar other than a holder of a minor inam referred to in Section 6.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the inamdar shall not be entitled to alienate the land or building vested in him under sub-section (1) or (2), except by way of a lease for a term not exceeding five years.
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any alienation effected with the previous sanction of the prescribed authority.
9. Determination of claims for registration of occupancy and continuation of tenancy.-(1) The Tribunal shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a person claims to be registered as an occupant : 102 : under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A, 7 and 8 as the case may be, or in respect of which any person claims to be continued as tenant under Section 6, and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed.
(2)(a) No person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A, 7 and 8 unless the claimant makes an application to the Tribunal. Every such application shall be made.-
(i) in respect of lands in imams which have
vested in the State before the
commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Lows (Amendment) act, 1974 on or before 30th day of June, 1987;
(ii) in respect of lands in inams which vest in the State or after the commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 within three years from the date of vesting of the inam concerned or 30th day of June, 1987 whichever is later).
(b) Where no application is made within the period specified in clause (a), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the : 103 : land shall vest in the State absolutely.
Such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands;
(c) The provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the relevant rules framed there under shall mutatis mutandis apply to an enquiry for determination of a claim under this section and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
(3) xxxx
9-A. Entries to be made in the record
of rights.-(1) After the determination of claims under Section 9, the Tribunal shall send the prescribed particulars of the decision to the Officer maintaining the record of rights under the Karnataka Land Record of Rights Act, 1958.
(2) On receipt of the particulars under sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Karnataka Land Record of Rights Act, 1958 the officer concerned shall enter such particulars in the registers.
10. Liability to pay land revenue to Government.-(1) Every person who becomes entitled to be registered as an occupant under : 104 : Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A, 7 and 8 in respect of any land shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be liable to pay to the Government as land revenue.-
(a) in the case of an inam village to which survey and settlement has been introduced under Section 113 of the Land Revenue Code the amount equal to the land revenue assessment levied on the same extent of similar land revenue assessment fixed on such land during such survey and settlement;
(b) in the case of an inam village to which survey and settlement has been introduced under Section 113 of the Land Revenue Code the amount equal to the land revenue assessment levied on the same extent of similar land in an adjoining unalienated village.
(2) The Deputy Commissioner shall, after such enquiry, as he thinks fit, determine the land revenue payable under clause (b) of sub- section (1).
11. Vesting of certain buildings situated in an inam.-Every private building other than buildings which vest under Sections 7 : 105 : and 8 situated within the limits of an inam shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date. Any dispute relating thereto shall be decided by the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
12. Right to agricultural land used for non-agricultural purposes.-Where any land used for agricultural purposes has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time.
13. Saving of rights in certain cases.-(1) Wherever before the date of vesting, an inamdar has created any right in any land which vests in the State, other than land registered under Section 7 or 8 (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including rights in any forest, mines or minerals, quarries, fisheries of ferries, the transactions shall be deemed to be valid and all rights and obligations arising there under, on or after the date of vesting, shall be enforceable by or against the Government:
Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time:: 106 :
Provided also that where such right was created in any land, unless it relates to land registered under Section 7 or 8, the Government may, if, in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date of thereof.
(2) The person whose right has been terminated by the Government under the foregoing proviso, shall be entitled to compensation from the Government equal to the estimated net income to such person from the land for the unexpired portion of the period for which the right was created having regard to all the circumstances of the case."
78. The Act applies to (a) Religious inams including the Sringeri Jahgir; and (b) Charitable inams. The explanation to sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act states that Religious inam, or Charitable inam means a grant of a village, portion of a village or land entered in the register of inams, quit- rent register, alienation register or any revenue account maintained by or under the authority of : 107 : Government as Devadaya inam or Dharmadaya inam, as the case may be. Sub-section (5) of Section 2 defines an Inam to include an inam village and a minor inam. Sub-section (10) of Section 2 defines Minor Inam to mean an alienated holding other than an inam village, situated in an alienated village or in an unalienated village. Inam Village is defined under Sub-section (7) of Section 2 to mean an alienated village, whether Sarvamanya or Jodi or a portion of such village. The explanation thereto is with regard to the Sringeri Jahgir, which is not relevant for the purpose of this case. inamdar means a religious or charitable institution owning an inam. Thus, inam has two different categories: one, being an inam village and the other, a minor inam, defined as above. Thus, a minor inam is an alienated holding situated in an alienated village, or an unalienated village other than an inam village. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act states that when the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of any inam has been : 108 : published in the Karnataka Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect on and from the date of vesting, and save as otherwise expressly provided under the Act, certain consequences would follow. The expression Notification is defined as per sub-section (11) of Section 2 to mean a notification published in the Karnataka Gazette.
79. Subsection (2) of Section 2 defines Date of vesting in relation to an inam to mean, the date appointed by a notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 to be the date on which the provisions of the Act (other than Sections 2, 34 and 36) shall come into force in such inam. Thus, the date appointed in the notification assumes significance and the said date has to be mentioned in the notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act. : 109 :
80. Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act states that Section 1 and Sections 2, 34 and 36 shall come into force on 01st September 1955 and the rest of the Act shall come into force in minor inams, other than such Devadaya inams in unalienated villages in such area and on such date, as the Government may by notification specify, and in any inam village, the sections would come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification specify in respect of such inam village. The State Government issued a notification on 04th April, 1970 which was in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act. Under the said notification, the State Government appointed 01st July, 1970 (01.07.1970) as the date on which the rest of the Act, i.e., other than Sections 2, 34 and 36 (which had already come into force) was to come into force in respect of minor inams in unalienated villages in the State. : 110 :
81. The consequences which would follow on issuance of a Notification under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act of 1955 are as under:
(a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Code, relating to alienated holdings, shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the inam; and the provisions of the Land Revenue Code and all other enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply to the said inam;
(b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, cultivated lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries, shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances;
(c) the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the inam other than the : 111 : interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act;
(d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and royalties accruing in respect of lands comprised in such inam on or after the date of vesting shall be payable to the State and not to the inamdar and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be valid;
(e) all arrears of revenue, whether as jodi or quit-rent and cesses, remaining lawfully due on the date of vesting in respect of any such inam shall after such date continue to be recoverable from the inamdar by whom they were payable and may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be realised by the deduction of the amount of such arrears and cesses from the compensation money payable to such inamdar under the Act;
(f) no such inam shall be liable to attachment in execution of any : 112 : decree or other process of any Court and any attachment existing on the date of vesting or any order for attachment passed before such date in respect of such inam, shall cease to be in force;
(g) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the inam and all accounts, registers, pattas, mutchalikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the inam which the Government may require for the administration thereof. The proviso states that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in respect of which he is considered prima facie entitled to be registered as the occupant or to be continued as a tenant;
(h) the inamdar whose rights have vested in the State of Karnataka under clause (b) shall be entitled only to compensation from the Government as provided in the Act;: 113 :
(i) the relationship of landlord and tenant shall, as between the inamdar and a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant or any other tenant, be extinguished;
(j) the relationship of superior holder and inferior holder shall, as between the inamdar and the holder of a minor inam, be extinguished;
(k) kadim tenants, permanent tenants and other tenants in the inam and persons holding under them and holders of minor inams shall, as against the Government, be entitled only to such rights and privileges and be subject to such conditions as provided for by or under the Act; and any other rights and privileges which may have accrued to them in the inam before the date of vesting against the inamdar shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such inamdar.
Nothing stated above would operate as a bar for the recovery by the : 114 : inamdar of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his rights as inamdar and any such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law which, but for the Act would be available to him.
(underlining by us)
82. Section 4 deals with kadim tenant as defined in sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Act to be registered as an occupant of his holding. Permanent tenant as defined under sub-section (12) of Section 2 of the Act could be registered as an occupant under certain conditions as per the provisions made in Section 5 of the Act. Similarly, a Protected tenant as defined in sub-section (12-a) of Section 2 of the Act could be registered as an occupant under certain conditions as per Section 5-A of the Act. Apart from the aforesaid categories of tenants, every other tenant could be continued as tenants under the Government under Section 6 of the Act. In fact, Section 6 of the Act states that every tenant of the inamdar, other than a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant shall, with : 115 : effect on and from the date of vesting, and subject to the provisions of Chapter IV, be entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of land of which he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. Chapter IV consists of Sections 22 to 27-A, which deal with the provisions relating to rent (S.23); continuation of tenancy on the death of a tenant (S.24); termination of the tenancy (S.25); procedure for eviction and recovery of rent (S.26); tenant where to be registered as an occupant (S.27); and extent of land which a person may be registered as an occupant (S.27-A).
83. Sections 6A deals with Pujari, archak, etc., to be registered as an occupant on certain conditions. Sections 7 and 8 deal with rights of holder of a minor inam and inamdar respectively. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 states that every holder of a minor inam shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands : 116 : which, immediately before the date of vesting were included in his holding other than, (i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigations;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 4, 5, 5-A or 6-A or is entitled to be continued as a tenant under Section 6; and (iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam. But, every building situated within the limits of the minor inam and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam, shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the holder of the minor inam. (sub- section (2) of Section 7). Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 are subject to sub-section (3) of Section 7, as sub-section (3) of Section 7 begins with a non- obstante clause. It states, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the holder of a minor inam shall not be entitled to alienate : 117 : the land or the building vesting in him under sub- sections (1) or (2), except by way of lease for a term not exceeding five years. The proviso thereof states that nothing in sub-section (3) shall apply to any alienation effected with the previous sanction of the prescribed authority.
84. Section 8(1) is in pari materia with Section 7(1). It deals with the lands and buildings vesting in the inamdar. Every building situated within the limits of the inam and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the inamdar shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the inamdar (sub- section (2) of Section 8). Explanation to sub-section (2) states that for the purpose of Section 8, an inamdar means an inamdar, other than a holder of a minor inam, referred to in Section 6. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 are subject to Sub-section (3) of Section 8. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 is in pari materia with Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act. : 118 :
85. As regards a person who claims to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 5-A and 6-A or in respect of a person who claims to be continued as tenant under Section 6 is concerned, the determination is made under Section 9. Section 9 states that the Tribunal shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a person claims to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A, 7 and 8, as the case may be, or in respect of which any person claims to be continued to be a tenant under Section 6, and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 9 states that no person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6-A, 7 and 8 unless the claimant makes an application to the Tribunal. In respect of the time frame for making such an application, it is stated that every such application shall be made (i) in respect of lands in inams which have vested in the State before the commencement of the Karnataka : 119 : Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 on or before 30th day of June, 1987; and (ii) in respect of lands in inams which vest in the State on or after the commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 within three years from the date of vesting of the inam concerned or 30th day of June, 1987 whichever is later. Where no application is made within the period specified in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 9, the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in the State absolutely. Such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands-Clause (b). Admittedly, in the instant case, no application was made by respondent No.1/mutt under Section 7 of the Act in respect of the land in question. Clause (c) of sub- section (2) of Section 9 states that every enquiry for determination of a claim under the Section shall be as per the provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Land Reforms Act, and the relevant rules framed : 120 : thereunder would apply mutatis mutandi and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
86. Section 9A states that after the determination of claims under Section 9, the Tribunal shall send the prescribed particulars of the decision to the Officer maintaining the record of rights under the Karnataka Land Record of Rights Act, 1958. On receipt of the particulars, the officer concerned shall enter such particulars in the registers. As per Section 10, every person who becomes entitled to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6- A, 7 and 8 in respect of any land shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be liable to pay to the Government land revenue as stipulated in the said Section.
87. Section 11 states that every private building other than buildings which vest under Sections 7 and 8 in the holder of an inam or in an inamdar, as the case may be, situated within the : 121 : limits of an inam shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date. Any dispute relating thereto shall be decided by the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. This Section has to be related to Section 7(1)(iii) and Section 8(1)(iii) of the Act. This is because, if a building is owned by any person other than the holder of a minor inam or the inamdar, then the same cannot be registered in the name of the holder of a minor inam or vest in the inamdar, as the case may be. This means if a person owned a building immediately before the date of vesting, the same would vest in the person who owned it.
88. In respect of agricultural land used for non- agricultural purposes, Section 12 states that where any land used for agricultural purposes has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not : 122 : void or illegal under any law in force at that time. This means that such land could be kept only by the holder of such land.
89. Section 13 saves certain rights. It states that where before the date of vesting, if an inamdar has created any right in any land which vests in the State, other than the land registered under Section 7 or 8, (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including the rights in any forest land, mines and minerals, quarries, fisheries and ferries, the transactions shall be deemed to be valid and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on and after the date of vesting, shall be enforceable by or against the Government. This is subject to the transaction not being void or illegal under any law in force at that time. If any such right was created in any land, the Government may, if, in its opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right after giving not less than three months' notice from the date specified in the said notice. The person : 123 : whose right has been terminated by the Government shall be entitled to compensation from the Government equal to the estimated net income to such person from the land for the unexpired portion of the period for which the right was created having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
90. Chapter IV of the Act applies to a tenant continued under Section 6. Such a tenant shall be entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of land of which he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. Every such tenant has to pay to the Government the rent which was being paid by him to the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. Section 24 to Section 27A referred to above deal with various aspects of tenancy and registration of occupancy.
91. In this regard, Section 28 of the Act, which deals with conferment of rights in certain lands on the : 124 : inamdar under Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, as the case maybe, is significant. The proviso thereto states that while conferring the rights on the holder of the minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be, the same would not affect the rights of any other person in such land. Hence, the exception carved out in sub-section (1) of Section 7 and in sub-section (1) of Section 8, as the case may be, assumes significance.
92. Thus, on the issuance of the Notification dated 04.04.1970 under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act, Section 3 of the Act came into force. As a result of which, with effect from the date of vesting, which, in respect to inam, means the date appointed by a Notification issued under Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act to be the date on which the provisions of the Act including Section 3 came into force in such inam, the consequences mentioned in Section 3 of the Act would apply. The said date was 01.07.1970.
: 125 :
93. In Kumbhan Lakshmanna and others vs. Tangirala Venkateswarlu, [AIR (36) 1949 PC 278], the concept of an inam has been discussed. According to the Privy Council, inam is a well known word of Arabic origin which means reward or favour.
"An inam holding may be of a field only, or a village or a tact of several villages". (Land Systems of British India by Baden Powell, Vol.III, p.140). Grants consisting of a whole village or more than one village are technically called major inams to distinguish them from minor inams which are grants of something less than a village. Further, a grant of an inam could be in the nature of an endowment of revenue rather than of land for the purpose of cultivation. As regards the expression 'tenants' in the context of tenants of landlord in respect of land, it was held that the word 'tenant' should be read in a stricter sense who had been let into possession by landlord. The term does not apply to tenants in a looser sense of the word as those in cultivation of land, the origin of whose rights : 126 : is not known. Further, the expression tenant of land must mean to lands belonging to his landlord.
94. In Muthusubramanis Gurukkal vs. Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam, [1993 Supp.(4) SCC 519], reference has been made to Subramania vs. Kailasanatha, [ILR (1955) Mad 35], wherein it has been pointed out that the word "Devadaya" is used in inam registers not only in connection with religious grants strictly so called but also where the ultimate purposes are religious. It is clear from the decision that the test to be applied in distinguishing a grant to an institution from a grant to an individual, is the intention and each case depends upon its own facts. In the instant case, the grant was for respondent No.1/Mutt which is a religious institution and hence, the grant was a Devadaya Inam made for the welfare of the institution, could augment its resources by deriving revenue in the form of rents etc., by letting out the land to tenants. : 127 : Whether, under the provisions of the Act, filing of an application, inter alia, under Sections 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Act is necessary?
95. A perusal of the scheme of the Act would indicate that with effect from the date specified in the Notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Act, which is 01.07.1970, in the instant case, certain consequences ensued, which are delineated in Section 3 of the Act. The sum and substance of the consequences are as follows: (i) all right, title and interest vesting in the inamdar in respect of the inam land ceased and became vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances; (ii) the inamdar ceased to have any interest in the inam other than the interests expressly saved under the provisions of the Act; (iii) agricultural tenants and other tenants in the inam and persons holding under them, the holders of the minor inams were, as against the Government, entitled only to such rights and privileges and subject to such conditions as provided for by or under the Act; and other rights and : 128 : privileges which may have accrued to them in the inam before the date of vesting against the inamdar ceased and were determined and not enforceable against the Government or such inamdar. (iv) The Government however could not dispossess any person from any land in respect of which they considered would prima facie be entitled to be registered as the occupant or to be continued as a tenant.
96. Thus, on the vesting of all inam lands in the State Government, certain rights were reserved in the inamdars as well as tenants. It is as per Section 6, that tenants could inter alia seek for continuation of tenancy under the Act and under Section 7, a holder of minor inam could make an application, while under Section 8, an inamdar could make an application for registration of occupancy. The said applications had to be considered as per Section 9 of the Act, which deals with determination of claims for registration of occupancy as well as continuation of tenancy. In fact, sub-section (2) of Section 9 prescribes a time frame : 129 : within which such an application could be made, inter alia, under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Section 9(2)(b) of the Act is significant and it states, where no application is made within the period specified in clause (a) of Section 9(2) of the Act, the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in the State absolutely and such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands. This, of course, is subject to any right of tenant of such land who has made an application claiming any such right. Having regard to Section 9(2)(b) of the Act, it is held that it was incumbent on the inamdar/holder of the minor inam, as the case may be, to make an application before the Land Tribunal. If an application of the tenant of the inam land was also made, then the said applications would have to be considered together and the respective rights determined in accordance with the Act. But, when no application was made by the inamdar under the Act, then it implies : 130 : that the inamdar did not seek to claim any right or privilege as per the provisions of the Act. Thus, in our view, the making of an application under the provisions of the Act is a sine qua non for claiming any right or privilege under the Act.
97. In fact, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1 contended that under Section 12 of the Act, it was not necessary to make an application. The said Section permits the holder of an inam land used for agricultural purposes, which is converted for any purposes unconnected with agriculture, to keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time. Even for the purpose of keeping the land as per Section 12 of the Act, it is necessary that an Order to that effect be made as, all inam lands stood vested in the State on and from the date specified in the Notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Act i.e., 01.07.1970. In the instant case also, as the inam land stood vested in the State and if the : 131 : holder of such inam land sought to keep the land as per Section 12 of the Act, then there had to be an order passed to that effect. This is because under Section 3(1)(c) of the Act, an inamdar ceased to have any interest in the inam land other than what was expressly saved under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, on and from the date specified in the Notification i.e., 01.07.1970, in the instant case also, all right, title and interest which vested in the inamdar ceased and vested absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Therefore, when the land in question stood vested in the State on the issuance of the notification and with effect from the date specified therein, which is by operation of law, it was for the holder of such inam land, to keep the land, as there had to be divesting of the said land so as to enable the holder of such land to keep the land as per the contingencies mentioned under Section 12 of the Act. In the circumstances, we hold that for the purpose of enforcing any of the rights of an inamdar or a tenant : 132 : or any other category of persons, such as pujari, archak etc., under the Act, it was necessary to make an application as per the provisions of the Act. In fact, a reading of Section 11, which deals with vesting of certain buildings situated in an inam, which includes private buildings also, it was necessary to make an application under Section 11 also. This is because, Section 11 itself states that any dispute relating to vesting of buildings situated in an inam shall be decided by the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. Therefore, it is only when an application was made by the owner of a private building situated in an inam under Section 11 of the Act that the Tribunal would get the jurisdiction to determine, as to, whether, the said building would vest in the person who owned it immediately before the date of vesting.
98. Sri Aditya Sondhi, learned senior counsel relied upon Sathyanarayana Sinha (supra) and contended that where no right of a party is affected, : 133 : he has no locus standi to challenge an order of an authority or the Court or any Governmental action as he is not a person aggrieved or affected. Hence, according to learned senior counsel, in the instant case, respondent No.1/Mutt had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition before this Court and hence, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The aforesaid contention is rebutted by the other side.
99. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and discussed the aforesaid two aspects of the matter. We have already noted that, admittedly, respondent No.1/Mutt did not make any application so as to seek registration as an occupant under the provisions of the Act. That it was only the lessee Sri.S.M.Kannappa who made the application under Sections 6, 11 & 12 of the Act. The said application was, in fact, made against the State as the land had vested in State Government with effect from 01.07.1970 and therefore, the registration of : 134 : occupancy rights was vis-à-vis the State Government. But, respondent No.1/Mutt, being the erstwhile inamdar and lessor, was arrayed as a formal party. Respondent No.1/Mutt was made a party to the lis as the determination had been made under Section 9 read with Section 11 of the Act by the Land Tribunal and it was just and proper on the part of the applicant to have arrayed respondent No.1/Mutt as a party to the proceeding. The object and purpose was for the inamdar to have a say in the matter vis-à-vis the land in question being inam land and leased to the applicant and for the confirmation of the said facts.
100. It is also noted that respondent No.1/Mutt appeared before the Land Tribunal and admitted that the applicant was a tenant/lessee of the land in question. But, respondent No.1 raised other contentions with regard to registration of occupancy rights in the name of the applicant which were, however, negatived by the Tribunal. Since, respondent No.1/Mutt was permitted to raise the aforesaid : 135 : contentions and the same were answered against the mutt, being aggrieved to that extent, it filed writ petition. It is in the above narrow compass that respondent No.1/Mutt challenged the order of Land Tribunal. Thus, if no plea or contention countering the application filed by a tenant is raised by the inamdar, then, it would not have the right to assail the order of the Land Tribunal.
101. In our view, under two contingencies, an inamdar would have locus standi to challenge the order of the Land Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. The first is, when the inamdar is also an applicant seeking registration of occupancy rights and in that sense, is a rival claimant and when aggrieved by an order of the Land Tribunal. Secondly, when the inamdar opposes an application filed by a tenant on factual or legal grounds. Such contentions could have been with regard to the Lease Deed or tenancy rights of the tenant or the land, being a part of inam land, : 136 : vesting in the State Government or such other contentions.
102. In the instant case, admittedly, respondent No.1/Mutt did not file any application and hence, its rights under the Act has stood extinguished. Moreover, at the time the application of the lessee was taken up for consideration by the Land Tribunal, there were no other claimants in respect of the land in question. But, respondent No.1 had the right to raise legal and factual contentions against the applicant and it was permitted to do so by the Tribunal but, the same were negatived. Hence, to that narrow extent, respondent No.1 had filed the writ petition. Otherwise, respondent No.1/Mutt had no locus standi to file the writ petition. We hold so for two reasons: firstly, because respondent No.1/Mutt inamdar was not an applicant/claimant of the land in question under the provisions of the Act. As no application whatsoever was made by respondent No.1/Mutt making a claim or seeking a registration of occupancy rights, all its : 137 : rights, vis-à-vis the land in question stood extinguished by virtue of Section 9(2)(b) of the Act. Secondly, we find that by filing the writ petition and getting the order of Land Tribunal set aside, no benefit has enured to respondent No.1/Mutt. This is because the land had vested in State Government, subject to any party seeking registration of occupancy rights by making an application under the relevant provisions of the Act. We have held that, making of an application is a sine qua non for claiming a right of registration of occupancy rights or any other right under the provisions of the Act. Without filing any application and by filing the writ petition and getting the order of Land Tribunal set aside, the land which vested in the State Government would continue to so vest, subject to the rights of the tenant and nothing would enure to the benefit of respondent No.1/Mutt/inamdar. Therefore, such a party cannot be considered to be an aggrieved party at all.
: 138 :
103. In the instant case, respondent No.1, admittedly, did not make an application for registration as an occupant. The reason for not doing so is apparent. This is because, under Section 7, even if such an application had been made by respondent No.1 for registration as an occupant, it would have been considered along with the application filed by the lessee/applicant contending that he was entitled to be continued as a tenant under Section 6, and on the land as the lessee had erected buildings owned by lessee and therefore, land had to be registered in the name of the lessee as an occupant. Possibly, for the aforesaid reason, respondent No.1/inamdar did not make any such application. On the other hand, the application under Section 6 for continuation of tenancy was made by the lessee, was considered under Section 9 and the Land Tribunal passed the order in favor of the lessee which has been set aside by the learned Single Judge.
: 139 :
104. In the instant case, respondent No.1/Mutt/inamdar took up contention as a formal party before the Land Tribunal which were not accepted. Hence, the writ petition was filed and entertained by this Court. But, respondent No.1 did not make any application under the Act seeking registration of occupancy rights in its favour and therefore, in that sense, there being no lis between the appellants and respondent No.1 herein, we hold that respondent No.1 had no right to file the writ petition assailing the order of the Land Tribunal for seeking any benefit for itself and was also not an aggrieved party. In the instant case, it is noted that respondent No.1/inamdar has, admittedly, not made any application whatsoever either under Section 7 as holder of the minor inam or under Section 12 claiming to be a holder of the land in question. In the circumstances, it is held that respondent No.1 had abandoned all its right, title or interest whatsoever in respect of the land in question. Respondent No.1 had : 140 : no lis as against the appellants and hence had no locus standi to file the writ petition for seeking any benefit under the Act for itself. We clarify that the right to file the writ petition was only to the limited extent of being aggrieved by the order of the Land Tribunal in not accepting certain pleas made by it and not otherwise. Point No.1 is accordingly answered.
105. We shall, however, consider the matter on merits as substantial arguments were advanced by the learned senior counsel, learned counsel for the respective parties on the pleas raised by respondent No.1 before the Tribunal.
106. This takes us to the next point for consideration namely, whether, the learned single Judge was right in setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal dated 01.09.1984?
: 141 :
107. Before answering the said point, it is necessary to consider the following aspects of the matter. They are as under:
(i) Whether the Act applies to only
agricultural land? What was the
nature of the land in question on the
date of vesting in the instant case?
(ii) Whether respondent No.1 is the
holder of the land?
(iii) Distinction between the Act and
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.
(iv) Whether the order of the Learned
Single Judge is justified and correct?
(v) Whether lessee/tenant of the land in question is entitled to registration of occupancy rights?
(vi) Whether the order of the Land Tribunal is justified and correct?
The aforesaid aspects of the matter shall be considered in seriatim.
: 142 :
(i) Whether the Act applies to only agricultural land?
108. The expression "land" is not defined under the Act, but it is defined under the Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888 as under:
"3(3). "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the revenue or rent of villages or other defined portions of territory:"
"land" is defined under Tenancy Act, 1952 as under:
"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-
x x x
(8) "land" means land which is used
for agricultural purposes, and includes-
(a) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to land used for agricultural purposes, and : 143 :
(b) the sites of dwelling houses occupied by agriculturists, agricultural labourers or artisans and land appurtenant to such dwelling houses;"
Under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, the expression "land" is defined as under:-
"2(14). "Land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the revenue or rent of villages or other defined areas;"
Thus both the aforesaid definitions are in pari material.
109. The contention of learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 is that the Act applies only to agricultural lands and not to other lands. This contention has been rebutted by learned senior counsel for the appellants.
110. In this regard, we have closely perused the provisions of the Act. Section 3(1)(b) refers to ceaser : 144 : of rights, title and interest of the inamdar in communal lands, cultivated lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries, to be vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances on issuance of notification under Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act, which was issued on 04.04.1970. While Sections 4, 5 and 5-A deal with kadim tenants, permanent tenants and protected tenants respectively, Section 6 deals with every other tenant of the inamdar. While kadim tenants, permanent tenants and protected tenants are in respect of land used for agricultural purposes, other tenants need not be tenants of agricultural lands only. They could be of any of the aforesaid species of lands including uncultivated land. Such tenants have the right to be continued as tenant under the Government in respect of which they were tenants under the inam immediately before the date : 145 : of vesting. Further, under Sections 7 and 8, which deal with vesting of land and buildings in the holder of a minor inam or inamdar respectively, there is a clear reference to communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigations inasmuch as there can be no registration of the holder of a minor inam or inamdar respectively, as an occupant in respect of such lands. Similarly, lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam or inamdar cannot be registered as occupants and such lands need not be agricultural lands (Section 7(1)(iii) of the Act).
111. Further, on a reading of Section 11 of the Act also, it is clear that private buildings constructed on an inam land, other than buildings which vest under Sections 7 and 8 in the holder of a minor inam or inamdar respectively, would vest in the person who owned the buildings immediately before the date of vesting. Such building could be on agricultural lands : 146 : (uncultivated land) or non-agricultural lands as the case may be. Moreover, Section 12 categorically states that any land used for agricultural purposes could be converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture and the holder of such land would be entitled to keep the land provided and such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time.
112. Section 13 speaks of saving of rights in certain cases. If any inamdar has created any right in any land which vests in the State, whether by way of lease or otherwise, including rights in any forest, mines or minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transactions shall be deemed to be valid and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on or after the date of vesting, shall be enforceable by or against the Government on such land vesting with the State Government. Of course, these are lands other than lands registered under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. : 147 : This is an inclusive provision which deals with both agricultural as well as non-agricultural lands.
113. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the provisions applicable to tenants under the Government. It is a sequiter to Section 6 of the Act under which tenants have the right to be continued under the Government on vesting of the inam lands tenanted by the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting.
114. On a conspectus reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the Act is not applicable only to inam lands which are agricultural in nature, but also applies to non-agricultural lands such as uncultivated lands, agricultural lands used for non-agricultural purposes or unconnected with the agriculture as well as to lands on which buildings have been constructed either by the inamdar or by a tenant, as the case may be.
: 148 :
115. In fact, by way of an amendment, it has been clarified by insertion of Section 31-A of the Act that the Karnataka Tenancy Act, 1952 [referred to as "the Tenancy Act, 1952"], for the time being in force shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be applicable and govern the relations of the persons who are entitled to be registered as occupants under Sections 4, 5, 7 and 8 and to agriculturists who hold lands on lease from such persons as tenants immediately before the date of vesting. The aforesaid provision does not include Section 6 of the Act. This is because Sections 4 and 5 deal with kadim tenants and permanent tenants, who are agricultural tenants, but every other tenant is covered within the scope and ambit of Section 6 of the Act, inter alia, tenants of uncultivated land or converted lands. Therefore, while considering the rights of kadim tenants or permanent tenants, the Tenancy Act, 1952 would have to be considered subject to the provisions of the Act. But, the Tenancy Act, 1952 would not be applicable to : 149 : tenants of non-agricultural lands or tenants of lands used for any purpose unconnected with agriculture. Hence, Section 31-A also clarifies the fact that the Act in its applicability is not restricted to only agricultural lands. Hence, learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the Act applies only to agricultural lands and to tenancies created on such lands only. Nature of the land in question:
116. It is not in dispute that the land in question was part of a minor inam. The inam was granted by the State Government to respondent No.1/Mutt and the same is evident from the Quit-Rent Register, a copy of which is produced as Document No.18 at page No.672 of the convenience compilation. What was granted to respondent No.1 was agricultural land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura Village, totally measuring 11,988 sq. yards (approximately). Respondent No.1/Mutt, inter alia, leased the said land to M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles under the lease deed : 150 : dated 06.02.1967. The relevant portions of the lease deed are extracted as under:
"THIS DEED OF LEASE executed in Bangalore this Sixth day of February One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty Seven Between Sri Santaveera Swamygalu, Presiding Head of Sri Koladmutt situated in Survey Number 15 of Annipura Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk now called as H.Siddaiah Road, Bangalore, hereinafter called the "LESSOR" of the One Part and Messrs. S.M.Kannappa Automobilies represented by its Partners (1) Shri S.M.Kannappa son of Late B.S.Muniswamy Maduliar, aged about 49 years, residing at 236, 6th cross, IInd Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 11, (2) Shri Magaji Dhandusa S/o Late Shri Magaji Meese Rama Lakshmanasa, aged about 54 years, Silk Merchant, residing at No.Santhuspet, Bangalore 2, (3) Magaji Narayan, brother of No.2, aged about 38 years, residing at the above address, (4) Srimathi K.Subhadramma, wife of No.1, aged about 40 years, and (5) Shri T.M.Chandrashekar, S/o. late Shri T.Marippa, aged about 25 years, agriculturist, residing at No.24, Ist Block East, Jayanagar, Bangalore 11, hereinafter called the "LESSEES" as joint Tenants on the Other Part.
: 151 :WHEREAS Shri Koladmutt situated in Survey No.15 of Annipura village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk is a Muzrai Institution for the support of which the said survey number has been endowed by Government as Devadaya Inam land, and WHEREAS the Lessor was duly appointed by the Government in their Order No.R 1706-R Mus.881-48-8 dated 3-12-1949 as the successor to the Peetha during his minority, and;
WHEREAS, the lessor after attaining was duly installed in the Gadi as the Swamiji of the said Mutt as per Government Order Number noted above and assumed the Management of the Mutt and its properties as per Memo No.Muz.DVS.222/1959-60 dated 24-10-1960 of the Special Tahsildar for Muzrai Works, Corporation Area, Bangalore;
WHEREAS the Lessor has since then been fully and openly managing the affairs of the Mutt and its properties, and WHEREAS, the said survey number being situated in the heart of the City, not fit for cultivation though the land is shown as an agricultural land, in Revenue Records, and : 152 : WHEREAS, for the reason stated above, the Lessor has leased out small bite of lands to several tenants for garage and other purposes to augment the resources of the Mutt with a view to carry out the religious services in the Mutt regularly and also for running the Sanskrit and Hindi Patasala, and, WHEREAS, the Lessor is desirous of leasing out the bit of land more fully described in the schedule hereunder to the Lessees for running an automobile Industry under the name and style mentioned above, for the better management of the Mutt and its educational institutions, and whereas the Lessees agree to take up the scheduled land on a rent of Rs.501/- (Rupees Five Hundred and one only) per month.
NOW THIS LEASE DEED WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS:-
1. The lessor hereby demises to the Lessees all that plot of land described in the schedule hereto and delineated on the plan annexed hereto and thereon coloured Red to hold the same to the Lessees from the day of 8th Feb 67 for the term of 20 years (Twenty years) paying therefore during the said term a monthly rent of : 153 : Rs.501/- (Rupees five hundred and one only) payable on or before the 10th day of each month, the first of such payment to be made on 10th March 1967.
2. The tenancy is computed from the First of each month to the First of the succeeding month and the rent is payable as herein before mentioned.
3. The Lessees as joint tenants covenant with the Lessor as follows:-
1) That the Lessees shall comply with all Municipal requirements and any other regulations concerning the demised premises and the purpose for which the same are used and will indemnify and keep harmless the Lessor from any liability for any default in this respect.
2) That during the said period of the lease, the Lessees shall keep the demised premises with the structures that will be erected thereon at a cost of not less than Rupees One Lakh in good and substantial repair and condition and peaceably and quietly deliver them to the Lessor at the expiration of the said term in good state of repair except the machineries - electrical : 154 : and other fittings that may have been installed for running the automobile industry. The annual repairs, white washing and colour washing of the building that are going to be erected shall be done by Lessees at their own cost.
3) The Lessees are fully entitled to sink a well and erect the compound all-round for the safety of the machineries and to do all other acts for better working of the Industry at their own cost and deliver possession of the same to the Lessor after the expiry of the lease period.
4) The Lessees themselves should obtain all the licences from the departments concerned at their cost.
5) That they will pay all taxes and other charges which become payable hereafter in respect of the said Industry and of any buildings erected thereon and pay the bills to the Electric Department for power consumed. It will be the liability of the Lessor to pay the fine for converting the land for non agricultural purposes and other charges relating to the said land, the benefits of which will accrue permanently to him. But the Lessees alone shall take : 155 : all necessary steps for an on behalf of the Lessor with the concerned Revenue, Muzrai, Corporation and Trust Board Authorities for this purpose.
6) The Lessees shall carry on the automobile Industry and allied business and if necessitated by circumstances any other kind of business.
7) The Lessor or his authorized agent is entitled to enter and inspect the premises at all reasonable times with prior notice in writing to the Lessees.
8) That the Lessees may underlet only the surplus portion out of the office building to be constructed on the premises hereby demised or any part of the main building without the permission in writing of the Lessor.
9) The whenever any part of the rent hereby reserved shall be in arrears for three months after due date or there shall be a breach of any of the covenants by the Lessees herein contained the Lessor has the right to enter on the demised premises and determine the lease.: 156 :
THE LESSOR COVENANTS WITH THE LESSEES AS FOLLOWS:-
1. The Lessees paying the rent regularly hereby reserved and performing and observing all the covenants by the Lessees herein contained may hold and enjoy the demised premises during the said term without any interruption by the Lessor.
2. The Lessor will at the request and cost of the Lessees at the end the term of years hereby granted shall execute to the Lessees a new lease of the demised premises by way of renewal for the term of 10(Ten) years on such covenants as are herein contained except that relating to the monthly rent which may be fixed by mutual agreement.
3. That the Lessor has no objection for the Lessees assigning the lease hold rights in the premises to the Mysore State Finance Corporation, Bangalore.
4. The Lessor has put this day put the Lessees in possession of the schedule land as per site plan appended hereto.
5. The Lessor has received the sum of Rs.5000/- only (Rupees five thousand : 157 : only) under receipt dated 15-12-1966 as deposit for due performance of the terms of the lease. This amount will not carry any interest. This amount is adjustable towards the last ten months' of the lease period.
That where the context so requires or admits, the expression "THE LESSOR" shall include the survivor of them and their and of their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF both the Lessor and Lessees have put their hands to this deed of lease in the presence of the following witnesses on the day, month and year first above written.
The copies of the lease deed shall be prepared and duly signed by the Lessor and Lessees, the original being retained by the Lessor and the Duplicate by the Lessees. Likewise, out of the duplicate sets of plans viz., site planed building plans approved by the Lessees and Lessor, one set shall be with the Lessees."
The schedule of the lease is as under:
: 158 :
SCHEDULE " All that piece and parcel of land out of Survey No.15 of Annipura village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, now in Corporation area of Bangalore, bounded on the East by: the portion of the said survey number leased to Sri. K.N.Ramaswamy, West by: the remaining portion of the land leased in favour of the Stone Polishing and Crushing Firm, North by: Sri Koladamutt Buildings and a portion of land of the said survey number and South by: Hosur Road as delineated in the plan annexed hereto measuring 11,988 Square Yards or there about. "
(underlining by us)
117. The said lease was made prior to the 01.07.1970, which was the date on which under Section 3 the land stood vested in the State Government. On a reading of Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967, it becomes clear that the lessee was permitted to erect structures on the said land which is shown as agricultural land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village, Kasaba Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk in the revenue records but not fit for agriculture. The : 159 : condition was for the lessee to put up structures at a cost of consisting not less than Rs.1,00,000/- and the land with the structures would revert to the Mutt at the end of the lease period. That M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles, by their application dated 28.02.1967, requested the Special Tahasildar for Muzarai works, for permission to put up structures. The Government, on noting that although, no permission was taken by the Mutt before entering into the long lease which amounted to temporary alienation of Muzarai land and thus had contravened Section 30 of Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927, nevertheless, the lease being in the best interest of the Mutt and on consideration of all aspects of the matter, ratified the action of the Mutt for leasing a portion of the land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore, measuring 11,988 sq.yards to M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles by a registered lease deed dated 06.02.1967 for a period of twenty (20) years in the first instance with a provision for : 160 : extension of the term for a further period of ten years, subject to the conditions stipulated therein. 'No objection' certificate dated 14.11.1967 was issued by the Tahasildar to the appellant to construct structures on Sy.No.15 of Kolada Mutt in Annipura village, on obtaining licence from the Corporation of City of Bangalore for such construction. Licence was issued by the Corporation of City of Bangalore to put up construction according to the approved sketch, as per licence bearing No.LP 3539 / 67-68, on 04.12.1967. Admittedly, the structures were put up on the land in question by the lessee.
118. When the matter stood thus, certain provisions of the Act came into force on 04.04.1970 when Notification under sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act was issued appointing 01.07.1970 as the date on which other than Sections 2, 34 and 36 (which have already come into force) came into force in respect of minor inams in unalienated villages in the State. The land stood vested in the State Government : 161 : on 01.07.1970. Subsequently, the notice was issued on 09.08.1971 to the lessee informing that all the minor inam lands had vested to the Government with effect from 01.07.1970. Therefore, the lessee (M/s. S.M.Kannappa Automobiles) was required to pay the rent directly to the Special Tahasildar for Muzrai Works, Corporation Area of Bangalore and to collect the receipt from the said office.
119. An application was made by Sri.S.M.Kannappa, of M/s.S.M.Kannappa Automobiles, through his advocate for registration of occupancy rights of the land in Sy.No.15 endowed to respondent No.1/Mutt. From the order of the Land Tribunal, it is noted that after vesting of inam land in the State Government, an application dated 04.08.1972 was made before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams for continuation of the lease and for registration of land and the buildings constructed by him under the provisions of the Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act. On 03.12.1974, the Deputy Commissioner : 162 : rejected the said application. On 15.01.1975, the Deputy Commissioner also rejected the application made on 23.12.1974 for referring the case to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
120. An endorsement was issued on 03.12.1974 as per Document No.11 of convenience compilation, informing that the request for registration of two acres nineteen guntas of land (2A-19G) in Sy. No.15 of Annipura village endowed to Kolada Mutt, Bengaluru, had not been considered by the Government as the said land was non-agricultural land and applicant was only a lease holder enjoying the land under the terms of the lease deed. The said endorsement was challenged in Writ Petition No.2373 of 1975 which was allowed by order dated 19.02.1979. The learned Single Judge of this Court held, whether, the land is a Devadaya land and whether, it had vested in the State Government on 01.07.1970 under the Act, were all matters to be examined by the Deputy Commissioner after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties : 163 : and such other persons who would have any interest in the land. In the circumstances, the impugned order/endorsement was quashed; the matter was remanded to the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bengaluru, to dispose of the application in accordance with law. (Document No.14 of convenience compilation)
121. On remand, the matter was taken up by the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru North Taluk, Bengaluru in case No.INA 60/1979-80. The case was taken up by the Land Tribunal pursuant to the amendment made to the Act by Act 26 of 1979, with effect from 01.05.1979, conferring jurisdiction on the Land Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the application made under Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act was considered on the undisputed facts that the land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village, Bangalore North Taluk--the land in question--formed part of the religious and charitable inam land endowed by the State Government to respondent No.1/Mutt. That the Mutt had also : 164 : admitted that it was a Devadaya inam, endowed by the State Government to the Mutt and it was a religious and charitable inam. That on 09.08.1971, notice was issued pursuant to the notification dated 15.12.1970 stating that the land in question vested absolutely with the State Government as per Section 3 of the Act. In the above context, the following five points as under, were raised by the Land Tribunal:
1. Whether the suit land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village forms part of the Religious and Charitable Inam land endowed by the Government in favour of the respondent mutt?
2. Whether the said land is vested in the Government after coming into force of the Act and if so what are the legal consequences?
3. Whether the petitioner is in possession of the land and if so whether he is a tenant in respect of the said land?
4. Whether he has constructed structures at his own cost on land?: 165 :
5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to be registered as an occupier of the land in question under the Mysore Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act?"
122. The Tribunal held that the land in question, being in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village, was a part of a religious and charitable inam endowed to respondent No.1/Mutt. That on the issuance of notification dated 15.12.1970, the said land had vested with the State Government and the inamdar had lost all rights, title and interest over the land except as provided under the Act. Then, the question, whether, the applicant had proved his possession was considered and if so, to what rights it was entitled to. On noting the fact that the Government of Karnataka had approved the lease deed executed by respondent No.1/Mutt in favour of the applicant by order dated 07.11.1967 and that the appellant herein had proved that he was the tenant of the land by paying a monthly rent of Rs.501/- as contemplated in the lease deed, it was held that the : 166 : applicant was in possession of the land in question. On going through the lease deed, the Tribunal noted that the appellant herein was provided with vacant land with permission to put up super-structure at its own cost and a super-structure was put up by the appellant herein and the valuation in raising the super-structure produced was Rs.30,12,602/-. The Tribunal directed a spot inspection and noticed that there were super-structures standing on the land in question. Respondent No.1/Mutt had also not denied the fact that the super-structures were constructed by the lessee at its own cost.
123. The next question considered by the Land Tribunal was, whether, the appellant herein was entitled to be registered as an occupant having regard to Sections 6, 11 and 12 of the Act. In that regard, the Tribunal noted that the respondent/Mutt for the first time had raised a plea that the land was non- agricultural land and the applicant was not entitled for registration as an occupant. But, the Tribunal held : 167 : that the Index of the lands, Record of Rights and Pahani records clearly showed the character of the land to be agricultural in nature and it was assigned Survey No.15 and even in the order of the Government dated 07.11.1967, approving the lease in favour of the lessee, it was mentioned as non- converted land and the lessee was asked to have it converted. Thus, the land was still non-converted land, as seen from the entries of village records. Further, respondent No.1/Mutt had not produced any document to show that the land had been converted. Hence, under Section 133 of the Land Revenue Act, there was a presumption that the land was agricultural land and not converted. The Tribunal further opined that even otherwise, as far as the respondent No.1/Mutt is concerned, it is immaterial whether it was converted or not, as it had not made any application under the provisions of the Act for declaration of its rights.: 168 :
124. The Land Tribunal further held that on the date of vesting of the land with the State Government, the respondent No.1/Mutt had lost all its rights, title and interest in the land and even if the land had been used for non-agricultural purpose by putting up a super-structure therein, as a lessee, the applicant was entitled to claim the land along with the buildings built thereon, as per Section 11 of the Act, since the lessee herein had owned the said building as it had constructed the same. That as per notice dated 09.08.1971 issued by the State Government, the lessee was paying rents to the Government and on the land being vested with the State Government, the inamdar/respondent No.1 herein was no longer collecting rents as the relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end. In the above premise, the Land Tribunal held that the applicant was entitled to be registered as an occupier in respect of two acres nineteen guntas (2A-19G) of land in Sy.No.15 of Annipura village (land in question) and a declaration : 169 : to own the buildings constructed by the lessee on the land, on the date of vesting as per Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. Accordingly, the application was allowed on 01.09.1984. (Document No.23 of convenience compilation).
125. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that in the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967, it was categorically stated that the land in question is an agricultural land and shown in the revenue records as such, but later coming within Bangalore City, it was not fit for cultivation. Hence, the Lease Deed also permitted the lessee to put up structures on the land in question and to keep it in good repair and condition and on the expiration of the term of lease, the structures to be put up by the lessee was to be delivered to the lessor. More significantly, the Lease Deed stated that it was the responsibility of the lessor to pay the conversion fine for converting the land for non-agricultural purposes and the benefits of the same to be accrued to the lessor, but the lessee was : 170 : to take all steps on behalf of the lessor with the concerned Revenue, Muzrai, Corporation and Trust Board Authorities for this purpose. Admittedly, the lease was for non-agricultural purpose namely, to carry out an automobile industry and allied business. The schedule to the lease deed also categorically stated that the land is situated in Sy.No.15 of Annipura Village, Bengaluru North Taluk, but within the Corporation area of Bangalore. Thus, as on the date when the land in question was leased to the lessee, it was admittedly an agricultural land. With the issuance of Notification under Section 1(4) of the Act vesting all inam lands with the State Government with effect from 01.07.1970, the land in question stood vested with the State Government. The said vesting of the land was as agricultural land.
126. Section 133 of the Land Revenue Act reads as under:
"133. Presumption regarding entries in the records.-An entry in the : 171 : Record of Rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations or in the patta book shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor."
127. The said presumption has not been rebutted by respondent No.1. Reliance placed on a typed copy of a document dated 15.09.1939 regarding conversion is of no assistance as the same pertains to some other portion of the survey number for putting up a factory building by Ananda Industries measuring 1.33 ½ acres, but not the land in question. The aforesaid typed copy of the document was not produced before the Land Tribunal. It is evident from the statement of objections filed by respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal that no material was placed before the said Authority.
128. It is also noted that before construction of building on the said land, licence was obtained from the Corporation of City of Bengaluru and 'no objection' certificate was issued by the Tahasildar and there was : 172 : also approval of the plan as per licence bearing No.LP 3539/67-68, on 04.12.1967. Admittedly, the buildings were constructed by the lessee on agricultural land. In the circumstances, it is held that the land in question is agricultural land and the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that it was not an agricultural land and it was not tenanted for carrying out agricultural activities and hence the Act did not apply as it applies only to agricultural land.
In Savithramma, which is a case cited by learned senior counsel for Respondent No.1, the question considered was whether the provisions of the Act are applicable to non-agricultural lands. It was observed that occupancy right can be claimed by a person as a tenant only if the lands are agricultural in nature and the person claiming right is personally cultivating the same. But, in the said case, admittedly the lands were not agricultural in nature and the petitioners therein were admittedly carrying on commercial activities over the same. In that view of the matter there was no : 173 : occasion on their part to claim occupancy right in respect of the lands in question.
As far as this case is concerned, it is also noted that the said judgment, which is by a learned Single Judge, does not take into consideration Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. In the said judgment, it has been held that the occupancy rights can be claimed by a person as a tenant only if the lands are agricultural in nature and the person claiming right is personally cultivating the same. In the above context, it was held that the Act does not apply to the lands which are not agricultural lands and occupancy rights in respect of the non- agricultural lands cannot be claimed. However, having regard to Sections 11 and 12 read with Sections 7(1)(iii) and 8(1)(iii) of the Act and as per our discussion made above, it is clear that the Act is applicable even to non-agricultural lands or lands which have been used for non-agricultural purposes. Moreover, in the said case, it was found that the Act was not applicable as the site in question therein was : 174 : not comprised in a Devadaya or Dharmadaya inam, as the case may be, as it had not been entered in the Quit Rent Register or any other revenue records maintained by or under the authority of the Government, as such. Therefore, the site was not part of a religious or a charitable inam within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the Act. However, the said judgment does not discuss Section 6 of the Act wherein it is stated that every tenant, other than a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant, has a right to be continued as a tenant. What rights the tenant of a inam land has, are discussed in the various provisions of the Act. The same have not been discussed by the learned Single Judge in the said case. The said decision in our view turns on its own facts and the other observations made therein by the not binding on the Division Bench. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, the said judgment cannot be considered to be a precedent in the instant case as the facts therein are totally distinct.
: 175 :
(ii) Whether respondent No.1 is a holder of the land?
129. The contention of learned senior counsel, Sri.Ravi B.Naik, was respondent No.1 was the holder of the land in question and therefore, was entitled to keep the land under Section 12 of the Act. In this regard, reliance was placed on the Land Revenue Code vis-à-vis definition of holder. The said contention was rebutted by learned senior counsel, Sri.S.Vijay Shankar, by referring to Section 202(3) of the Land Revenue Act to contend that the Land Revenue Code has been repealed by the Land Revenue Act and hence, no reliance on the Land Revenue Code can be placed.
130. Section 12 of the Act states that where any land used for agricultural purposes has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to : 176 : keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time.
131. The expression holder is not defined under the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act reads as under:
"2(1) All words and expressions defined in the Land Revenue Code shall have the same respective meanings as in that Code with the modifications, made by this Act".
Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the Land Revenue Code. Under the said Code, the expression "to hold land", "holder", "holding", "tenant", "superior holder", "inferior holder" are defined as under:
"3. In this Act, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context,--
xxx (9) "to hold land" means to be legally invested with a right to the possession and enjoyment or disposal of such land, either immediate or at the termination of tenancies legally subsisting;: 177 :
(10) "holder" or "Landholder" signifies the person in whom a right to hold land is vested, whether solely on his own account or wholly or partly in trust for another person, or for a class of persons or for the public. It includes a mortgagee vested with a right to possession;
(11) "holding" signifies land over which such right extends;
(12) "tenant" signifies a person who holds by a right derived from a superior holder called his "landlord" or from his landlord's predecessors in title, and is, or, but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent for such land to his landlord;
(13) "rent" signifies whatsoever is paid or delivered in money or kind, or whatever service is rendered, by a tenant on account of the use or occupation of land let to him;
(14) "superior holder" signifies a holder entitled to receive from other holders rent or land revenue on account of lands held by them, whether or not such holder pays land revenue to Government on account of such lands;: 178 :
(15) "inferior holder" signifies a holder liable to pay rent or land revenue to a superior holder;"
132. On a cumulative reading of the aforesaid definitions, it is apparent that, a holder is a person in whom the right to hold land is vested. Holder is of two kinds: a superior holder and an inferior holder. A superior holder is called a landlord, who is a holder entitled to receive from other holders, rent or land revenue, on account of land held by them, whether or not such holder pays land revenue to the Government on account of the such lands. An inferior holder is a holder liable to pay rent or land revenue to a superior holder. "To hold land" means to be legally invested with a right to the possession and enjoyment or disposal of such land, either immediate or at the termination of tenancies legally subsisting. A tenant is a person who holds by a right derived from a superior holder or landlord or from his landlord's predecessor- in-title, and is, or, but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent for such land to his landlord. A : 179 : holder includes a mortgagee vested with a right to possession. "Holding" signifies land over which such right extends. Thus, a superior holder or a landlord can lease the land vested in him to a tenant for a rent or land revenue to be derived from such land. Such a superior holder is a holder who is entitled to receive from other holders (inferior holder) rent or land revenue on account of the lands held by them. The expression "land", defined under Section 3(3) of the Code, includes benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the revenue or rent of villages, or other defined portions of territory. The expression, "rent" is also an inclusive definition and an expansive one.
133. The Land Revenue Act has repealed the Land Revenue Code. The said Act was passed to consolidate and amend the law relating to land, the assessment and recovery of land revenue, land revenue administration and other matters. : 180 :
134. Section 202 of the Land Revenue Act is the repeal and savings section and the same reads as under:
"202. Repeal and Savings.--(1) The enactments specified in the Schedule, and any other law corresponding to this Act are hereby repealed:
Provided that subject to the provisions of this Act, the repeal shall not effect,--
(a) the previous operation of any such enactment or law or anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under such enactment or law;
(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against such enactment or law;
(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;: 181 :
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as if such enactment or law had not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) but subject to any notification issued under Section 201, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment, or delegation made, land revenue, non-agricultural assessment, fee or cess, settled, fixed or imposed, notification, order, instrument or direction issued, rule or regulation made, certificate obtained or permission granted) under any enactment or law repealed by sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act.
(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or in any enactment or law repealed by sub-section (1) or any other law, in respect of any order made or proceedings disposed of by any officer subordinate to the Divisional Commissioner under any enactment or law, repealed by sub- : 182 :
section (1) or any rule or order made under such enactment or law, no appeal shall lie to the Divisional Commissioner, but an appeal shall lie to the tribunal as if the Tribunal were the appellate Authority under such enactment, law, rule or order, and such appeal shall be disposed of by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of such enactment, law, rule or order.
(3) Any reference in any enactment or law or in any instrument to any provision of any of the enactment or law repealed by sub- section (1) shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of this Act.
(4) Any custom, usage or order prevailing in any area of the State, at the time of the commencement of this Act, and having the force of law therein shall, if such custom, usage or order is repugnant to, or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, cease to be operative to the extent of such repugnancy or inconsistency."
135. As already noted, under the Act, all words and expressions defined in the Land Revenue Code have the same respective meanings as in that Code : 183 : with modifications made by the Act. The expression holder found in Section 12 of the Act has not been defined under the Act. Therefore, the meaning of the said word had to be found under the provisions of the Land Revenue code. But, with effect from 01.04.1964, the Land Revenue Act, has come into force. Sub- section (3) of Section 202 of the Land Revenue Act states that any reference in any enactment or law or in any instrument to any provision of any of the enactment or law repealed by sub-section (1) of Section 202 shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of Land Revenue Act. It is noted, the Land Revenue Code has been repealed by virtue of sub- section (1) of Section 202 of the Land Revenue Act as per Sl.No.9 of the Schedule to the Land Revenue Act which refers to the Land Revenue Code. Therefore, the meaning of expression 'holder' has now to be discerned with reference to the Land Revenue Act, which we shall refer to.
: 184 :
136. Section 2 of the Land Revenue Act is the definition clause, which defines holder of the land in sub-section (11) as meaning to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not. For a better understanding, it would be useful to refer to sub-sections (11) to (15) as well as sub- sections (19) to (21) and (28) as also sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Land Revenue Act, which read as under:
"Section 2 in this Act unless the context requires:
xxxx "(11) "To hold land" or to be a "land-
holder" or "holder of land" means to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not;
(12) "Holding" means a portion of land held by a holder;
(13) "Joint holders" or "Joint occupants" mean holders or occupants who hold land as co-sharers, whether as co-sharers in a family undivided according to Hindu law, or otherwise, and whose shares are not divided : 185 : by metes and bounds; and where land is held by joint holders or joint occupants, "holder" or "occupant", as the case may be, means all of the joint holders or joint occupants;
(14) "Land" includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the revenue or rent of villages or other defined areas;
(15) "Landlord" means a person who has leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant;
xxxx (19) "Occupation" means possession, and "to occupy land" means to possess or take possession of land;
(20) "Occupant" means a holder in actual possession of unalienated land other than the tenant:
Provided that where the holder in actual possession is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant;
Explanation.- A ryotwari pattadar in the Mangalore and Kollegal Area and Bellary : 186 : District, a pattedar or shikmidar in the Gulbarga Area and a holder or land-holder including Jammabane privileged and un- privileged, umbli land in the Coorg District shall be deemed to be an occupant of such land for purposes of this Act.
(21) "Occupancy" means the portion of land held by an occupant;
xxxx (28) "Superior Holder" means a land holder entitled to receive rent or land revenue from other land holders (hereinafter called 'inferior holders'), whether he is accountable or not for such land or land revenue or any part thereof, to the State Government:
Provided that where land has been granted free of rent or land revenue, subject to the right of resumption in certain specified contingencies by a Jahgirdar, inamdar, or other such holder of an alienated land, whose name is authorisedly entered as such in the land records, such Jahgirdar, inamdar or holder, shall, with reference to the grantee, be deemed to be the superior holder of the land so granted by him and the grantee, with reference to the grantor be deemed to be the inferior holder of such land;
: 187 :
xxxx (34) "Tenant" means a lessee, whether holding under an instrument or an oral agreement and includes,-
(i) a person who is or is deemed to be a tenant under any law for the time being in force;
(ii) a mortgagee of a tenant's rights with possession; or
(iii) A lessee holding directly under the State Government or a local authority or a body corporate;"
137. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid definitions, it is clear that a "holder of land" means, to be lawfully in possession of the land, whether such possession is actual or not and holding means, a portion of land held by a holder. Further, the expression land is an inclusive definition. Landlord means a person who has leased a land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant. "Occupant" means a holder in actual possession of unalienated land other than the tenant, : 188 : but where the holder in actual possession is a tenant, then the landlord or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the "occupant". On a conspectus reading of the above definitions, it becomes clear that "Landlord" means a person who has leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant. Where the actual possession of the land is with the tenant and he is lawfully in possession of the land, then the landlord or superior holder, as the case may be, is the deemed occupant and the tenant is the holder of the land. This is clear from the proviso to Section 2(20) of the Land Revenue Act. Superior holder is defined in Section 2(28) of the Land revenue Act. Thus, when the tenant is the holder of the land, his possession must be lawful. Hence, under the Land Revenue Act, even a tenant could be a holder of the land when the land is tenanted. Section 2(34) defines "tenant" to mean a lessee whether holding under an instrument : 189 : or an oral agreement and includes various categories of tenants.
138. Having regard to Section 202(3) of the Land Revenue Act, it is necessary to interpret the definition of "holder of the land" in Section 12 of the Act as per the definition in Section 2(11) read with 2(20) of the Land Revenue Act and by a conjoint reading with the other relevant definitions extracted above, as the definitions under the Land Revenue Act are quite distinct. Even otherwise, under Section 3(12) of the Land Revenue Code, a tenant is a person who holds by a right derived from a superior holder called his landlord.
139. Thus, the expression "holder" under Section 12 of the Act would refer to the inamdar or holder of a minor inam when he is in actual or constructive possession of the land, provided there is no tenancy created. But, when the inam land is tenanted, it is neither the inamdar nor the holder of : 190 : the minor inam, but the tenant in actual or constructive possession of the land who is the "holder". But, the possession must be lawful. Applying the aforesaid reasoning to the facts of the case, it is evident that there was a subsisting lease of the land in question as on the date of vesting and possession of the land was with the lessee or the tenant, which was lawful. Thus, the holder of such land would be the lessee or the tenant and not the inamdar or the holder of the minor inam, in the instant case. Therefore, Section 12 is not applicable to respondent No.1 herein. Hence, under Section 12 of the Act, no right, title or interest is derived by respondent No.1 in respect of the land in question.
140. In Munibasappa (supra), the meaning of expression "holder" used in Section 12 of the Act was considered. In the said case, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court observed that, the expression holder used in Section 12 of the Act has not been defined therein. But, by virtue of the provision under Section 2(1) of : 191 : the Act, the meaning of the expression has to be sought from the Land Revenue Code, wherein that expression has been defined. In order to understand the provision in Sub-section (10) of Section 3 of the Land Revenue Code which defines "holder", regard must be had to the definition of the expression 'to hold land' in sub-section (9) of Section 3. As the latter expression has been defined under sub-section (9), wherever such expression occurs subsequently, it should be read in accordance with that definition. As the expression 'to hold land' occurs in sub-section (10), out of legislative necessity its definition under Sub-section (9) must be adhered to. According to the Co-ordinate Bench definition of certain expressions which are to be used in a legislative enactment more than once is a convenient method of drafting an enactment as that avoids the repetition of the expression in several parts of the enactment. When once the expression has been defined, unless the subject or context otherwise requires, the meaning : 192 : attributed to it in the definition must be read as part of the Section in which the defined word is used. Therefore, it was observed, sub-sections (9) and (10) of Section 3 of the Land Revenue Code had to be read together in order to understand the meaning of the word holder used in Section 12 of the Act. It was further observed that where there was a legally subsisting tenancy, the tenant cannot be said to have a right to hold the land, and the only person who is entitled to be in possession and enjoyment at the termination of the tenancy, would be the person who would have a right to hold the land. Therefore, according to the Co-ordinate Bench on a true construction of the expression holder in Section 12 of the Act read with definitions under sub-sections (9) and (10) of Section 3 of the Land Revenue Code, a lessee of inam land used for non-agricultural purpose, was not a person who was entitled to claim the right to the land under Section 12 of the Act. : 193 : In the aforesaid judgment, it has been categorically stated that the right of a holder of the land commences only at the termination of the tenancy legally subsisting. In other words, where there is a tenancy in respect of the land, the right of the holder would be of the person who would have the right of possession and enjoyment after the termination of the tenancy. Thus, where the land is a subject matter of tenancy, the person who is entitled to be in possession and enjoyment on the termination of the tenancy would be a person who would have the right to hold the land. That would be the land lord or lessor. The aforesaid observations of the Division Bench would not assist respondent No.1 as, in the instant case, when the land in question stood vested with the State Government, there was a subsisting lease and there was no termination of the same. Moreover, the said judgment has not taken into consideration sub-section (3) of Section 202 of the Land Revenue Act, by which the Land Revenue Code : 194 : has been repealed under the Land Revenue Act. Hence, the interpretation of holder in the said case cannot be a binding precedent. As a result, the definitions and meanings under the Land Revenue Act must be applied to Section 12 of the Act and the same must be discerned having regard to Section 2(11), (20) and 34 of the Land Revenue Act. If such an interpretation is made, point No.1 cannot be construed to be a holder of the land in question; rather it is the lessee/tenant who would be so, as on the date of vesting of the land in the State Government i.e., 01.07.1970.
(iii) Distinction between the Act and Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961:
141. Learned Single Judge, in his judgment has observed that the object and purpose of the Act is to achieve agrarian reforms inter alia, by abolishing religious and charitable inams in the State, except Ballari District. Further, the land in question, not being agricultural land and the lessee, not being an : 195 : agricultural lessee or tenant, had no right to seek registration of occupancy under the provisions of the Act. While the object of the Act is to abolish all religious and charitable inams, it would be useful to understand the meaning of the terms 'inams' or 'alienation of land', which mean transfer or assignment in favour of an individual or individuals or to a religious or charitable institution, the right of Government towards land revenue. The expression alienated is found in sub-section (19) of Section 3 of the Land Revenue Code, to mean transfer insofar as rights of the State Government to payment of rent or revenue are concerned, wholly or partially, to the ownership of any person. Under sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Land Revenue Act, the definition of the expression, alienated, is identical to the definition under the Land Revenue Code.
142. That, in the 19th century, during the reign of Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar III, in erstwhile Mysore State, large alienations were made and many : 196 : villagers were granted inams as permanent tenure. There were various classes of inams such as, personal inams; religious (Devadaya) and charitable (Dharmadaya) inams; Kodagi inams; service inams and miscellaneous inams. Devadaya inams were grants made to religious institutions such as respondent No.1 herein and for the maintenance of persons therein rendering services, as in the instant case. With the enforcement of the Act, there was abolition of all religious and charitable inams in Karnataka State, except Ballari District and the inam lands stood vested in the State Government with certain consequences as enumerated in Section 3 of the Act. Thus, the object of the Act was to do away with the system of grant of inams and the administration of inam lands by individuals or institutions including the right of Government to levy land revenue.
143. On the other hand, the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, is a uniform law relating to land reforms : 197 : in the State of Karnataka, relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings and for certain other matters. The Act, which came into force with effect from 02.10.1965 aims to achieve the following important objects:
" (i) Abolition of absentee landlordism and conferment of ownership on the actual tillers of the soil.
(ii) Fixation of maximum ceiling on the right to own agricultural lands and taking over the excess by the State Government.
(iii) Distribution of the excess lands vested in the State Govt. to people belonging to weaker sections of the society such as persons belonging to schedule caste and tribes, and landless agricultural labourers etc. [Purandhar Lagama Ingale and Others vs. Land Tribunal, Raibag and Others, (1978) 2 KLJ 339]"
144. Section 141 of the Land Reforms Act reads as under:
"141. Tenure Abolition Acts.- Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any of the : 198 : Land Tenures Abolition Acts, specified in Schedule II to this Act, in so far as such provisions relate to the conferment of the right of an occupant or grant of a ryotwari patta in favour of any inferior holder or tenant in respect of any land held by him".
Section 141 of the Land Reforms Act states that nothing in the said Act shall affect the provisions of any of the Land Tenure Abolition Acts, specified in Schedule II of the Act, insofar as such provisions relate to the conferment of the right of an occupant or grant of a ryotwari patta in favour of any inferior holder or tenant in respect of any land held by him. Schedule II contains the list of Land Tenure Abolition Acts and the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 [Mysore Act No.18 of 1895] that is, the Act under consideration, finds a place at Sl.No.8. Therefore, conferment of right of occupancy under the Act under consideration is de hors the Land Reforms Act. This is because, under the Act, occupancy could be conferred not merely on the tenants but also when there is no tenancy, as per : 199 : Section 7 or 8 of the Act read with proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 28 of the Act on inamdars or holders of minor inams, as the case may. But, under the Land Reforms Act, occupancy rights are conferred only on tenants or tillers of the land, who are personally cultivating the land. Thus, the object of the two enactments is distinct. This vital aspect has been ignored by the learned Single Judge.
In fact, our attention was drawn to Entry 18 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution by both sides, which reads as under:
"18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of the landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization."
A reading of Section 141 read with Schedule II of the Land Reforms Act, would make it amply clear that the Act under consideration is a legislation for abolition of land tenures; it is not a land reform legislation.
: 200 :
145. The following decisions on this aspect of the case could be cited as under:
(a) As to the distinction between the Act and Karnataka Land Reforms Act, in Muniyallappa (supra), it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the purpose and scope of the two Acts are distinct.
The Act was enacted for the purpose of abolition of inam tenures and conversion of such tenures into ryotwari tenures and in that process, grant of occupancy rights to the inamdars and the classes of tenants specified in that Act. The purpose of the Land Reforms Act, however, is quite different. The main purpose was to abolish the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the tenanted lands and to confer occupancy rights on tenants who are personally cultivating the lands. Therefore, the rejection of the claim of the appellant in the aforesaid case under the Act did not lead to the inference that he had no claim for occupancy right under the Land Reforms Act. The appellant therein claimed that he was a deemed : 201 : tenant as provided under Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the requirement of deemed tenant, as provided under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act i.e., Land Reforms Act, had to be determined by the Land Tribunal.
(b) In Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple (supra), distinction has been made between the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 and the Act under consideration i.e., Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955, and hence the distinction from Muniyallappa was observed in the following words:
"15. x x x
(i) x x x
(ii) x x x
(iii) Between the provisions of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 which was considered in Muniyallappa's case and the provisions of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, under which the petitioner secured occupancy rights, there is one material difference. In respect of lands vested in the : 202 : State under this Act, Section 4 of the Act provides for conferment of occupancy rights on the Kadim tenants and Section 5 confers similar rights on permanent tenants and Section 6 of the Act provides that all other tenants to continue as tenants of the Government, as distinct from Section 9A of the Personal and Miscellaneous Act under which the other tenants were to continue to be the tenants of inamdar. Further, Section 8 of the Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act provided for conferment of occupancy rights in respect of lands not falling under Section 4, Section 5 and Section 6. In other words, under this Act inamdar could get occupancy rights only in respect of lands not under cultivation of any tenants including deemed tenants as defined under Section 4 of the Mysore Tenancy Act. Thus, it is not only on a finding that there were no Kadim tenants or permanent tenants, who could get occupancy rights in respect of an erstwhile Inam land but also on a finding that there were no tenants of any kind to continue as tenants of the Government under Section 6, occupancy rights could be granted to the inamdar under Section 8 of the Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act. Therefore, once an occupancy right is granted under Section 8 of this Act on : 203 : the inamdar, in a proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, no question of any existence of any tenant before the date of vesting under that Act arises, whereas in the case of occupancy right granted to an inamdar under the Personal and Miscellaneous Abolition, a question might arise as to whether a person claiming occupancy right under the Land Reforms Act was a tenant under Section 9A of the Act".
(underlining by us)
(c) Reliance was placed on Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. (supra), to contend that Section 1(4) of the Act is a piece of conditional legislation. Such Legislation is termed conditional, because the legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards 'place, person, laws, powers', leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on and the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide.
(d) As to the consequences of vesting of land under Section 3(1) of the Act, reliance was placed on : 204 : A.R Venkatachalaiyengar (supra), which is a judgment arising under the provisions of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, but applicable by way of anology to the instant case also wherein, it was observed, the cumulative effect of all the provisions is that the Act expressly extinguishes all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar. Those rights, title and interest are vested absolutely in the State. The abolition of Inams is by Legislative decree and its consequences must, therefore, be sought only in the statute itself and not de hors the statute. When Section 3(1)(c) of the Act states that the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the inam other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act, it is not open to the inamdar to rely upon the principles of common law or any other law to save his right to collect rents from the tenants.
(e) With regard to interpretation to be placed on the expression "every tenant of the inamdar" in : 205 : Section 6 of the Act, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Marwanjee F. Desai and others, [(2002) 2 SCC 318], to contend that the Legislature had deliberately used the word 'every' in the context of and for the purpose of continuation of such a tenant under the Government in respect of land of which he was a tenant of the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that a restrictive meaning cannot be given to the word tenant under the Act and a broad interpretation must be given to include every nature of tenancy other than a kadim tenant, permanent tenant or protected tenant.
(f) With regard to Section 11 of the Act in the matter of vesting of buildings in the owner of such buildings by operation of law, reliance was placed on Rajamma vs. Hanumakka (supra), which is a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court. The : 206 : said matter also arose within the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. But, Section 12 of the said Act, with reference to vesting of private buildings in the holder of a minor inam is in pari materia with Section 11 of the Act under consideration. While dealing with the said Act, it was also observed that under Section 7 thereof, every holder of a minor inam to which the said Act was applicable shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands which immediately before the date of vesting were included in his holding other than (i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works; (ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Section 4 or 5; and (iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam. This provision confers right on the inamdar to be registered as an occupant. However, no : 207 : registration was required in respect of holding of the lands mentioned in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 7(1) of the said Act which also included erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam.
In the said judgment, it was further observed, insofar as building situated within the limits of minor inam (to which the said Act is applicable) and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam, shall with effect on and from such date, vest in the holder of the minor inam. In view of the exclusion of the building for registration, Section 10 of the said Act would not be applicable in respect of building owned by private persons prior to the coming into force of the Act. That means, in respect of private buildings owned by the persons immediately before the Act came into force, it will vest with such persons. It was further observed in the said judgment that a reading of Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the said Act (considered in that case) : 208 : abundantly makes it clear that a building erected before coming into force of the Act would vest in a person who owned it or vest in the holder of the minor inam or inamdar, as the case may be.
Thus, the question, whether, the private buildings are vested or not does not arise as it vests by operation of Law on the owner of such buildings. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only in respect of the dispute relating, to any building other than the building referred under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act under consideration in the instant case situated within the limits of inam, and only such question as required under Section 12 of the Act, has to be decided and not any other question.
(g) With regard to scope of Entry-18 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, reliance was placed on Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar (supra), wherein it has been observed that the expression land in Entry 18 is not restricted to agricultural land alone but includes : 209 : non-agricultural land etc. The words 'rights in' or 'over land' confer very wide power, which are not limited by rights between the land holders inter se or the land holder or the State or the landholder or the tenant. It is seen that restriction or extinction of existing interest in the land includes provision for abolition and extinguishment of the rights in or over the land. Resumption of the estate is one of the objectives of the Government. In the said case, reference is also made to Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of U.P., [AIR 1962 SC 1563], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the word "land" is wide enough to include all lands, whether, agricultural or non-agricultural land.
146. The following judgments were relied upon by learned senior counsel, Sri Ravi B.Naik, appearing for respondent No.1:
(a) In Peddinti Desika Iyengar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering Andhra Pradesh : 210 : (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (Inams Abolition Act) and Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (1987 Act) and the question considered was, whether, the legislature, by a side wind, without suitably amending the Inams Abolition Act, as interpreted by the High Court, or repealing it, could directly nullify the said law laid down by the Court and divest, under Section 76 of the 1987 Act, the vested right and declare that the land was not covered by the said ryotwari patta or shall not be transferred or shall be deemed never to have been transferred thereunder and would treat such persons as encroachers. In the said case, it was observed that the competency of the legislature to make this law, its deep impact on vested rights and its sweep would be properly gazed and appreciated when the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act, which is a part of agrarian reform, forming part of the scheme to abolish an estate and conferment of ryotwari patta on the tiller of : 211 : the soil and the institution respectively and creation of direct relationship of him with the State paying revenue assessment thereof, was looked into. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
The preamble of the said Inams Abolition Act envisaged "an Act to abolish and convert certain inam lands into ryotwari lands". The title of the Act itself indicated abolition of the inam lands and conversion thereof into ryotwari lands. The said Inams Abolition Act had come into force on December 14, 1956 and it had been amended from time to time. After a detailed discussion it was held that without amending the law under Inams Abolition Act and without properly removing the foundation of the judgments rendered by the High Court, the legislature sought to destroy the effect of the law in Inams Abolition Act on an erroneous belief or assumption that it did not bind the religious or charitable institutions or endowment or that the holder of land did not acquire title or no patta : 212 : was granted to him and the land was still with the institution and treated the occupant as encroacher. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the legislation founded on such an erroneous assumption did not have the effect of depriving the holder of the land of their vested rights acquired under the Inams Abolition Act and the legislature had plainly misfired. In Peddinti Desika Iyengar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (Act of 1987) as well as Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (Inams Abolition Act). In the said case, it was observed that under the aforesaid Inams Abolitition Act, there was a vested right created over the erstwhile inam lands which ceased to exist on the grant of ryotwari patta. Being a ryoti land held by a tenant, he would hold the land with absolute right to the extent of 1/3rd land as an independent and absolute owner, under the said Act. : 213 : The pre-existing relationship, in relation to the land stood terminated and direct relationship with the Government was created by imposition of ryotwari assessment. When such was the legal position, the Andhra Pradesh Legisltaure, without suitably amending the Inams Abolition Act referred to above, as interpreted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, or repealing it, sought to nullify the said law and divest, under Section 76 of the 1987 Act, the vested right and declared that the land was not covered by the said ryotwari patta nor was it transferred or deemed never to have been transferred thereunder and to treat such persons as encroachers. Thus, without amending the law under Inams Abolition Act in the said State and without properly removing the foundation of the judgments rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Andhra Pradesh legislature sought to destroy the effect of the law in Inams Abolition Act on an erroneous belief or assumption that it did not bind the religious or charitable institutions or endowments : 214 : or that the holders of such land did not acquire title nor any patta was granted to them and the land was still with the institution and treated the occupants as encroachers. This was criticized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the aforesaid case that the legislation founded on such an erroneous assumption would not have the effect of depriving the holder of the lands of their vested rights acquired under the Inams Abolition Act. Hence, according to the Apex Court the legislature had misfired. It was, therefore, held that Section 76 and Explanation II to Section 2(22) of the said Act were invalid and unconstitutional.
The context in which the observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are not applicable to the present case. This is because, under Section 141 of the Land Reforms Act clearly states that hand tenure legislations such as the Act under consideration would not be affected by the : 215 : Land Reforms Act. The aforesaid judgment is of no assistance to Respondent No.1.
(b) Shri Dharmarayaswamy Temple, has also been referred to by learned senior counsel for Respondent No.1 which has already been discussed above.
(c) The vires of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amended Act) 1956, was challenged in Sri Ram Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay, [AIR 1959 SC 459]. Under the said Act, the expression land-holder was defined to mean a zamindar, jagirdar, saranjandar, inamdar, talukdar, malik or khot or any person not specified above, who is a holder of land or who is interested in land, and whom the State Government had declared on account of the extent and the value of the land or his interests therein to be a land-holder for the purpose of the said Act.
It was contended by learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 that the aforesaid definition does not : 216 : include a tenant. We do not think that the said judgment would be of any assistance to respondent No.1 as what was considered in the said case was the vires of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956. But, the instant case deals with Abolition of Religious and Charitable Inams. As already noted the object and purpose of the two enactments are totally distinct. The Act under consideration is not a tenancy legislation but it is an act to abolish certain kind of land tenures namely Religious and Charitable Inams and vesting or saving of rights in certain persons including tenants of inam lands. This is also clear on a reading of Section 141 of the Land Reforms Act.
(d) Learned senior counsel for Respondent No.1 also submitted that in the case of Sri.B.V.Ramachandrappa's case in LRRP No.3513 of 1990, separately disposed of by the very same learned Single Judge on 14.12.2012, the matter has attained finality as R.P.No.32 of 2013 was dismissed : 217 : by learned Single Judge on 05.02.2013 and on 04.12.2018, the Special Leave Petition were also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was contended that, in the said case, reference was made to the impugned judgment and on the basis of the impugned order, LRRP was dismissed and hence, indirectly the impugned order has also been sustained as the said judgment dealt with another parcel of land in the very same inam land under consideration. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Sri.B.V.Ramachandrappa in LRRP No.3513 of 1990 disposed of on 14.12.2012 separately cannot also be treated as a binding precedent to the instant case, even though the said judgment has been sustained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by order dated 04.12.2018. This is for the simple reason that the dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions per se, is not a judicial precedent and cannot be considered to be a precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of : 218 : India except between the parties thereto. That apart, learned Single Judge in the said case has passed the said order on the basis of the impugned order and on the basis of the judgment in Munibasappa's case referred to above. Since, the impugned order is in challenge in these appeals and the judgment in Munibasappa's case has been distinguished, the order passed in the case of Sri.B.V.Ramachandrappa although sustained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions cannot be construed as a binding precedent for these appeals.
(iv) Whether order of learned single Judge is justified and correct?
147. We have perused the order of the Land Tribunal on various aspects and answered the contention raised by learned counsel for the respective parties.
Being aggrieved by the said order, respondent No.1/Mutt filed Writ Petition No.25308 of 1993. The : 219 : learned Single Judge considered the question, whether, the appellant herein could be construed as the owner of the buildings which were constructed on the land in question for the purpose of Section 11 of the Act. On considering Sections 7, 8 and 11 of the Act, learned Single Judge, inter alia, held that if the buildings situated on inam land are owned by a person, other than the holder of a minor inam or an inamdar, then they would vest in such person who owned the said building immediately before the date of vesting. That an inamdar has no right or interest in the inam land which has vested in the State on the enforcement of the provisions of the Act except the rights saved by the Act. Further, the Government cannot dispossess any person of any land if he is entitled for being registered as an occupant or being continued as a tenant. Also the relationship of landlord and tenant between the inamdar and tenant stands extinguished.
: 220 :
148. We now discuss as to why the order of learned Single Judge is not correct. While considering Section 6 of the Act, learned Single Judge has reasoned in paragraphs 23 to 33, which we have closely perused and we find that the learned Single Judge has committed certain errors in his conclusions, for the following reasons:
(i) In paragraph 23, while discussing Section 6 of the Act, the learned Single Judge was under the impression that a kadim tenant, permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenants would be entitled to be registered as occupants as provided under Section 4, 5, 5-A and 6 of the Act. That in the instant case, the appellant-tenant does not fall within the definition of kadim tenant, permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenants to claim registration of occupancy rights of the land. According : 221 : to the learned Single Judge ".....Admittedly, the land in question was not an agricultural land and it was not tenanted for carrying out any agricultural activities. .............." We find that Section 6 of the Act deals with the rights of a tenant other than kadim tenant or a permanent tenant, who was also entitled to be continued as a tenant under the Government in respect of the land of which he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. In fact, Section 6 of the Act does not deal with registration of occupancy rights at all;
(ii) On the nature of the land, there is also an error, inasmuch as, the Tribunal, on considering the revenue records had come to the conclusion that the land in question was agricultural land, but was : 222 : leased for non-agricultural activity. The same is also admitted in the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967, the relevant portions of which are extracted above. But the learned Single Judge has held that the land in questions is non-agricultural land, which is contrary to records.
(iii) The learned Single Judge has said that the tenancy is not in respect of any agricultural land and was entirely for non-agricultural purpose. Also "...even if any shed or building has been constructed on the said land by the tenant, it cannot be said that the tenant who had put up such shed was the owner of the shed. No ownership right is conferred on the tenant in respect of either the land or the shed put up thereon." This again is erroneous for the reasons that the land in question is : 223 : agricultural land but uncultivated land and that the lease for non-agricultural purposes, namely for running an automobile garage, the building was put up on the said land by the lessee pursuant to the Clauses in the lease deed dated 06.02.1967 and on obtaining permission from the State Government and the Bangalore City Corporation.
Under Section 11 of the Act, every private building, other than the building which vest under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, situated within the limits of inam shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date. Every dispute relating thereto shall be decided by the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. In the instant case, there is no dispute with regard to : 224 : the fact that the building on the inam land was constructed by the appellant herein and it vested in the lessee as the lessee owned it immediately before the date of vesting namely 01.07.1970;
(iv) Further, learned Single Judge has stated that as per Section 7(2) and 8(2) of the Act, vesting of the building on the inam land shall be on the owner/inamdar.
This is, no doubt, true but it is only in respect of building other than the land upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam [Section 7(1)(iii)]. Even under Section 7(2) of the Act, if the building was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of a minor inam, then such building with effect on and from such : 225 : date, vested in the holder of the minor inam;
(v) The learned Single Judge was also not right in holding that ".....the tenant who has put up sheds in the land cannot be regarded as owner of such buildings for the purpose of provisions of the Act to contend that the said buildings constructed by him will vest in him.
Such intention of the legislature is not discernible from any of the provisions contained in the Act to vest the building in the tenant of the non-agricultural land." Under Section 7(1), every holder of a minor inam is entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than the lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar and further, under Section 7(2), any building : 226 : situated within the limits of the inam which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam, with effect on and from such date, vested in the inamdar.
Therefore, in the instant case, respondent No.1/Mutt, being the holder of the minor inam was not entitled for registration of the building as per Section 7(1) of the Act, as the building was not owned by it but by the lessee.
Thus, on a cumulative reading of Section 11 along with Section 7 of the Act, in the instant case, it becomes clear that the private building would vest in the person who owned it immediately before the date of vesting and the holder of the minor inam will be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands upon which have been erected buildings : 227 : other than those owned by any other person. If any building situated on the land was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam then, only the said building would vest in such a person;
(vi) The learned Single Judge was not right in holding that "no material is produced in the form of sanctioned plan or building licence issued by the local authorities permitting the construction of any permanent structure in the form of buildings (on the land in question). In fact, for such land, the provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable. The Tribunal has ignored all these vital facts". The above inference is incorrect inasmuch as the order of the Tribunal records the fact that the building was constructed after seeking permission : 228 : from the State Government and also on getting approval from the Banglore City Corporation vis-à-vis plan sanction and construction licence. Even if the property is within the jurisdiction of the Bangalore City Corporation now Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike (BBMP), that cannot be a ground or reason to hold that the Act is not applicable. Also the fact regards construction of the building by the lessee is admitted by respondent No.1.
(vii) The learned Single Judge was also not right in observing that the vesting of private building constructed by any person on inam land in the said person, is necessarily in respect of the building constructed by such owner in his land which was part of the inam land. In fact, Section 7(1)(iii) of the Act : 229 : recognizes erection of buildings by persons other than the holder of the minor inam, in which case, the land upon which such buildings have been erected cannot be registered in such a person as an occupant.
While giving the above findings, the learned Single Judge has travelled beyond the scope of the writ petition and the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the writ petition was allowed. But, no relief was granted to respondent No.1 as such.
(v) Whether the tenant/lessee of the land in question is entitled for registration of occupancy rights?
149. Section 6 of the Act uses the expression, "every tenant of the inamdar". As already noted, the expression 'inamdar' is a generic term and 'holder of a minor inam' is a species. The implication of Section 6 is that 'every tenant of the inamdar', (which expression would also include 'holder of a minor inam',) other than a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant', with effect from the date of vesting, as entitled to be : 230 : continued as a tenant under the Government, in respect of land, of which, he was a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting.
150. As already noted, Section 3 of the Act speaks about the consequences of vesting of an inam in the State Government. In the context of tenanted lands, Section 3(1) of the Act states the relationship of landlord and tenant, as between the inamdar and kadim tenant or a permanent tenant or any other tenant is extinguished. Further, the relationship between a superior holder and inferior holder with the inamdar or the holder of a minor inam is extinguished. So, all tenants of inam lands, other than kadim tenants and permanent tenants and persons holding under them and holders of minor inams, as against the Government, are entitled only to such rights and privileges and be subject to such conditions as provided for by or under the Act. Moreover, any other right and privilege which may have accrued to a tenant in the inam before the date of vesting against : 231 : the inamdar shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such inamdar.
151. A reading of the aforesaid provisions cumulatively would indicate that the Act does not deal only with kadim tenants permanent tenants or protected tenants, but all other tenants are also comprehensively covered under the Act. It is in respect of every other tenant i.e., other than a kadim tenant or a permanent tenant or protected tenant that Section 6 permits continuation of tenancy under the Government in respect of the lands of which they were tenants under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting (Section 6). The object and purpose of continuing all other tenants of inam lands is in order to confer certain rights and benefits under the Act. Hence, possession of inam land in the hands of the tenants is continued even though the said land would vest in the State Government. This is clear from Section 3(1)(g) of the Act. The said provision further : 232 : states that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in respect of which he is considered prima facie entitled to be registered as an occupant or to be continued as a tenant.
152. Further, Section 6 of the Act itself indicates that the continuation of all other tenants as tenants under the Government in respect of the land of which he was a tenant is subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act. Chapter IV of the Act applies to tenants under the Government who are continued as per Section 6 of the Act. Such tenants are not restricted only to agricultural tenants. While it is the contention of respondent No.1 that Chapter IV applies to only agricultural tenants, a reading of Section 6 does not indicate such a restricted interpretation. It would indicate that an agricultural tenant who may be other than a kadim tenant or permanent tenant or protected tenant, is also covered under Section 6 of the Act. But, the expression 'every tenant of the inamdar' would imply that a tenant, who is other than an : 233 : agricultural tenant is also covered under the said provision.
153. The above interpretation would become clear on a reading of the following provisions:
(a) Section 12 of the Act provides for right to agricultural land used for non-agricultural purposes.
In the event any agricultural land has been converted for non-agricultural purpose, then the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at that time. Section 12 would clearly indicate that where a tenancy is created for a non-agricultural purpose, subsequent to conversion of agricultural land to any purpose unconnected with the agriculture, then the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land. Therefore, the holder of such land could be a tenant who is not an agricultural tenant and where the tenancy had not been terminated. If the tenancy had been terminated, then the holder would be the : 234 : landlord or the lessor. Therefore, so long as the tenancy was continued on the date of vesting, then the tenant of a converted land would obviously not be an agricultural tenant and the holder of such a land i.e., the tenant would be entitled to keep the land;
(b) Section 11 speaks of vesting of private building constituted in an inam. That provision categorically states that every private building, other than the building which would vest under Sections 7 and 8 in a holder of a minor inam or an inamdar, as the case may be, within the limits of an inam, with effect on and from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date. If there is any dispute in that regard, the Tribunal's decision would be final. A reading of this provision would indicate that an inam land could be let out to a person permitting the tenant to put up a building on the said land. The said building put up need not be only for agricultural use and the tenant need not be an agricultural tenant. The building could be for the : 235 : purpose of utilizing the land for non-agricultural purpose, as in the instant case. In such a circumstance, Section 11 provides that such a building would vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date, provided it is a building other than the building which would vest under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act.
(c) A reading of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act would also clearly indicate that every building situated within the limits of a minor inam or an inam, as the case may be, and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be, shall with effect on and from the date of vesting, vest in the holder of a minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be. This is as per sub-section (2) of Section 7 and sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act respectively. These provisions may be juxtaposed with Sections 7(1)(iii) and 8(1)(iii) of the Act. The said provisions would clearly indicate that the holder : 236 : of the minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be, shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands which immediately before the date of vesting were included in the holding, or having rights, as an inamdar, as the case may be, "other than", inter alia, the lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the inam or inamdar, as the case may be. This would mean that if the buildings have been put up by persons, other than the holder of a minor inam or the inamdar on inam land, then the land upon which the buildings have been erected as well as the buildings cannot be registered in the name of the holder of the minor inam or the inamdar, as the case may be. That is why under Section 11 of the Act while dealing with vesting of private building, the expression 'other than the buildings which vest under Sections 7 and 8' is used.
(d) Thus when Section 7(1)(iii) or Section 8(1)(iii), as the case may be, is read conjointly with : 237 : Section 11 of the Act, it becomes clear that the private building constructed on the inam land would vest in the person who owned it immediately before the date of vesting. Further, under Section 7(1)(iii) or Section 8(1)(iii), as the case may be, the land upon which has been erected a building owned by any person, other than the holder of a minor inam or the inamdar, has to be registered in the name of the owner of the building as an occupant and not in the name of a holder of a minor inam or in an inamdar. That means, the said land upon which the private building is constructed would together vest in the person who owned the private building immediately before the date of vesting. Thus, what follows is that a holder of a minor inam or an inamdar, cannot be registered as an occupant of the land on which a private building has been constructed and the same would vest in the person who owned the building immediately before the date of vesting. The said provisions would have to be read conjointly, for the : 238 : reason that the purpose of the Act is to enable the owner of the private building in whom the building would vest to also be vested with the land upon which the said building has been constructed. Such a person would also include a tenant and such a tenant need not be an agricultural tenant.
(e) Hence, Section 6 of the Act must be given an expansive and a broad interpretation to include both agricultural tenants as well as tenants who have been let out lands for a purpose unconnected with agriculture or a non-agricultural purpose. Thus, the object and purpose of Section 6 of the Act is to continue every tenant of the inamdar, other than a kadim tenant or the permanent tenant, as tenant under the Government in respect of the land, of which he is a tenant under the inamdar immediately before the date of vesting. This is in order to enable the adjudication of rights of such a tenant under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, as the case may be.
: 239 :
(f) Hence, the continuation of tenancy subsequent to the inam land vesting in the State Government under Section 6 of the Act is analogous to attornment of tenancy from the inamdar to the State Government. The purpose of continuation of tenancy is to enable the tenant who is the owner of private buildings to seek rights over the private buildings as well as the land on which private building are situated. Therefore, an expansive interpretation must be given to the expression 'every tenant' in Section 6 of the Act to include both an agricultural tenant as well as a non-agricultural tenant. Also, the expressions 'building owned by any person other than the holder of a minor inam' or inamdar' in Sections 7(1)(iii) and 8(1)(iii) of the Act respectively aid in giving such a contextual interpretation.
154. We have perused the valuation report produced as Document No.6 in convenience compilation, which has been submitted on behalf of : 240 : the appellant. It is noted that on the land in question, inter alia, the following structures have been built:
(1) petrol bunk with all structures; (2) office block;
(3) smithy section;
(4) machine shop;
(5) stores;
(6) power section;
(7) painting and miscellaneous shop section;
(8) lavatory block;
(9) service bay;
(10) pump house;
(11) coach shop;
(12) open bath service bay;
(13) carpentry shop;
(14) compressor room;
(15) watch room;
(16) workmen changing (dressing clothe) room;
(17) cycle shed etc.
155. The spot inspection was conducted by the Members of the Land Tribunal in the presence of the parties and an inspection report was prepared. The : 241 : same is produced as document No.20 in the convenience compilation.
156. We have perused the same. In the said report, it is stated that there is a petrol bunk on the land in question and in the remaining area, there are shops which have been constructed by Sri Kannappa, which are used for bodybuilding of motor vehicles.
157. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that buildings were put up on the land in question by the lessee under the Lease Deed dated 06.02.1967 and subsequently, the land stood vested in the State Government with effect from 01.07.1970. Therefore, the lessee had the right to seek continuation of the lease and hence, the application was made under Section 6 as well as Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. The same was considered by the Land Tribunal and the lessee was ordered to be registered as an occupant as the building and the land upon which the buildings stood were admittedly put up by the lessee. : 242 :
(vi) Whether the order of the Land Tribunal is justified and correct:
158. In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion, we are of the view that the order of the Land Tribunal is justified and correct on account of the following conclusions:
Conclusions:
In view of the above discussion, we hold that:
(i) The Act is not restricted in its application to only agricultural land and such other land. It applies to non-agricultural land, uncultivated land, mines, quarries, waste land and other such lands.
Further, the land in question was agricultural land on the date of vesting i.e., 01.07.1970.: 243 :
(ii) That respondent No.1/Mutt was not the holder of the land in question on the date of vesting i.e., 01.07.1970.
(iii) That the object and purpose of the Act and Land Reforms Act are distinct.
This is clear from a reading of Section 141 of the Land Reforms Act.
(iv) That the order of the learned single Judge is not justified and not correct.
(v) That the order of the Land Tribunal
dated 01.09.1984 is justified and
correct.
(vi) That the lessee of the land in question
is entitled to registration of occupancy rights.
(vii) That all rights, title and interest of respondent No.1/Mutt in respect of the land in question have been : 244 : extinguished in view of Section 9(2)(b) of the Act. Therefore, respondent No.1/Mutt had no right to claim any benefit under the provisions of the Act.
(viii) However, since respondent No.1/Mutt who was entitled to raise legal and factual contentions on the application made by the applicant, to that limited extent being aggrieved by the order of the Land Tribunal, respondent No.1/Mutt had the right to file writ petition. However, we find that the writ petition was filed in the year 1993 assailing the order of the Land Tribunal dated 01.09.1984, possibly after the abolition of the Appellate Authority.
(ix) We clarify that we have not dealt with
the disputes inter se between the
appellants in these appeals and
: 245 :
hence, all contentions on that aspect of the matter raised in these appeals are left open.
In the result, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside in both the appeals.
The writ appeals are allowed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE *mvs/s*/RK/-
CT-RM.